XHE INXIMAXE PAPERS O] COLONEL HOUSE VOLUME I COLONEL HOUSE ARRANGED AS A NARRATIVE BY CHARLES SEYMOUR PROFESSOR OF HISTORY AT YALE UNIVERSITY VOLUME I BEHIND THE POLITICAL CURTAIN 1912-1915 House longed to get good accomplished and was content that others should have the credit/^ VISCOUNT GREY OF FALLODON ERNEST BENN LIMITED 8 BOUFERIE STREET LONDON E.C. First p^tblished McircH 5 ^^, Reprinted , « March, I*rtrt4ted 4snS Bdmd& in. Grea-t Mr%ia,in hy 'Wa.tson ^ Winey, Z^ndiyn atnd. A,y%&shM.Ty» xo SIDNEY EDWARD MEZES PREFATORY NOTE By Colonel House T his book written around my papers is in no sense a conventional apologia such as, despite my best intentions, I should probably have written had I attempted to describe the stirring and controversial events in which it was my fortime to play a part. The reader must bear in mind that it treats only of such matters as came within the orbit of my own activities. The President and his Cabinet dealt with many questions which could not enter into this narrative. My chief desire has been to let the papers tell their own story, and for this reason I have preferred to leave their arrangement in the hands of an historian. Dr. Seymour in arranging these papers has felt it his duty to assume a highly critical attitude towards some of the chief actors. Especially he has attempted to present the great central figure of the period, Woodrow Wilson, in a purely objective light. As for myself, I frankly admit that I was and am a partisan of Woodrow Wilson, and of the measures he so ably and eloquently advocated. That we differed now and then as to the methods by which these measures might be realized, this book reveals as one follows the thread of the story, and never more sharply than in the question of military and naval preparedness. The President, I believed, represented the opinion prevailing in the coimtry at large, apart from the Atlantic seaboard; and I was not certain, had he vil v/x CL idig^c diiiiy'^ i^on^rcss would have sustained him. But I was sure, given a large and efficient army and navy, the United States would have become the arbiter of peace and probably without the loss of a single life. When the President became convinced that it was necessary to have a large navy, Congress readily yielded to his wishes. But, even so, it is not certain that had he asked for such an army as I advocated he would have been successful. The two arms do not hang together on even terms, fon , the building of a great army touches every nerve centre of the nation, social and economic, and raises questions and antagonisms which could never come to the fore over a large navy programme. In my opinion, it iU serves so great a man as Woodrow Wilson for his friends, in mistaken zeal, to claim for him impeccability. He had his shortcomings, even as other men, and having them but gives him the more character and virility. As I saw him at the time and as I see him in retrospect, his chief defect was temperamental. His prejudices were strong and oftentimes clouded his judgments. But, by and large, he was what the head of a state should be — intelligent, honest, and courageous. Happy the nation fortunate enough to have a Woodrow Wilson to lead it through dark and tempestuous days ! Much as he accomplished, much as he commended himself to the gratitude and admiration of mankind, by some strange turn of fate his bitterest enemies have done more than his best friends to assure his imdying fame. Had the Versailles Treaty gone through the United States Senate as written and without question, Woodrow Wilson would have been but one of many to share in the imperishable glory of the League of Nations. But the fight which he was forced to make for it, and the world-wide proportions which this warfare assumed, gradually forced Woodrow Wilson to the forefront of the battle, and it was around his heroic figure that it raged. While he went down in defeat in his own country, an unprejudiced world begins to see and appreciate the magnitude of the conception and its service to man- kind. The League of Nations and the name of Woodrow Wilson have become inseparable, and his enemies have helped to build to his memory the noblest monument ever erected to a son of man. NOTE OF ACKNOWLEDGMENT Some three and a half years ago Colonel House gave to Yale University, for deposit in the University Library, his entire collection of political papers. For permission to select and pubhsh the most significant of these, I my- self and all students of recent history are deeply in his debt. The responsibility for the choice and arrange- ment of these papers, as well as their interpretation, must rest upon me. Colonel House, whose sense of the scientific historical spirit is very lively, agreed that no essential document which might affect the historicity of the narrative should be omitted. Whatever deletions appear in the published papers have been dictated by the exigencies of space or by a regard for the feelings of persons still alive, and in no case do they alter the his- torical meaning of the papers. The comment and advice of Colonel House have been invaluable. He has carefully avoided, however, any insistence upon his personal point of view, at the same time that he has offered priceless aid in throwing light upon innumerable aspects of the political story which would otherwise have remained obscure. For the time and interest and freedom which he has given me I am profoundly grateful. It is a rare privilege for the his- torian that his documentary material should be explained by the chief actor in the drama. I am indebted also, and beyond measure, to Colonel House’s brother-in-law. President Sidney E. Mezes, and to his secretary, Miss Frances B. Denton, for constant assistance and criticism. xi ^ ***w.*A c ctxlUL piuuij, a.iiCL oy rcs-Son of their intimate first-hand knowledge of the events concerned, they have corrected many misinterpretations. My gratitude must also be expressed for the help given by many of those who themselves played an im- portant political role during the past thirteen years ; they have been willing to discuss freely the history of that period and to permit me to publish their letters. I would mention Ambassador James W. Gerard, Ambas- sador Brand Whitlock, Ambassador H. C. Wallace, Attorney-General T. W. Gregory, Postmaster-General A. S. Burleson, Mr. Frank L. Polk, Mr. Vance McCormick, Mr. John Hays Hammond, Mr. Gordon Auchincloss, Viscount Grey of Fallodon, the Earl of Balfour, Mr. Lloyd George, Sir Austen Chamberlain, Sir Horace Plunkett, Sir William T5nTell, Mr. H. Wickham Steed, Mr. J. A. Spender, Sir WiUiam Wiseman, M. Georges Clemenceau, M. Ignace Paderewski. All of these came into close touch with Colonel House, and the personal and political sidelights which they have thrown upon him have been of inestimable value. The volumes owe much to those who have cordially permitted the publication of letters now in the House Collection of the Yale University Library. I take pleasure in thanking Mrs. Walter Hines Page, Mrs. Thomas Lindsay, Mrs. Franklin K. Lane, Lady Spring- Rice, Mrs. WiUiam Jennings Bryan, Secretary of State Robert Lansing, Secretary of the Treasury William G. McAdoo, Secretary of Agriculture David F. Houston, Justice James C. McReynolds, President Charles W. Eliot, Mr. J. St. Loe Strachey, Mr. A. H. Frazier, Mr. E. S. Martin, Mr. George Foster Peabody, Mr. James Speyer. In the arrangement of the papers and their interpreta- tion I have made constant use of the numerous letters k from President Wilson to Colonel House now deposited in the House Collection. It seemed wise to the hterary legatee of the President not to grant permission to publish these letters textually ; something of the personal attractiveness of Mr. Wilson has thus been lost. But the sense of the letters, setting forth his intimate feelings and policies, has been freely translated into the pages which follow. A hst of the letters which I have thus utihzed is appended.^ None of them have been pub- lished ; many of them were typed by the President himself without a copy being made, often in the private code used only by Colonel House and himself. To the authorities of Yale University who have pro- vided facilities for the care of the House Collection and to the staff of the University Library, especially the Librarian, Mr. Andrew Keogh, I would express warmest gratitude, as well as to those alumni of Yale who by financial assistance have made possible the fifing and organization of documents; given by Colonel House and others. I am indebted in particular to my assistant in the curatorship of the House Collection, Miss Helen M. Reynolds ; every page of these volumes bears witness to the devoted effort she has expended upon the construc- tion of the manuscript, the verification of references, and the correction of proof. Finally I must acknowledge the constant encouragement and practical assistance of my wife in the large task of selecting the most significant documents and arranging them so as to make a coherent narrative. C. S. Yale University Janmry i, 1926 ^ See page xv. LETTERS FROM WILSON TO HOUSE Utilized for the period^ October 1911 — March 1917 BATE SUBJECT 1911 October 18 Wilson’s party regularity. 24 Desirability of abolishing two-thirds rule in National Democratic Convention. * December 4 Engagement to dine with House and Dr. Houston. 22 Pre-Convention campaign organization. 26 Pre-Convention campaign organization. 1912 January 4 Personal. Bryan’s attitude. 27 Personal. February 6 Personal. 14 Personal. March 15 Pre-Convention outlook. Political strength of Champ Clark, Underwood, Harmon. May 6 House’s political organization in Texas. 29 Personal. [Telegfam.] June 9 Plans for Baltimore Convention. 24 Convention organization. July 17 Plan of electoral campaign. August 22 Plan of electoral campaign. 31 Plan of electoral campaign. September ii McCombs’s possible resignation as National Demo- cratic Chairman. November 7 Comment on result of election. Gratitude for House’s services. 30 Personal. House’s Washington visit for study of Cabinet material. December 3 Personal. House’s Washington visit. 1913 January 6 Discussion of Cabinet materiaL 23 Discussion of Cabinet materiaL February 5 Cabinet appointments. 7 Cabinet appointments. May 9 New York appointments. XV 1913 May 17 Federal Reserve Bill, 20 Personal. [Telegram.] July 17 Personal. [Telegram.] September 4 Personal. 18 Massachusetts appointments. 26 Request for House’s help in personal matter. 29 Personal. October 17 One Hundredth Anniversary of peace among English™ speaking peoples. November 5 Mexico. December 9 Message to Congress. 27 Personal, 1914 January 3 Trusts. 6 Trust Message. [Telegram.] 9 Federal Reserve Board appointments. 28 Panama Canal Zone. 30 Personal. [Telegram.] February 16 Federal Reserve Board appointments. 18 Federal Reserve Board appointments. 25 Federal Reserve Board appointments. Mexican situa™ tion. March 7 Federal Reserve Board appointments. 30 Federal Reserve Board appointments. April 2 Federal Reserve Board appointments. May 2 Federal Reserve Board appointments. 15 Departure of House for Europe. June 16 House’s mission in Europe. 22 French proposal for revision of commercial treaty be tween France and the United States. Mediation between the United States and Mexico. 26 House’s mission in Europe. July 9 Endorsement of House’s mission August 3 Situation m Europe. 4 Mediation in European War. [Telegram.] 5 Mediation in European War. 6 Mediation in European War. Shipping Bil* 6 Mrs. Wilson’s death. [Telegram.] 17 Personal. 18 Personal. 25 Attitude towards European War. 27 Personal. [Telegram.] September 8 Approval of House’s letters to Zimmermann and Am- bassador W. H. Page. A. VIJ. S SUBJECT ciber i6 Approval of House's suggestion on taxes. 17 Appointments. 19 Approval of House's negotiations with Bernstorff. [Telegram.] 3r 10 Negotiations for purchase of cotton. 16 Negotiations for purchase of cotton. 19 Appointments. 22 Personal. 23 Attitude of Ambassador W. H. Page, 29 Attitude of Ambassador W. H. Page. aber 2 Personal [Telegram.] iber I Presidential Message. Belgian relief. 2 Foreign relations. 9 Presidential Message. 14 Personal. 16 Personal. [Telegram.] 22 Personal. [Telegram.] 25 Personal. 26 Industrial relations, [Telegram.] 26 Trade Commission. 28 Personal. 28 Personal. [Telegram.] 31 Personal. [Telegram.] iry 5 Approval of House's letter to Zimmermann. 6 Appointments. 7 Federal employment bureau. II Personal. 16 Mediation in European War. 17 Personal. [Telegram.] 28 Situation in Germany. 29 Personal. [Telegram.] 29 Purpose of House's European mission, lary 13 House's negotiations in England. Note to the Allies. [Cablegram.] 15 Gerard's information on situation in Germany, [Cablegram.] 20 Relations with Great Britain. [Cablegram.] 25 House's negotiations. [Cablegram.] li I Conditions in Germany. [Cablegram.] 8 House's negotiations. [Cablegram.] 23 British Order in Council. [Cablegram.] 2 Approval of House's negotiations. [Cablegram.] DATE SUBJECT 1915 AprE 15 Messages to President and Foreign Minister of France, [Cablegram.] 22 Pan-American Pact. [Cablegram.] Ma]/ — British blockade. [Cablegram.] 4 Sinking of GulfligU. [Cablegram.] 5 British blockade. [Cablegram.] 16 Possible compromise between British blockade and German submarine warfare. [Cablegram.] 18 British blockade. [Cablegram.] 20 Possible compromise between British blockade and German submarine warfare. [Cablegram.] 23 British blockade. [Cablegram.] 26 British blockade. [Cablegram.] June I House’s return. [Cablegram.] 20 Personal, Wilson planning visit to House. [Tele- gram.] 22 WEson’s visit to House. [Telegram.] July 3 Mexico. [Telegram.] 3 Mexico. 7 Mexico. 12 Counsellorship of State Department. Note to Ger- many. 14 Strained relations with Germany. 19 Contraband and cotton. 20 British blockade. 22 Contraband and cotton. 27 Counsellorship of State Department. British blockade, 29 British blockade. Bernstorff. August 4 Appointments. 4 Mexico. 4 German plots, 5 Contraband and cotton. 7 Contraband and cotton. 21 Asking for advice on Arabic case. Attitude of Am- bassador W. H. Page. 25 Bernstorff. German plots. 31 Personal. 31 Arabic crisis. Federal Reserve Board, September 7 Austrian plots. Sinking of Hesperian. 20 Bernstorff, Arabic crisis. 27 Bernstorff. Arabic crisis. 29 Personal. October 4 Personal. 4 Armed merchantmen controversy. 18 Possible offer of help to Allies. DATE SUBJECT 1915 October 18 Attitude of Ambassador W. H. Page. 29 Personal. November 10 Possibilities of peace. Domestic politics. 11 House's messages to Grey. [Telegram.] 12 Conditions in Germany. Sinking of Ancona. 17 House's mission to Europe. 24 British and German Ambassadors in Washington. House's mission to Europe. 1916 ^January February March April May June July 9 Assurance of American co-operation in policy seeking to bring about and maintain permanent peace. [Cablegram.] 12 The Senate and British blockade, [Cablegram.] 13 Approval of House's negotiations. [Cablegram.] 16 Armed merchantmen. [Cablegram.] 3 Personal. [Telegram.] 20 Gerard's report from Germany. 15 Appointments. [Telegram.] 21 Sussex crisis. 22 Sussex crisis. Domestic politics. 29 Sussex crisis. [Telegram.] 5 Sussex crisis. [Telegram.] 8 Relations with GrSat Britain. 9 Possibility of peace. 16 Offer of help to Allies. British blockade. 17 Attitude of Ambassador W. H. Page. 17 Chairmanship of Democratic National Committee. 18 Offer of help to Allies. Relations with Great Britain. 18 Request for advice on speech before League to Enforce Peace. 22 Relations with Allies. Request for material for speech. Chairmanship of Democratic National Committee. 29 Chairmanship of Democratic National Committee. 6 Chairmanship of Democratic National Committee. 10 Chairmanship of Democratic National Committee. 11 Chairmanship of Democratic National Committee. [Telegram.] 22 European situation. Mexico. Plan for electoral campaign. 2 Relations with England. Appointments. Electoral campaign. 23 British Black-list. 27 Relations with Great Britain. I— & DATE SUBJECT 1916 September 20 Personal 29 Electoral campaign. October 10 Relations with Great Britain. 24 Electoral campaign. 30 Madison Square rally. November 6 Personal. 21 Drafting of note calling on belligerents to state terms of peace. 24 Relations with Germany. Attitude of Ambassador W. H. Page. 25 Peace note. December 3 Peace note. 4 Personal. 8 House’s information from England. 19 Peace note. 27 Attempt to secure confidential peace terms from Germany. 1917 January 16 Drafting of speech on peace terms before the Senate. 17 House’s negotiations with Bernstorff. 19 House’s negotiations with Bernstorff. Speech before the Senate. 24 House’s negotiations with Bernstorff. February 12 Refusal to consider coalition government. CONTENTS VOLUME I CHAPTER I. Introduction II. Backgrounds (1858-1911) War and Reconstruction in the South — House in School and College — Frontier Life and Friends in Texas — Political Beginnings — State Electoral Campaigns — The Governors' Adviser — ^National Campaigns — Enter Wilson. III. Beginnings of a Friendship . First Impressions of Woodrow Wilson — ^The Pre- Nomination Campaign-»-Persuading Mr. Bryan — Organizing Texas — ^The Threat of Champ Clark — The Baltimore Convention — Wilson N omin- ated — Discords among the Democrats — ^McCombs and McAdoo — Soothing the Tammany Tiger — Captain Bill McDonald — Democratic Victory. IV. Building a Cabinet . . . . Everyone wants something " — Sifting the Possi- bilities — House Refuses a Cabinet Post — ^The Aloofness of Wilson — ^A Visit with Mr. Bryan — Offers and Refusals — ^The Final State. V. The Silent Partner . . . . Relations of House and Wilson — Mr. House is my second self" — ^Wilsonian Table-talk — ^The Visits of a President — Defects of Wilson as seen by House — The Colonel as a Political Buffer — A Recipient of Criticism — Relations with the Cabinet — Problems of Appointments and Local Politics, PAGE I 9 46 86 118 PAGE CHAPTER VI. The Administration Starts Work . 155 The Radicalism of Colonel House — Philip Dra : its Composition and Significance — Legislative Prob- lems of the Wilson Administration — Colonel House and Currency Reform — ^Drafting the Federal Reserve Act — Making up the Federal Reserve Board — Results af the First Legislative Session : '' A great exhibition of leadership/' VIL Aspects of Foreign Policy . . « i8i Problems of Diplomatic Appointments — ^The Am- bassadorship to St. James's — Colonel House as Confidant of Ambassadors — His Conception of a Positive Foreign Policy — Relations with Great Britain — Panama Tolls Exemption — Mexico — Clearing the Ground with Sir Edward Grey — ^The Visit of Sir William Tyrrell — ^An Informal Under- standing — Repeal of the Tolls Exemption. VIII. A Pan-American Pact .... 213 House Urges Need of Close Understanding with South American States — ^First Draft of Proposed Pact — Conversations with Naon, da Gama, Suarez — ^Approval, in Principle, of A.B.C. Powers — Joint Action Regarding Mexico — ^Development of the Pact — ^Dfficulties and Delays — ^Lapse of Negotia- tions — Historical Significance of the Attempt. IX. The Great Adventure . . . 241 Heavy Clouds in Europe — House's Sense of American Interest and Responsibility — A Scheme to Meet the Danger — ^An Extraordinary Mission — Atmosphere in Germany — ^The Talk with the Kaiser — Planning Peace with the British — The Murder of the Archduke — Colonel House's Letter to the Kaiser — Failure. X. Wilson and the War .... 282 Outbreak of the Conflagration — ^The Question of American Mediation — ^President Eliot’s Suggestion of Intervention — ^The Sympathies of Wilson — House Urges Military Preparation — ^Allied Interference with American Trade — ^Difficulties with the British — ^Page and Spring-Rice. PAGE chapter XL Plans of Mediation . « » « 324 The Military Situation in Europe — German Defeat on the Marne — Overtures of Bernstorff — Discussions with Spring-Rice — Letters from Page and Gerard — Growth of Feeling against United States in Belli- gerent Countries — Sir Edward Grey on the Attitude of American Government — ^Wilson Decides to Send House to Europe. XII* A Quest for Peace * . . * 365 House Sails on the Lusitania — First Conferences with Grey and Asquith — ^The German Submarine Threat — Suggestion of ** The Freedom of the Seas — Discouraging News from Germany — K Talk with the King — ^The Personal Contracts of House — ^War- time London — Decision to go on to Germany. XIII. The Freedom of the Seas , . . 399 Paris — Interview with Delcass6 — ^Aspirations of France — Berlin — '' Everybody seems to want peace, but nobody is willing to concede enough to get it — Feeling against America — tiouse Suggests Freedom of the Seas — Its Significance — ^Bethmann and Zimmermann — Return to Paris — Poincare — London again — Conferences with Grey — Sinking of the Lusitania. XIV. Submarine versus Blockade . . 436 House’s Advice to Wilson — Lord Kitchener on American Participation — ^Wilson’s Note to Germany — A Suggestion of Compromise between German Submarine and Allied Blockade — Grey Approves Compromise — Germany Refuses — ^Effect of Allied Restrictions on American Commerce — House Explains the Danger — Conferences with Lloyd George, Bryce, Balfour, Crewe — House Returns to America — Results of Mission. Index . At end of Volume II CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION I look forward now to your book. It is, I hope, books like yours and mine that will bring people to reflect soberly upon the war. If so, we shall be helping to form a public opinion that will make for peace. Viscount Grey of Fallodon to House, October id, 19^5 T he practice of interring historical documents in securely locked archives, where they may lie forgotten until popular interest in the period evaporates, has much to be said for it. It prevents their use for partisan political purposes ; it protects the sensibilities of those political leaders whose role, viewed at close range, may have been less heroic than the public imagined; it guarantees, through the lapse of time, the growth of that ma’gical touchstone, “ historical perspective,” which supposedly eliminates bias and ensures the truth. Unfortunately, if the materials of real history are absent, those of legend replace them. ” History,” said Voltaire, “is a fable which men have agreed upon.” And one may ask whether it is not the duty of the historian to estabhsh the facts before the fable has crystallized, and the duty of whoever possesses the documents to make them available to the historian at the earliest possible moment. The argument is the stronger if we accept the view that mankind learns from its past. Granting that a lesson of value is to be secured from history, surely our own generation has a right to insist that its benefits ought not to be reserved for the unborn of the future. If the inner history of the decade I— I wmcn saw JC/Uiope uaugm ui uic iiunui ui wai aiiu ixs aftermath can help us to avoid another such disaster, the disadvantages of keeping that history in cold storage until the twenty-first century are apparent. Such thoughts may have crossed the mind of Colonel House when he determined to have published sufficient of his papers to elucidate what he regarded as the true story of the decisive years in which he played a role of major political importance. A newspaper cartoon of 1916 represents the Muse of History (rather a frowzy Clio, to be sure, bespectacled and distraught) presenting a tightly corked bottle labelled Foreign Policy to a silent and impassive Colonel House, and in desperation de- manding the opener. After the lapse of a decade, the Colonel has produced it. The anxiety of the Historical Muse is comprehensible as the student pores over the pile of papers which indicate the extent and variety of the personal and political contacts that House establislied. Here are great sheaves of letters from the European statesmen of the war period —Grey, Balfour, Bryce, Lloyd George, Plunkett, Reading, Briand, Clemenceau, Zimmermann, Bemstorff, Spring- Rice— with the Colonel's replies; yet more extensive files of his correspondence with the American Ambas- sadors in the capitals of Europe — the Pages, Gerard, Sharp, Penfield, Whitlock, Willard ; letters to and from the members of Mr. Wilson’s Cabinet, covering the details of appointments and departmental policy ; and finally the eight years’ series of correspondence with the President himself, intimate and afiectionate, which explains the origin and development of Wilsonian policies, domestic and foreign, from the beginning of Wilson’s race for the Presidency in 1911 until the Peace Conference of Paris in 1919. As he sorts the dusty files, the curious investigator finds himself introduced into the very penetralia of politics — the making of a Cabinet, the origins of currency reform, the American attempt to prevent the World War, American offers to help the Allies made and refused, the intimate details of American co-operation in the war, in the Armistice, and in the Peace Conference ; he sees at close range, the President himself, Bemstorff and the Kaiser, the European Premiers and Foreign Ministers, American Ambassadors and Cabinet members. If it had not been for an aid of exceptional character, the preservation of these papers would have been dif&cult or impossible. Fortunately House possessed in Miss Frances B. Denton, the daughter of an old friend, an assistant who was more collaborator than confidential secretary, and one whose r 61 e proved to be of increasing importance. In the midst of the negotiations which Colonel House carried on with Cabinets and potentates, she found time to gather and file the material without which the story could never have been told. She com- bined the discretion and tact demanded by House's diplomatic activities with an instinct for the preservation of documents that will always endear her to historians. “ She has not only kept the record,” wrote House m 1916, “but has kept the faith and with an enduring loyalty and self-abnegation.” Through Miss Denton was made possible the diary which forms the heart of the entire collection of papers. Every evening, with rare exceptions and during eight years, Colonel House dictated to her his resume of the events of the day. Definitely and objectively he related his conversations with, often the very words of, his political associates, and he was associated with the men who made the history of the decade. The result is a V* AAAwxv Lvvu LiiuuDciiiu. pdgtjbi E record drafted at the moment and with a frankness which suggests that it was not designed for publication. It has the Colonel’s comments on men and events, opinions which he sometimes changed, prophecies which upon occasion were fulfilled and again remained unfulfilled, a personal document such as the biographer dreams of and seldom discovers. Upon the basis of such papers and his recollections. Colonel House might have written the conventional “ Memoirs,” which too often confuse the after-impression with the event itself, but which, through the possession of hindsight, preserve the author from ever having committed an error. Instead, he chose to let the papers tell their own story and permit the reader to decide whether or not the Colonel was right in this incident and in that. If there is prejudice in the pages that follow— -and what historical narrative is innocent of prejudice ? — it is that of the man who, after many months of arranging the papers so as to let them make a story, came to see events through the eyes of Colonel House himself. But at no time was a chapter begun under the influence of a preconceived thesis, and nothing could have been more exciting than to watch the behaviour of the chief figures as each chapter took form ; in this they did well, m that they were disappointing. An objective narrative, such as the documents themselves recount, was the more necessary in view of the paucity of published information touching the career and accomplishments of Colonel House. There are few, if any, instances of men exercising so much political influence about whom so little was known. The personal story of a man holding public of&ce must needs become public property. A searchlight is immediately turned upon his past career. The press will have it so and, if skilfully utilized, political propaganda of value may conceivably be developed from it. Since we demand of our public personages a certain blameless rectitude of conduct, without which one is ill-advised to seek of&ce, the subject of inquiry, even though he may never have accomplished anything of note, is generally well pleased with the conventions of political advertising designed to engage the interest of the voters. With Colonel House it was bound to be otherwise. He sought no office for himself — in itself a peculiarity and one that would naturally puzzle opinion— nor did he seek office for his friends. His methods and purposes were quite different from those of the party boss, for he never worked through a “ machine ” ; he disliked the details of party politics, and in later years he generally managed to evade them. He aimed certainly at influenc- ing political events, as the sequel will show, but he accomplished his aim thro'ugh personal influence very different from that of the orthodox politician. The story of how he acquired such influence is the explanation of his success, and to understand it we must read his political papers. But it is easy to comprehend at first glance that to him conventional political advertisement could bring no profit and might bring much harm. He strove constantly to stifle the public adulation that zealous press agents sought to inspire, and he was careful to bring it about that credit for this or that measure in which he was interested should go to the political office- holders. House's papers are Med with references to the efforts he made to obliterate the intimate personal sketch, so familiar in American politics ; and when finally a brief biography appeared which gave him full credit for his influence in the Wilson administration, at 6 IJNlKUUUtXiUJN his special request the edition was withdrawn by the publisher. The desire to escape publicity was largely a matter of common sense, for in this way only could he hope to avoid political enmities and jealousies ; President, Cabinet members. Ambassadors, all knew that he stood ready to help them and yet would seek no public recogni- tion. It was also instinctive, springing not from undue modesty, for Colonel House was as coldly objective in judging himself as another, but rather from a philosophic pleasure in accomplishment rather than reward, and perhaps in part from a sardonic sense of humour which was tickled by the thought that he, unseen and often unsuspected, without great wealth or office, merely through the power of personality and good sense, was actually deflecting the currents of history. Whether this supposition is borne out by the intimate papers of the Colonel, the reader must judge. The path which House' laid out for himself was entirely untrodden, and it is fruitless to seek an historical parallel. Monarchs had shared their secrets with father- confessors and extracted wisdom from their advice; Presidents had created their kitchen-cabinets. But neither the one nor the other suggests the unofficial functions which House exercised. He was a combina- tion of Richelieu’s Father Joseph and Thurlow Weed, but he was very much more. At the same time that he played the part of adviser to the President, of buffer between office-seekers and Cabinet, of emissary to foreign courts, he indulged in a complex of activities which kept him in close touch with business men, local politicians, artists, and journalists, lawyers and college professors. His intimacy with European statesmen was as close and his friendship as warm as the personal associations he created at home. Long after the war, when their political relations had become ancient history, he visited Grey and Plunkett, Clemenceau and Paderew- ski. Long after the Democrats lost power in the United States, the officials of Great Britain, France, and Ger- many sought his advice. His range of contacts was so great that he became a sort of clearing-house for all who desired to accomplish something. He avoided high office, which comes to many men, but he reserved for himself a niche which is unique in history. Inevitably, the public was mystified, especially during the early years of the Wilson administration. The circle widened that recognized in him a powerful factor in national and international politics, and yet few could answer the simplest questions about him. Who and what was he ? Many replies were given, but, as Colonel House refused to say which were true and which false, no one was the wiser. He became the Man of Mystery and, since facts were lacking, fiction supplied their place. Myths of the most varied sort developed about this " Texas Talleyrand,” this “ backwoods politician.” He was represented as a lover of devious methods, reticent as the Sphinx, emotionless as a Redskin. Such tales must be strung with the other mock-pearls of history. And the interesting point to note is that the public, deprived of facts, none the less refused to accept the legends fed to them which, had they been true, would have disqualified House utterly for the work that he undertooL Puzzled but untroubled, they accepted him finally as "the President's adviser.” Here and there were to be heard grumbles at this strange departure in American politics ; but in general, knowing little of his activities and nothing of his advice, the people came to look upon him as a wise institution. 0 Xi'« iiV\/JL/ WV^XiV/X'l Thus Colonel House disdained fame and achieved it. His fame, however, rested primarily upon the fact of his relations with Wilson and not upon what he was or what he did. Of that the Colonel and those close to him alone could tell, and they told nothing. It is, therefore, with the greater interest that the historian turns over the mass of papers from which the story of his dramatic career may be disengaged. CHAPTER II BACKGROUNDS Your success has been without a parallel in Texas politics. Governor-elect Sayers to House, May ij, I “ "T T TE originally came from Holland and the name \/\/ was Huis, which finally feE into House. Father V V ran away from home and went to sea when a child, and did not return to his home until he had become a man of property and distinction. He came to Texas when it belonged to Mexico. He joined the revolution, fought under General Burleson, and helped make Texas a republic. For his services in this war he received a grant of land in Coryell County. He lived to see Texas come into the Union, secedfe, and return to the Union. He lived in Texas under four flags.” Thus wrote Colonel House in the summer of 1916, when a brief luU in his political activities gave oppor- tunity for him to reconstruct on paper something of the background that lay behind his rapid rise to national and international eminence. Although the family was in its origin Dutch, his forbears were for some three hundred years English, and it was from England that his father ran away. House himself, a seventh son, was bom in 1858, at Houston, Texas, and this State he has always regarded as his home. Even more than those of Wilson or Walter Page, with whom he later was so closely associated, his first years were touched by the excitement and turmoil of the events of the time. 9 10 i5 U IN J^O " Some of my earliest recollections are of the Civil War. I began to remember, I think, in ’62 and ’63, when our soldiers were coming and going to and from the front. I remember quite distinctly when Lincoln was assassinated. Father came home to luncheon, and I recall where Mother was standing when he told her that the President had been shot, I remember, too, that he said that it was the worst thing that had so far happened to the South. He saw farther than most men, and he knew from the beginning of the war that it must end disastrously for the South. He knew the Northern States possessed the resources which are potential in war, and that the Southern States, lacking them, would lose. The blockade which the Federal Government was able to throw around the Southern coast, while not absolute, was rigid enough to make it difficult to break through and obtain from the outside what was needed within. “During the war he sent many ships out from Galveston with cotton, to run the blockade to the near- by ports, such as Havana and Belize, Honduras. At that time we had a house in Galveston as well as in Houston. The Galveston home covered an entire block. The house was a large red-brick Colonial one, with white pillars, and an orange grove took up most of the grounds, and oleanders encircled them. “ In determining when to send his ships out. Father was governed largely by the weather. Dark, stormy nights were the ones chosen. In the afternoon he would go up to the cupola of our house, and with his glasses he would scan the horizon to see how many Federal gun- boats were patrolling the coast. Then his ship would go out in the early part of the night. In the morning, at daylight, he would be again on the look-out to count the Federal gunboats, to see if any were missing. If they were aU there, he felt reasonably sure his ship with her cargo had gotten through the blockade. “ It would be months before he knew definitely whether his ships had come safely to port or whether they had been captured. When he lost one, the loss was complete ; but when one got through, the gaii ^a^ large. He had a working arrangement with the Com federate Government by which the return voyage brought them clothing, arms, and munitions of war of all kinds. “ The terrible days between Lee’s surrender and the bringing of some sort of order out of the chaos in the South made a lasting impression on my mind. I cannot recall just now how long the interim was, but it must have been a fuU year or more. " There was one regiment of Texas soldiers that came to Houston and disbanded there. They looted the town. They attempted to break into Father’s store- house, but he stood at the doors with a shotgun. . . . Murder was rife everywhere ; there was no law, there was no order. It was unsafe to go at night to your next-door neighbour’s. When Father had this to do, he always reached for his shotgun or six-shooter and held it ready to shoot while both going and coming.” Those who later were to accuse Colonel House of ill- considered pacifism, would doubtless have been surprised to learn of the atmosphere in which he was reared. In later life he was often asked whether he considered him- self a pacifist. ” Yes,” he replied, ” so far as inter- national affairs are concerned. War is too costly and ineffective a method of settling disputes between nations. But as an individual I have not been able to escape the conviction that there are occasions in hfe when a man must be prepared to fight.” As a boy and later in early manhood, he learned from personal experience the meaning of lawlessness and bloodshed. Because of this, perhaps, he was brought to perceive not merely the horror but the stupidity of war ; and it was easier for him, when he attained an influential position, to utilize it to bring peace, in that his personal courage was beyond question. It may have JL^ 15ALK.GR0UNDS been from these early experiences also that he learned the value of audacity. In the days of his great political influence, Colonel House was frequently pictured as a man dominated by the spirit of caution. Nothing could be further from the truth. He believed always in careful preparation and foresight whenever possible ; as an English statesman once said, " House always sees three months ahead.” But he believed more fervently yet that nothing worth while could be accomplished without a daring that might wisely be allowed to approach reck- lessness. Like Cavour, whom he admired, he knew how to wait for the supreme moment and then risk everything. “ Even the children of the town [he wrote] caught the spirit of recklessness and disorder, and there were constant feuds and broils amongst us. My brother James, six years older than I, was the leader of our ‘ gang.' We all had guns and pistols. We had ' nigger shooters ’ (small catapults), and there were no childish games excepting those connected with war. We lived and breathed in the atmosphere of strife and destruc- tion. “ In the evening, around the fireside, there were told tales of daring deeds, and it was the leader of such deeds that we strove to emulate. Often the firebeUs would ring as a signal that a riot was imminent, and the citizens would flock together at some given point, all armed to the teeth. These disturbances were, as a rule, between the old-time citizens and the negroes and carpet-baggers. ” I cannot remember the time when I began to ride and to shoot. Why I did not kill myself, one can never know, for accidents were common. My eldest brother had the side of his face shot off and has been disfigured by it all his life. He hung between life and death for weeks, but finally came through with one side of his face gone. ” I had many narrow escapes. Twice I came near killing one of my playmates in the reckless use of fire- BACKGROUNDS 13 arms. They were our toys and, as a matter of fact, death was our pla5miate.” The young House was taken to England as a boy and went to school at Bath. His experiences with his schoolmates by no means presaged the cordial relations which he was later to establish with British diplomats : “ James attempted the same sort of rough play we had been accustomed to in Texas, and we were constantly in broils with the young English lads, who were not familiar with such lawlessness. My old darkey nurse used to tell me that if I had not been the seventh son of a seventh son, I would never have survived.” At the age of fourteen, after the death of his mother, he was sent to school first in Virginia and then in Connecticut. House’s recollections of the former are not pleasant : “ I shall never forget my depression when we arrived. . . . The nearest town to us was thirty miles away, and a more desolate, lonely spot no homesick boy ever saw.” Scholastic pursuits evidently made less impression on his mind than the cruelty of the older boys, which soon furnished an opportunity for House to display his mettle. He says little of the particular incident which evidently gave him a preferred place among the boys, but that little indicates something of the determined temper which was to appear on various occasions during his political career. " I made up my mind at the second attempt to haze me that I would not permit it. I not only had a pistol but a large knife, and with these I held the larger, rougher boys at bay. There was no limit to the lengths they would go in hazing those who would allow it. One form I recall was that of going through the pretence 14 BACKGROUNDS of hanging. They would tie a boy's hands behind him and string him up by the neck over a limb until he grew purple in the face. . . . None of it, however, feU to me. What was done to those who permitted it, is almost beyond belief. . . . The only thing that recon- ciled me to my lot was the near-by mountains, where I could shoot and enjoy out-of-door life.” Clearly a change, even to a Yankee atmosphere, was an improvement ; and House hailed with relief, if not enthusiasm, the plan which at the age of seventeen sent him to New Haven, Connecticut. " I had expected to be able to enter Yale, but I found myself wholly unprepared and reluctantly entered the Hopkins Grammar School of the Class of '77. . . . What I had been taught was of but little use, and I would have been better off as far as Latin and Greek were concerned if I had known nothing and had started from the beginning. I studied but little, and I soon found I would have difficulty in joining the Class of ’81 in Yale. Meanwhile, Oliver T. Morton, a son of Senator Oliver P. Morton of Indiana, and I had become fast friends and we agreed to tutor together and go to Cornell instead of Yale. Both Morton and I were more bent on mischief than upon books, and, while the mischief was innocent, it made us poor students.” It was less mischief, however, than budding enthu- siasm for his lifelong interest that kept House and Morton from their books. Already the young Southerner was intoxicated by a passion for politics and public afiairs ; he read politics, talked politics, and in his first year at the Grammar School, a boy of seventeen, he brought himself into close contact with the mechanism of politics. It was the year of the famous Hayes-Tilden campaign. BACKGROUNDS 15 " Every near-by political meeting I attended, and there was no one more interested in the nomination and election of the presidential candidates of 1876 than 1. At every opportunity I would go to New York and hang about Democratic Headquarters, which, I remember, were at the Everett House in Union Square. I used to see Mr, Tilden go in and out, and wondered then how so frail a looking man could make a campaign for President. “ Bayard, Blaine, and others I heard speak whenever the opportunity occurred, and I believe that I was as nearly engrossed in politics as I have ever been since. “ Before the nominations were made, I was, of course, hoping to see young Morton’s father nominated for President, and it was a bitter disappointment to us both when the telegraph operator handed us out the first slip giving news that the Republicans had compromised upon Rutherford B, Hayes. The operator knew us, for we were continually hanging about the ofiice instead of attending to our studies. Morton’s father was such a power at that time that there was no difficulty in his having access to any information that was to be had. “ Ardent Democrat that Lwas, and ardent Republican that he was, young Morton and I had no unpleasant discussions. After the election and during the contest that followed, it was utterly impossible for me to bring myself to think of desk or books. I was constantly going to Washington with Morton, in order to be near the centre of things, I was usually the guest of the Mortons, who lived at that time at the Ebbitt House. I knew much of everything that was going on. Re- publican leaders would come in day and night to consult the distinguished invalid who was directing the fight for Hayes. In this way, directly and indirectly, I saw and met many well-known Republicans in public life at that time.” No clearer proof is necessary that the child is father to the man, for, as his papers will show, the mature Colonel House displayed an invincible obstinacy in BACKGROUNDS i6 making personal friends of his political opponents. The characteristic proceeded, perhaps, from a natural inability to remain on anything but good terms with those whom he met, whether in conflict or co-operation ; it resulted in giving him an insight into the motives that actuated his opponents which was of no small political value. The election of 1876, we may remind ourselves, was disputed and was ultimately settled by an Electoral Commission which, despite the protests of Democrats at the moment and heedless of the criticism of later his- torians, awarded the Presidency to Hayes. Such a conflict formed an incomparable opportunity for the young House to study political operations, and one which he did not fail to utilize, regardless of the fact that school was in session. “ When the Electoral Commission was organized and began to hold its sittings in the Supreme Court Room at the Capitol, young Morton and I were permitted to slip in and out at will, although the demand for admission could only be met in a very small way. I heard Evarts speak, but the speech that impressed me most was that of Senator Carpenter, who, although a Republican, pleaded for Tilden. “ In those days, too, I had the entree to the White House. I remember General Grant and Mrs. Grant and several members of his Cabinet. All this was educational in its way, but not the education I was placed in the Hopkins Grammar School to get, and it is no wonder that I lagged at the end of my class. I had no interest in my desk tasks, but I read much and was learning in a larger and more interesting school. “ When I entered Cornell, it was the same story. . . . I was constantly reading, constantly absorbing, constantly in touch with, public affairs. I knew the name of every United States Senator, of practically every Repre- sentative, the Governors of all the important States, and BACKGROUNDS 17 had some knowledge of the chief measures before the people. " I had found that I could neglect my studies up to the last minute and then, by a few days of vigorous effort, pass my examinations by a scratch, nothing more. I cannot remember getting a condition, nor can I re- member getting much more than a passing mark. “ My Washington experience perhaps changed my entire career. Fortunately or unfortunately for me, I saw that two or three men in the Senate and two or three in the House and the President himself, ran the Government. The others were merely figureheads. I saw Senators and Representatives speak to empty benches and for the purpose of getting their remarks in the Congressional Record sent to their admiring con- stituents. I saw, too, how few public men could really speak well. I can count on the fingers of one hand all the speakers that I thought worth while. In some the manner was good, in others the substance was good, but in nearly all there was lacking one or the other. Therefore I had no ambition to hold office, nor had I any ambition to speak, because I felt in both instances that I would fall short of the first place, and nothing less than that would satisfy me. " Yet I have been thought without ambition. That, I think, is not quite true. My ambition has been so great that it has never seemed to me worth while to strive to satisfy it.” Matters might have been different had it not been for the delicacy of House’s health. " Up to the time I was eleven or twelve years old,” he wrote, ” I was a robust youngster. One day while I was swinging high, a rope broke and I was thrown on my head. Brain fever ensued, and for a long time I hovered between life and death. Upon my recovery, malaria fastened upon me, and I have never been strong since.” The confining routine of office was impossible for him. Especially did 1—2 i8 BACKGROUNDS he suffer from the heat, which put residence in Washing- ton during the summer months out of the question. Thus early and for various reasons he set aside the thought of a conventional political career ; but his ambition, although unorthodox, was, as he admits, very real, and, even though he does not admit it, we shall see that he did much to satisfy it. He longed to play an influential if not a decisive role in politics, and from the beginning seems to have been inspired by the desire to improve political conditions. Through all his corre- spondence and papers runs this idealistic strain : to make of government a more efficient instrument for effecting the desires of the people ; to inspire in the people a more sensible view of their welfare ; to take a few feathers out of the wings of enthusiasm and insert them in the tail of judgment ; above all, to hasten the advent of a system which would protect the weak, whether in the political or economic sphere, from ex- ploitation by the strong. -Even as a boy there was in him something of Louis Blanc and Mazzini, strictly controlled, however, by an acute sense of the practical that recalls Benjamin Franklin. His ambition, furthermore, was determined by an ever-lively sense of proportion, which means sense of humour, that continually manifests itself in his papers. It led him to seek accomplishment rather than notoriety. Careless of title or office, even had his health per- mitted him to seek them, yet determined to make of politics his real career. House faced the problem that confronts so many young idealists leaving college and anxious to serve their country and mankind. How to begin ? BACKGROUNDS 19 II Mischance cut short the college career of House, for after two years at Cornell he was called back to Texas by the illness of his father, who died in 1880. The two had been close companions, and the younger man’s sense of loss was acute and the deprivation of his father’s aid and experienced counsel was a serious blow. “ My affection may blind me,” he wrote, “ and my judgment may have been immature, but he seemed to me then, as he seems to me now, among the ablest men I have ever known. ... I owe more to my father than to any person, living or dead. He not only made it possible for me to pursue the bent of my inclinations by leaving me a fortune suf&cient for all moderate wants, but he gave me an insight into the philosophy of life that has been of incalculable value. . . . While he devoted his life largely to commerce in various forms and while he acquired what* seemed to Texas a large fortune, he taught me not to place a fictitious value on wealth. It was with him merely a means to an end.” The year after leaving college, House married Miss Loulie Hunter, of Hunter, Texas, and after travelling in Europe for a twelvemonth, returned to make his home first in Houston and then in Austin, Texas. Cotton- farming and commercial enterprises kept him busy, but more and more he began to steal time from business to indulge his vital interest in public affairs. During what he calls " the twilight years,” after he had achieved political success in Texas and before the opportunity for national service had opened, he indulged his taste for adventure by embarking upon various industrial schemes, some of which were obviously calculated to produce pleasure rather than profit for himself. 20 BACKGROUNDS “ In this connexion I undertook the building of the Trinity and Brazos Valley Railway. The capital was raised by my friend Thomas Jefferson Coolidge, jun., of the Old Colony Trust Company of Boston, who occa- sionally visited me in Texas. I outlined the route and he accepted my judgment as to its feasibility. For two or three years this gave me much pleasure and absorbed my entire interest. There was not a man connected with the building of this road, except the engineer, that had ever had the slightest experience with railroad building. I wonder now at the temerity of those Boston capitalists. My one thought was to have around me men capable and honest, and to this I attribute our success. My secretary, Edward Sammons, than whom there is no better accountant, looked after the accounts ; and William Malone, the manager of my farms, saw to it that we got such material as was paid for. I put but little money in the project, for I had but little ; therefore I made but a small sum from it, success- ful as it was — some thirty thousand dollars. A larger share of the profits had been allotted me by the syndicate managers who had put up'the money necessary to build the road, but I divided it with those friends in Texas, poorer than I, who aided in the actual work of building the road. “ It was a pleasure, though, to undertake to build a railroad honestly, without a dollar’s profit to anyone excepting to those who placed their money in the venture. The money was raised in advance and everything was paid for in cash, and no bonds were sold until after the road was a going concern and sold to another system. “ We undertook to lay down one cardinal principle which no road in Texas, up to that time, had deigned to do ; and that was, to treat the public in such a way that they became friends of the road instead of enemies. If a farmer or any citizen along the route had a claim against the company, it was promptly and fairly adjusted. Notices were put up and circulars sent out that there would be no need to hire damage-claim lawyers when BACKGROUNDS 21 there was a claim against the T. and B.V. Railroad ; that all honest claims would be adjusted immediately. “ The result was magical, and it was not long before the patrons of the road understood that we were acting in their interest as well as our own, and any attempt — and there were many — to blackmail us in the usual way that railroad corporations have been blackmailed, found no S3mipathy with any jury along the line of the road.” During the eighties Texas was just passing from the condition of a frontier where law was frequently enforced by the individual, according as his hand was quick and his eye true, and where order was a variable quantity. House speaks admiringly of “ those citizens of Texas who died with their boots on — a death which every citizen of Texas of those days coveted.” We must picture him, accordingly, as a man who spent his early years not merely in Eastern colleges and schools, in cotton-farming and politics, but as the com- panion and friend of the older generation — " that intrepid band,” he calls them, “ that made Texas what she is to-day. I make obeisance to them ! Nothing daunted them. They tore a principality from a sovereign state and moulded a trackless wilderness into a great common- wealth. These men were the heroes of my childhood ; and now when I am growing old and have seen many men and many lands, I go back to them and salute them, for I find they are my heroes still.” With the younger generation of frontiersmen House was on close personal terms, and for a while, after returning from college and beginning his business as planter, he lived their life. One of the oldest and perhaps the best of these friends was the noted and picturesque Ranger, Captain Bill McDonald, whose career House felt to be so 22 BACKGROUNDS typical of the Texas of those days that he could not rest until it was put into a book. “ I wanted to have Sidney Porter ( 0 . Henry) do it. I had it in mind that he should write twelve stories, each representing some incident in Bill’s life. I wrote to Porter, whom I had known while he lived in Texas ; but the letter was held back by his mother-in-law until a few weeks afterwards, when she visited him at his summer home at New Ground, Long Island. In the meantime, not having heard from Porter, I got in touch with Albert Bigelow Paine through James Creelman, whom I knew, and he undertook the work. . . .• I received a letter from Porter after Paine had undertaken the task, in which he said he would have liked to have done it, for it would have been a ' labour of love.’ “ I was amused at Paine when Captain Bill arrived in New York. Paine and I were waiting for him at the New Amsterdam Hotel, at Fourth Avenue and Twenty-First Street, which was convenient to the Players’ Club, where Paine intended to stay while writing the memoirs. It was a cold, wet night, and Bill came in with his ‘ slicker ’ and big Stetson hat. We went upstairs with him. He took off his coat, pulled from one side his *45 and from the other his automatic. He did this just as an ordinary man takes out his keys and knife. I explained to Paine that Bill had to carry his artillery in tMs way in order to be thoroughly ballasted — that he would have difficulty in walking without it. “ At this time Paine was writing the life of Mark Twain and was living most of the time at Mark Twain’s home, which was then in lower Fifth Avenue. Mr. Clemens invited us to dinner one evening. I could not go because of a previous engagement, but dropped in later. When I arrived, Mark and Bill were playing billiards and it was amusing to see Bill sight his cue just as if it were a rifle and, three times out of four, send his ball ofl the table. It entertained Mr. Clemens immensely. When we went upstairs, Clemens ran and Bill ran after, BACKGROUNDS 23 as if to catcli him, but did not do so. Bill winked at me and said, ‘ I believe the old man really thinks I could not catch him.’ BUI is as lean and as agile as a panther. “ Another time Paine invited Bill and me to take dinner with him at the Players’. I found Bill in the lobby of the hotel without a collar. I said, ‘ Bill, you have no collar on.’ He reached up his hand and replied, ‘ That’s so ; I forgot it.’ However, he made no move to get one. Paine came in a few minutes later and asked if he were ready to go to dinner. BUI replied that he was. Paine then said, ‘ Captain, you have no collar on.’ Bill remarked, ‘ My God Almighty, can’t a man go to dinner in New York without a collar ? ’ Paine did not press the matter further and Captain Bill went to the Club just as he was, much to the amusement of everybody there. " In my early boyhood I knew many of the BUI McDonald type, dthough he was perhaps the flower of them all. I knew personally many of the famous desperadoes, men who had kiUed so many that they had almost ceased to count their victims. . . . “ There were two types, of so-called ‘ killers ’ — one that murdered simply for the pure love of it, and others that killed because it was in their way of duty. Bill McDonald belonged to this latter class. So also did Blue-eyed Captain McKinney of the Rangers, whom I knew in my ranching days in south-west Texas. " McKinney was finally ambushed and killed, as almost every sheriff of La Salle County was killed during that particular period. Whenever I went to our ranch, I was never certain that I would return home alive. Feuds were always going on, and in some of these our ranch was more or less involved.” Fort Bend and Brazoria Counties, where the elder House’s plantation lay, seemed to be the breeding- place for bad men. “ They were different from the ordinary desperado, and only killed upon insult or fancied insult. Duels 24 BACKGROUNDS were frequently fought on the plantation and were always deadly. I recall two in particular. George Tarver's brother and his room-mate had some slight quarrel concerning the bed they occupied in common. I think the room-mate put his muddy boots on the bedspread. ‘ Here, you can’t put those boots on the bed,’ said George’s brother. ‘ I can if I choose,’ was the reply. There was only one possible outcome to the debate. They went out, stood back to back, counted aloud, walking ten paces, wheeled, fired, and advanced upon one another. They fell dead almost in each other’s arms, both having several mortal wounds. They were good friends a quarter of an hour before the duel. "Another incident I remember. Jim Thompson fancied that some man, whose name I have forgotten, was making fun of him. He demanded that the man get his shotgun. The man hesitated and made a faint apology, which Thompson would not accept. The man then got his shotgun, stepped out of the house, both fired, and Thompson killed him instantly. Thompson was missed by a few inches. They were so close together when they fired that the buckshot went almost like a rifle ball, having no time to scatter. " I asked Thompson why he was so insistent upon fighting. He said he knew that if he had not called the man to account, he would not have been able to live at Areola and would have been branded as a coward. It was necessary, he thought, either to kill or be killed, and without further argument. . . . " I can hardly realize that so short a while ago we lived in an atmosphere where such things seemed proper and even a matter of course. I was often with men whom I knew would surely be killed soon, and perhaps at a time I was with them. " Governor Hogg^ did more than any executive in Texas to break up this habit of public killing. ... He also broke up strikes during his administration. Cap- tain Bill McDonald, of the Ranger Service, was the ' Governor of Texas frota 1890 to 1894. BACKGROUNDS 25 instrument he used. Hogg sent word to the leaders that if they continued to uncouple cars, or to do any- thing that might interfere with the movement of trains, he would shoot holes through them big enough to see through. When Bill conveyed this to the ringleaders and presented himself as the instrument through which it was to be done, lawlessness ceased. “ The nearest I ever came to killing a man was in Breckenridge, Colorado. It was in 1879, when the town was merely a mining camp. I had gone to Colorado at the request of Whitney Newton, a college friend who was in Breckenridge at that time buying gold dust and sending it to the Denver Mint by special messengers, the express companies refusing to carry it because of the danger of robbery. “ In going to Breckenridge in those days, one left the main line of the railway at the little station of Como, which at that time had but one house. A so-called stage carried one from there to the mining camp. There is no need to describe it, for it was like all other camps of that sort-rough men, and rougher women, gambling, drinking, and kiUing. I was in a saloon, talking to a man whom I had known in Texas, when the incident I speak of occurred. A big, brawny individual came into the room and began to abuse me in violent terms. I had never seen the man before and could not imagine why he was doing this. I retreated, and he followed. I had my overcoat on at the time and had my hand on my six-shooter in my pocket and cocked it. The owner of the saloon jumped over the bar between us. In five seconds more I would have killed him. An explana- tion followed which cleared up the mystery. He had taken me for someone else against whom he had a grudge, and whom he had seen but once. I learned later that he was a popular ex-sheriff of Summit County and that if I had killed him I should have been lynched within the hour. " It always amuses me when I see the bad men in plays depicted as big, rough fellows with their trousers BACKGROUNDS 26 in their boots and six-shooters buckled around their waists. As a matter of fact, the bad men I have been used to in southern Texas were as unlike this as day- light from dark. They were usually gentle, mild- mannered, mild-spoken, and often delicate-looking men. They were invariably polite, and one not knowing the species would be apt to misjudge them to such an extent that a rough word or an insult would sometimes be offered. This mistake of judgment was one that could never be remedied, for a second opportunity was never given." In later years House expressed intense amusement at the oaths and objurgations of Parisian taxi-drivers, which, however violent, never seemed to result in physical encounter. “ In Texas,” he said, “ it was the reverse. No words were wasted. Frequently the first symptom of mild disapproval would be a blow or revolver-shot. People praise us Southerners for our courteous de- meanour ; we learned it in a school of necessity." Ill It would be a mistake to picture House’s early life as merely that of the frontiersman. Quiet and unobtru- sive as one of the mild-mannered desperadoes he describes, and as courageous, he loved to meet every variety of individual and he had a gift for bringing him- self into touch with the Rangers and men of the back districts.^ He loved the open country, the smeU of the camp-fire, and the meal cooked over its embers. But his time was spent mostly in the towns and especially in the capital. He knew the business men of Texas, the > S. V. Edwaxds, Captain of Rangers, wrote House, May 24, 1902 : " If you want anything in this new district all you have to do is indicate it. . . . I am with you to a finish in any old thing.” BACKGROUNDS 27 editors, lawyers, and educators ; later they tried to make him a trustee of the University of Texas. The Mayor of Houston writes to him as “ My dear Ed.” and the Governor signs himself “ Your friend.” His father had bequeathed to him a social position in the State which he enjoyed maintaining and develop- ing, so that, apart from the frequent journeys that he made to Europe, he came constantly into contact with persons of interest. The home in Houston was the place where nearly every distinguished visitor that came to Texas was entertained, Jefferson Davis among the rest. “ Father counted among his friends,” wrote House, ” the rich and the poor, the humble and the great.” The younger House followed in his footsteps. After moving to Austin, he built a large house which became the focus of the social and political life of the region. ” The large veranda to the south [wrote House] was the scene, perhaps, of more political conferences than any similar place in Texas. It was there that the clans congregated. I had long made it a rule not to visit, and it was understood that if anyone desired to see me, it must be at my home. I did this not only to conserve my strength, but because it enabled me to work under more favourable conditions. I had an office which I was seldom in, and latterly I refused to make any appointments there whatsoever. This necessarily led to much entertaining, and our house was constantly filled with guests. Those days and guests are among the pleasantest recollections of my life. “ Many distinguished people, passing through Austin, from time to time were our guests. Among those that I admired most was Dr. Charles W. Eliot of Harvard. His life and devotion to public service were a revelation to me. He seemed to regulate his life in a way to get the maximum of service for the public good. 28 BACKGROUNDS "Baron d’Estoumelles de Constant of France was another guest whose society I enjoyed while he was in Texas. I remember when leaving me at the station he remarked : ‘ My friends in Paris would be amazed if they could hear me say I was leaving Austin, Texas, with keen regret.’ ’’ Apart from the interest which he took in men and in their activities, a further characteristic should be noted: constant and omnivorous reading. This fact is to be deduced less from his correspondence and papers than from the existence of a private library which he developed and enlarged without cessation. It is an illuminating instance of the man’s real tastes that when, after the Paris Peace Conference, he had made a book- plate, he omitted in its composition all references to his diplomatic or political career; he chose as salient features ^bove the horse, dog, and camp-fire, the gun and powder-flask, reminders of his early life — an open hearth and books. The books which he read were of all sorts, poetry and essays, but chiefly biography, history, and political science. The main strength of Colonel House in his later political career was, of course, his understanding of human nature, his ability to enter into friendly relations with all t3^es ; but it would be a mistake to overlook the strength he derived from books. In such an atmosphere House began the career in politics which soon became his real vocation, and it was during those years that he underwent the political schooling that prepared him to assume a guiding rfile in national and international affairs. With aU the cosmopolitan tastes which he developed by constant travel, and with every intention of entering the arena of national poHtics, he regarded his life in Texas as a necessary and delightful prologue. Before he could BACKGROUNDS 29 acquire national influence, he must win prestige in his own State. An ardent Democrat, he saw in Texas, with its tremendous influence in the party, an ideal spring-board. A liberal and progressive, he could throw himself into the fight for liberal and progressive legislation which Governor Hogg — “ the inimitable Hogg,” House calls him— was directing. He was ready for the opportunity, which was not slow to knock upon the door. IV The year 1892 was one of politico-social ferment in Europe and the United States ; the forces of liberal progressivism were everywhere arrayed against reaction. In Texas the struggle was sharp. Governor Hogg, whose courage and force had made him a dominating influence in the State, was the centre of the storm ; and because of his advanced ideas, many of which found incorporation in sweeping legislative reforms, he had aroused against himself a powerful group which protested against his nomination for a second term. The fight offered to the young House the opportunity for which he had been waiting. " House was not nominally manager of the Hogg campaign,” writes T. W. Gregory, later Attorney-General, who was then active in Texas politics, “ but was chiefly responsible for the organization, and to him Hogg owed a large share of his victory.” ^ For ten years House had watched the mechanics of State politics, pondered the mistakes of politicians, developed personal contacts. Already he possessed the technique necessary for the conduct 1 Manuscript memorandum communicated to the author, August 1924. 30 BACKGROUNDS of a campaign, and it was infused with an enthusiasm for reform. “ When I found that the railroads and the entire corporate interests of Texas were combining to defeat Hogg [wrote House], I enlisted actively in his behalf. Although he had known me but a short time, we had many times discussed political ways and means, and he asked me and the then State Health Of&cer to take charge of his campaign. Later the burden of it fell on me. We selected a committee and got my good friend General W. R. Hamby to act as chairman. That campaign was a battle royal. We had no money, and every daily paper in Texas was against us. Hogg’s opponent was Judge George Clark, of Waco. When the Clarkites found we had sufficient votes to nominate Hogg, they bolted the convention and nominated Clark. The Republicans endorsed him and we had another hard fight at the election, but Hogg won by a decisive majority. It was a bitter fight and the wounds lasted many years. It was the first firm stand the people of any American State had taken against the privileged classes, and it attracted attention throughout the Union. “ I felt that Governor Hogg’s confidence in me was a great compliment, because of my youth and, as far as anyone knew, because of my lack of political experience. " So in politics I began at the top rather than at the bottom, and I have been doing since that day pretty much what I am doing now— that is, advising and helping wherever I might.” With the success of the Hogg campaign, the political position of House in Texas evidently became assured. “ From 1892 to 1902 [Mr. Gregory writes] House took continual interest in the elections and the admin- ' istration of Texas. . . . From the first he displayed that quality which made him of such value to the successive BACKGROUNDS 31 Governors and to President Wilson, an almost uncanny ability to foretell the effects which any measure would have upon public opinion. He was offered by them and dechned many positions of honour and power, and he might have been Governor himself. . . , “ In 1894 he managed Culberson’s successful cam- paign. He was again in charge when Culberson was re-elected in 1896. In 1898 and 1900 he directed the successful campaigns of Major Joseph D. Sayers. He was active in the Lanham campaigns of 1902 and 1904.” Apart from the fact that House himself consistently refused office, one notes especially, in the first place, that he was invariably successful in his political ventures, and in the second place, that he did not rely upon a “ machine,” for House's candidate for Governor was almost invariably opposed by his predecessor. It was a curious manifestation of electoral skill, political judg- ment, or good luck, according as the reader may choose. Thus in 1894 Governor Hogg and House disagreed upon his successor. The Governor supported the veteran Senator Reagan, who had served in Jefferson Davis’s Cabinet ; House was behind the State’s Attorney-General, Charles A. Culberson. Both were liberals. As always in Texas, the real struggle was at the Democratic Con- vention, where in addition to Reagan and Culberson two other candidates appeared — one of them as leader of the reactionary forces in the party which had been suppressed by Hogg. House pointed out the danger of division in the liberal camp. AU the reform legisla- tion of the past four years was threatened, and it could be saved only if one of the two liberals withdrew. The final interview between the Governor and his recalcitrant adviser must have been picturesque. Hogg was immense, loud, commandmg, with his “ Young man, you’U do as I teU you, if you know what’s good 32 BACKGROUNDS for you.” House, of slight build and quiet manner, speaking almost in a monotone, was inflexible in his argument that liberalism in Texas depended upon the union of the progressive forces und that to secure it Reagan must withdraw. It ended with Hogg going to Reagan, who magnanimously agreed to retire in order to avoid the split in the liberal group. ” Texas never produced a nobler citizen than Judge John H. Reagan,” wrote House. ” He was honest, he was able, and he was fearless.” Doubtless it was easier for House to pass this high estimate upon his erstwhile opponent, in that his retire- ment paved the way for the nomination of Culberson. Great was the astonishment of the convention when the man chosen to nominate Reagan, after beginning with the conventional eulogy of his subject, proceeded in the peroration to announce his withdrawal and to second Culberson himself. House stayed in the convention until his man had received a majority, then walked over to the club to congratulate him. It was characteristic of his foresight that he had by him the expert accountant Major Edward Sammons, who could add fractions in his head, so that in the convention (where fractional votes of delegations are common) he loiew the result some minutes before the clerks themselves. “ The truth is, as I told you,” wrote Culberson to House, August 17, 1894, " I could not have won except through your splendid management.” ” This is the only time in my political career [wrote House] that I openly assumed the chairmanship of a campaign. It has been my habit to put someone else nominally at the head, so that I could do the real work undisturbed by the demands which are made upon a chairman. BACKGROUNDS “ The public is almost childish in its acceptance of the shadow for the substance. Each chairman of the campaigns which I directed received the publicity and the applause of both the press and the people during and after the campaign had been brought to a successful conclusion. They passed out of public notice within a few months, or at most within a year ; and yet when the next campaign came around, the public and the press as eagerly accepted another figure-head. . , . “ In every campaign I have insisted that the candi- date whose fortunes I directed should in no instance make any pre-election promises, either directly, indirectly, or otherwise. I pointed out that it was bad morals and worse politics. The opposition usually promised everything, and it was not infrequent that two men would meet that had been promised the same office.” Four years later a similar situation developed when Governor Culberson, after a second term, supported his Attorney-General, M. M. Crane, while House opposed him — largely on the ground that the Attorney-General- ship was becoming a stepping-stone to the Governorship. ” I did not believe it was a good precedent to follow,” he wrote, ” because it would cause an Attorney-General to become something of a demagogue, perhaps uncon- sciously but nevertheless surely.” He agreed, therefore, to direct the political fortunes of a Texas Congressman who during the entire campaign remained in Washington, Major Joseph Sayers. ” Culberson urged me not to do this [wrote House], declaring that defeat was certain. ... I did not heed his advice. It looked as if it would be necessary to do what was done in the Culberson-Reagan fight four years before, and that was, to break down the organization which had been built up during the previous administra- tion. This was not disagreeable to me, for I was never a believer in political machines. 1—3 34 BACKGROUNDS “ In the Culberson race I had to overcome the Hogg organization which I had helped to build up. In the Sayers-Crane campaign it was necessary to defeat the Culberson organization. ... In justice to that organiza- tion, it pleases me to say that most of them came to offer their services in behalf of Sayers if I demanded it. This I did in no instance, advising them to go where their sympathies and interests lay. “ The two other candidates in this campaign were Lieutenant-Governor Jester and Colonel Wynne of Fort Worth. At the start I assumed that Crane had eighty per cent, of the chances for success. However, there were no single counties in Texas he could call clearly his own, while there were many counties that could not be taken from Sayers. “ We had our friends in these Sayers counties caU their primaries early. The Crane forces saw what we were doing, but were unable to respond in kind because they had no counties which they were absolutely certain of carrying. The result was that when county after county declared for Sayers and we had practically reached the end of our strength. Crane in a fit of depression withdrew from the race. “ The Dallas News called me over the telephone at twelve o’clock at night and said that Crane had sent in his written withdrawal. They asked me if I had any statement to make. I replied I would make one in the morning. I lay awake for nearly an hour, enjoying the victory, and then went back to sleep. In the morning before I arose I reached for one of my pockets, secured an old envelope, and wrote in pencil our opinion of Crane’s withdrawal. I took occasion to comphment Crane upon his great patriotism in bowing to the will of the people, and I declared that it was certain that Mr. Jester and Colonel Wynne would not be lacking in as high patriotic motives and that the electorate of Texas could look forward with certainty to their early with- drawal. The result was that both Jester and Wynne began to deny they had any intention of withdrawing. BACKGROUNDS 35 But the deed was done, and Jester actually withdrew within a few weeks and Wynne did not stand the pres- sure much longer.” Major Sayers displayed at the moment a gratitude and modesty which the elect of the people are not always prone to manifest. “ Your success in the management of my canvass [he wrote House, May 17, 1898] has been unprecedented in the history of political campaigns. You have taken a disorganized and probably a minority force at the outset and driven from the field the candidate of an organized majority. You have not only done this, but you have also held in line the lukewarm and trivial of our own party and have made them brave, vigorous, confident, and aggressive. Your generalship has indeed been superb, and considering that your own candidate was absent from the State and has not made a political speech outside of his own district in more than twenty years . . . your success has been without a parallel in Texas politics. ... I have felt that it would be wise in me to leave the entire matter to yourself.” The situation was not less piquant in that Culberson, who opposed House’s candidate for Governor, was him- self running for the United States Senate and asked House to direct his campaign. The latter acceded, and the election of Culberson proved to be the beginning of a senatorial career that lasted a quarter of a century. V House’s political activities in Texas were by no means confined to elections. Under both Hogg and Culberson he took a constant interest in legislation and gradually came to occupy the same position in the State 36 BACKGROUNDS as he was later to assume in national affairs. He believed first in the necessity of reform, and next in an intelligent and reasoned foundation for reform measures, and he spared no study or effort in the preparation of bills. His pride in the accomplishment of the Texas Governors was great, and perhaps not unjustified. " House was always a progressive [writes Gregory], and in many respects a pronounced radical, almost invariably being more advanced in his ideas than the persons he was working with. This genuine interest in progressive legislation accounts to a large degree for his interest in politics. He wanted to see advanced ideas placed upon the statute books. It is interesting to note that, although rated as one of the wealthy men of Texas, he was invariably aligned politically on the side of the plain people and*^ against most of those with whom he was socially intimate.” ” In Texas I worked, I think [wrote House], not only for Texas itself, but also in the hope that the things we worked for there would be faken up by the country at large ; and in this I was gratified. The great measures which Governor Hogg advocated, like the Railroad Commission, the Stock and Bond law, were largely written into national law later. Texas was the pioneer of suc- cessful progressive legislation, and it was all started during Hogg’s administrations. ... I see it stated from time to time that California, Wisconsin, and other States were the first to impress the progressive movement upon the nation. This is not true ; Texas was the first in the field, and the others followed. “ Even in municipal reform, Texas led the way. Galveston initiated the commission form of government, and nearly all the other Texas cities of importance fol- lowed. It was then taken up in Iowa and I often hear of the ‘ Dubuque idea.’ As a matter of fact, they took over the idea from Texas. " Governor Hogg, I think, we wiU have to place as BACKGROUNDS 37 the foremost Texan, giving Sam Houston the second place. He did not have the fine, analytical mind that Culberson has, but he possessed a force, vision, and courage to carr)^ out, that few men I have known possess. With Hogg it was always a pleasure to enter a fight, for it was certain that there would be no compromise until victory crowned the effort. He was afraid of nothing and gloried in a conflict. “It is a great pity that he did not go into national life when he left the gubernatorial chair. His proper place would have been in the House of Representatives, although he might have gone to the Senate had he so desired.” House’s relations with Governor Culberson w^ere even closer than with Hogg. Many people have wondered how it was possible for the Colonel later to find a way to make himself indispensable to President Wilson and by what magic he maintained himself as the Presiden:’? unofficial adviser. There was less of magic than of experience, for during his fexas days he had been doing exactly the same sort of thing for the Governors. “ During Culberson’s terms as Governor [he recorded] I devoted myself as constantly to his administration of public affairs as I have since to Woodrow Wilson’s as President. I went to his office at the Capitol nearly every day, and sometimes continued my work there until nightfall.” House’s files are fiUed with letters like the following : " Knowing that you have a great deal more influence with the Governor-elect than anyone else, and as I ask nothing for myself, I venture to write you in behalf of a friend of mine,” etc. And from the holder of an appointive office : “ I presume the crisis will approach 38 BACKGROUNDS very soon in matters political. When it comes, please remember me in your prayers." The Governor evidently relied upon House both as political confidant and personal friend. So much is made clear by the numerous letters that passed between them. “ You must take charge of things here [wrote Culber- son] and organize the work. My room will be open to you at all hours.” And at the opening of a legislative session : “ It is impossible for me to be in Austin prior to the organization of the legislature, and in fact I do not know when I can get there. This busy time I wish you would seek the Speaker, whoever he may be, and talk with him about the committees on taxation and revenue, finance and contingent expenses.” "In my day [ran a letter from Culberson, dated February i, 1895] I have had many friends, but you have been more than any to me. . . . There is nothing in the way of happiness and prosperity and honour good enough for you in my view, yet I hope for you all that is attainable.” After Culberson entered the Senate, the friendship evidently persisted, for he writes to House : “I wish I could see you to-day and have a long talk. I feel that way often these days. . . . Take a pencil and write me confidentially how I stand with the Democrats in the State now. Give me the thing straight, no matter how the chips may fall.” And when a certain bill came up in the Senate : " What do you think of it ? Write me fully and at your earliest convenience, because I want to study it.” BACKGROUNDS 39 It was Governor Hogg who provided House with the title of " Colonel/’ by appointing him, entirely without the recipient’s suspicion, to his staff. The staff officer’s uniform could be, and was, bestowed upon an ancient and grateful darkey, but the title proved to be adhesive. There is a certain poetic justice, almost classical in character, to be seen in the punishment thus laid upon House, who spent his Hfe in avoiding office and titles, and during the World War exercised as much ingenuity in escaping European Orders as in his diplomatic negotia- tions : henceforth, despite his protests, he became and remained " Colonel House,” or even “ The Colonel.” With the succeeding Governors, House’s relations were not so close, but it is obvious that in 1902 his influence in Texas affairs still dominated. He was the directing spirit in the election of Lanham in that year, who wrote to him in gratitude for " your discreet advice and promptness to suggest to me. Always say just what you think, for it will be received in the spirit tendered.” And again : " The fact that your influence was for me has been of incalculable benefit to me. . . . The knowledge of your friendship for me will also deter other entries into the field. ... I need and appreciate your counsel.” At the same period a letter from Con- gressman, later Postmaster-General, Burleson indicates that it had become a state tradition for House to draw up the party platform. “ I tender my congratulations upon the sldll you have displayed in drafting the platform. ... It is such a great improvement, from the standpoint of brevity, over those you have given us in the past, that I think the State is to be felicitated upon the prospects of its adoption.” 40 BACKGROUNDS But the end of this phase of House’s career was approaching. “ When another election drew near,” he wrote, “ I refused to interest myself in any way.” We find him asked by both candidates for his advice, which " I gave to each of them— advice which in no way con- flicted.” Apparently the one heeded the advice, while the other " was so certain of success that he left his campaign to be run in the old slipshod way, to find himself defeated.” VI " I had grown thoroughly tired of the position I occupied in Texas,” wrote House. He had, it is true, the satisfaction of participating in the administration of a great commonwealth ; ten years of Texas success had been admirable preparation. They gave him the political experience and prestige he needed. But now he felt equipped for a broader field. “Go to the front where you belong,” wrote Governor Hogg in 1900. “ During all these years [recorded House] I had never for a moment overlooked the national situation, and it was there that my real interest lay. In 1896 I was ready to take part in national affairs. My power in Texas was sufficient to have given me the place I desired in the national councils of the party. “ The nomination of Bryan in 1896 and the free silver issue made me feel the unwisdom of entering national party politics under such conditions. I therefore bided my time.” He proved that he knew how to wait. Three national campaigns followed in which the Democratic Party was dominated by Mr. Bryan or by Eastern conservatives, and House stood aloof. In each campaign overtures were made with the purpose of giving him a responsible BACKGROUNDS 41 share in its management, but on each occasion he evaded them. The Democrats must embrace the liberal creed, he insisted, but it must be cleansed of the Bryan financial heresies. None the less. House came more and more into touch with the national Democratic leaders and with Bryan himself, and established a close personal friendship. “ Mr. Bryan’s daughter, Grace, had not been well and he wished to spend a winter south. Governor Hogg and I undertook to arrange a home for the Bryans practically within the same grounds as ours. ... So he, Mrs. Bryan, and the children lived there next to us during the winter, and I had many opportunities to discuss with him national affairs and the coming campaign. It was the winter, I think, of 1898 and 1899. “ I found Mrs. Bryan very amenable to ad\ice and suggestion, but Mr. Bryan was as wildly impracticable as ever. I do not believe that anyone ever succeeded in changing his mind upon any subject that he had determined upon. ... I believe he feels that his ideas are God-given and are not susceptible to the mutability of those of the ordinary human being. ‘‘ He often told me that a man that did not believe in ' the free and unlimited coinage of silver at 16-1 was either a fool or a knave.’ He was so convinced of this that he was not susceptible to argument.” In 1900 Bryan went down to defeat for the second time. In 1904 the quarrels of the Eastern and Western Democrats would have ensured disaster even in the face of a weaker candidate than Roosevelt. “ I returned to Texas,” wrote House, " discouraged over the prospects of the Democratic Party ever being able to rehabilitate itself.” In 1908 came the third Bryan candidacy and defeat. But already the Democratic sun was about to rise. 42 BACKGROUNDS The difficulties in the Republican Party, which threatened under Roosevelt, became more obvious in the succeeding administration. They were intensified after Roosevelt’s return from travel abroad by his own outburst of dis- content at the policies adopted by Mr. Taft, whose selection as President he had himself demanded. The apparent control of the Republican Party by the Old Guard, alleged to be tied up to the “ interests,” the unsatisfied demand for measures of social reform, the threat of the new Progressive movement in the heart of the party itself, pointing to a possible split— all gave hope to the Democrats. That this hope was not entirely illusory seemed indicated by the state and congressional elections of 1910, when the political pendulum swung far in their direction. Colonel House was watching the opportunity. The great problem was to find a leader. In 1910 he came East from Texas and, like Diogenes, sought a man. “ I began now to look dbout [he wrote] for a proper candidate for the Democratic nomination for President. In talking with Mr. Bryan, he had mentioned Mayor Gaynor of New York as the only man in the East whom he thought measured up to the requirements. ” I felt sure the nomination should go to the East, and I also felt it was practically impossiWe to nominate or elect a man that Mr. Bryan opposed. I therefore determined to look Mr. Gaynor over with the thought of him as a possibility. “ I used my good friend James Creelman to bring us together. Creelman was nearer to Gaynor than any other man. He arranged a dinner at the Lotus Club, at which only the three of us were present, and it was a delightful affair. The food and the wine were of the best, for Creelman was a connoisseur in this line. The dinner lasted until after twelve o’clock. I bad been told that Gaynor was brusque even to rudeness, but I BACKGROUNDS 43 did not find him so in the slightest. He knew perfectly well what the dinner was for, and he seemed to try to put his best side to the front He showed a knowledge of public affairs altogether beyond my expectations and greater, indeed, than that of any public man that I at that time knew personally who was a possibility.” “ I proceeded to follow up this dinner by bringing such friends as I thought advisable in touch with him. “ One day Creelman and I went to the Mayor’s office by appointment, to introduce Senator Culberson and Senator R. M. Johnson, editor of the Houston Post and Democratic National Committeeman from Texas I got Culberson and Johnson to second my invitation to Gaynor to go to Texas during the winter and address the Texas legislature. Gaynor consented. When I went to Texas I asked some members of the legislature to introduce a resolution inviting him to address them. This was done and the invitation telegraphed to him. A newspaper reporter of one of the small Texas dailies sent Gaynor a telegram asking him about it, Gaynor telegraphed back something to the effect that he had no notion of coming to Texas to address the legislature and had never heard of any such proposal.” Reasonable explanation of this surprising volte-face on the part of Mayor Ga3mor has never been advanced. It may have been that he failed to appreciate the value of the support of Texas ~a vital misjudgment, as the Baltimore Convention of 1912 proved. Or it may have been merely another example of the erratic and whimsical nature of the Mayor which did so much to vitiate his undeniably statesmanlike qualities. Colonel House felt certain, in any case, that Gaynor’ s blindness to the opportunity he had created, indicated a lack of political sagacity. “ I wiped Gaynor from my political slate [he wrote], for I saw he was impossible. I was confirmed in this 44 BACKGROUNDS resolution when Dix was nominated for Governor of New York, which I wanted Gaynor to accept. Some of the Mayor’s other friends thought that it would be a mistake to accept the nomination, that to be Mayor of New York meant greater honour and more power than to be Governor of the State. I contended that the people would hesitate to nominate or elect a mayor of a city to the Presidency, but if he were elected Governor he would become the logical candidate.” House continued his search. He had carefully con- sidered Senator Culberson, and frequently discussed with him the possibility of the presidential nomination. But Culberson’s health was poor. Furthermore, House believed that he was too purely a Southerner to make a successful race. The candidate must come, if possible, from the East ; he must attract the West by his liberalism. “ I now turned to Woodrow Wilson [House wrote], then Governor of New Jersey, as being the only man in the East who in every wiy measured up to the office for which he was a candidate.” House had never met Wilson, but his attention had been called to him by Wilson’s ambitious reform pro- gramme in New Jersey and the success with which he was driving it through the legislature. He studied his background, which was admirable in that he had no political record and thus started with no political enemies, while his troubled career at Princeton seemed to label him as an opponent of aristocratic privilege. He studied his speeches, which he believed should be classed with the finest political rhetoric extant. There was obviously in him the capacity for moral leadership. Late in the year House returned to Texas convinced that he had found his man, although as yet he had never BACKGROUNDS 45 met him. “ I decided to do what I could,” he writes, “ to further Governor Wilson’s fortunes. I spoke to all my political friends and following, and lined them up one after another. This was in the winter of 1910-1911.” Thereafter we find House making arrangements to bring the Governor to Texas, in clearing up doubts of his party regularity, in securing the aid of Culberson and striving for that of Bryan. A letter to E. S. Martin, editor of Life, makes it plain that House’s support of Wilson as yet rested less upon his personal admiration for him than upon the conviction of Wilson’s availability. “ The trouble with getting a candidate for President [he wrote, August 30, 1911] is that the man that is best fitted for the place cannot be nominated and, if nominated, could probably not be elected. The people seldom take the man best fitted for the job ; therefore it is necessary to work for the best man who can be nominated and elected, and just now Wilson seems to be that man.” Thus in his work for Wilson, House was serving the Democratic cause rather than the man, whom he had never seen. One afternoon late in November, Governor Wilson called alone on Colonel House at the Hotel Gotham, where the latter was staying. From that moment began the personal friendship which was so powerfully to affect the events of the following years. CHAPTER III BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP It looks to me as if they depended too much upon speech-making and noisy demonstrations, and not enough upon organization. House to Wtlson, August 28, 1912 I W oodrow WILSON and Colonel House first met on November 24, 1911, a year before the presidential election. Already House had decided definitely that circumstances made of Wilson the most available candidate, one who could arouse the enthusiasm of the voters in the electoral campaign, and one who, if elected, possessed the courage and the imagination to lead a vigorous reform administration. For these were the two qualities which the Colonel believed essential to a successful President. Governor Wilson, in his turn, must have found his curiosity piqued by the friendly efforts of the unseen House, word of which had been brought to him during the summer. Without experience in national politics, he knew little or nothing of the career of House in Texas, nor of his relations there with the successive Governors and with Bryan. But he appreciated the skill with which House, working through Senator Culberson, had disposed of the attacks on Wilson’s party regularity that threatened to destroy his candidacy even while in the em- bryonic stage ; and he was impressed by the success of his address in Texas which House and Gregory had arranged. 46 BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP 47 This beginning of what Sir Horace Plunkett later called “ the strangest and most fruitful personal alliance in human history,” should properly have taken place under more dramatic auspices. The small hotel room where they met did not add glamour to the occasion and neither could guess what the political future held in store for them. But each evidently experienced an instinctive personal liking for the other which ripened immediately into genuine friendship. The first impres- sions of Wilson can only be deduced from the almost affectionate tone of the letters that he wrote to House after the interview. Those of the Colonel have been preserved in more definite form. “ He came alone to the Gotham quite promptly at four [recorded House], and we talked for an hour. He had an engagement to meet Phelan, afterwards Senator from California, at five o’clock, and expressed much regret that he could not continue our conversation. We arranged, however, to meet again within a few days, when at my invitation he came to dine with me. ” Each time after that we met at the Gotham, as long as I remained in New York that autumn and winter and whenever he came to the city. “ From that first meeting and up to to-day [1916], I have been in as close touch with Woodrow Wilson as with any man I have ever known. The first hour we spent together proved to each of us that there was a sound basis for a fast friendship. We found ourselves in such complete sympathy, in so many ways, that we soon learned to know what each was thinking without either having expressed himself. “ A few weeks after we met and after we had ex- changed confidences which men usually do not exchange except after years of friendship, I asked him if he realized that we had only known one another for so short a time. He replied, ‘ My dear friend, we have known one another always.’ And I think this is true.” 48 BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP It is curious to note that it was the personal amiability of Mr. Wilson, rather than his intellectual qualities or political ideas, which impressed House at the outset. He thus reported this first interview to his brother-in- law : Colonel House io Dr. S. E. Mezes'^ New York, November 2$, 1911 Dear Sidney ; I had a delightful visit from Woodrow Wilson yester- day afternoon, and he is to dine with me alone next Wednesday. ... I am glad that he has arrived, and we had a perfectly bully time. He came alone, so that we had an oppor- tunity to try one another out. He is not the biggest man I have ever met, but he is one of the pleasantest and I would rather play with him than any prospective candidate I have seen. From what I had heard, I was afraid that he had to have his hats made to order ; but I saw not the slightest evidence of it. . . . Never before have I found both the man and the opportunity. Fraternally yours E. M. H. Writing in November to Senator Culberson, House expressed his thorough satisfaction with Wilson as a candidate and solidified the support which the influential Texan Senator was already prepared to offer. The more I see of Governor Wilson the better I like him,” said House, “ and I think he is going to be a man one can advise with some degree of satisfaction. This, you know, you could never do with Mr. Bryan.” Wilson’s amenability to advice at this period per- ^ Then President of the University of Texas, later President of the College of the City of New York^ BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP 49 mitted an important development which House suggested and carried through. The Governor had taken as his chief text for campaign speeches the political control of privileged interests under Republican Administrations. He had not, however, emphasized the importance of the real stronghold of privilege and the means by which it might be attacked. If Wilson were to pose as the champion of the “ common man,” he must not overlook the tariff. “ In reading the speeches he was making in 1911 [recorded Colonel House], I noticed he was not stressing the tariff. I called his attention to this and thought it was a mistake. Underwood and Champ Clark were making this a feature. I was sure Wilson could do it better than they, and, since it was becoming a prominent issue of the campaign, I advised striking a strong note on the subject in order at once to call attention to him- self as a fit champion of the Democratic cause. I sug- gested that he let me invite D. F. Houston,^ who had made a lifelong study of the question, to come to New York for consultation. “The Governor agreed to the advisability of this move, and Houston came. I gave a dinner at the Gotham [December 7]. The others present besides Governor Wilson were Houston, Walter Page, McCombs, and Edward S. Martin. I seated Houston by Wilson and arranged it so they could talk afterwards. Before dinner I went over the data which Houston had prepared, and added to it and eliminated from it whatever seemed necessary. This data was afterwards given to Governor Wilson, who based his tariff speeches largely on it.” The effect of Wilson’s tariff speeches was destined to put him in the popular mind as the chief antagonist of 1 Formerly President of tlie University of Texas ; at this time Chan- cellor of Washington University, and later a member of Wilson's Cabinet- 50 BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP Republican policies and therefore the natural repre- sentative of the Democratic point of view. The dinner at the Gotham also assured the enthusiastic support of Mr. Houston. Dr. D. F. Houston to Dr. S. E. Mezes Washington University, St. Louis December ii, 1911 My dear Mezes : ... I have just returned from New York, where I saw a great deal of Mr. House and something of some other people. I will tell you all about it, including the Wilson part of it. Wilson is the straightest-thinking man in public life, and can say what he thinks better than any other man. He may not be a great executive officer, but neither was Lincoln, and I am for him. Wilson is clean, courageous, and disinterested. It will be a liberal education to the community to have Wilson do the talking, such of it as he ought to do and will have to do. I can’t tell you how mfuch I enjoyed my visit with Mr. House, especially on the train. He has a vision. I should like to make him Dictator for a while. . . . Cordially yours D. F. Houston II The various booms for candidates were now beginning to assume definite form. The Wilson movement was regarded more seriously by the practical machine poli- ticians than hitherto, but wiseacres believed that the final struggle would be between Underwood of Alabama and Harmon of Ohio. Both were regarded as repre- senting conservative interests. Champ Clark of Missouri, esteemed a radical, ‘was mentioned by those who realized the difficulty of success with a conservative standard- BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP 51 bearer and who feared that Wilson, after his fight with the New Jersey bosses, would not be inclined to accept the orders of any machine. Both House and Governor Wilson understood that the approval of Bryan would be a factor essential to the success of Wilson’s candidacy, and from the autumn until the time of the nominating convention, House worked ceaselessly to secure it. The intimacy with Mr. Bryan which he had developed in Texas now proved of inestimable value, for he knew exactly which of Wilson’s qualities would attract Bryan and therefore deserved emphasis ; he laid especial weight upon the fact that the reactionary forces in the Democratic Party were fighting both Bryan and Wilson. " Before I left for Texas, in December 1911 [wrote House], it was understood that I should nurse Bryan and bring him around to our way of thinking, if possible. Before Mr. Bryan left New York for Jamaica, he asked me to keep him informed concerning political conditions and to send him such clippings as I thought would be of interest. He said he was taking but few papers : the World, the Washington Post, I think he mentioned, because I wondered why he took either of them, since they were both so antagonistic to him. “ However, his request gave me an opportunity to send him such clippings as I thought would influence him most in our direction.” As early as November, we find House writing to Senator Ciflberson : “ I saw Mr. Bryan just before he sailed for Jamaica and I think I removed several ob- stacles that were in his mind, and I got him in almost as good an attitude as one could desire.” Thereafter House called Bryan’s attention to all the Wilson char- acteristics likely to attract his approval. 52 BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP Colonel House to Mr. W. J. Bryan New York, November 2 ^, 1911 Dear Mr. Bryan : . . . Governor Wilson called yesterday afternoon and was with me for an hour and a half. I am pleased to tell you that when I asked him what he thought of the Supreme Court ruling about which we talked when you were here, he replied in almost the exact terms you used to me. As far as I can see, your positions are identical. He is also opposed to the Aldrich plan,^ but I think you are both wrong there. You will have to convert me the next time I see you. I am inclined to think that Aldrich is trying to give the country a more reasonable and stable system. It seems to me a long way in advance of the money trust which now dominates the credit of the nation. There is some evidence that Mr. Underwood and his friends intend to make a direct issue with you for control of the next convention, and it looks a little as if they were receiving some aid from Champ Clark and his friends. My feeling is that we can lay them low, but we must not lag in the doing of it. . . . Faithfully yours E. M. House New York, December 6, 1911 Dear Mr. Bryan : ... I was called over the telephone last week by a friend of Mr. Hearst, who made an appointment to see me. He said that Mr. Hearst had been out to his country place on Sunday and they had talked about enlisting me in his behalf for the presidential nomination. ' For a central bank. WUson ultimately accepted House’s arguments for centralized control of banking which materialized in the Federal Reserve Act. See Chapter VI. BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP 53 I told him that I was thoroughly committed to Governor Wilson and that, even if I were not, I would advise Mr. Hearst to submerge himself for a while and work within the party for a season. After further conversation it developed that he was grooming himself for a dark horse. I do not know what effect my talk had, but as yet he has made no formal announcement. I learned, too, that he was favourable to Underwood or Champ Clark and was against Governor Wilson. I took lunch with Colonel Harvey yesterday. It is the first time I have met him. I wanted to determine what his real attitude was towards Governor Wilson, but I think I left as much in the dark as ever. He told me that everybody south of Canal Street was in a frenzy against Governor Wilson and said they were bringing all sorts of pressure upon him to oppose him. He said he told them he had an open mind, and that if they could convince him he was a dangerous man he would do so. He said that Morgan was particularly virulent in his opposition to Governor Wilson. I asked him what this was based upon, and he said upon some remark Governor Wilson had made in Morgan’s presence con- cerning the methods of bankers and which Morgan took as a personal reference. He told me that he believed that any amount of money that was needed to defeat Governor Wilson could be readily obtained. He said he would be surprised if they did not put $250,000 in New Jersey alone in order to defeat delegates favourable to his nomination. We are going to try to devise some plan by which we can use this Wall Street opposition to Governor Wilson to his advantage. If the country knows of their determination to defeat him by the free use of money, I am sure it will do the rest. . . . If you can make any suggestions regarding the best way to meet the Wall Street attack, I would greatly appreciate it. 54 BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP From now, letters wiU reach me at Austin, Texas. With kind regards and best wishes for aU of you, I am Faithfully yours E. M. House There was in the foregoing letter a cleverness which might escape the too casual reader. In the form of simple narrative Colonel House underlined the activities of Hearst, who was anathema to Bryan, and emphasized Hearst’s preference for Clark over Wilson; he then indicated the interest Wall Street exhibited in the defeat of Wilson ; and he concluded by an assumption that Bryan would ftaturally align himself with the forces that stimulated the enmity of Hearst and Wall Street. Mr. Bryan evidently wavered. He had opposed Harmon from the first, as a rank reactionary, and he refused to consider Underwood. If Clark were to have the support of the New York group, Bryan might be drawn to Wilson. Mr. W. J. Bryan to Colonel Home Kingston, Jamaica, December 2Z, 1911 My DEAR Mr. House : , . . Am anxious to get back and find out more of the political situation. I shah attend the Washington banquet on the 8th of January and will have a chance to learn how things are shaping up. I am glad Governor Whson recognizes that he has the opposition of Morgan and the rest of WaU Street. If he is nominated it must be by the Progressive Demo- crats, and the more progressive he is the better. The Washington banquet will give him a good chance to speak out against the trusts and the Aldrich currency scheme. Yours very truly W. J. Bryan BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP 55 The Washington banquet, to which he referred, gave a good chance to Bryan himself to exhibit his personal generosity, for just before it Wilson’s opponents published a letter which, while President of Princeton, he had written to Mr. Adrian Joline, some five years previous. In the letter appeared this unfortunate sentence : “ Would that we could do something at once dignified and effective to knock Mr. Bryan once for ail into a cocked hat.” It would have been only human nature if the Commoner had then and there forsworn Mr. Wilson and all his works. Instead, he did not permit himself to show any pique and at the dinner manifested the ut- most cordiality to the Governor, who himself in a speech of rare discretion emphasized the admiration that all good Democrats felt towards Mr. Bryan. It is possible that his friendliness towards Wilson was enhanced by the controversy between the Governor and Colonel George Harvey, which received much publicity as the result of % spirited exchange of letters between Mr. McCombs and Colonel Watterson. For Bryan distrusted Harvey as a representative of New York interests. House appreciated keenly the part which Colonel Harvey had played in setting Governor Wilson on the road to political fortune. Harvey had encouraged him to give up his academic career and try the luck of politics; he had influenced the New Jersey machine to give him the nomination for Governor. From the first he had worked with the possibility of the presidential nomination in mind. But the fervour with which he supported Wilson in Harper’s Weekly raised suspicions in the Middle West that the Governor, through Harvey, was putting himself under obligations to New York financial interests. This was so obvious that House 56 BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP had discussed with his friend E. S. Martin, editor of Life and also an associate editor of Harper’s Weekly, the desirability of a less enthusiastic support of Wilson by the Weekly. After House left New York, Colonel Harvey put the question direct to Wilson, as to whether the Governor felt this support to be injurious; the reply of the latter was perhaps too brusque an affirma- tive. The affair might have passed as a minor incident, had it not been for the emotion displayed in the press by McCombs on the one side and Watterson on the other. It was a moment when the conciliatory influence of House, then absent in Texas, would have proved valuable. Colonel House to Mr. E. S. Martin Austin, Texas, January i8, 1912 Dear Martin : What a mess we have made with the Harper’s Weekly- Harvey-Wilson matter. I feel it is largely my fault, and yet I had no thought of it taking any such direction. I would rather be defeated for the Presidency than even be under the suspicion of ingratitude, and, according to Colonel Watterson, Governor Wilson was almost brutal. I hope this is exaggerated. All I had in mind was for Harper’s not to be so strenuous, but I never remotely considered wounding Colonel Harvey’s feelings nor the breaking of the friend- ship between Governor Wilson and himself. , . . Faithfully yours E. M. House Both the Harvey episode and the publication of the Joline letter ultimately worked in favour of Mr. Wilson. In the Middle West and the South the impression became current that the Governor had braved the New York interests in refusing Harvey’s support and had dis- played honesty in telling Harvey that he did not want BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP 57 it. In Texas Mr. Gregory skilfully utilized a remark of Colonel Watterson, who had taken up the cudgels in favour of Harvey. Watterson spoke rather sneeringly of the “ austere truthfulness of the schoolmaster.” There was in Texas, a rural community, a great free school system and some forty thousand school teachers. Mr. Gregory at once gave full publicity to the phrase, asking whether Wilson should have lied in answer to Harvey’s question and whether this was not a time when austere truthfulness was desirable even from a schoolmaster. The next day forty thousand Texan school teachers were behind Wilson. Bryan, reassured by Wilson’s quarrel with Harvey, obviously felt kindly towards him after his own magnani- mous treatment of the “ cocked hat” incident. While still warm with the sense of having acted in a rather large way, he continued to receive the commendatory letters of Colonel House that always emphasized, directly or indirectly, the progressiveness of Wilson and the opposition of Wall Street to him. Colonel House to Mr. W. J. Bryan Austin, Texas, January zt, 1912 Dear Mr. Bryan ; . . . Another thing that has pleased me beyond measure is your treatment of the Joline-Wilson incident. Your friends all knew your bigness of mind and heart, but it was an object-lesson to those who thought of you differently. I am glad that you have taken the position that you have regarding the Wilson-Harvey controversy. I know a great deal about it, perhaps as much as anyone, and I hope that I may have the pleasure of discussing it with you when you come to Texas. . . . Faithfully yours E. M. House 58 BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP Colonel House to Governor Wilson Austin, Texas, February 2, 1912 My dear Governor Wilson : Mr. Bryan is now on his Rio Grande farm, and I have asked him here before he leaves. In the meantime I will continue to keep in touch with him by correspond- ence. Please let me know if there is anything you would like to have suggested to him, for there can be no better place to do this than by the quiet fireside, I am, my dear Governor, Your very sincere E. M. House Colonel House to Mr. W. F. McCombs Austin, Texas, February 10, 1912 Dear Mr. McCombs : . . . Mr. Bryan has gone to Tucson to see his son, but he promises to stop over and see me at the first opportunity. He says he did not stopTn going through, on account of reaching Austin at four o’clock in the morning, which he thought a little early for me. I sent him some clippings favourable to Governor Wilson, which he promises to use and asks for more. If you could think to have sent me things that you would like to have used in the Commoner, I am sure that I could arrange it. I agree with you that Mr. Bryan’s support is abso- lutely essential, not only for nomination but for election afterwards ; and I shall make it my particular province to keep in touch with him and endeavour to influence him along the lines desired. He has evolved considerably in our direction, for when I first talked to him in October he did not have Governor Wilson much in mind. Faithfully yours E. M. House BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP 59 Apart from his interest in winning Bryan to the Wilson cause, House directed his energies to the organiza- tion of Texas, the forty votes of which were bound to exercise a powerful influence at the Democratic Nominat- ing Convention. As one looks back, it is easy to see that without Bryan and without the steadfast loyalty and enthusiasm of the Texas delegates, Wilson could not have been nominated. That Colonel House realized this so long before the convention is an indication of the degree to which foresight afiected his plans. When he arrived in Texas, in December 1911, he found that, despite the success of Wilson's Dallas speech, sentiment had not crystallized in his favour. An energetic campaign would have to be developed if Wilson delegates were to be chosen. “ That campaign,” writes Mr. Gregory, who played an important role in it, " was the greatest work of organization that I remem- ber. Colonel House had various pieces of his old poli- tical machinery i5nng around, which he soon brought together ; but we had against us the political forces of the state. The Chairman and thirty of the thirty-one members of the State Executive Committee were opposed to Wilson, the Governor did not favour him, and Senator Joseph W. Bailey stumped the State against him. Only four of the Texas Congressmen favoured him.” ^ House mobilized his friends, who for three months stimulated Wilson sentiment in critical districts, without a blare of trumpets but none the less effectively, it would appear, for by the beginning of March the Colonel was willing to express the expectation of a solid Wilson delegation from Texas. He was the more optimistic 1 Memorandum of T. W. Gregory. Subsequently Governor Campbell a friend of Colonel House and later a member of the Texas delegation a Baltimore, supported Wilson vigorously in the National Convention. 6o BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP in that the Harmon supporters devoted themselves to speeches rather than personal canvassing, a sure method, according to House, of making a noise and losing the fight. Colonel House to Mr. W. F. McCombs Austin, Texas, March 4, 1912 Dear Mr. McCombs : . . . Confidentially, I have not been at all satisfied with our organization in this State ; but I am glad to tell you that it is now getting in such shape that I feel I can say that you need have no further concern about Texas. I will not go into details now, further than to let you know that it is in process of complete organization and that we find the sentiment largely for Governor Wilson. Strangely enough, the opposition are doing practi- cally nothing in an effective way, except to blow in the newspapers. , . . Faithfully yours E. M. House Colonel Rouse to Governor Wilson Austin, Texas, March 6, 1912 My dear Governor Wilson : _ I am pleased to tell you that we now have every- thing in good shape in Texas and that you may con- fidently rely upon the delegates from this State. We may or may not have a presidential primary, but the result will not be changed. In two or three weeks our organization will be per- fected, and then I shall leave for the East where I shall have the pleasure of seeing you. Faithfully yours E. M. House Mr. Wilson replied that House’s news brought great cheer when he most needed it. The Governor had been BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP 6i discouraged by the news from Kansas and Michigan, where he felt the Wilsonian forces ought to have won, and he declared that the Colonel’s success in Texas and the knowledge that he would soon be East to offer his counsel put him in heart again. Wilson was troubled by the suspicion of a combination against himself of Clark, Underwood, and Harmon, with a division of territory, and by what he regarded as evidence of its being financed from Wall Street. And he expressed the fear that the " dear old party ” might become the tool of reactionaries. Ill In April Colonel House returned to New York, satisfied that Texas was safe for Wilson, but disturbed by the failure of the Wilson forces to make the progress elsewhere that had been expected. For the political situation had changed since«autumn. The conservative leaders, who favoured Harmon or Underwood, appreci- ated the strength of liberal feeling in the party and realized that Wilson by assuming the leadership of the liberals might run away with the nomination. To defeat him the Harmon, Underwood, and Clark sup- porters combined to concentrate in each State upon the strongest candidate opposed to Wilson. The result was that the threat of Champ Clark, in particular, began to appear dangerous. Bryan had endorsed him as a liberal and the conservatives preferred him to Wilson, for he was a “ practical politician ” with whom they could negotiate. At least he would serve to deadlock the convention against Wilson. “ Nobody regards Clark seriously,” wrote House to Gregory, “ except as a means to defeat Wilson.” 62 BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP After a few days in the East, House recognized the strength of the combination that was putting Clark forward. Pennsylvania went for Wilson, but the South and the Middle West were cold. “ Illinois hit us a pretty bad jolt,” wrote House to Burleson on April ii, “It was not that we expected to carry it, but we did not expect to lose by so heavy a vote. A few days later Nebraska declared for Champ Clark. The Colonel recorded that at the end of May it looked as if the anti- Wilson forces would triumph. Bryan remained neutral as between Clark and Wilson. “ I had seen Mr. Bryan in New York [wrote Colonel House] almost immediately upon arrival in April, and had persuaded him to declare his belief that either Clark or Wilson would be an acceptable candidate. I could not get him to go further than this, although I pointed out that all his enemies were in the combination to defeat Wilson. “ Mrs. Bryan helped me in getting a favourable decision for Woodrow Wilson. I remember I break- fasted with the Bryans at the Holland House, and every argument I made in behalf of Wilson was supple- mented by Mrs. Bryan.” The Commoner refused as yet, however, definitely to commit himself, and Colonel House could not avoid the suspicion that Mr. Bryan regarded it as a good Demo- cratic year and would not scorn the nomination. Colonel House to Senator C. A. Culberson New York, May i, 1912 Dear Senator ; ... It looks to me as if the opposing candidates might again be Bryan and Roosevelt. In that event, I think Roosevelt would beat him. He would get his share of the progressive vote and most of the conserva- BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP 63 live vote. _ Bryan thinks he could beat Roosevelt, but, in my opinion, he could beat Taft more easily. Wilson’s best chance now, I think, is the fear of many people that Bryan will be nominated and the further fear that Hearst may succeed in landing Champ Clark and then dominate the Administration. Faithfully yours E. M. House As May passed, prospects appeared brighter ; and the result of the Texas convention, which, as House had predicted, was wholly in Wilson’s favour, gave impetus to the cause. The Colonel relied upon the forty dele- gates from Texas to stand firm, and his confidence was justified. He told them to consider no second choice. Mr. Gregory records that shortly before the convention, “ Tammany made an offer to the Texas delegation that, if they would drop Wilson, Tammany would support Culberson ; but the delegation, which included Culberson himself, simply laughed at them.” House also relied upon the fact that many delegates instructed for Clark or Underwood approved Wilson in their hearts and would vote for him as soon as it became obvious that their candidates could not be chosen and they were released from their pledges. He now advised Wilson to proceed carefully, for he felt that Bryan, influenced by his wife, was more favourable, and he feared the tactical mistake which at the last moment so frequently spoils a candidate’s chances. Colonel House to Governor Wilson Beverly, Massachusetts Jum 7, 1912 Dear Governor Wilson : I have a letter from Mr. this morning, telling me that he has suggested some things to you, which I hope you will not consider. . . . 64 BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP In my opinion, everything is being done that should be towards influencing the delegates in your behalf. Plans for organizing them into an efficient and effective force at Baltimore are already under way, and will be much more potent than anything Mr. has suggested. If I see the situation rightly, there has never been a time when your nomination seemed so probable as now, and if I were you I would move cautiously and do no- thing further for the present. I do not doubt but that a large part of your time has been taken up, as indeed has Mr. McCombs’s and mine, by people giving advice which, if acted upon, would defeat our ends. Do you recall what I told you concerning the con- versation I had with Mrs. B. ? I have a letter this morning from her containing this most significant sen- tence ; “I found Mr. B. well and quite in accord with the talk we had.” ^ It encourages me to believe that Mr. Clark will never receive that influence and that you will. It also means that he [Bryan] will not want the nomination unless two Republican tickets are in the field. If your engagements will permit, I hope that we may have the pleasure of seeing you here before the 25th. Faithfully yours E. M. House Governor Wilson replied in a manner that would have surprised some of his later critics. He not merely thanked House for his advice, but confessed that he stood in need of it, for at first he had been inclined to follow Mr. ’s suggestion. Not only did he admit he was wrong, but he promised not to act independently in the future. ‘ Evidently suggesting that Bryan was veering away from Clark. BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP 65 IV Colonel House was not at the Baltimore Convention which nominated Wilson, Because of his health he was accustomed to flee American summer heat, and even the importance of this particular crisis did not prevent him from following his regular habit, which was to spend the summer in Europe. When the convention met, he was on the ocean. ft This absence did not eliminate his influence. In Texas he had been present at only three of the nominat- ing conventions that chose the candidates he had sup- ported ; he was accustomed to lay his plans so carefully that they could be clearly understood and definitely executed by his lieutenants. Thus we find him, during the weeks that immediately preceded the convention, in close consultation with Mr. McCombs and spending long hours v/ith the leaders of the Texas delegation, which was promised the rolb of Old Guard in the ap- proaching battle. “ On June i [the Colonel recorded] McCombs and I went to Beverly, Massachusetts, where we had taken a house for the summer. McCombs was so run down in health that I did not think he would be able to go to the Baltimore Convention on June 25. Governor Wilson thought I was mistaken about this and that he was tougher than his appearance indicated. I was sure, however, he needed the rest ; and I was also sure he needed what suggestions and coaching I might be able to give him in regard to handling conventions, because he had never had any experience in such matters.” In these consultations Mr. T. W. Gregory and Mr. T. A. Thomson of the Texas delegation played a pro- minent part. They were to hold the fort against Clark, I C 66 BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP who had already secured a majority of the delegates and who, if his strength did not weaken on the early ballots, threatened to gather enough more to obtain the neces- sary two-thirds. Underwood was strong in the South, but among the Southern delegations there was bitter opposition to Clark which the Texans were able to capitalize. “ It looked to me [recorded House] as if Wilson had a good chance, but nothing more. I urged both Gregory and Thomson to use their influence with the Texas delegation to hold it as a unit and to stay in the fight in the same way we had been accustomed to do in Texas. The history of the convention records the work of those forty delegates from Texas, without whose loyalty and intelligent support the President could never have been nominated.” \^Tiat House advised was to assign to each influential member of the Texas delegation the task of working upon some other delegation with whom he had personal relations, and to secure mutual understanding that in no contingency would either yield to pressure from the Clark forces. This plan had evidently long been in Colonel House’s mind, for as far back as December 1911 he had written to a Southern friend, William Garrott Brown : “It goes without saying that we will make no move adverse to Mr. Underwood in his own State, but we will expect our friends to see that delegates are selected there not unfriendly to Governor Wilson for second choice.” Mr. Gregory thus describes his own activities ; “ Champ Clark had by far the largest convention vote of any of the candidates, and it was evident that he must first be disposed of before any of the other BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP 67 candidates would have a chance. In these circumstances the Wilson people made airtight agreements with a sufficient number of delegates instructed for candidates other than Clark, to the effect that under no conditions would any parties to the agreement vote for Clark ; there was no agreement as to what would be done after Clark had been eliminated. The delegates involved in this agreement constituted more than one-third of the convention vote, and against this stone wall the forces of Champ Clark battered in vain.” Colonel House to Governor Wilson Beverly, Massachusetts Jtme 20, 1912 Dear Governor Wilson : I am sorry beyond measure that it is my fate not to be able to be at the Baltimore Convention. Both my inclination and my deep interest in your success call me there, but I am physically unequal to the effort. However, I have done everything that I could do up to now to advise and to anticipate every contingency. I have had interviews with many delegates, and some of my warm personal friends on the Texas delegation will be here to-morrow in order to have a final word. Colonel Ball, who is perhaps the most forceful man on the Texas delegation and the one best equipped for floor tactics, has wired me that he will be in Baltimore to-day. I have told Mr. McCombs of those upon whose ad\'ice and loyalty he can lean most heavily, and now I feel that I can do nothing further excepting to send my good wishes. If Mr. Clark’s strength crumbles on the second and third ballot— which I hope may be the case— then I believe that you will be nominated forthwith ; but if, on the other hand, his vote clings to him and he begins to get the uninstructed vote, he may be nominated. We are sailing for England on the Cunard s.s. Laconia on the 25th at six o’clock, but Mr. McCombs has promised 68 BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP to tell me of the result by wireless ; and if you are nominated I shall return almost immediately. I shall at least have the benefit of the trip over and back, and that is one of the reasons I am going on the 25th rather than waiting until after I know the result If you will permit me to act as your friend in an advisory capacity, it will give me pleasure to use my every effort in your behalf. With kind regards and best wishes, I am Faithfully yours E. M. House Beverly, Massachusetts June 23, 1912 Dear Governor Wilson : T. W. Gregory and T. A. Thomson, two of the delegates from Texas, have just left me. I have never known two better organizers than they are, and I have outlined to them in detail what to do at Baltimore with Mr. McCombs’s approval. I am afraid that if thorough organization is not had, we will find fifty of our friends working upon one dele- gation and perhaps no one attending to another dele- gation of equal importance. I have suggested that the forty men from Texas be divided into four units of ten, and each given one of the doubtful Southern States. The same methods should be pursued with New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and other loyal delegations. In this way the work becomes effective and good results foUow. I have urged them to make friends with the delega- tions to which they are assigned, to influence and enter- tain them in one way and another until the convention is ended. . . . Faithfully yours E. M. House On June 25 Colonel House sailed, and on the same day the Democratic Convention met at Baltimore. Its history has been told many times and we may merely BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP 69 remind ourselves of the bitter struggle between the liberal and conservative forces, and of how Clark, originally put forward to break the Wilson movement, soon threatened to run away with the convention. His strength did not crumble, as House had hoped, after the first few ballots and, if we may believe Wilson’s secretary, Joseph P. Tumulty, even McCombs despaired. At this juncture appeared the value of the plans made by House during the winter and spring. The Wilson delegates, at first in a small minority, stood firm, led by the band of forty from Texas. Gradually, as the cause of Underwood appeared hopeless, Wilson began to pick up votes from the delegations of which he was second choice ; the Clark forces weakened. And at the critical moment the arguments that House had so constantly pressed upon Bryan, during the winter and spring, bore fruit. The New York delegation, dominated by Tammany, attacked Wilson and supported Clark with such vigour that Bryan -was finally convinced that Wilson must be the right man. His intervention proved decisive, and on the forty-sixth baUot Wilson received the nomination. Colonel House had not yet reached England when the issue was determined. “ I received the notification of the nomination of Wilson by wireless, one day out from Liverpool. It was from H. H. Childers and read, ‘ Wilson wins.’ It came at ten o’clock at night. Dr. Arthur Hadley of Yale and some others were pla5dng cards at the time. I told Hadley that perhaps he would be glad to know that Woodrow Wilson had been nominated at Baltimore. I was sadly mistaken in my supposition that the know- ledge of this would give him pleasure, for I never saw a man who evinced less enthusiasm.” 70 BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP V The real struggle of 1912 was for the nomination. It would have been far otherwise had the Republican Party remained united and presented its normal strength at the polls ; in such a case the election of Wilson would have been difficult, if not impossible. But the dissen- sions which during the spring had already threatened Republican solidarity culminated in Republican disaster at the Chicago Convention, where Taft was nominated ; for the adherents of Roosevelt bolted, organized the Progressive Party, and in August nominated their hero. Most well-informed observers, while they conceded the personal popularity of Roosevelt, believed that the lack of an established organization would certainly prevent his election ; nor did they believe that Taft, now deprived of the support of the most vigorous elements in the party, would prove a dangerous candidate. Wilson might count upon the approval of many regular Republicans who detested Roosevelt and who realized that the surest means of defeating him would be to elect Wilson, The issue proved the accuracy of such prog- nostications. Generalizations are usually misleading, but in this case the historian may venture the assertion that in 1912 Roosevelt put Wilson in the White House. Colonel House was among those who believed that the result of the split in the Republican Party would be certain Democratic victory. Hence he did not cut short the travels that he had planned for the summer of 1912, which included Sweden, Finland, Russia as far east as Moscow, Germany, France, and England. In August, however, he returned ready to throw himself into the campaign, which soon captured all his time and energy. He was delighted with the liberalism and BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP 71 eloquence displayed in Wilson’s speeches, which gained in effectiveness as the campaign progressed ; and he found a double assurance of success in the vehemence with which Roosevelt emphasized the differences between Republicans and Progressives, in his virulent attacks upon Taft. “ In my opinion [he wrote Wilson, soon after his return] the greatest asset that we have is the scare that Roosevelt is giving the conservative Republicans, and I have found that my efforts in proselytizing prominent Taft adherents have been successful whenever I have been able to show that a vote for Taft is a half- vote for Roosevelt.” Colonel Rouse to Governor Wilson Beverly, Massachusetts August 28, 1912 Dear Governor Wilson : ... I am trying to get our friends to organize properly in Vermont and Maine. It looks to me as if they depended too much upon speech-making and noisy demonstrations, and not enough upon organizations. I have suggested that they get a committee in every precinct, whose business it shall be to get out the Demo- cratic vote and influence as many of the Republican votes as possible. Upon these committees I have suggested placing a Taft Republican, who is supporting you for one reason or another, a progressive Republican who does not want to vote for Roosevelt and cannot vote for Taft, and the best Democratic organizer that can be obtained. If this method is followed, not only in Vermont and Maine, but in every State in the Union, there will be nothing left of your opponents that wiU be worth while. Your very sincere E. M. House 72 BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP What interested House chiefly was not so much the election of Wilson, which he regarded as certain, as the question of harmony between the Democratic leaders. Fortunately, the influence of Mr. Bryan was not among the disturbing elements. He was naturally satisfied with the part he played at Baltimore, where he had abdicated his own pretensions, and his attitude towards the candidate whose success he had done so much to assure was one of benevolence. Obviously he was not inclined to interfere with the management of the cam- paign. Mrs. W. J. Bryan to Colonel House Fairview, Jtily 27, 1912 My dear Mr. House : Have been in a mad struggle with mail lately— my desk is cleared and I celebrate by writing a line to you. Your letter was faithfully delivered by Mr. Thomson, and the correctness of your diagnosis was even then proven. I thought of you aaid Mrs. House several times while the fight was on. I knew how anxiously you were awaiting bulletins on shipboard. Just between us three, it was a remarkable fight. I was never so proud of Mr. Bryan — ^he managed so well. He threw the opponents into confusion ; they could not keep from blundering and he outgeneralled them at every point. After all their careful planning, he wrested the power from their hands. Under the circumstances I am sure the nomination went to the best place and am entirely satisfied with the result. Will said all the time he did not think it was his time, and when we found the way things were set up we were sure of it. The people through the country regard him as a hero —he is filling Chautauqua dates in larger crowds than he has ever had, and is perfectly well. The mail i The secretary told me yesterday there are several thousand Baltimore letters still unopened, and it is almost impos- BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP 73 sible to handle the daily increase. I am not telling you these things to boast, but because I know you are interested to know how he is getting on since he has been “ buried ” again. As to the possibilities in case of Democratic success : I am not sure what he would do. I know he dislikes routine work exceedingly, but believe he would do anything to help the cause. . . . Did you read the platform ? Will got in a provision on national committeemen that will eliminate the whole ring four years from now. — This letter seems full of politics, but we are all interested. My best wishes for a safe return and kindest regards to Janet, Mrs. H. and yourself. Sincerely yours Mary B. Bryan Reassured by the friendly attitude of Mr. Bryan, Colonel House was none the less disturbed by the lack of organization in the Democratic campaign and the contentions that had arisen among the campaign leaders. “ They are making the usual campaign of speeches, publicity, and noisy demonstrations,” he wrote Mr. Houston, " and if it were not for the split in the Repub- lican Party the result would be fatal.” It was true that the Republicans and Progressives firmly refused to permit the Democrats to defeat themselves. But if the latter were so torn by discord at the moment of victory as to find it impossible to organize an harmonious adminis- tration, there would be small profit in victory. Much of the dif&culty resulted from the illness of Mr. McCombs, who had been chosen Chairman of the National Committee and who during the summer found himself unable to stay at Headquarters. Mr. McAdoo, Vice- Chairman, took active control of affairs. Feeling between the two men and their adherents became scarcely short 74 BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP of envenomed. It was the first news that reached House upon his arrival from Europe. " We landed at Boston [he recorded] and motored to Beverly, where messengers began to^ come telling of discord and demoralization at Democratic Headquarters. Those that brought their tales first were adherents of McCombs, and my sympathy was largely with him. "McCombs himself came from the Adirondacks to Boston for a conference with me. He told a story of perfidy that was hardly believable. McAdoo was the ringleader and he, McCombs, was the victim.” For Colonel House the important matter was party harmony. Unable to decide exactly where the trouble lay, although to begin with he sympathized with McCombs, he was determined that the first Democratic Administration in twenty years should not be ruined at the outset by the scandal of a public quarrel. The initial step was to prevent the resignation of McCombs, which he threatened at regular intervals. The next was to come into touch with McAdoo. Colonel House to Governor Wilson Beverly, Massachusetts September 2 , 1912 Dear Governor : McCombs is seriously thinking of resigning, and may do so to-morrow. There are reasons why his resignation at this time would be a serious blow to the cause. I cannot go into an explanation here, but you would readily under- stand the reason if all the facts were before you. . . . Mr. McAdoo has asked me to go to Maine, which I shall do to-morrow night or Wednesday morning ; and when I return I should be glad to come to New York if you will let me know when you will be there. Your very sincere E. M. House BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP 75 " I returned to New York [wrote Colonel House] as soon as the weather would permit, and had a conference with Woodrow Wilson. I asked if he knew of the feud that was going on between McAdoo and McCombs, and I indicated my sympathy for McCombs. At that time I knew McAdoo but slightly, having met him but twice. Wilson asked me not to make up my mind about the matter until I had learned the ins and outs of it by personal contact at Headquarters. “ I afterwards learned the wisdom of this advice, for I had not been in New York more than two weeks before I knew that there was another side. Later I found that it was almost wholly McCombs’s fault and that McAdoo was scarcely to blame at all. McCombs was jealous, was dictatorial, ... He was not well enough to attend to the campaign himself, and he could not sit by and allow McAdoo to carry on the work and get a certain amount of newspaper publicity. This latter was particularly galling to McCombs.” At this moment (September 25, 1912) Colonel House began to make those detailed daily memoranda which, taken together, form a diary the historical importance of which can hardly be overstated. Every night, with rare exceptions, during the following seven years, he dictated his record of the events of the day, whUe his recollection was fresh and definite and with an astounding frankness of expression. From the first of these memoranda it appears clear that during these weeks his main task was always the composing of quarrels. It was a function to which he had become accustomed from his days at school, where, according to a youthful friend, he loved to incite disputes between his schoolmates in order to have an opportunity to settle them. In September and October there were not merely the difficulties between the leaders at National Headquarters 76 BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP which must be alleviated, but also the customary dis- agreement between the National Committee and Tam- many Hall. The New York organization had fought the nomination of Wilson at Baltimore and would evidently not “ tote fair ” in the election unless Wilson agreed actively to support the New York State ticket ; and this Wilson would not do if it meant endorsing the Tammany boss, Charles F. Murphy. As always, there was the danger that Tammany would trade its support of the presidential candidate against Republican willing- ness to permit the election of the Democratic candidate for Mayor of New York City the year following. And this danger was increased by Wilson's attack upon the bosses and his refusal to approve the renomination of Governor Dix, which Murphy demanded. At National Headquarters there were divided counsels. McAdoo, who may have himself hoped to be nominated for Governor, was willing to fight the bosses ; McCombs, both because ofihis feud with McAdoo and his political affiliations, was willing to endorse them heartily. House disliked the bosses and wrote on September 28, " I believe McAdoo would be good material for the Governorship.” But he held that an open breach with Tammany must be avoided at all costs. “ The New York situation is acute [wrote House, on September 25], and it is necessary for some ' definite policy to be decided upon. The break between Murphy and National Headquarters is becoming wider each day, and the newspapers are printing numerous false inter- views which make it yet wider. I am anxious to hold the party together, so that every available means may be used for the common good. My dishke of Tammany and its leaders is perhaps stronger than that of Governor Wilson ; yet, having had more political experience, I BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP 77 am always ready to work with the best material at hand. My idea is to have them decide upon some unobjection- able Tammany man for Governor of New York who would not bring discredit upon the party. . . . “ There is much jealousy and back-biting at Head- quarters, and tales are fetched and carried without number until all harmony is lost. McAdoo and others are anxious to give me a room for my personal use. I do not desire a room. They want to give me half of O'Gorman’s.^ Everyone ohers me someone else’s room. McAdoo continues most cordial and belies the charges of his accusers. . . Wilson, fulminating against the bosses, was on the point of attacking Murphy and Dix by name and insisting that the New York nominating convention formally repudiate the control of Tammany Hall. It would have meant an open conflict between the National and the City and State organizations. “Governor Wilson [House wrote, September 28] came in last night from New England, leaving at twelve. He asked me to take him out in our motor for a conference. He was particularly anxious to discuss the State situation before making his speech at McCombs's dinner. McAdoo is urging him to come out actively against Dix and Murphy. I urged him not to do this. McCombs is the only Mnk between the bosses and Wilson. The Governor’s inclination is to go after them. He finally a^eed to give out a letter Monday without mentioning either by name. . . . “ October 2 ; The New York situation is still in a muddle. . . The solution finally discovered by Colonel House was not without its elements of humour. At least it pre- vented an open rupture between the National Democratic 1 United States Senator from New York, 78 BEGINNINGS OF A. FRIENDSHIP organization and the New York organization. Mr. Murphy, leader of Tammany, agreed to the demand of Wilson, edited by House, that no man should dictate to the nominating convention what it must do. Quietly he permitted the impression to percolate that Governor Dix need not be renominated. At the convention, he (according to a New York correspondent), " once Boss Murphy, now metamorphosed by the talisman of college men's ideals into Leader Murphy, said nothing, gave no orders— when nominations for Governor were called reported himself ‘ present, not voting 1’ ” The convention, thus freed from the despotism of the bosses, repudiating Dix, proceeded to nominate the Honourable William Sulzer, the purest product of the New York City organization. “ The advocates of the bossless con- vention had won and nominated a Tammany brave.” Thus House saved Wilson from the tactical mistake of a quarrel with Tammany, which would at this moment certainly have failed to dislddge the bosses and must have produced merely disorganization ; at the same time he persuaded Murphy ostensibly to yield to Wilson's leader- ship. Press reports gave him full credit : “Just what the wise Texan whispered into the Princeton ears no man may know. But the club did not fall on the Tam- many head. . . . The good ship is sailing strong and no breakers ahead. Without Tammany New York was gone. With Tammany New York City will give Wilson the largest vote ever recorded for a Democratic candidate. . . . The story of Democratic success is almost ready to be told. Only one thing can prevent— Wilson himself. If he makes no blunder ! He almost did in the matter of New York— but Ed House is still here.” ^ Later, when the leadership of Wilson in the party had * Press despatch by Pat Lay, New York, October 4, 1912. BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP 79 been assured, House urged a vigorous assault upon Tammany; but a less propitious moment than the autumn of 1912 could not have been selected. More difficult, however, was the situation caused by the physical and nervous condition of the Democratic Chairman. Much of House’s time and energy was consumed in quieting the suspicions of Mr. McCombs, in persuading him to avoid indiscretions and to forget enmities. It was not the first or the last occasion upon which Colonel House served the cause of harmony by assuming the ungrateful role of buffer. “ October 3 : McCombs and McAdoo had an interview, and I hope that a more amicable relation will follow. The Governor ■ was particularly anxious to have this brought about, and said he knew that I could do it if it could be done at all. “ October 8 : I went to see McCombs. I do not like his af&hations or methods. He is very secretive and wiU only interview one person at a time, although he seems to have no secrets from me. He suggested getting rid of McAdoo by giving him the presidency of some railroad out West, which he said he could secure for him. ... “ October 13 : McCombs is very emphatic that no campaign promises, either direct or indirect, have been made. I talked to Governor Wilson, urging liim also not to make any promises. He says he has not, but he does not altogether trust McCombs in this direction. . . . “ October 24 : McCombs is in a panic, and believes there is a chance of losing New York, Illinois, and Wis- consin. . . . “ October 25 : I went to Headquarters at eleven and met McCombs as I was leaving. ... He was counter- manding everybody’s orders, without regard to authority. . . . McAdoo teUs me that the Governor thinks it best not to address him [McAdoo] in future, and McAdoo 8o BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP asked him not to consider him in any way. He said he would do the best he could until the campai^ was over, and then he wished to be forgotten. I did not tell McAdoo that the Governor was doing this at my suggestion and because I am afraid of an open scandal between McCombs and himself. . . . “ October 26 : Very little is being done at Head- quarters excepting routine work. I went over each department, after seeing McAdoo at nine at his hotel. McCombs is in conference most of the time with old- style politicians. The whole character of the callers has changed since he took charge, and for the worse. I fear Governor Wilson will have trouble on account of connections made at this time. . . . “ October 31 : McAdoo is not in evidence at all, and has almost effaced himself to secure harmony. ...” VI At the height of the campaign the country was shocked by the news that ^ fanatic had shot Mr. Roose- velt, who was on a speaking tour, and that, while he would recover from the wound, his personal campaign was at an end.^ Colonel House, in opposition to the members of the Democratic Campaign Committee, in- sisted that Mr. Wilson should cancel his speaking engage- ments, for it did not seem quite sporting for him to continue his vigorous campaign so long as his most redoubtable adversary was laid low. “ October 18 ; Everything is upset to-day over the attempted assassination of Theodore Roosevelt. . . . " I telephoned Governor Wilson at Princeton wMe Burleson was here, urging him to cancel all engagements 1 Mr. Roosevelt, whose life was saved by the manuscript of his speech and his glasses* case in Ms breast pocket, recovered so rapidly that he was able to address an enthusiastic rally in Madison Square Garden just before the election. BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP 8i until Roosevelt was able to get out again. Wilson was at first doubtful, but wrote out a statement, which he read to me over the telephone, following my suggestions as to what to say. Ail of the Campaign Committee were against me in this. They wanted the Governor to continue speech-making, and so advised him. My thought was that if he continued to speak after T. R. had been shot, it would create sympathy for T. R. and would do Wilson infinite harm. The situation is a dangerous one and needs to be handled with care. The generous, the chivalrous, and the wise thing to do, so it seems to me, is to discontinue speaking until his an- tagonist is also able to speak. I am glad Wilson sees it as I do. He suggested that we might delay a decision until to-morrow and get the opinion of the full Committee, but I disagreed with this and said that the delay would be disadvantageous. Then, too, it would make it embarrassing if the Committee Offered from him, as they certainly would, for their individual opinions have already been expressed. Burleson thinks I took too much responsibility in advising contrary to the rest of the Committee ” The Colonel’s opinion carried the day, and Wilson’s speaking tour was abandoned. The effect of this gesture, combined with the exchange of cordial telegrams of sympathy and appreciation between Wilson and Roose- velt, was certainly not disadvantageous to Wilson's campaign. “ The best politics,” House used to say, “ is to do the right thing.” The attack upon Roosevelt immediately drew House’s attention to the danger of a similar attempt upon Wilson’s life, and he bethought himself of his old Texas friend the Ranger, McDonald. Captain Bill would furnish com- plete protection and ideal company for the Governor. There was also the advantage that McDonald, as House well knew, would waste no time in discussion as to T — 6 82 BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP whether the trip from Texas were worth while or what preparations he ought to make. Colonel House to Captain McDonald [Telegram] Come immediately, tillery. New York, October 15, 1912 Important. Bring your ar- E. M. House Captain McDonald to Colonel House [Telegram] Coming. Quanah, Texas, October 16, 1912 McDonald Colonel House to Dr. D. F. Houston New York, October 22, 1912 Dear Doctor Houston :r ... I got the Governor to let me send for Bill McDonald after the T. R. assault. I merely wired Bill to come at once. ... He thought I was in trouble, so he borrowed a shirt from one of his friends, boarded the train without money (which he borrowed on the way), and landed here in a little over two days after leaving Quanah. I took him from the station to Headquarters, and it happened that Judge Parker and Norman Mack were in McCombs’s rooms when I brought Bill in. He had on his big white Stetson and a four days' growth of beard, and I need not tell you he created a sensation. . . . Mrs. Wilson told me on Sunday that she had slept better Saturday night than at any time since T. R. was shot. They all seem pleased with Bill. I arranged to keep him out of the papers, and he has refused to open his mouth to anyone about an3rthing. I told him when he came not to say a word to anybody, BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP 83 and he is carrying it out literally. I heard a reporter ask him who I was, and that is the only time I have heard him speak. He told the fellow that he was a stranger in New York and did not know. The mayor and police of one town that I know tried to disarm Bill after he was out of the Ranger Service and had no right to carry arms, but they were unable to accomplish their purpose. I would like to see the New York police try it. Faithfully yours E. M. House Wilson and his protector became fast friends. A fortnight after McDonald’s arrival. House noted : " I arose at seven and went over to see Governor Wilson and Captain Bill at the Hotel Collingwood. They were just leaving for the train, but we had a few minutes’ conversation. Bill said the Governor was the finest fellow in the world, and the Governor seemed equally pleased with Bill and said he was taking good care of him.” After the election McDonald returned to Texas, with keen appreciation of his Eastern experiences, but without reluctance to leave the hard city pavements. He once complained to Colonel House ; “ Ed, I get awful tired of walking on these rocks.” He was not entirely un- critical of the protection provided eminent public servants by the Government. " November 8 : Old Bill arrived [recorded House], and after talking with him I think it is best for him to return home for the present. The Wilsons were sorry to see him leave. He looked over the Secret Service men to see if he thought them fit. He told me that they did weh enough, but he did not like their carrying •38’s. When he said this to the Secret Service men, 84 BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP they did not like it and replied : ‘ A *38 will kill a man all right/ ‘ Yes/ said Bill, ‘ if you give him a week to die in/ I find that he has talked much of me and my political work in Texas to Wilson. The Governor wanted to know whether I had been successful in all my political campaigns and what kind of men I had chosen.” VII The last days of the campaign were not marked by the customary excitement, for the result of the election had become a foregone conclusion. The contest between Roosevelt and Taft had split the anti-Wilson vote so effectively that a Democratic landslide in the electoral college appeared certain. As election returns came in on November 5, it soon became clear that Democratic confidence in overwhelm- ing victory was fully justified. Mr. Taft carried only two States, Roosevelt oi^ly 88 electoral votes. It is true that Wilson’s popular vote was less than a majority, but his plurality in the electoral college was the greatest ever received by a presidential candidate, and he carried with him handsome Democratic majorities in the Senate and House of Representatives. “ I went to Headquarters [wrote House on the even- ing of election day], and saw a few people, but nothing of importance was going on. By half-past six o’clock it was evident that Wilson had won, so I sent him a telegram of congratulation. By seven o’clock returns were in enough to enable one to see that it was a Wilson landslide. " I went down to the Waldorf Hotel, where McCombs had invited^ guests to hear the returns. He had taken nearly one side of the hotel, and there were about twenty- five people there ” BEGINNINGS OF A FRIENDSHIP 85 It was a season of triumph for McCombs, who as Chairman of the Committee received fervid praise. It was one of equal although less obvious triumph for Colonel House, whose share in the campaign only a few of the more keen-sighted realized. He held no office in the party organization, his goings and comings at Head- quarters were unostentatious. But there was no thread in the campaign pattern which he had not touched, no symptom of party discord which had not evoked his genius for pacification.^ The new Wilson Administra- tion might have been wrecked at the moment of victory. This the President-elect understood and his gratitude to House was unfeigned. Two days after the election, replying to House’s note of congratulation, he declared that no small part of Democratic success must be ascribed to the counsels of the Colonel. Whether or not the victory at the polls could be capitalized to ensure a positive programme of reform legislation, was the question of the future, and to it Colonel House had already turned his attention. X < He wonld come into an office/ explained a Democratic Committee- man, ‘ and say a few words quietly, and after he had gone you would suddenly become seized with a good idea. You would put that idea forth and receive congratulations for it ; it would work out first-rate. Long after, if you thought the thing over, you would suddenly realize that the idea had been oozed into your brain by Colonel House during a few minutes* quiet conversation. You did not know it and the Colonel did not want you to know it. As a matter of fact, before the campaign was over, in his quiet way Colonel House came near being the biggest man about the works, although be did not hold any position and would not take one.* ** — CmfBni Opinion, vol. iv, no. 6, June 1913. CHAPTER IV BUILDING A CABINET Yon can never build a Cabinet to please everybody. . . . When you have about concluded that you have the proper man, someone will come along and condemn him so vigorously that it will make you doubt. There- fore, in the end, you will have largely to determine their fitness yourself. House to Wtlson, November 22, 1912 I T he victory of 1912 was the first won by the Democrats in a presidential election since 1892, an even twenty years. This long exclusion from power laid a tremendous handicap upon the party and its leaders when they came to organize an administra- tion ; for in the United States the minority suffers as much materially from being the under-dog as the majority suffers morally from an over-long lease of control. The older men of the party which has been in opposition have developed critical rather than constructive faculties, and it is long since they have exercised executive func- tions ; comparatively few younger men of capacity have been attracted to the party, and those few have had no administrative experience. What is worse, long political exile will have sharpened everyone’s appetite for office, and the first indication of success at the polls will sound like a dinner gong, gathering the ravenous horde of anxious place-hunters, whose ability is apt to be in inverse ratio to their eagerness. Mr. Wilson did not conceal from himself the particular dMculties which he, as leader of the party and President- 86 BUILDING A CABINET 87 elect, must face. He was without political experience except for his brief tenure of the New Jersey governor- ship. Although he always maintained that a college president found ample opportunity to develop political genius, he did not, at this time certainly, overestimate his own ability. He was threatened, furthermore, by a flood of enthusiastic and contradictory advice. His two chief campaign leaders, McCombs and McAdoo, were at daggers drawn . The man who exercised strongest influence in the party, Mr. Bryan, Wilson regarded as impractical and notoriously mistaken in his personal judgments. Other leaders, such as Underwood and Champ Clark, he had fought vigorously in the pre- nomination campaign. Still others, in Congress, upon whom he must depend for the success of his legislative programme, were ex-Populists, such as Gore of Oklahoma, or machine politicians, such as Stone of Missouri ; both types Wilson had attacked frequently and fearlessly, and their assistance in this .juncture was at least ques- tionable. Each and all of them, furthermore, if not applicants for office themselves, marshalled a solid phalanx of deserving Democrats who had long and faithfully served the cause when there had been no hope of immediate reward and for whom places must be found. As early in the campaign as September 7, House wrote to Waiter Hines Page : “ The wise man will not envy Governor Wilson even in success, for, as you say, the office-seekers will sorely beset him. They are cheerfully dividing up the honours now, and the numbers engaged in this pleasant pastime will increase as the campaign grows older.” It was inevitable that Wilson should turn to Colonel House for assistance. Apart from the warm affection 88 BUILDING A CABINET he had conceived for House, he knew the reputation for political sagacity which the Colonel had earned in Texas and he recognized the value of his services in the pre- nomination and electoral campaigns. House and Wilson, furthermore, were in close accord upon all important political issues. Both were ardent liberals, and Wilson’s S 3 nnpathy was not lessened by his realization that the Colonel’s idealism was touched by a very real sense of the practicable. The factor which counted most heavily in stimulating the confidence of Wilson was the obviously disinterested attitude of Colonel House. At the beginning he made it plain that he would ask nothing for his friends and wanted no office for himself. He was too much the philosopher to be attracted by the badge of public position, and he was convinced that he could serve the Administration more effectively out of office. “ I would not exchange the confidence and friendship that Governor Wilson seems to have for me,” he wrote in November, ” for any office in the land.” Nor would he give advice on appointments until the President demanded it. Colonel House to Dr. S. E. Mezes New York, November 4 , 1912 Dear Sidney: . . . My mail is getting heavy with applications, but I think I know how to handle it. As a matter of fact, I do not care two whoops in hades who gets the offices, and Governor Wilson knows it. . . . He has the opportunity to become the greatest President we have ever had, and I want him to make good. He can do it if the office-seekers will give him leisure to think, and I am going to try and help him get it The Governor spent practically all day with me BUILDING A CABINET 89 Saturday, most of the time at the apartment. It would have done your heart good to have seen him walk in after we had finished lunch, and Loulie’s expression when I asked him to join us. It is true that I took the food from under the servants’ noses as they were about to eat it, but the Governor enjoyed what he had neverthe- less. . . . Fraternally yours E. M. House Colonel House to Senator Culberson New York, Noveniber 5, 1912 Dear Senator : ... It is Governor Wilson’s intention to leave in ten days for a four weeks’ absolute rest, and during that time I suppose the boys will decide definitely upon what offices they will take. As far as I am concerned, I am not interested in the office end of it. ... I have urged Governor Wilson to leave these matters largely to his Cabinet, to the Senators and to the Congressmen, and let them be the bufier between himself and the hungry host. I rather think he will do this in his own defence, in order that he may have some leisure to consider the complex problems that will confront him. . . . It is that end of his Administration in which I am most interested. In other words, I am interested in measures and not in men, and what time I have I shall devote to helping him in that direction. . . . Your very faithful E. M. House With everyone else trying to tell the President-elect what he ought to do and everyone advising differently, and with Colonel House refusing to press any claims, Wilson characteristically put full trust in him. House was ready. Long before the election, regarding Wilson’s victory as assured, he had prepared to help him in every 90 BUILDING A CABINET way that he could ; and he knew that the first call for advice would be upon the subject of appointments. However honest he might be in his interest in measures rather than men, the personnel of the new Administra- tion was the first great problem to be faced. “ I am on constant watch for good material [he wrote on October 21] from which to select a Cabinet and other important places. I wish to be well informed if Governor Wilson should consult me.” There was no danger that House would not be well informed of those who desired office. The applicants themselves saw to that. Party leaders already recog- nized the influence he had acquired and guessed that his approval might be the determining factor in an appoint- ment. " A tremendous mail arrived from all directions,” he wrote immediately after the election. ” Everyone wants something.” AU attempts to disguise the import- ance of the position givenr him by the President-elect proved fruitless, for Mr. Wilson’s frequent visits to the small apartment on Thirty-Fifth Street were too well known. From October until the following spring, when in desperation he left for Europe, the assault upon the Colonel continued. Colonel House to Dr. S. E. Mezes New York, October ii, 1912 Dear Sidney: ... It is not a pose with me, this keeping out of the limelight ; but it is my judgment that I can do far more effective work and accomplish the things I have in mind better by the methods I have heretofore followed. I agree with you that it is going to be dif&cult to keep out of the papers. . . . The trouble is, the fact that I am close to Wilson is BUILDING A CABINET becoming known ; and, since everybody wants some- thing, they are doing their best to please me and this is the way they think to do it. A magazine is trying now to write me up and wants my photograph, but if they get it, it will be when I have lost my head more completely than I think I have as yet. Fraternally and hastily yours E. M. H. Pressure upon House was increased because Wilson had determined to go to Bermuda for a rest and before sailing was slow to confer with the politicians, who one and aU feared that they were not going to find a place in the picture. The Colonel reassured them and urged patience, at the same time that he pointed out to Wilson the need of showing consideration for their sensibilities. “ I telephoned to the Governor [he wrote on Novem- ber 14] and advised him to write a note to Mr. Bryan telling him that he would .confer with him after his return from Bermuda. He said he would do so at once. I am to see the Governor Saturday morning and will advise him concerning other matters pending. In my opinion he is making a mistake in not calling for advice from political leaders, as they will become disgruntled.” Two days later, before Wilson left, he and House drew up a tentative list for Cabinet positions and discussed the best means to satisfy those who, by their work in the campaign, felt that they had earned proper rewards. It was already agreed that Mr. Bryan must be given his choice of positions. As far back as September, House recorded that Wilson had accepted his argument that ” it would be best to make him Secretary of State, in order to have him at Washington and in harmony with the Administration, rather than outside and possibly in 92 BUILDING A CABINET a critical attitude. Mrs. Bryan’s influence, too, would be valuable,” Whatever his capacity, Bryan had come to Wilson’s rescue at Baltimore and might ask for political recogni- tion, Furthermore, his influence in the party was such that, if hostile, he could effectively block the legislative programme and perhaps wreck the Administration. Nothing illustrates more clearly the exigencies of govern- ment under the party system. Mr. Wilson did not want Bryan in his Cabinet and did not believe him fitted for the Secretaryship of State ; but it was undeniable that the new Administration could carry through its reform programme more effectively with Bryan in it. At least there would not be the danger to the public service that threatened in 1897, when McKinley, in order to provide a vacancy in the Senate which Mark Hanna might fill, appointed Senator Sherman Secretary of State,^ The claims of McCombs and McAdoo were placed in the forefront because of ' their campaign leadership. Wilson regarded the abilities of the latter highly, but he distrusted the former’s capacity, although he had long had for him a personal fondness. McCombs was in ill-health, lacked evenness of temper, and was ready to make alliance with the type of old-fashioned politicians whom Wilson hated. He had done much to stimulate enthusiasm in the pre-nomination campaign, but the experience of the electoral campaign itself seemed to indicate that his appointment to a Cabinet position would not make for harmony, even if he possessed the requisite administrative capacity. 1 William Roscoe Thayer wrote of this manoeuvre : " To force the venerable Sherman, whose powers were already failing, into the most important office after that of President himself, showed a disregard of common decency not less than of the safety of the nation.” {The Life of John Hay, ii, 156.) 93 BUILDING A CABINET “ November i6 : Governor Wilson telephoned me early [recorded Colonel House] and asked if it would be convenient for him to come over [to House’s apartment] at ten o’clock. He remained for an hour or more and we went over all matters in the most confidential way. Cabinet material was discussed. ... We discussed what to do with McCombs and McAdoo. He said he would give the former a first-class foreign appointment in order to get rid of him. He said he would be willing to ^ve him the CoUectorship of the Port of New York if it were not that he could build up a formidable political machine. I told him McCombs would not think of accepting the CoUectorship. I suggested McAdoo as Secretary of the Treasury, Burleson as Post- master-General. He thought Daniels would be better for Postmaster-General, but I thought he was not aggressive enough and that the position needed a man who was in touch with Congress. He agreed that this was true. “We talked again of James C. McReynolds as Attorney-General. We practicaUy eliminated Brandeis for this position. ... He asked again about offering Mr. Bryan the Secretaryship of State or Ambassador- ship to England, and I advised him to do so. He said that he would.” II With Wilson’s departure for Bermuda, House set seriously to work investigating the claims and the capa- cities of the applicants for office, from lowest to highest. Much of the work was intensely uncomfortable. " Visited Headquarters [he noted on November i8] and spent a disagreeable time with X and Y. Sug- gested to X the secretaryship of the Senate, which pays |6,ooo per year, but he scorns a position of this kind and wants something much better. Y is in the same frame 94 BUILDING A CABINET of mind. Y abused McAdoo viciously. When I pressed him, he could not verify any of his statements. He says he will depend upon McCombs to look out for his in- terests. . . . “ I am overwhelmed with office-seekers who have probably seen notices of Governor Wilson having called on me on the i6th. I am busy getting up a list of Cabinet possibilities with data attached, to send the President-elect for his information. ...” Colonel House to the President-elect New York, November 22, 1912 Dear Governor : . . . James C. McReynolds, of Tennessee, but more recently of New York, is worthy of consideration. Although a Democrat, Mr. Roosevelt made him special counsel for the Government in the suit against the Tobacco Trust and the Anthracite Coal Trust. He won the Tobacco suit and he has won the suit against the Coal Trust as far as it has gone. It is now in the Supreme Court. McReynolds severed his connection with the Govern- ment because of his disagreement with Mr. Wickersham regarding the dissolution of the Tobacco Trust. He contended that Wickersham’s plan nulhfied the effects of the victory. He is about fifty years old. He is considered radical in his views by a large part of the New York Bar.^ His character and legal attainments are of the highest. I lunched with Mr. Brandeis yesterday. His mind and mine are in accord concerning most of the questions that are now to the fore. He is more than a lawyer ; he is a publicist and he has an unusual facility for lucid expression. . . . ^ This reputation doubtless resulted from the vigour with which he had prosecuted the suits against the trusts. As a member of the Cabinet Mr. McReynolds displayed no radical proclivities, and after he assumed his seat on the Supreme Court he was generally regarded as one of the most conservative of the Justices. BUILDING A CABINET 95 A large number of reputable people distrust Mm, but I doubt whether the distrust is weU founded, and it would perhaps attach itself to any man who held his advanced views. Norman Hapgood^ lunched with us and I found in Mm an enthusiastic admirer of Brandeis. They are both going to Hot Springs for a few days as guests of Mr. Charles R. Crane. Franklin K. Lane, Democratic Interstate Commerce Commissioner from California, was with me a large part of yesterday. Lane is fine material, but he is contented with his present position and would not change it. You will have some difficulty in selecting your Secretary of the Interior. The West wants him, but it would perhaps be a mistake to select him from there. In the first place, he could not maintain himself with his own people and satisfy the East. If he satisfied the East, the West would rend him.^ It would also be well not to put an ultra-Eastem man in that position, for the West would resent such action. As you know, the East is nU for conservation and the Far West is for it in a limited way — that is, where it does not conflict with their material interests. The West is anxious to have the forests and mines opened up and used to an extent that would aid them commercially! They are also largely wedded to the idea of state versus national control, which I think is wrong, but wMch we need not go into here. There is one tMng I want to say, and that is tMs : You can never build a Cabinet that will please every- body. When you seek advice you will find but few agreements, even amongst your friends. When you have about concluded that you have the proper man, ^ Editor of Collier* s Weehlyt 1903-12 ; of Harper* s WeeUy, 1913-16 ; later appointed Minister to Denmark. ^ Mr. Lane, who was ultimately appointed, belied this prophecy. Although a Westerner and retaining the confidence of the West, he was generally spoken of by the Eastern press as one of the most capable mem- bers of Wilson's Cabinet. 96 BUILDING A CABINET someone will come along and condemn him so vigorously that it will make you doubt. Therefore, in the end, you will have largely to determine their fitness yourself. Please do not bother to answer my letters unless there is something you want me to do. Your very faithful E. M. House Mr. Wilson wrote from Bermuda, thanking House for his suggestions. He addressed him, as he had done since the summer of 1912 and continued to do for five years, as “ My dear Friend,” and signed himself “Affec- tionately yours.” He expressed himself as able to rest with an equable mind if the kind American people would not unload their correspondence upon him, and en- couraged House in a prospective trip to Washington. Colonel House’s visit to Washington was partly, as he expressed it, “ to find the lay of the land ” so that he might wisely advise Governor Wilson upon his return from Bermuda, and partly to discover means to harmonize the discordant factions in the party. The differences that had arisen during the campaign were largely per- sonal ; those that now threatened were political and seemed likely to cause more serious difficulties. There was disagreement over the legislative programme, especially in the matter of currency reform ; and a storm of greater or less severity seemed hkely to arise over the question of the single term for President, which was warmly advocated by Bryan and to which Wilson was strongly opposed. House set himself to persuade the party leaders to take no step which might later bring them into conflict with the President. He worked unobtrusively. Mr. Burleson, a Democratic leader in the House, asked Senator Gore what he thought of the Colonel, “ Take my word for it,” replied Gore, “ he BUILDING A CABINET 97 can walk on dead leaves and make no more noise than a tiger.” His work was none the less effective in that it was quiet, and it does not spoil the story to say that in the end the currency and single-term problems were both settled in accordance with Wilson’s wishes. Colonel Home to the President-elect New York, November 28, 1912 Dear Governor : I spent two strenuous but interesting days in Wash- ington. While there I had an hour with Chief Justice White, by appointment, and was with him at dinner later. Among those that called upon me were Speaker Clark, Hoke Smith, Gore, Culberson, Bob Henry, Bur- leson, Carter Glass, and many others. I mention these by name, for each of them had something interesting to say. Mr, Clark has not gottdh over his defeat. He is inclined to be friendly with you, but his hatred of Mr. Bryan amounts to an obsession and it is not unlikely that there will be a personal difficulty between them when they meet. Almost at the begmning, Clark asked me what you intended to do. I replied, “ About what ? ” He said, “About anything or everything.” I told him that was a pretty leading question and asked him to be more specific. I finally told him that you intended to carry out the Democratic policies as far as you were able with the aid of such leaders as himself and others. Before he left, he was telling me the story of his life and we were on very cordial terms. I think he would like to be invited to see you when you return, and I believe it would be a wise thing to do. . . . I had a most interesting hour with Mr. Glass. He candidly confessed that he knew nothing about banking 98 BUILDING A CABINET or the framing of a monetary measure. I congratulated him upon this, for I told him that it was much better to know nothing than to know something wrong. He, too, indicated a willingness to do everything in his power to give as speedily as possible a sound economic bill, and upon lines advised by you. . . . He expressed a desire to see you soon after your return, and I think the quicker you see him the better it will be. You will find him ready to co-operate with you to the fullest extent. Harvey was there for the purpose of furthering his plan for a single term. Mr. Taft favours this, and so does Mr. Bryan. Mr. Taft favours a six-year term, and Mr. Bryan leans to four years. Harvey told me that Bob Henry was work- ing with Bryan along this line and that was going to be our first difficulty. He was very pessimistic. He said that no one knew your viewpoint concerning the matter and that your friends were apathetic, and that before they realised it a measure would be passed through both branches of Congress and be ready for submission to the people. It does not require the signature of the President, but, if it did, Mr. Taft would sign it. Harvey is mistaken about your friends not being alert in regard to it, because I talked to Burleson and others and told them to watch every move. Harvey thought it would be a wise thing to com- promise on a six-year term which would include you. In talking with Gore about it afterwards, he said the difficulty there was that the Republican States would hesitate to lengthen the term of a Democratic President two years longer than was necessary. If the Republicans refused to lengthen the term of a Democratic President, then the Democratic States would in turn refuse to lengthen the term of a Republican President. . . . ^ The general consensus of opinion amongst those with whom I talked and who had met Bryan, was that he would work in harmony with your Administration BUILDING A CABINET 99 if he went into the Cabinet, but they all thought that there were two difficulties which should be met at the outset : the question of a second term and the further question of currency reform. . . . I obtained a great deal of valuable information from the Chief Justice. He talked to me frankly, with the understanding that what he said was to be repeated to no one excepting you. He cheerfuUy slaughtered nearly all the gentlemen about whom I wrote to you in my last letter. . . . Your very faithful E. M. House With the return of Mr. Wilson, conferences multiplied, and the following six weeks House devoted to sifting the claims of importunate apphcants and to a search for avail- able but less vociferous candidates. A series of excerpts from his daily memoranda will illustrate the process. No letters were exchanged with Mr. Wilson during this period, since the two were in constant touch through the telephone. “ December 6, 1912 : I had a long conversation with McCombs and Vick.^ I believe if I had been authorized to offer McCombs a foreign embassy to-day, he would have accepted it. Office-seekers are driving him crazy, I suggested a foreign position and he said that he did Dot have sufficient money ; but I told him that it would not take much. He asked where I would suggest his going — ^Vienna, Italy, or where ? . . . “ December ii, 1912 : Mr, David F, Houston came to dinner and spent the evening. We discussed the different Cabinet possibilities and otW matters. He knows that I have suggested him to the President-elect for Secretary of Agriculture. He thought it would be better to defer legislation on currency and tarifi until later, but I con- ^ Walter F* Vick, one of Mr. McCombses cMef Uentenants in the electoral campaign* 100 BUILDING A CABINET vinced Mm of the importance of passing such measures before ah the patronage had been distributed. . . . “ December i8, 1912 : Governor Wilson came at half- past one. I talked to him about Morgenthau^ and suggested him for Turkey. He replied, " There ain’t going to be no Turkey,” ® and I said, “ Then let him go look for it.” . . . “ I thought if I were in Wilson’s place I would take only men I knew, that in making a selection it was like walking in the country — one could always imagine that something better was beyond, but upon reacMng the given point the view was stiU in the distance like the rainbow. ” Bryan was also discussed freely. I advised Mm to offer Bryan the Secretaryship of State, but afterwards to suggest that it would be of great service if he would go to Russia at tMs critical time. He thought Bryan would want to discuss with Mm the personnel of his Cabinet and that they could never agree. I argued that there were many people and tMngs that they could agree upon, as their object was really the same only their ways of getting at it were different. He might, I thought, mention the names of Burleson, Daniels, and others he was considering for the Cabinet who were also friends of Mr. Bryan. “ We discussed again the Attomey-GeneralsMp. . . . We went back to McReynolds and I thought he seemed to understand the different phases of the situation better than anyone I had talked to. He asked if I considered McAdoo suited for the Treasury, and I thought he was ; under ordinary conditions I should say an Eastern man would be a bad choice, but that in tMs instance I heartily approved McAdoo. “ December 19, 1912 : Governor Wilson called me over the telephone and said that McCombs was distinctly ^ Chairmaii of the Democratic Finance Committee and later appointed Ambassador to Turkey. 2 Turkey in Europe seemed about to disappear as the result of the defeats administered by the Balkan League. BUILDING A CABINET loi disappointed at the ambassadorial offer made him yesterday, and no decision was arrived at. He wanted to know again about Bryan and my advice about it. I advised being cordial in making the otfer,^ and to make it plain afterwards that he would appreciate his taking the foreign post [the Ambassadorship to Russia]. “B. M. Baruch, McCombs’s friend, told Wallace that he had advised McCombs not to accept office, but to resign from the National Committee and to go into the practice of law as soon as his health permits. McCombs seems terribly ‘ cut up ’ over the fact that Governor Wilson has not offered him all that he desired and that he tendered him an Ambassadorship instead of a Cabinet place. “ I called up Governor Wilson to talk things over, and he asked if I still held to my advice about Mr, Bryan, and I answered ‘ yes.’ This is the third or fourth time he has asked me this. It shows how dis- trustful he is of having Mr. Bryan in his Cabinet, . . . “ December 21, 1912 : Tumulty telephoned about the Governor’s and Bryan’s interview. Bryan was in fine humour and everything "was lovely.^ He asked me to send a further list of men whom I thought it best for the Governor to see. I had already sent in a list several days ago to Trenton. "McAdoo ... is now anxious to go to Staunton, where the Governor is to attend some celebration given in his honour on the 28th, and some of McAdoo’s friends are urging him to go, telling him he is effacing himself too much and will be forgotten. I advised to the contrary, but wished him to use his own judgment. “ December 23, 1912 [House and Colonel George Harvey taking lunch together] : Martin was also^ at lunch. Harvey told him that I was the best adviser the President-elect had, and that he thought I should be given the Secretaryship of the Treasury. Martin ^ Of the SecretarysMp of State. 2 At tHs interview Mr. Bryan was offered the SecretarysMp of State and tentatively accepted it. 102 BUILDING A CABINET “wanted to know, if my health permitted would I take it ? I replied, ‘ Not if I were as strong as a bull ! ' ; that, as it was, the Governor discussed everything frankly and without fear of misunderstanding, but that if I were an applicant for any position both he and I would feel the restraint. . . . “ The more I see of McAdoo, the better I like him. He is a splendid fellow, whole-souled, and generous, without a tinge of envy, and with it aU he is honest and progressive. “ December 29, 1912 : Tumulty was with me from five until half-past nine in the evening. We went over the situation in detail. He is very desirous of being Secretary to the President. “ I asked Tumulty how many letters of protest the Governor was receiving against himself for that position. He admitted that there had been five or six hundred. I inquired if he showed them to the Governor. He had not shown them all, but had always told him of the number received. He did not show him the letters which came that were favourable to him either. . . . “ January 5, 1913 : The Governor has invited Burleson, Palmer, Culberson, Gore, Hoke Smith, and Bob Henry, as I had suggested, to come to Trenton this week. Tumulty said the Governor did not want to invite them much, as he thought there was nothing that he wished to discuss with them, Tumulty explained to him that I thought he should see them in order to compliment them rather than to expect much help from their advice. He then consented to see them. " January 7, 1913 : McAdoo came at five and re- mained until seven o’clock. We discussed Cabinet possibilities. He wanted to know what my general idea was, and I told him that I thought the Governor had poor material to select from. McAdoo replied, ‘ I believe you are right, and you may include me too,’ I disclaimed any thought or reference to him, but he cheerfully included himself. I explained that my reason for sa3dng this was that the Democratic Party had been BUILDING A CABINET 103 out of power so long that no one had been in training or in process of development for public office. “ X tells me that he understands from Thomas Nelson Page and others that Y is anxious for a recon- ciliation. Martin says Y has a plan for disposing of Bryan. I answered that a lot of people were busy with such plans, but I thought Governor Wilson and Mr. Bryan would be able to manage the matter them- selves. . . . “ January 8, 1913 : I told him [Wilson] he was now leaving Texas out of the Cabinet. His reply was, ‘ I want you to go m the Cabinet.’ ... He urged me not to give a definite answer for the present and said he very much wished me to be a member of his official family, that it seemed to coincide with the fitness of things. " He generously asked me what place I would like, evidently leaving me to choose. I regard this as a very high compliment, for the reason that he has offered no one a place in the Cabinet up to now excepting Mr. Bryan, whom we agreed upon just after the election . . . as a pohtical necessity. Of course, I shall not take any office, although I would dounuch to oblige him and to be of service. My reasons are that I am not strong enough to tie myself down to a Cabinet department and, in addition, my general disinclination to hold office. I very much prefer being a free lance, and to advise with him regarding matters in general, and to have a roving commission to serve wherever and whenever possible.” To such reasons for remaining out of office should be added one which Colonel House may not have definitely formulated, but which must have affected him at least subconsciously. His experience with the Texas Governors had taught him that, however much in sympathy he might be with their general policy, questions of detail must arise on which his opinions would be at variance from theirs. He believed that in essential matters he 104 BUILDING A CABINET and Wilson would agree in principle, but they might conceivably disagree as to method. If he were in an official position such disagreement would compel his resignation, unless he were to be placed in the unpleasant position of carrpng out a line of action which he dis- approved. So long as he remained in a private capacity, he could give what advice he chose ; and if the President did not follow it, House could shrug his shoulders and turn his attention to other matters in which Wilson might accept his guidance. “ Had I gone into the Cabinet,” House once said, “ I could not have lasted eight weeks.” Outside of the Cabinet he lasted for eight years. Ill The serious, although rather unconventional, responsi- bilities laid upon the shoulders of Colonel House during the process of drafting Cabinet possibilities were not lightened by the political inexperience of the President- elect and his temperamental inability to develop confi- dential relations with the party leaders. “ Such men as Speaker Clark [so ran a despatch from Trenton to the New York Herald], Representative Oscar W. Underwood, Senator Hoke Smith, Senator Culberson, and many others of importance in the Democracy have journeyed to Princeton and gone away saying they had no more information than when they came. One of them said to me : ‘I know that Governor Wilson was elected President on November 5. I know that he will be inaugurated on March 4. Further than that I know nothing about what has happened or is going to happen.’ Several of the leaders frankly say, when asked what will happen after March 4 : ‘You will have to ask either the President-elect or Colonel House.’ ”1 ^ The Herald, February 19, 1913. BUILDING A CABINET As the days passed the pohticians took th^tEopej and their ideas to House, who, somewhat by his position, nevertheless worked steadfastly to make them feel less out in the cold. “ Making the suggestion through you,” wrote McCombs to House on January 2, of a proposition for Wilson’s decision, “ is the only way I know of handling the matter.” “ February 17, 1913 : X called at five o’clock [re- corded House]. He wished to tell me many things, but particularly how very competent he was to be Secretary of the Treasury. He seemed hurt that Wilson had not c^ed him into consultation, or sent for him, or noticed him in any way since the election. His position, he seemed to think, entitled him to great consideration. I explained that the President-elect had not called his friends into consultation, and those who had been with him had made the appointments themselves and had not come at his invitation. This was invariably the case, as far as I knew, with the exception of Mr. Bryan, Speaker Clark, Mr. Underwood, and some members of the Senate and House. He left in a fine humour, and promised to write me his views if I would convey them to the Governor. . . .” “ February 19, 1913 : Y came at half-past five. He complained bitterly of the way the Governor was treat- ing him ; that he did not consult with him or tell him about any of his plans. I asked if he knew of anyone else that he consulted or to whom he told his plans. He confessed he did not, and I told him he had no right to complain. ... He said there was a bitter feeling among the party leaders that they were not being con- sulted, and not taken into confidence. Of course he exaggerates this.” It was all the more important that when it came to the composition of the Cabinet the wishes of the party leaders should be carefully considered ; for if, after io6 BUILDING A CABINET keeping his own counsel (or that of Colonel House), Mr. Wilson chose a Cabinet of independents, he would soon find a rebellious party in Congress. House was frankly troubled. “ Walter Page lunched with me to-day [the Colonel wrote on January 14]. I found that he had been ad- vising Governor Wilson very much along the lines I have. . . . " I tried him out as to the department in which he was most interested. If the Governor appoints him, I shall advise that he be given the Interior. I told Page that I was fearful that the Governor was thinking of appointing too many independents and that he was not looking for rock-ribbed Democrats.” The Colonel struck the same note on the following day in a talk with Mrs. Wilson, whose influence with her husband he evidently counted upon. “ I told her that the men the Governor had in mind for his Cabinet were nearly all irregular party men and that most of them had voted for Taft four years ago. I cited as an instance. She spoke up immediately and said, “ But you would not keep him out of the Cabinet on that account ? ” I replied no, not in his case, but I would not put in too many with the same sort of record, for the reason that the moment the Cabinet was announced their political records would be exposed. " I thought that in twenty years from now no one would know how the different departments of the Government had been run and that the President’s fame would rest entirely upon the big constructive measures he was able to get through Congress ; and in order to get them through he had to be on more or less good terms with that body. This, I thought, was one of the most important things he had to consider, for his future reputation would rest almost whoUy upon it.” BUILDING A CABINET 107 Of all the politicians, the one whose influence during the first legislative session would be most valuable was, of course, Mr. Bryan ; and it was natural that House should suggest that he be given a voice in the composi- tion of the Cabinet, or at least an opportunity to com- ment upon the tentative slate which Wilson had drafted by early January. The Governor agreed, House recorded on January 10, that it would be well for the Colonel to go to Miami, where Bryan was building a Southern home, and explain Wilson’s plans. “ He said I could talk to him freely, but that it was to give him, Bryan, information and not to ask his advice.” The newspapers of the East had taken unholy plea- sure in picturing Mr. Bryan in a truculent frame of mind and inclined to dictate Mr. Wilson’s pohcy and appoint- ments. House discovered the reverse to be true. ” He is in a delightful humour,” the Colonel wrote Wilson on January 29. “ He likes the names suggested for the famUy gathering.” And as House developed his views he found Bryan careful not to press any specific appoint- ments with undue ardour and surprisingly mild in his criticisms. Colonel House to the President-elect Miami, Florida, January 30 , 1913 Dear Governor : I had a long conference with our friend last night and again to-day. . . . He is very earnest in his advice that a Catholic, and perhaps a Jew, be taken into the family. I told him T[umifity]’s appointment as Secretary would cover the one, but he thought not. He suggests Governor Higgins of !]^ode Island as a possible choice. He shows a very fine spirit and is exceedingly anxious for your success. He also shows no disposition whatever to interfere, even io8 BUILDING A CABINET in his own department. He says he would like to name his first assistant unless you have someone you want to place there. He knows all the disadvantages to him of accepting place and mentions them in detail, but he says that those things must not be taken into account. He thinks the Pacific slope should be recognized, but he does not seem to get beyond Phelan and Lane, although I do not think he would seriously object to anyone excepting Teal. For the first time, I think, he is finding out how difficult it is to form this body. He likes the suggestion you made to me for Germany [Professor Fine of Princeton], but has no one in mind for England. . . . He has accepted aU your conclusions so cordially that it has been a pleasure to me to discuss matters with him. Your very faithful E. M. House “ January 30, 1913 : Mr. Bryan was as pleased with his new place [recorded Colonel House] as a child with a new toy. He is really a fine man, full of democratic simplicity, earnest, patriotic, and of a fervently religious nature. Mrs. Bryan is the ‘ salt of the earth.’ She has all the poise and good common sense which is lacking in her distinguished husband. . . . “ January 31, 1913 : It was so warm that we did not go through the Everglades. Mr. Bryan came over in the evening and we had another political talk. He was much distressed when I told him that Governor Wilson had offered the Chinese mission to Dr. Charles W. Eliot. He thought it the poorest selection that could be made, for the reason that Eliot was a Unitarian and did not believe in the divinity of Christ and the new Chinese civilization was founded upon the Christian movement there. I asked him to state his objections in writing, not only as to Dr. Ehot, but as to any member of the BUILDING A CABINET 109 proposed Cabinet. I said as far as Eliot was concerned, it was too late ; but I did not believe Dr. Eliot would accept, for he had told the Governor that he would take it only if his wife approved and he was afraid she would not. Mr. Bryan was hopeful she would not.” " He is only trying to help,” wrote House again to Wilson, ” and does not mean to urge.” ” Everything he said,” the Colonel noted later, ” showed a fine spirit in Mr. Bryan and seemed to me to be a hopeful sign for future harmony.” It appears from the terms of the following letter that Wilson left these negotiations entirely to House. Colonel House to the President-elect St. Augustine, Florida February 6 , 1913 Dear Governor; Our friend has asked me many times whether I had heard from you in response to his suggestions. He wired me just before he left for Havana, asking the same question. If I were you, I would send him a line indicating that you appreciated his interest and had found his suggestions helpful. He will be back in Miami next Thursday, and if he found a note from you awaiting him it would please him greatly. . . . Your very faithful E. M. House IV Upon Colonel House’s return, early in February, Wilson felt himself prepared to make the definite appoint- ments. It was already settled that Bryan should be Secretary of State. McAdoo had accepted the Treasury portfolio, and Burleson was to be offered that of Post- no BUILDING A CABINET master-General, two selections urged by House from the beginning. For Agriculture, Wilson had determined upon the distinguished economist, D, F. Houston, Chancellor of Washington University, another close friend of House. Josephus Daniels, a North Carolina editor, and W. B. Wilson, once a miner and an active albeit conservative labour leader, were to be given the portfolios of the Navy and of Labour respectively. There remained those of War, the Interior, Justice, and Commerce. " February 8, 1913 : The President-elect writes that he needs to see me for a final conference about the official family. He asks me to sound Houston on the Secretaryship of Agriculture. On that case he is clear and his mind made up, but he thinks it best for me to open the matter with him. The Treasury has been offered and accepted as we planned.’' In the conferences between Wilson and House which followed, the latter urged the appointment of J. C. McReynolds and F. K. Lane, the first because of his record as special prosecuting attorney in anti-trust suits, the second because of his record on the Interstate Com- merce Commission. Wilson did not know McReynolds, and on February 15 the Colonel recorded that the latter was invited to House’s apartment while the President- elect was there, “ ostensibly to discuss the appointment of a District Attorney here. The Governor liked Mc- Reynolds.” On the following day Mr. Lane came over from Washington, for Wilson had asked House to sound him as he had already sounded the other appointees. The conference crystallized the Colonel’s conviction that Wilson would make a mistake if he left Lane out of the Cabinet. BUILDING A CABINET III " I informed him of what we had in mind for him. The Interior, in his opinion, was the most difficult post in the Cabinet, but he would take it if we wanted him to do so. He said he would take anything we thought him best suited for, but that he was content to remain where he was as Chairman of the Interstate Commerce Commission. “ Feeling responsible for Lane, I drew him out upon all the leading questions, and I found that he has a remarkably strong, virile mind. My opinion of him increased materially, much as I had thought of him before. There will certainly not be a stronger or more dominant force in the Cabinet. “ Norman Hapgood came and I brought them together, and we had a fine hour. After Lane left, Hapgood expressed his enthusiastic admiration for him and said he thought he would suit the position for which we had him in mind wonderfully well. I asked that he write a letter to this effect, telling him I wanted him to share the responsibility with me because the President- elect had never met Lane and knew him only through me,” The difficulties and complexities of political Cabinet- making are illustrated by the story of the succeeding days. One after the other, objections cropped up which seemed to destroy the availability of men Wilson wanted. His choice for Attorney-General was A. Mitchell Palmer, whose activity on the floor of the Balti- more Convention had gone far to decide Wilson’s nomina- tion. Opposition in certain quarters proved to be so strong that he was instead offered the Secretaryship of War. This, however, he felt he must decline, in deference to his Quaker principles. Inauguration day was approaching, was barely a fortnight away, and Wilson realized that no time could be lost if his Cabinet were to be completed by March 4. II2 BUILDING A CABINET " I asked him not to worry [wrote House], that the getting of Lane in the Cabinet was of much more import- ance than the losing of Palmer for Attorney-General ; that Lane could take that place, if necessary, and fill it with distinction, and that we could keep Baker ^ for the Interior. . . . " February i8, 1913 : Newton Baker [recorded House] rang me up to say that he had arrived. When I was in Princeton, the Governor wrote him a note asking him to come to New York on Tuesday or Wednesday, as was most convenient, and to telephone me and that I would make an appointment for him to meet the Governor at my apartment. I asked Baker to dine with us at seven o’clock and I requested him not to let his presence in New York be known and, above all things, not to let anyone know he was coming to my apartment or was having an appointment with the President-elect. , . , “ I met Governor Wilson and brought him to the apartment. We had about forty minutes before Baker came, and we discussed the Cabinet and other appoint- ments. . . . “ Baker came and we had a very delightful dinner ; politics were not discussed at all, stories were told, Mark Twain and various other persons and matters were talked of. After dinner I left the Governor and Baker. . . . “ In about a half-hour, I returned. The Governor said he had offered Baker the Secretaryship of the Interior and that he was considering the matter. Baker finally decided he could not take it. He said there was no one to carry on the work in Cleveland which he had begun, and he thought the government of our American cities was the greatest disgrace to our citizenship ; that Cleveland was emerging from that state and would soon be an example to her sister cities throughout the land. ‘ ‘ Both the Governor and I urged him to take a broader view of the situation and do the bigger work. He finally ^ Newton D* Baker, reform Mayor of Cleveland. BUILDING A CABINET 113 decided to take the matter under consideration for the night, and said if he changed his mind he would wire me to-morrow, quoting a line from Shakespeare which I would understand.” The cryptic line from Shakespeare was never sent, and it was found necessary to look further for a Secretary of the Interior. Baker’s refusal led Wilson definitely to decide that he would return to House’s original suggestion of McReynolds as Attorney-General. The Colonel pointed out that Walter H. Page might be offered the Interior and Lane be shifted to the War Department. Wilson acceded and authorized House to see whether Page would accept. He at once called him upon the telephone, but learned that he had left town ; he there- upon sent him a telegram asking him to call as soon as he returned. Chance plays its part in history. Had Mr. Page been in town, he would have been offered and would have accepted the Secretaryship of the Interior, and he would not have gone to London as Ambassador. But before his return, the party leaders in Congress learned of the suggestion and objected strongly. Page, they pointed out, was a Southerner, and no Southerner should be Secretary of the Interior because of his control of pensions. In view of these objections, Wilson decided to keep Lane in the Interior and look for another man for War. House was left to explain his telegram to Page to the best of his ability when the latter returned. He proved equal to the interview, which might conceivably test his tact and powers of invention, “ February 24, 1913 ; Walter Page arrived in response to my telegram, '^en I wired him we expected to place him in the Interior and move Lane up to War, but BUILDING A CABINET 114 in talking with the Governor last night it was decided best not to put a Southerner in that place. “ I told Page the reason we had summoned him was because there was likely to be a slip-up in some of the Cabinet places, and we wanted to know definitely whether he could be used in case it was necessary, I also told him the Governor wished me to discuss with him the material already gotten together. He suggested, and I advised, his going at once to Trenton to take the matter up with the Governor.” A few weeks later House told Page how near he had been to becoming Secretary of the Interior, a story which excited in Mr. Page more amusement than regret. The final choice for the portfolio of War was delayed until the last moment. Colonel House had strongly recommended Mr. H. C. Wallace, who later became Ambassador to France, Mr. Wilson approved the selec- tion and offered the post to Wallace. But the latter found it impossible to accept. The ultimate decision was made on the spur of the moment. During the morning of February 24, House recorded : " Tumulty suggests, and we are going to look up, a New Jersey man, Vice-Chancellor Garrison, and see whether he will fill the bill.” Wilson evidently lost no time, for in the evening : " Tumulty telephoned while Page was here, saying that the Governor had sent for Vice-Chancellor Garrison and was very much pleased with him, and had offered him the post of Secretary of War.” The reader can hardly escape a shock of surprise at the apparently nonchalant manner in which the President- elect chose his Cabinet. In reality he had received an immense quantity of carefully sifted information, and BUILDING A CABINET 115 the eligibility list of possibilities was drafted with care. But he made his final selection with a suddenness of decision that startled House himself. “ The thing that impresses me most [he recorded] is the casual way in which the President-elect is making up his Cabinet. I can see no end of trouble for him in the future unless he proceeds with more care.” The Cabinet, as finally selected, was a melange of administrators selected because of personal ability and of political leaders whose influence demanded recognition. The number of purely political appointments was less than is customary, a tribute to Wilson’s original deter- mination to consider ability alone in his appointments. Because of this fact and also because of his consistent refusal to discuss the Cabinet intimately with anyone but House, the wiseacres were largely at fault in their prognostications. Ten days before the Inauguration, the New York Herald announced " Rifts in Cabinet Secrecy.’ ’ But the list which it published of the probable Cabinet proved to be far from accurate.^ Of the ten final appointees, only four were recognized beforehand by the Herald as possibilities. The publication of the official family aroused more surprise than enthusiasm. In Republican circles the new Cabinet was naturally regarded as inferior, and by the country as a whole it was looked upon as mediocre. This was inevitable, since Wilson’s choice was limited not merely to Democrats but to radicals who would approve of the drastic reforms he contemplated. For half a century the Democratic party had been out of power, except for the two terms of Cleveland’s Presi- dency ; and during that period there had been a steady ^ See A.ppendix to chapter. ii6 BUILDING A CABINET gravitation of men of practical ability into the opposite political camp, which was more and more affiliated with the great money and business interests. “ It has thus come about [a New York paper pointed out] that most of the men eminent in the administration of national affairs have become defenders of existing conditions, in spite of the growing importance of a newly awakened national consciousness of intolerable wrongs in the political and economic life of the country. . . . Such men as seem to give promise of solid ability and administrative success lack importance in the public mind. . . . [Mr. Wilson] expects the country to be surprised by the absence of commanding or dis- tinguished figures in his selection, but feels that the men he is to call into power will in time develop reputa- tions that will justify him,” ^ Colonel House himself was satisfied rather than enthusiastic, and in meeting the criticism of his friends emphasized the difficulties of the problem more than the innate strength of the Cabinet. “ Walter Page [he noted on February 24] came after dinner and told of his trip to Trenton. He regretted that it was too late to keep Daniels out of the Cabinet. The President-elect had already written him. I knew this, because he told me he intended writing McReynolds, Daniels, and Burleson notes on Sunday. ... He said to Page, ' You do not seem to think that Daniels is Cabinet timber.’ Page replied, ' He is hardly a splinter.’ “ In discussing the Cabinet, Page thought it dis- tinctly mediocre and thought the country would so regard it. I asked him how he could better it ; and when he attempted to do so, like aU the rest he failed signally. ... I think, in all the circumstances, we have done well.” ^ Evening Mail, New York, January 17, 1913* BUILDING A CABINET ii APPENDIX Thc^^Hemir^ List The Cabinet as ot Februa/y 22. Appointed. Secretary of State W. J. Bryan W. J. Bryan Secretary of the Treasury . W. G. McAdvO W. G. MmAdoo Secretary of War Charles R. Crane Lindiey M. Garrisc Attorney-General A. ]Mitchcll Palmer J. C AIcReynoMs Postmaster-General . f Josephus Daniels 1 Albert S. Burleson Albert S. Burleson Secretary of the Navy Lewis Nixon Josephus Daniels Secretary of the Interior /Alva Adams 1 Edward L. Norris F* K. Lane Secretary of Agriculture Obadiah Gardiner D F. Houston Secretary of Commerce and ! rW. C. RedMd Labour rLouis D. Brandeis hw B. Wilson ] { (Labour) CHAPTER V THE SILENT PARTNER The source of Ms power was . . • the confidence that men had in his sagacity and nnselfishness, E, S. MafUn, %n " Harper's Magazine” February 1912 I M r. house is my second personality. He is my independent self. His thoughts and mine are one. If I were in his place I would do just as he suggested. ... If anyone thinks he is reflecting my opinion by whatever action he takes, they are welcome to the conclusion.” Such was the reply given by President Wilson to a politician who asked whether House represented him accurately in a certain situation. It indicates the degree of confidence which he placed in the Colonel. The President made it clear that, although House had refused official position of any kind, he was determined that the Administration should not lose the political services which House was qualified to perform. On the very day of his inauguration he asked and summarily accepted his recommendations for important appointive posts. “ The President-elect telephoned [Colonel House wrote on March 4] and asked Loulie and me to meet his family party at the Shoreham Hotel at 9.45, in order to accompany them to the Capitol for the inauguration ceremonies. I took Loulie to the Shoreham and left her with the Wilsons, but I did not go to the Capitol myself. I went instead to the Metropolitan Club and THE SILENT PARTNER 119 loafed around with Wallace. Functions of this sort do not appeal to me and I never go. “ Mrs. Wilson invited us to the White House to see the fireworks. When we arrived we found the President was over in his office. I went there and was with him for a few minutes in order to teU him that I had in- vestigated John H. Marble for Interstate Commerce Commissioner, in place of F. K. Lane, and had found him satisfactory. The President had never met Marble and had made no inquiries concerning him further than mine. He said he would send his name in to-morrow, along with the names of his Cabinet. He made the appointment in this way in order to avoid the great pressure which would be made upon him by candidates for this important office. . . . “ March 8, 1913 ; The President asked me to be at the White House this morning at nine. “ The offices w^ere nearly deserted at so early an hour. The President was dressed in a very becoming sack suit of grey, with a light grey silk tie. It was rather an informal-looking costume, but very attractive. I sat with him for nearly an hour and we had a delightful talk. We discussed the Cabinet mainly, and he laugh- ingly told me his estimate of each one and how they acted at the first meeting. . . . The President spoke finely of Bryan and said their relations were exceedingly cordial. . . . “ The President suggested that we could have a cypher between us, so when we talked over the telephone or wrote we could discuss men without fear of revealing their identity. He took a pencil and started out with Bryan, saying, ‘ Let us call him “ Primus,” ’ McAdoo is already known as ‘ Pythias,' McCombs being ‘ Damon.’ Garrison he suggested as ‘ Mars,’ McReynolds ‘ Coke,’ Burleson ' Demosthenes.’ ” Thus began House’s career as Silent Partner It ^ The appeliation was first used by Peter Clark Macfarlane in an article in Collier's, and soon became general. 120 THE SILENT PARTNER was a relationship which rested chiefly upon the political co-operation of the Colonel in meeting the problems of government. His labours were of the most varied kind, and he sought every opportunity to ease the load that bore upon the President, to bring him information, to work out details of policy. There was, however, an essential personal basis to the relationship, since it would have been impossible for a man of Wilson’s temperament to put full political confidence in a man who did not evoke his affection as an individual. I have an intimate personal matter to discuss with you [he said to House in the summer of 1915]. You are the only person in the world with whom I can discuss everything.^ There are some I can tell one thing and others another, but you are the only one to whom I can make an entire clearance of mind.” The letters of Wilson to House invariably displayed an intensity of personal feeling that would have astounded those who attributed to him about the same degree of warmth as that of a Euclidean proposition and failed to realize the human qualities that lay concealed under his armour of exterior austerity. He wrote him fre- quently of his desire to talk with him and the need and desire for his advice on many a complicated matter. At the end of the first legislative session, he put his feeling into emphatic language. “ Your letter on the passage of the Tariff Bill [the President said] gave me the kind of pleasure that seldom comes to a man, and it goes so deep that no words are adequate to express it. I think you must know without my putting it into words (for I cannot) how deep such ^ TMs was after Mrs. Wilson's death and before the President's re- marriage. THE SILENT PARTNER 121 friendship and support :^oes with me and how large a part it constitutes of such strength as I have in public affairs. I thank you with ail heart and with deep affection.” The friendship between the two, however rapidly it bloomed, was progressive. It is not uninteresting and is perhaps significant to trace its development through the forms of salutation used by the President in his letters. They met in November 1911, and until the following spring Wilson addresses him as ” Dear Mr. House.” But after his nomination, in August 1912, he begins to address him as ‘‘ Dear Friend,” signing himself “ Faithfully yours,” or “ Sincerely 3’ours.” After his election in November 1912, he signs himself "Affectionately 3"ours,” and this is constant with the salutation of ” Dear Friend ” for tw'O and a half v'ears. In moments of great emotion, as at the time of Mrs. Wilson’s death, he addresses him as “ My dear, dear Friend.” In the summer of 1915, at the period of the Arabic crisis when he was torn by doubt and worry, the President begins to address him as ” Dearest Friend,” a salutation which remains invariable until after his re-election in November 1916. In January of 1917 the President reverts to the form of address, ” My dear House,” although he continues the conclusion, “Affectionately yours.” Otherwise it is impossible to detect in Wilson’s letters any change of tone. It is certain that the political relationship between the two men remained as close during the twm years that followed ; but it is possible that their personal friendship was most intense between the years 1912 and 1917. Close spiritual communion was not dependent upon physical propinquity, for the heat drove Colonel House far from Washington in the spring and frequently several months would pass without their meeting. Separation 122 THE SILENT PARTNER seems to have made no difference in their understanding. ‘‘ I never worry when I do not hear from you,” wrote House. "No human agency could make me doubt your friendship and affection. ... I always understand your motives,” At the end of each summer, enter- prising and ill-informed newspapermen would regularly feature a " break.” "You are a little behind your schedule this year, my friend,” said House to a reporter one September day, after the publication of the annual story. During the cool months, however, Wilson and House saw much of each other, for the latter made frequent trips to Washington, and on each of these trips Wilson devoted long hours to intimate discussions with his adviser. The President lacked the capacity and inclina- tion for meeting and entertaining varied types of people which, under the Roosevelt regime, made the White House a magnet for explorers, litterateurs, pugilists, and hunters — everyone who had an interesting story to teU. Wilson had the college professor’s love of a quiet evening by the fireside with the family, and an early bed, varied by a visit to the theatre, preferably a simple vaudeville. House was one of the few admitted to the small family circle. “ At night,” said Herbert Corey in the Commercial Advertiser, “ after Mr. Wilson had wound the clock, and put out the cats and politicians, House stayed for a little further talk.” To the President’s study House brought the impressions he had formed of public opinion, gathered from his numerous contacts with office-holders, business men, and editors, and there Wilson gave free vent to his political theories, his aspira- tions, and his fears. There, too, the President found relaxation in reading poetry and essays to his friend. THE SILENT PARTNER 123 “ May II, 1913 : I spoke to the President about conserving his strength, and suggested various means by which it could be done. I thought it was essential. He said it looked as if the people were tr\ing to kill him, and he spoke of the loneliness of his position, in a way that was saddening. . . . “ I spoke of his probable renomination and re-election. He replied, ‘ Do not let us talk about that now. ily dear friend, if I can finish up my legislative programme, I do not desire re-election.’ I urged him to keep up his courage, for if he ever faltered in the slightest he would lose his leadership and influence. He realized this and declared he would maintain his courage to the end. “ October 16, 1913 • One thing the President said, which interested me, was that he always lacked an}" feeling of elation when a particular object was accom- plished. When he signed the Tariff Bill he could not feel the joy that was properly his, for it seemed to him that the thing was over and that another great work was calling for his attention, and he thought of this rather than the present victory. “ November 12, 1913 : He [Wilson] said he believed in the Executive becoming the leader in putting into law the desires of the people. He thought there was no danger in this course, for the reason that unless a President had the force of public sentiment back of him, he could never get a law through. That the reason he himself had been successful with the tariff and the currency bills was because the people demanded them, and Congress knew it. It was not the pressure from him, but the pressure of the nation back of him. “ He read some extracts from his works on govern- ment, in order to define better his views. He expressed himself as being in sympathy with the movement for amending the Constitution with less difficulty than at present, . , . “ He said he had not slept well the night before ; that he had nightmares, and that he thought he was THE SILENT PARTNER 124 seeing some of his Princeton enemies. These terrible days have sunk deep into his soul and he will carry their marks to his grave. “ December 22, 1913 : At dinner there was no one present but the family, and the conversation ran along general lines. I asked the President how high he ranked Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address. He said, very, very high. He had also noticed that great orations and great poems, when spoken or written under deep emotion, were simple in language. He mentioned Burke as an example. Some member of the family took exception to this opinion and cited Browning and also suggested that Shakespeare made his heroes say grandiloquent things under stress of great emotion. . . . “ I spoke of his success, and he said his Princeton experience hung over him sometimes like a nightmare ; that he had wonderful success there, and aU at once conditions changed and the troubles, of which every- one knew, were brought about. He seemed to fear that such a denouement might occur again. . . . “ It was twenty minutes to tw’elve when we left his study for bed. He was solicitous of my welfare and came into my room to see that everything was properly arranged. “ April 27, 1914 • The President spoke of not feeling at home anywhere now ; that is, he had a feeling that he had no home. He said he felt the same way when he was at Princeton and occupied the house of the President ; that while he was perfectly comfortable and happy in his surroundings, yet he always had that unsettled feeling if as he had no permanent abiding-place. '‘April 28, 1914 : At breakfast I spoke of Edward S. Martin’s delicious humour, and I thought he wasmot only humorous but had as much good sense as anyone I knew. The President replied that ‘ humour and good sense go together.’ . . . ‘ ‘ I asked if he would like to be editor of a daily paper. He replied that nothing would appeal to him less, for the reason that no one co^d write every day an opinion of 125 THE SILENT PARTNER value. It was difficult enough to do this once a week, but impossible to do it each day. He said he enjoyed Punch ven" much. That ‘ while there were no laughs in it, it was full of smiles.’ “ May II, 1914 : No one dined with us excepting Grayson/ and after dinner he left us. The President read poems to me for nearly an hour. It was Words- worth, Matthew Arnold, Edward Sill, and Keats. What he particularly liked was ‘ A Fool’s Prayer ’ by Sill, and ‘ A Conservative ’ by Gilman. When he finished reading, I took out my budget.^^ “August 30, 1914 : The last morning I was with the President [in the country] he planned to play golf early enough to get back for lunch and leave on the 2.40 train for Washington. It was my intention to leave . . . when he started for the golf field. This necessitated our getting up early and about the same time. He arose a half-hour earlier than was necessary, merely to give me the uninterrupted use of our common bathroom. This illustrates, I think, as weU as anything I could mention, his consideration for others and the simplicity of the man. I notice, too, in his relations with his family that he is always tender, affectionate, and considerate. “ September 28, 1914 : We talked much of leadership and its importance in government. He has demon- strated this to an unusuffi degree. He thinks our form of government can be changed by personal leadership ; but I thought the Constitution should be altered, for no matter how great a leader a man was, I could see situations that would block him unless the Constitution was modified. He does not feel as strongly about this as I do. “ November 7, 1914 : There were no outside visitors for dinner, but the President artfully evaded getting alone with me in his study. He was afraid I would renew the McAdoo-Tumuity controversy. However, he need ^ Dr. Cary T. Grayson, physician to the President. ® Meaning the items of political business that demanded the President's attention. 126 THE SILENT PARTNER not have worried. We had a delightful evening. He began by talking about German political philosophy and how wrong their conclusions usually were. He spoke of himself as a disciple of Burke and Bagehot. This is literally true, for he is always quoting from one or the other, mostly from Bagehot. “ He began to speak of a flexible or fluid Constitution in contradistinction to a rigid one. He thought that Constitutions changed without the text being altered, and cited our own as an example. At the beginning, he thought, there was no doubt that there was no dif- ference of opinion as to the right of the States to secede. This practically unanimous opinion probably prevailed down to Jackson’s time. Then there began a large sentiment for union which finally culminated in our Civil War, and a complete change of the Constitution without its text being altered. “ Just then the ladies came in the sitting-room where we were, and I got him to read some poems, something he very much likes to do. He read William Watson’s ‘ Wordsworth’s Grave,’ and afterwards, at my request, Gray’s ' Elegy.’ He also amused himself with any number of limericks. We did not go to bed until around 10.30. “ December 19, 1914 : As usual, no one excepting the family was present at dinner. After we had finished the President read aloud for nearly two hours, ‘ The Adventures in Arcadia of the Idle Rich.’ ” When President Wilson came to New York, he almost invariably stayed wfith Colonel House. The two would motor in the country, often to Piping Rock, followed by the Secret Service automobile and three cars of newspapermen who hovered around the President “ like birds of prey,” the Colonel wrote, to be ready in case of an accident. More pleasant were the evenings spent in the small apartment on Thirty-Fifth Street and later on Fifty-Third Street. House disconnected the THE SILENT PARTNER 127 telephone, barred the door, and left to the President the blessed choice between going to bed or a talk upon some subject unconnected with politics — ^literature, ethics, the immortality of the soul. Like Napoleon, Wilson enjoyed suddenly descending upon his friends. “ November 14, 1914 : Last night Loulie and I went to dinner and theatre with the Bertrons. He had the Belgian Minister and Madame Havenith. The play was ‘ The Only Girl,’ which I found amusing. Upon my return to the apartment I found a call from the White House. In answering it, they told me the Presi- dent would arrive at six o’clock this morning and would expect me to breakfast at six-thirty. This changed my plans and I had to notify the Police Commissioner and several others, so it was well after midnight before I went to bed, and I arose at half-past five. “ The matter of entertaining a President within such confined quarters as our little apartment is not an easy undertaking, especially since I have no clerical force excepting my one secretary. “ October 8, 1915 : To-day started off with the usual bustle incident to a visit from the President. Telegrams, telephone calls, Secret Service men, newspaper reporters, notes, etc., etc. However, the confusion will cease the moment the President arrives, for I do not permit the telephone to ring and we are undisturbed by letters, notes, telegrams, or visitors. When he is once here, everything appears as peaceful as if there were no such things as noise and confusion in the world.” II House’s admiration for the President’s qualities was as keen as his personal affection was deep. He regarded Wilson’s power of leadership as supreme, and in certain 128 THE SILENT PARTNER respects he placed a high estimate upon his intellectual qualities. “ I have seen a great deal of the President on this %dsit [he wrote April 17, 1914], and we have opened our minds to one another without reserve. I am impressed by the analytic qualities of his mind and the clearness with which he expresses his thoughts. I have come in contact with minds of greater initiative and imagina- tion, but never one that had more analytical power and comprehension. “ November 14, 1914 : The President ... is efficient in his manner of working. For instance, when we were discussing his message to the people concerning the Belgian Relief funds he said : ' Now let us decide what points are best to cover.’ He took a telegraph blank having lines on it, and began to take down in shorthand the different points, he making some suggestions and I making others. There were about five points to be covered, and he asked me to think if that were all. When we concluded, there was nothing more ; he called his stenographer and dictated the message in full. “ He has one of the best ordered minds I have ever come in contact with, although he is always complaining of forgetfulness,” On the other hand, Colonel House was too objective not to observe certain qualities in the President which weakened him as an executive and the effects of which might ultimately seriously endanger his influence. “ One peculiar phase of the President’s character develops itself more fully from time to time [he wrote, November 22, 1915] ; that is, he ‘ dodges trouble.’ Let me put something up to him that is disagreeable and I have great difficulty in getting Mm to meet it. I have no doubt that some of the trouble he had at Prince- ton was caused by this delay in meeting vexatious problems. THE SILENT PARTNER 129 Another phase of his character is the intensit}^ of his prejudices against people. He likes a few and is ver}’ loyal to them, but his prejudices are many and often unjust. He finds great difficulty in conferring with men against whom, for some reason, he has a prejudice and in whom he can find nothing good. “ J:.'/)’ 10, 1915 ■ I am afraid that the President’s characterization of himself as ‘ a man with a one-track mind ’ is all too true, for he does not seem able to carry along more than one idea at a time. I say this regret- fully, because I have the profoundest admiration for his judgment, his ability, and his patriotism. “ December 8, 1915 ; The President, as I have often said before, is too casual and does the most important things sometimes without much reflection.” An example of such casualness is to be found in Mr. Wilson’s speeches, which at times he delivered almost impromptu. He had the power of arranging in his head, at short notice, the order of the topics he would treat and even of constituting the phrases he would use. On May ii, 1914, he came from Washington to deliver a memorial speech at the Brooklyn Navy Yard as tribute to the sailors who had died in the capture of Vera Cruz. House met him at the station and asked him about the speech. “ He had not prepared any- thing,” wrote the Colonel, but he would think it out en route from the Battery to the Navy Yard. It is his way of doing. Sometime he will make a serious blunder. It is an occasion for something great, and he may or may not rise to the occasion.” Unfortunately, President Wilson lacked the power to conceal his prejudices and he was not equipped by temperament or experience to appear a good “ mixer.” A Senator passed the word to House that “ the Senators are in an ugly mood and critical of the President. One THE SILENT PARTNER 130 grievance is that when they go to the White House for conferences, they are offered nothing to drink excepting water and nothing to smoke.” “ The President,” House commented, ” does not drink excepting occasionally at meals and he never smokes ; consequently he does not offer such things to his guests.” More serious was the fact that the President did not convey the impression of great respect for the Senators, either individually or as a body. “ Sena- tor ,” he hazarded, “ is the most comprehensively ignorant man I have ever met.” And later, referring to the same statesman, Wilson said to House, “ Someone wanted to know the other day if I didn’t think So-and- So the most selfish man in America. I replied, ‘ I am sorry, but I am already committed to Senator .’ ” Such remarks, frequently as apt as they were indiscreet, did not tend to promote cordial relations between the two branches of government. Mr. Wilson, however, evidently felt that the criticism passed upon him for aloofness and cold self-confidence was quite unjustified. ” December 22, 1913 [conversation between House and Wilson] : I said my long experience with public officials had made me fearful of anyone after they were elected to office ; that the adulation of friends and partisans and the position itself seemed to go to their heads and they did not do rational things. ... He thought there was no fear of this with him ; that his long university training had shown him how necessary it was to confer about important matters ; that he seldom went into a conference and came out with the same ideas as when he went in. “ April 15, 1914 : I asked [Wilson] whom he con- sidered the greatest man in the early days of the Re- public. He thought Alexander Hamilton was easily THE SILENT PARTNER 131 the ablest. We spoke of Washington and how nincb he depended upon Hamilton's advice. I thought this in itself indicated Wa>hin3ton’s greatness. The fact that he was abie to pick out Hamilton from among his associates, as his guiding mind, and that he used him in this way, showed a breadtli of view that was remark- able. I told Iiim that ali the really big men I had known had taken advice from others, while the little men refused to take it. . . . “ At another time in our conversation, he remarked that he always sought advice. I almost laughed at this statement, for McAdoo had just been telling me to-day that he was at Wliite Sulphur with the President and his family when the despatch came from Admiral Hayo concerning his demand of Huerta to salute our flag, and he said the President never even mentioned the matter to him. The President does get a lot of information and suggestions from other.^, but it mostly comes gratuitously and not by his asking. ilcReynolds, Houston, Lane, and ali the others have the same storj* to tell. . . . “ April 18, 1914 : Houston and I lunched with Martin [recorded House]. Henry Watterson was also there. He spoke kindly of the President and said they did not differ regarding his policies, but he was a man that he, Watterson, could not successfully co-operate TOth, indicating that the President was cold and in- different. I told him that as far as my own experience had been, he was just the opposite, for I had never had a sweeter, kinder, or more affectionate friend than Woodrow Wilson. . . . “ June 27, 1914 [in London] : I lunched with Page.^ Afterwards we went into the private park in front of his house and talked for an hour or more. He asked me to bring to the attention of the President the fact that he, the President, was not seeing enough business men and was not talking to them, as he expressed it, ® in their language.’ He thought the President had a ^ Walter Hines Page* Ambassador to the Court of St. James's* THE SILENT PARTNER 132 Lroad and philanthropic view of the situation, and that everything he was doing for the country was absolutely right, but he failed to give proper assurances to the business world that he had their welfare, at heart and was not unfriendly as they thought. He suggested that the President should invite some of them to lunch and show them some marked social attention. I did not think he would do this— he was not constituted that way ; that I had been at the White House a great deal, but, with the exception of seeing Cleveland Dodge there once, I had not met anyone other than the immediate family. “ I told him, too, how very tired the President was and how he had to conserve his strength, and that we must take him as he was and not as some people would like to have him. He said a prominent American told him the other day that the President did not confer with anyone excepting me ; ... he thought a President should not confine himself to a single individual. Page asked how he knew this was true. He replied that it was a matter of common knowledge in America. “ I told Page the President consulted with the individual members of his Cabinet about their depart- ments, but he did not consult with them on matters affecting their colleagues, and I thought he was right. If he did this, he would soon have every Cabinet officer meddling with the affairs of the others, and there would be general dissatisfaction.” Keenly aware of the wave of criticism that threatened the President because of his retired habits, and realizing that Wilson’s strength lay in the formulation and exposi- tion of policy rather than in the despatch of business through personal conference. House set himself to the labour of innumerable interviews and multifarious corre- spondence, which might offset the criticism and lighten the burden of detail that weighs upon every President. He intercepted importunates on their way to the White House and promised to arrange their business with the THE SILENT PARTNER 133 President more rapidly than they could themselves. He sifted applications for appointments. He discussed industrial relations with capitalists and labour leaders. He advised the chiefs of industrial corporations how to settle their difficulties uith the Government. And afterwards, reporting the gist of these interffiews to the President, he brought him into touch with the currents of opinion and affairs. “ March 22, 1913 : Mr. Frick came at eleven. He wished to know whether I thought it was possible to settle the United States Steel Corporation suit outside of the courts. He declared that he came of his own initiati\'e and no one knew he was doing so. He wanted the matter kept confidential, excepting the President and Attorney-General. We discussed the matter at some length. I pointed out the difficulties, with which he concurred. He seemed fair. I promised to mention the matter and to see what could be done, , . . “ 2 slarch 24, 1913 : I told him [Wilson] about Mr. Frick's call and his suggestion in regard to the United States Steel Corporation suit. Before the President replied, I said, ‘ You had better let me tell Frick that you referred me to the Attorney-General and suggested that whatever proposal came to you should come through the Attorney-General’s Office.' The President smiled and said, ‘ "Tou may consider it has been said.’ “ We discussed it at some length. The President thought that the Steel Corporation should have the same consideration as any other, neither more nor less, and that they should be allowed to make a proposition for an agreement as to a decree of court in the suit. . . . '"April 18, 1913 : I went to the White House early and met the President on his way to the memorial service held for the late President of the Honduras. I found a large number of people waiting, Mitchell Palmer being one of them. I asked if I could not attend to his matters for him, explaining how busy the President was and how 134 the silent partner uneasy we were for his health if the pressure continued. He said he wanted to know about Guthrie’s chances for an ambassadorship. I was able to tell him that the President had him down for Japan. I asked, ‘ What next ? ’ He wished to know about Berry for Collector of the Port of Philadelphia. I was able to tell him that McAdoo and I had threshed that out the day before and we would both recommend his appointment. “After that he wanted to know about Graham, who wishes to go in the Attorney-General’s Office. I told him that McReynolds and I had discussed that the day before and that he intended to appoint him. This satis- fied Palmer and he went back to the Capitol. “Jerry Sullivan from Iowa wa's waiting to see the President, and I treated him as I did Palmer. He had just been appointed on the Appraisers’ Court in New York. ... He was uncertain as to whether he ought to leave Iowa and wished to know how much time he could have to decide. ... I asked him not to bother the President, but to take it up with me and I would thresh it out with the Attorney-General and take it to the Presi- dent in concentrated form. He had several other desires, which I advised him to put in writing and to send to me at his convenience. “ I wish I could always be here to do these things for the President and give him time to devote himself to the larger problems which confront the country. , . . “August 2, 1913 : John Mitchell, President of the Federation of Miners, and Timothy Healy, President of the International Brotherhood of Stationary Firemen, lunched with me to-day. I talked to them earnestly concerning the future of labour. I urged upon them the necessity of taking a broad view, and not letting the unimportant things of to-day interfere with the larger ones which are to come. . . . “ November 19, 1913 : I lunched with Charles Grasty of the Baltimore Sun. The other guest was Mr. Daniel Willard of the Baltimore and Ohio. I found Willard had a clear knowledge of railroad rates. Many of the THE SILENT PARTNER 135 facts given me by Secretary Lane, Commissioner Marble, and Frank Train biiil are mi'^leadimr. Mr, Willard is very agreeable. He used the tabieclofii instead of paper to make diagram'^ and to illustrate his pioints, and he ate no lunch to speak uf, b-ut talked all the time, though not tiresomely. ...” Not the least important functixn tsken over by tlie Colonel was that of receiving complaints against the Administration- which his personal friends, who tre- quentiy did not share his admiration for the President, passed on to Mm with a rugged disregard for his peace of mind. With journalists and editors he kept always in close touch, and they seemed to find in him a man to whom it was worth while to send criticism. Mr. E. S. Marlin to Colonel H'>mc :Jay 18, 1915 Dear House : . . . Cass Gilbert was at lunch. I said to him: “ The most that I shall do to-day will be to send clippings to House. Why do people do such things for House ? And then we went on to discuss House. Well ! I hope House is pretty well and that the swivel in his honourable neck is working easily, so that when Ms head is turned with consortations with the mighty he can twist it back without too much effort. Good luck ! E. S. Martin f 1914 Dear House ; I commend to your thoughtful consideration the story I read in the paper, that in some districts in India where they held a bee and cleaned out the tigers, the wild pigs so multiplied that they ruined the crops. Are the wild pigs going to . . . devour us when we pass the anti-trust Mils with the labour union exemptions and muzzle the railroads and skin the millionaires ? 136 THE SILENT PARTNER I think that is quite a parable about the tigers and the wild pigs. The I.W.W.’S, the labourites, the socialists, all the cranks and all the hoboes, they are the wild pigs. Yours E. S. M. May II, 1915 Dear House : . . . Woodrow, after a three-day conference ^ex- clusively with himself, made a short speech yesterday which I didn’t like ; but no matter. I wished he had talked to himself and conferred with someone else. They say he has not conferred one single lick with Bill Bryan . . . and that is good. So we profit by the virtues of Woodrow’s defects. . . . I think Wilson will do right, but if he gets sloppy I’m going to get right in with the Powers of Darkness [Roosevelt and his followers] and help drive the Bryan and Daniels crowd out into the wilderness. This I say, not that it is true, but to enable you to feel the temper of the public. . . . Good luck. E. S. M. Mr. George W. Wickersham to Mr. E. S. Martin [forwarded to Colonel House) New York, February 3, 1914 My dear Martin : Your editorial for February ii is very sane. The trouble with Mr. Wilson is that he lives in an imaginary world. He fancies that a thing should be so, and it is so. Which is all very well until a large enough number of people begin to inquire, “Is it so ? ’’ Then, like “ the unsubstantial fabric of a vision,” it vanishes. Unlike it, it does leave a mark behind. Yours faithfully George W. Wickersham THE SILENT PARTNER 137 Mr. James Speyer to Colonel House York, March J2, My dear Coloxel House : I am glad you are coming back soon I I am satisfied that the gentlemen in Washington do not realize the seriousncbs of the financial situation through the general impairment of railroad credit. The Interstate Commerce Commission shows no disposition to hurry its decision, as to an advance in rates ; on the contrary, they have again extended the time for hearings and are asking more questions, etc. ileantime gross and net earnings are declining and the weaker roads like the Erie, Southern Railway, Chesapeake and Ohio, etc., cannot sell their bonds e.xcept at bankruptcy figures, if at all. I can only repeat that, in my opinion, which I do not express publicly, we are face to face with tlie possibility not of one but of several receiverships of the bier railroad systems. And you know how harmful that would l>e and how slow the recovery, ilr. Rea’s statement, of which I enclose a copy, is absolutely true and so is the enclosed article from the Ra{lu.ay Gazette. Something must be done and done soon, in a big and courageous way, to stop these attacks by Government agencies both federal and state, if disaster is to be averted. We need a practical and constructive policy and measures. I wish I could write more cheerfully, but even I am not sufficiently optimistic to close my eyes to existing conditions. With kind regards Sincerely yours James Speyer Major Henry L. Higginson to Colonel House Boston, Massachusetts January 13, 1915 My dear Colonel House : ... It does not seem clear to Washington that the action there and in the States is keeping business men on pins, and that, having lost considerable money and lost 138 THE SILENT PARTNER almost entire confidence, they are not willing to risk their credit. They have simply withdrawn their money in a large way from active business, and are waiting to see whether it is safe for them to pledge their names and their honour in carrying out either old or new enter- prises. ... It is not what Mr. Wilson’s Administration has wished ; it is not his intention or that of Congress, no doubt, but they do not see, they do not realize how people feel. I was glad to vote for Mr. Wilson, and have liked a great deal that he and Congress, with his guidance, have done ; but this shipping bill is a terrible mistake. If we can only have peace and nothing new, trust placed in railroad directorates and in other great concerns, we shall go on very well. . . . Perhaps these matters could be laid before influential men and do some good, and perhaps not. With kind regards, I am Very truly yours H. L. Higginson Mr. E. S. Martin to Colonel House New York, February lo, 1915 Dear House ; Your press agent is still working overtime. Who is he, anyhow ? Here are a few clippings. Our poor country is working along under shortened sail since you left.^ I don’t know any more than I can help about what is going on, and read the papers through smoked glasses. I understand that your friend W. W. has clenched his teeth through the remnants of the shipping bill and means to hold on. He has a heroic bite. I am afraid it is his destiny finally to adhere to something that wiU sink with him. But who can tell ? We are all in the Lord’s hands and should be hopeful, however anxious. . , . Yours E. S. Martin ^ For six montlis in Europe. THE SILENT PARTNER 139 House received the complaints cordially, explain^xl the situation, and promis'jd do what he could to belter it. To members of the Tabinet he pas.^ed on the criti- cisms and insisted iip'.*n the need of meeting the factors that produced them. “ Xovemher y, 1913 ; Bidx'p Brent came tit iialf-past five to tell of conditions in the Philippines. He says they have a very wrong impression of the Adniinistraiion, believing that the Democratic Party s advent to power means immediate self-government for them. He does not believe it possible to git'e them self-government until the school children of to-day become old enough to take an active part in public affairs. “ I complimented him upon the work he is doing, and suggested that any time he \\ns!ied to reach the President or to accomplish sometiiing which he could I O not accomplish through the ordinary channels, he could communicate with me.” Colonel House to Mr. William Garrott Brown New York, April lo, 1913 Dear Mr. Brown : Martin tells me that you think too many Southerners are being given office under this Administration. You are quite right, but it is hard to help it. The best material that has been suggested for office comes from the South, and it is almost as hard to get satis- factory Democrats from the North as it would be for a Republican Administration to get satisfactory Republi- cans from the South. In naming Mr. Page for England the President went into the subject carefully, and by process of elimination Mr. Page seemed to be the most available. And so it has been in ever}'’ instance. . . . It seems to me that we wiU have to assume the burden of responsibility and let it go at that. If the Administration succeeds, as we now hope, then it will THE SILENT PARTNER 140 be a great tribute to the South ; and if it fails, we must necessarily shoulder a larger part of the blame. . . . With warm regards and best wishes, I am Faithfully yours E. M. House Mr. E. S. Martin to Colonel House New York, October 21, 1915 Dear House : It uplifted me very much to talk to you. It always does. You must be a hypnotizer. Anyhow you always make me feel that we’re going to do our duty. Here’s next week’s Life with a good cartoon. More power to your elbow ! E. S. M. Colonel House to Secretary McAdoo AtrsTiN, Texas, March 7, 1914 My dear Friend : I am enclosing you two letters from Colonel Nelson of the Kansas City Star, which I think it would be well to have the President glance over. Every day some complaint of this sort reaches me. I never tire of reading the generous chorus of praise of the President’s first year in office, and no one knows better than we how richly he deserves it. However, long experience has taught me how quickly this may turn in other directions. If this should happen, I feel sure it will not be from any act of the President himself, but because those of us whom he has trusted on the watch tower have failed in their duty toward him. . . . Faithfully yours E. M. House III The extraordinary position of Colonel House, without office and yet an integral part of the Administration, THE SILENT PARTNER 141 was made possible not merely by the personal regard nf the President and tise infinite variet}’ of service? which House performed for him, hut by the intimacy of rela- tions he maintained with tlie Eabiiir-t. He carried on constant correspondence with them, sometimes personal, sometime? political, always cordial in character. Each time that he visited \Va?hinj,ti'»n ht- evidently took pains to study the problems of their departments and to acquire for them whatever information he could. Brief selectituis from his memoranda indicate the informality of their intercourse. “ Man'll 20, 1913 • From Burleson I went to call upon the Secretary of the Interior, and spent a ver\' pleasant quarter of an hour. After that I returned to the Cosmos Club, where I met McAdno and Houston. They immediately began to berate me for having put them in the Cabinet. They wanted to know what they had done to have such jobs imposed upon them. Houston said he had work enough to do for six healthy men. . . . “April 13, 1913: Secretary Lane came an hour before the time set for the dinner to be given Ambassador James Bryce. He desired to talk of Ms department and to outline some plans for the future. . . . “ November 24, 1913 : We arrived at the Bryans’ at nine and went almost immediately to bed. It was understood that w^e were to have breakfast at half-past seven, but, much to our relief, Mrs. Bryan knocked on our doors a few minutes later and announced that Mr. Bryan would take his horseback exercise before breakfast, so we would not have it until half-past eight — an un- usually late hour for the Bryan household. . . . “ November 25, 1913 : To-day was Cabinet day, and I remained to meet the different members as they came in, for there was sometMng I had to say to each. . . . “ December 12, 1913 : Houston and Burleson came around to see me. I first took up with them the question of Cabinet officers not making speeches without the THE SILENT PARTNER 142 President’s permission, and perhaps not making any speeches unless the President had something in particular for them to say to the country about their departments. I thought the present habit of members of the Cabinet making indiscriminate speeches was very bad, and often embarrassing. I suggested that if the President would designate them to speak upon certain subjects at certain times, what they said would have much weight and would be almost equal to a presidential utterance. “ I found there was some feeling among the members of the Cabinet because the Friday Cabinet meetings had been discontinued. I agreed to mention it to the President and ask him to resume them. Later in the day I did this, and the President consented to do so. “ The President was pleased when I told him I had spoken to a sufficient number of the Cabinet to ensure the adoption of my suggestion that no speeches should be made in the future without his consent, and only when he thought the occasion demanded it. . . . “ November 15, 1915 : Last night the Secretary of War sent a special messenger from Washington, bearing a letter for me concerning his report. He desired me to discuss with the President the advisability of putting his report out in advance of handing it to the President. The President does not wish him to do so, and I am to convey to Garrison this unpleasant information. Mr. Bryan has wired requesting that I ask the President to appoint a friend of his as Marshal here. This he also declined to do, because he said the man was not fit for that particular place. . . . “ December 22, 1913 : McAdoo’s carriage met me [upon arrival in Washington] and I drove to his home for breakfast. He came to my room in his pyjamas, half asleep. He had been up practically aU night so as to be in touch by telephone with the House and Senate Conference Committee, which did not reach a conclusion until five o’clock this morning. “ During the morning I remained in McAdoo’s private office, telephoning some of the Cabinet members and THE SILENT PARTNER 143 making some memoranda ol things I desired to discuss with the President. . . . “ Dccemhcr 23, 1913 : I walked with McAdoo to the Cabinet meeting and saw the others as they assembled. Redfield was particularly anAion.s to show me some statistics regarding our exports, which he considered inttavstiiig. . . . “ Janii>''ty 16, 1914 : I spoke to each member of the Cabinet as fhev came in, and talked to Lane about the conservation of our radium deposits, strongly urging it. . . . “April 28, 1914: McAdoo and I went back to the White House, as there was to be a Cabinet meeting. There I met all the Cabinet, but had no conversation with any of them excepting Houston. I advised him that the President felt he could not spare him from the Department of Agriculture for the present, but later would probably place him on the Federal Re.serve Board. . . . “ May 8, 1914 : From the Treasury I went to the White House Offices in order to see members of the Cabinet before they convened. McReynolds, Burleson, Lane, Garrison, and others each held me for a moment. Lane was anxious to know whether I thought it advisable for him to go to California at this time to take the LL.D. degree which the University of California has offered him. I advised taking it up with the President and being governed by his wishes. ...” No more striking example of the cordial feeling of Cabinet members towards Colonel House can be found than the offer made by the Postmaster-General and the Attorney-General to resign, if their withdrawal would make it easier for the President to appoint House Secre- tary of State. This occurred in the early autumn of 1915, after Bryan’s resignation. “ Burleson and Gregory [noted House on June 20, 1915] thought perhaps I was refusing to become Secretary THE SILENT PARTNER 144 of State because it would give Texas three men in the Cabinet and all from Austin, They therefore offered to send in their resignations if I would accept. “ When I told the President about Burleson and Gregory offering to resign so as to leave me free to accept the Secretaryship of State without embarrassment to him, he said, ‘ I am glad you told me, for it is something I shall always remember with pleasure.’ ” Colonel House to Postmaster-General Burleson Roslyn, Long Island June 21 , 1915 Dear Albert : Gregory has given me your message, and nothing has ever touched me more deeply. There is no consideration, I think, that would influence me enough to make me accept an office. My endeavour must always be in the path I have so long followed. If I could be brought to think of it at all, it would be to serve my friends and not to accept sacrifices from them. You and Gregory have made me feel that hfe is worth living and that all I have tried to do has not been in vain. Your friend always E, M. House. To House, members of the Cabinet brought the most varied problems. He responded with an unsparing expenditure of time and energy and, like Kipling’s hero, frequently showed them a quiet and safe way round, out, or under. They evidently relied upon his judgment in matters of appointments. “ Will you kindly have this pair looked up,” wrote McAdoo, “ and tell me what is thought of them ? ” And two days later : " Please hurry up report on Mr, Vernon [appointments].” And again, stiH later : “ Here is a sample of my troubles. Will THE SILENT PARTNER 145 you be good enough to look into the character of this man and let me hear from you quickly ? ” “ May 10, 1914 : Attorney-General McReynolds lunched uitli me ‘recorded House . We went over much the same ground covered in Wa-^hington. We discussed a vacant federal judgeship . . . and' I insisted upon his making an immediate appointment. The docket is becoming clogged and there is no reason for his delay. I had X to see him this morning in order that he might look him over. His only objection to him was that he had no chin. The two men I sent him last week as candidates for United States Marshals seemed to be all right excepting that they were too fat. I have another suggestion to make for an appointment, but the man has a large mole on the back of his ear. I shall ask him to be careful not to expose that side of his head. " Later in the day, Gregory and I were laughing at this eccentricity of McReynolds. Gregory says he is such a big, fine-looking fellow himself that he cannot get it through his head that anyone has any ability that is not built upon the same lines.” Attorney-General 2IcReynolds to Colonel House New York, May ii, 1914 Dear Mr. House : IVe devoted some time to the judgeship, and this is the way it lies in my mind : X is well recommended and would not be a bad appointment ; neither will he ever make more than an or^nary judge. He did not make a good impression on me personally. Y made a better impression, but I do not regard him as the very best kind of material. If I should act whoUy on my own impressions, I’d guess in favour of Y. However, if you gentlemen think it wisest to select X, I will recommend his appointment and take the I — 10 146 THE SILENT PARTNER chance. He said that he was not certain about acceptance if tendered. We ought to know whether he will, before any formal tender is made to him. Will you see that the rest is done ? Called you on the ’phone, but you were reported out with the President. Sincerely McReynolds House’s opinion was finally approved. With Gregory, who succeeded McReynolds when the latter was appointed to the Supreme Court, Colonel House’s association was even more intimate. The Colonel discussed frankly with him the relations of a Cabinet member with the President, and gave him the benefit of his own experience : “ Never to go into long-winded arguments upon any subject, but to state his position in brief terms and never repeat. That when he and the President agreed upon a matter, never to give him reasons for so agreeing, as the President was too busy to listen to unimportant details, I was sure he would always be able to see the President whenever necessary if he did not burden him with unimportant and unnecessary verbiage. . . . “ Gregory is very able and has been exceedingly successful with New Haven affairs, but it has not spoiled him in the least. He is one of the few that I have ever met who, I believe, would never get ‘ the big head ’ no matter how successful he became. He is not only able, but is as loyal as the Legion of Caesar.” Colonel House to Attorney-General Gregory Pride's Crossing, Massachusetts August 20, 1914 My dear Friend : , . , I am so eager for your success and so anxious it may be brought about without any impairment of your THE SILENT PARTNER 147 strength that there are many suggestions that have come to me since our last talk. Do be careful about making appointments too soon. Take your time about them and do not let friendship have any undue influence upon you. . . . Afiectionaiely yours * E. }.I. House On his side, IMr. Gregory wrote continually to House, evidencing invariably the strongest affection both for him and for the President. “ How can I e^'er repay such confidence or justify it? ” he wrote on August 22, 1914. ” How can I ever even up matters ’uitli you. who have given him so exaggerated an idea of my ability ? ” And four days later : “ Come to Washington soon, give us all the suggestions 3"ou can spare, and do not doubt that I know you to be, as ^■'ou have been for years, m\' very best friend.” Apparently the Cabinet counted on House not merely to discover available material for appointments, but also to inform unsatisfactory office-holders that they need not expect reappointment or continuance. The function could not have been attractive. House writes to i^IcAdoo : " I am always ready to meet any suggestion that you make, but if you know Mr. X at all you would know that it would be utterly impossible for me or any- one else to notify him ‘ in a tactful way ’ and ‘ in a way not to hurt his feelings ' that his services w'ere to be discontinued. I would as soon undertake to square the circle or to prove the fourth dimension.” Mr. X, who was evidently a gentleman to be handled diplomatically, seems to have made difficulties, for some time later Mr. Gregory wrote as follows to the Colonel : 148 THE SILENT PARTNER Attorney-General Gregory to Colonel House Washington, November 25, 1914 My dear Friend : I went to the White House last night and had a long talk with the President about X. I do not think the President will agree to appoint him to the — - position, although a final conclusion was not reached. The President made a memorandum of X’s case and is going to make an effort to provide for him in some way, and I will keep the matter in mind. I do not want X, however, to be eternally bombarding my private secretary and me with telegrams demanding his immediate appointment to the place, and I must say that he is making a nuisance of himself. I wish you would get this idea conveyed to him in some diplo- matic way. , . . Sincerely and affectionately yours T. W. Gregory Much more interesting and congenial was the task which Colonel House set himself whenever in Europe — that of studying all sorts of reforms so as to be able to pass on new ideas to the heads of departments in Wash- ington. " This afternoon [he wrote in London, June 20, 1913] Sir Horace Plunkett came to call and remained for an hour. We discussed the betterment of the farming class along the lines of more effective farming, farming credits, co-operative marketing, and the making of country life more pleasant and desirable. He wished me to come to Ireland and visit him for three days before we sail, and I have promised to go. I am much interested in this phase of governmental work. I want to see what has been done in Ireland under his direction so that I may take some practical knowledge of it to the Presi- dent and to Secretary Houston for their information.” THE SILENT PARTNER 149 House knew of the lifetime of service which Plunkett had devoted to the science of agricultural improvement and to its application to Ireland, of his friendship \nth Roosevelt, and his love for America. He looked upon him as among the most eminent of living British states- men, and he hoped to win his interest and help in the solution of American agricultural problems. Plunkett, on his side, had been on the watch for a chance to come into contact with the new Democratic Administration and was delighted to find in the President’s adviser a congenial spirit, between whom and himself sprang up an enduring companionship. “ Thus began,” said Plun- kett, twelve years later, ” this precious friendship of my later years.” ^ Sir Horace Plunkett to Colonel House Washington, D.C., October 16, 1913 My dear Colonel House : You leave me wondering how you can show such extraordinary kindness to a stranger in the land, of whom you know so little, and how I can ever repay such hospitality and help. Yesterday morning and last night will long remain delightful memories. You gave me the opportunity I badly needed to explain things to Mr. Houston, and in this, judging by his kindness to me to-day, I think I must have had some success. I had a most useful time with him and others at the Depart- ment this morning and shall probably resume my studies to-morrow. I paid my respects to the President and was shocked to see him looking so worn. The change since January last is terribly marked, and you ought to try and force Mm to take a week’s complete rest the moment the strain is relaxed — even at the sacrifice of some public business. You vail be glad to know that already the atmosphere ^ Conversatioa with the author, August i, 1925* 150 THE SILENT PARTNER at the Department of Agriculture has noticeably changed. I am going to think quietly over what I have learned and shall probably write you from Battle Creek a sug- gestion for a line which, if taken by the President in his first annual message, might greatly assist the Agricultural Department, You would know whether to mention it to the President, Any suggestions I may have from time to time for the Department I shall send direct to the Secretary. . . . With renewed thanks and kind remembrances to Mrs. House, I am Sincerely yours Horace Plunkett Most characteristic is the following letter, which suggests the remarkable position held by Colonel House. Mr. Lane had in mind resigning from the Cabinet in case a certain other high office should be opened to him. Quite obviously he regarded House’s approval as neces- sary, and yet his fondness for the Colonel was such that he was unwilling to embarrass him by approaching him directly. Secretary Lane to Dr. S. E. Mezes Washington, July 4, 1916 My dear Sid : , . . Now don’t think me importunate or cheeky or impatient. I’m here to do my “ bit.” I’ll stand guard all night without a whimper. All I want is for you, in that superlatively tactful way of yours, to find out if my chances are worth considering at this time — and if they are, will the Colonel make them something better than mere chances. If they are not, I shah, continue sawing wood, and whistling most of the time. I am not asking for what Ned calls “ buU-con ” or for any pat on the back. If you can give me a tip, I THE SILENT PARTNER 151 shall be obliged ; if not, I shall be as always your most devoted and sometimes humble servant, F. K. L. P.S. Treat this rather frivolous epistle upon a most important subject as entirely between us. I wouldn’t for a good right leg want Colonel E. to think me to be butting in. IV The activities of Colonel House were not confined to assisting the National Administration. We find him in consultation with the Boston city authorities when appointments were to be made, and the New York City and State Democrats looked to him for counsel and aid. An infinite number of lesser problems were cheerfully deposited upon his doorstep by friends, acquaintances, and strangers. He soothed disgruntled journalists, and discussed the plans of inventors tvho w’ould save the Republic from material destruction in the next war and social enthusiasts who would preserve its soul during the peace. “ I have had as fine a collection of cranks to-day [he WTote on October 20, 1913] as it has been my lot to meet for a long time. Mr. Brj^an sent one, Secretary Daniels sent another, and I inherited yet another from the President. The talk has ranged all the w'ay from ofiice- seeking to the control of the planetary system. . , . " October 23, 1914 : My, my, w’hat a busy day ! Commencing with ^Governor Glynn, McAdoo, Dudley Malone, Commissioner Adamson, former Corporation Counsel Archibald Watson, Stuart Gibboney, Clarence Shcam, Montgomery Hare, Francis Lynde Stetson, McAneny, and so many others I cannot even think of them. Every phase of the New York state election has been referred to me to-day. Telegrams, party notices, THE SILENT PARTNER 152 arrangements for meetings, have all passed up for visa. I am literally tired out and shall he glad when the elec- tion has come and gone. . . . “ May 23, 1914 [on an Atlantic liner] ; I had several wireless messages, one from Mrs. , who desires her husband, who is now Consul at , appointed to the vacancy in London. Even at sea there is no rest from the office-seekers. . . . “ November 4, 1914 : Loulie and I took the 12.08 for Washington. Major-General went with us by invitation. I shall be more careful next time, for he literally talked me to death. If he can fight as hard as he can talk, no enemy in the world could resist him. . . Colonel House regarded his position in public affairs with philosophical eye and not without a touch of humour. “ The funny part of it is,'' he wrote to his brother-in-law, “ that people seem to think that I have done something unusual, when as a matter of fact it is only because the newspapers have begun to say extrava- gant things about me. Such, however, is the stuff of which fame is made.” The interest of the Colonel’s life was beyond question, but none the less it must have proved wear5dng. The more people realized the difficulty of reaching President Wilson personally, the more strenuous were the efforts they made at least to reach House. ” The Governor comes in again this afternoon [wrote House to Dr. Mezes] to spend the night with me and go to the theatre. It is an exceedingly pleasant diversion to have him, but you have no idea how much work it entails. “ As soon as the papers blaze forth in the morning, my troubles immediately begin anew and I receive communications from unheard-of quarters as well as from friends who have been lost for many years. . . .” THE SILENT PARTNER 153 And later : “ I am suffering from the after-effects of the President’s \isit. All the latent cranks in the country are at me. Some to kiU,^ some to amuse, but most of them to instruct concerning what is best to be done in every phase of government. ...” House also asked himself what would be the effect of his growing reputation upon the mind of the President and others in official positions. The role of Sminence grise was one that demanded a never-failing tact. It may have been flattering to be so placed that every- one should regard his consent to a proposal as equivalent to success, but it was politically perilous as well as physically tiring. Colonel House to Dr. S. E. Mezes New York, April 24, 1913 Dear Sidney: ... I was in Washington ten days, and wffien I re- turned I literally had to wade through mail to get to my desk. Every office-seeker and every crank in the United States is on my trail, and I get photographs from all sorts and conditions of people who think in this way they can impress their identity more securely upon me. It all comes from the newspaper notoriety, and the end is not yet. The next edition of Collier’s, I believe, is to do the thing in grand style. The article is to be entitled “ The President’s Silent Partner.” I urged them to name it anything but that, but nothing but that would satisfy them. They said that title had much ^ The following, aithoiigli belonging to a later period, is typical of the tlueatening letters House received : Sorry I missed the President wiieo lie left your home* I liad a nice bullet for him for a wedding present ! I get him yet and you to, because you are a facker. A friend of Justice/* 154 the silent partner more punch in it than any other. I agree to that, but I am afraid that I will get some of the licks. I do not know how much of this kind of thing W. W. can stand. The last edition of Harper’s Weekly spoke of me as " Assistant President House.” I think it is time for me to go to Europe or take to the woods. Fraternally yours E. M. House House decided to go to Europe, where he spent the summer of 1913. But he returned to find his influence undiminished and his energies engaged in a succession of major problems, at first domestic and then international in character. CHAPTER VI THE ADMINISTRATION STARTS WORK President Wilson has brought his party out of the wilderness of Bryan- ism. It has been a great exhibition of leadership. New York Tribune ^ December 24, 1913 I “ /■’ I xHE main thing, I think [wrote House to Wilson, I July 31, 1915], is always to do the job better I than anyone else has ever done it, and the political end will take care of itself. This has always been my theory, and I have found it satisfactory and successful.” This note, which recurs continually in House’s letters, would doubtless have surprised many persons who, without adequate information, looked upon the Colonel primarily as a political manager and an expert in party tactics. Another misconception lay in the belief that House acted as a brake upon the President, constantly restraining him from over-enthusiasm in reform and urging caution in speeches and legislative measures. His papers by no means bear out this sup- position. One may deduce from them, indeed, the definite conclusion that the Colonel was the more radical of the two and was ever in fear lest this Administration, like so many others, once it came into power should be content merely to govern and forget to pave the path for progress. House always insisted upon the need of courage and of radical reform. A clear example of his feeling is found in two conversations, almost a year 155 156 THE ADMINISTRATION STARTS WORK apart, between House and the President, The first occurred at the moment when tariff lobbyists were threatening the pohtical annihilation of Wilson if he persisted in driving through the Tariff Bill without regard to the demands of special interests. The second took place when reactionary forces were stirring feeling against him because of his proposed anti-trust legis- lation, “ May II, 1913 ; Captain Bill McDonald once told me that he attributed his still being alive to the fact that he had never hesitated the fraction of a second, but had always gone straight towards the point of danger, and the courage of the other fellow had always failed. I urged this attitude upon the President as strongly as I knew how, and told him it was the most essential thing of all. , . . “ April 27, 1914 : We talked of the desirability of pusMng the progressive cause forward. I thought unless we did this, we could not justify being in the position we were. We spoke of the political results of such a course, and came to the conclusion that it was best not to consider that aspect at all, but to go resolutely forward with the reform programme and let the future take care of itself.” The extent of Colonel House's influence upon the legislative plans of the Administration may be gathered from a remarkable document, which deserves some attention. In the autumn of 1912, immediately after the presidential election, there was published a novel, or political romance, entitled Philip Dru : Administrator. It was the story of a young West Point graduate, in- capacitated for military service by his health, who was caught by the spirit of revolt against the tyranny of privileged interests. A stupid and reactionary Govern- THE ADMINISTRATION STARTS WORK 157 ment at Washington provokes armed rebellion, in which Dm joins whole-heartedly and which he ultimately leads to complete success. He himself becomes dictator and proceeds by ordinance to remake the mechanism of government, to reform the basic law^s that determine the relation of the classes, to remodel the defensive forces of the republic, and to bring about an international grouping or league of powers, founded upon Anglo- Saxon solidarity. His reforms accomplished, he gives effect once more to representative institutions as for- mulated in a new American Constitution, better fitted than the old for the spirit and conditions of the twentieth century. As a romance, the book was not notable, for the effort of the anon5mious author had evidently been spent upon the careful working-out of the political and social ideas of the young Philip Dru rather than upon its literary form. Certain reviewers, however, were piqued by the daring and the ingenuity of these ideas and, treating the book as a political manifesto rather than a novel, acclaimed it as a remarkable publication. Speculation as to the personality of the unknown author, who was described merely as "a man prominent in political councils,” naturally followed. There seemed to be general agreement that he could not belong to either of the two older parties. “ We trust he is to be found among the Democrats,” wrote one reviewer, ” but we greatly fear he is of the New Party.” Another reviewer was of similar opinion : “We trust that the author’s counsel and assistance will be available at Wash- ington, if not during the present Administration, surely when the Progressive Party assumes control.” There were, indeed, numerous suggestions that Mr. Roosevelt himself was the author. 158 THE ADMINISTRATION STARTS WORK Five years after its publication an enterprising book- seller, noting the growing influence of House in the Wilson Administration, wrote with regard to the book : “ As time goes on the interest in it becomes more intense, due to the fact that so many of the ideas expressed by Philip Dm : Administrator, have become laws of this Repubhc, and so many of his ideas have been discussed, as becoming laws.” And he ends with the question, “ Is Colonel E. M. House of Texas the author ? If not, who is ? ” Colonel House was, in truth, the author ; to his other occupations he had added that of novelist. He tells us himself in a brief memorandum how, in the autumn of 1911, he conceived the idea of writing a novel as a medium to express his economic and political theories. That winter in Austin he was seriously ill. “ When I began to convalesce at home, and before I was able to get about, I wrote Philip Dm : Adminis- trator. I was surprised at the rapidity with which I wrote, for I was not certain when I began that I could do it at all. . . . “ I was also surprised to find how much I was in- terested in doing this kind of work. I had written platforms, speeches, etc., for different candidates and officials, and newspaper articles for campaign purposes, but this was an entirely new departure. I did not spend more than thirty days upon the first draft of the book. Mezes read and approved it, and I sent it to Houston to look over, largely with the view of getting his judgment as to the economic features of it. " He kept the manuscript until I passed through St. Louis on my way East. He declared his behef that it was economically sound, but held that the fiction in it was so thin that he advised rewriting it as a serious work, as he had suggested originally.” THE ADMINISTRATION STARTS WORK 159 Colonel House to Dr, D. F. Houston Austin, Texas, March 12, 1912 Dear Doctor Houston : ... I expect to elaborate somewhat concerning the functions of the National Government. I particularly want to make it clear that the Executive and his Cabinet vill be more nearly akin to the English Premier than to the French, inasmuch as I want him to have the right to propose measures directly and without referring them to a committee. If you have any suggestions along this or any other lines, please let me have them. I have done some padding — as, for instance, the story of the tenement fire — ^which I expect to take out later and put in more serious stuff. It is not much of a novel, as you \rill soon discover ; at the same time, unless it were known bv that name its audience would be reduced at least ninety-nine per cent. If it w^as called what I really mean it to be, only those who think pretty much as I do w'ould read it, and those I am trying to reach would never look at it. Faithfully yours E. M. House But this was the spring of 1912, and all of House's energies were taken up with the pre-convention cam- paign that ended mth the nomination of Wilson. The early summer he spent in Europe. Evidently not wishing to give the time necessary to putting it into the form that Mr. Houston advised, by elimination of the romance, and fearing that a scientific essay would not reach a large public, he decided merely to smooth it out so far as possible while on the Atlantic. “ I worked assiduously on Philip Dru all the way over and all the way back, but had no time for it in Europe. . . . We returned early in August, and the i6o THE ADMINISTRATION STARTS WORK first thing I did was to shake myself clear of Phili-b Dru. “ E, S. Martin read the manuscript and wanted me to rewrite it, saying that ‘ some of it was so good that it was a pity that parts of it were so bad.’ I had no time, however, for such diversions, for the political campaign was engrossing my entire time and the pub- lisher was urging me to give him the manuscript so it might be advertised in the autunrn announcements. “ I was so much more interested in the campaign than I was in the book that I turned it over to the pub- lisher, having determined to let it go as it was.” Whatever the literary merits of Philip Dm, it gives us an insight into the main political and social principles that actuated House in his companionship with President Wilson. Through it runs the note of social democracy reminiscent of Louis Blanc and the revolutionaries of 1848 : “ This book is dedicated to the unhappy many who have lived and died lacking oppor- tunity. ...” “ The time is now measurably near when it will be just as reprehensible for the mentally strong to hold in subjection the mentally weak, and to force them to bear the grievous burdens which a misconceived civilization has imposed upon them.” Government, accordingly, must be inspired by the spirit of charity rather than the spirit of ruthless efficiency. Especially must privileged interests be excluded from governmental influence, for by the nature of things their point of view is selfish. Through the book also runs the idea that in the United States, government is unresponsive to popular desires — a “ negative ” government. House calls it— ■ for it is at more pains to do nothing with safety than to attempt desirable reforms which might disturb vested interests and alienate the voters. “ We have been THE ADMINISTRATION STARTS WORK i6i living Tinder a Government of negation.” The theory of checks and balances has developed so as to re-enforce this negative character of government ; closer co-opera- tion between the President and Congress, perhaps in the direction of parliamentary methods, is necessary if the tendency of American government is to be made active and positive. The specific measures enacted by Philip Dru as Administrator of the nation indicated the reforms desired by House. The Administrator appointed a ” board composed of economists and others well versed in matters relating to the tariff and internal revenue, who . . . were in- structed to work out a tariff law which would contemplate the abolition of the theory of protection as a govern- mental policy.” “ The Administrator further directed the tax board to work out a graduated income tax. . . .” Philip Dru also provided for the “ formulation of a new banking law, affording a flexible currency bottomed largely upon commercial assets, the real wealth of the nation, instead of upon debt, as formerly. ... Its final construction would completely destroy the credit trust, the greatest, the most far-reaching, and under evil direction the most pernicious trust of all.” “ He also proposed making corporations share with the Government and States a certain part of their net earnings. . . .” Such were some of Dru's plans which shortly found actual life in Wilsonian legislation. No wonder that Cabinet members like Mr. Lane and Mr. Bryan com- mented upon the influence of Dru with the President. I— II i62 the administration starts work “ All that book has said should be,” wrote Lane, " comes about. . . . The President comes to Philip Dm in the end.” ^ Other excerpts indicate the extent of House’s pro- gressiveness. “ Labour is no longer to be classed as an inert com- modity to be bought and sold by the law of supply and demand.” Dru “ prepared an old-age pension law and also a labourer’s insurance law covering loss in cases of illness, incapacity, and death.” “ He had incorporated in the Franchise Law the right of Labour to have one representative upon the boards of corporations and to share a certain percentage of the earnings above the wages, after a reasonable per cent, upon the capital had been earned. In turn it was to be obligatory upon them [the labourers] not to strike, but to submit all grievances to arbitration.” To such an extent had Colonel House formulated his ideas upon national problems before the election of Wilson. “ In regard to Philip Dru,” wrote House in 1916, “ I want to say that there are some things in it I wrote hastily and in which I do not concur, but most of it I stand upon as being both my ethical and political faith.” II Four great legislative problems confronted Wilson, and their solution constitutes his chief claim, in matters of domestic politics, to the title of statesman. They concerned the revision of the tariff, with the introduction ^ LeUm of Franklin K» Lane^ p. 297* THE ADMINISTRATION STARTS WORK 165* of an income tax law, the creation of the Federal Reserve* banking system, the control of trusts, and the regulation of industrial relations. In meeting them Wilson dis- played the inspiring leadership essential to success ; he showed himself as convincing and sympathetic when he dealt with Congress as a whole, as he was reserved in his dealings with individual Congressmen. By the end of the special session which passed both the Tariff and Currency Acts, his moral supremacy was firmly estab- lished and his mastery of the party was complete. He was hailed as the Moses who had led the party out of the legislative ineffectiveness supposedly characteristic of all Democrats. In each of the great problems House took deep interest. He brought to the President the variety of opinions which he cuUed from his numerous personal contacts, he utilized his relations with party leaders to assist the passage of the bills through Congress. But it was in the currency question that he took chief interest, for this he had long studied and from its solution might be expected positive, tangible benefits in a short time. As cotton planter and one-time banker in Texas he appreciated the dangers of an inelastic currency, and as a liberal he distrusted the financial power which certain metropolitan banking firms were able to wield over national commerce and industry. Organized capital, “Wall Street” in popular par- lance, had secured a control of banking credits which, if it were extended, might place the industrial life of the country in the power of private and at least partially irresponsible interests. Against this so-called “credit trust ” Mr. Bryan had protested in 1896 : “ Let the Government go out of the banking business,” the financial magnates had cried ; to which Bryan retorted, “ Let i64 the administration STARTS WORK the banks go out of the Government business.” If private individuals could release or withhold credits at will, it meant a control of industry and inequality of opportunity at complete variance with traditional American principles. Colonel Rouse to Senator Culberson Magnolia, Massachusetts July 26, 1911 Dear Senator : ... I think Woodrow Wilson’s remark that the money trust was the most pernicious of all trusts, is eminently correct. A few individuals and their satellites control the leading banks and trust companies in America. They also control the leading corporations ; and if they are to be permitted on the one hand to use the corporations as a bar against loss to any speculation which they may make, and to use on the other hand the banks and trust companies to borrow all the funds they may need for such speculations, the stockholders of the corporations which they dominate and the business world that de- pends upon funds from the trust companies and banks which they dominate, are bound to suffer. . . . Faithfully yours E. M. House During the autumn of 1912 and the spring of 1913, even in the midst of the campaign and the process of forming a Cabinet, House worked constantly on the currency problem, in order to be prepared to assist the President when he should meet the congressional com- mittees. The task which Colonel House set himself was primarily to prevent the President-elect from com- mitting himself to any one scheme until the problem had been thoroughly studied ; later he guided the measure so that it was left in the control of experts and preserved THE ADMINISTRATION STARTS WORK 165 from the heresies of political incompetents. The Colonel was the unseen guardian angel of the bill, constantly assisting the Secretary of the Treasury and the Chairmen of the Senate and House Committees in their active and successful labour of translating it into law. Wilson, who was accused of a tendency to avoid advice, proved himself in fact to be far from the self-confident doctrinaire pictured by his opponents, and in the matter of currency reform he was determined that the bill should be founded upon expert opinion. “ The greatest embarrassment of my political career [he said to an enthusiast on this subject] has been that active duties seem to deprive me absolutely of time for careful investigation. I seem almost obliged to form conclusions from impressions instead of from study, but I intend to go much more thoroughly into this matter before saying anything about it ; and I heartily agree with you that this, the most fundamental question of ail, must be approached with caution and fearlessness and receive dispassionate and openminded treatment. I wish that I had more knowledge, more thorough acquaintance, with the matters involved. All that I can promise you is sincere study. I wish that I could promise you a constructive ability.” Colonel House was indefatigable in providing for the President the knowledge that he sought. He collected in his study the banking laws of every nation of Europe. He gathered reports and abstracts from college professors of economics and banking. But he laid chief stress upon his frequent conferences with the bankers themselves, especially those who had had practical experience in drafting previous bills for Republican Administrations. " Decernher 19, 1912 : I talked with Paul Warburg over the telephone regarding currency reform. I told i66 THE ADMINISTRATION STARTS WORK of my Washington trip and what I had done there to get it in working order ; that the Senators and Congressmen seemed anxious to do what Governor Wilson desired and that I knew the President-elect thought straight con- cerning the issue. “ February 26, 1913 : I went to the Harding dinner and talked with the guests invited to meet me. It was an interesting occasion. I first talked to Mr. Frick, then with Denman, and afterwards with Otto Kahn. “ March 13, 1913 : Vanderlip and I had an interesting discussion regarding currency reform. ” March 27, 1913 : Mr. J. P. Morgan, jun., and Mr. Denny of his firm, came promptly at five. McAdoo came about ten minutes afterwards. Morgan had a currency plan already formulated and printed. We discussed it at some length. I suggested that he should have it typewritten and sent to us to-day.” ^ “ The Governor [recorded Colonel House on January 8, 1913] agreed to put me in touch with Glass, Chairman of the Banking and Currency Committee, and I am to work out a measure which is to be submitted to him. " He spoke of his fear that Bryan would not approve such a bill as I have in mind. I said it was better to con- tend with Mr. Bryan’s disapproval and fail in securing[any bill at all, than it was to get one which was not sound. ” March 24, 1913 : I had an engagement with Carter Glass at five. We drove, in order not to be inter- rupted. . . . “ I urged him not to allow . . . the Senate Committee to change what we had agreed upon in any of the essential features. He promised to be firm. I advised using honey so long as it was effective, but, when it was not, I would bring the President and Secretary of the Treasury to his rescue. “ I spoke to the President about this after dinner and advised that McAdoo and I whip the Glass measure into 1 Typewritten, in order to avoid the impression that might be given by a printed plan that Morgan's were so sure of their financial power that they could impose a cnt-and-dried plan. THE ADMINISTRATION blAKi^) vvuimv xuy final shape, which he could endorse and take to Owen ^ as his own. My opinion was that Owen would be more hkely to accept it as a presidential measure than as a measure coming from the House Committee on Banking and Currency.” The Currency BiU was brought into the House of Representatives early in the extra session, its main features unchanged from the first drafts decided upon by the President, McAdoo, and the Chairmen of the House and Senate Committees. The initial difficulties threatened by certain elements in the party which tended towards economic freethinking, were safely passed. There remained, however, the opposition of a number of Senators, behind which lay the dislike of the bill expressed by prominent Eastern bankers, who evidently feared that it meant a weakening of Wall Street’s power and an amateur or political control of national financial problems. House spent much of his summer in defending the bill and more of his autumn in securing political support for it. “ July 23, 1913 [conversation vith Josiah Quincy, former Mayor of Boston] : I tried to show him the foUy of the Eastern bankers taking an antagonistic attitude towards the Currency Bill. The Administration is endeavouring to serve the country as a whole, and it is the better part of visdom for the Eastern bankers to join hands in working out a measure for the general good. “ Quincy wanted to know what I thought the result would be of their threat to withdraw their national bank charters and take out state charters. I thought the threat was puerile, and not to be discussed, and that the bill would be passed no matter what action they took in that direction.” On the following day House dined with the members ^ Chairman of the Senate Committee. SlAKlb WORK of the Boston Clearing House Association to discuss the bill. He went in no optimistic frame of mind. “I have a feeling,” he wrote, “ that they are not coming for the purpose of discussing the measure with open minds, but are antagonistic to it. I shall be alone to defend the measure.” His forebodings were apparently realized, for he noted after the dinner : “I found the bankers singularly barren of suggestions. They seem to stand upon the general proposition of being against the Administration bill, but without any constructive suggestions looking to its betterment.” House found more consolation and satisfaction in a long talk with Major Henry L. Higginson, at the end of August. ” I can well understand [wrote House] why he is considered by many, Boston’s first citizen. We talked of the currency question and I found that he had a breadth of view unusual amongst those of his calling. He seemed to want what was best for the entire country, and not something for his particular locality and pro- fession. I explained with what care the bill had been framed. Just before he arrived, I had finished a review by Professor Sprague of Harvard of Paul Warburg’s criticism of the Glass-Owen bill, and wiU transmit it to Washington to-morrow. Every banker like Warburg, who knows the subject practically, has been called upon in the making of the bill. Major Higginson seemed thoroughly satisfied with the endeavours the Adminis- tration have made to construct a good and beneficent measure. Colonel House to Mr. E. S. Martin Beverly, Massachusetts Dear Martin ; September 2 , 1913 , . . The Currency Bill should go through the House next week, but it will have a harder road in the Senate. THE ADMINISTRATIOIN' STARTS WORK 169 I have been working upon it assiduously. McAdoo has been here three or four times, and it seems to me that I have seen every banker and political economist in the East. The bankers, sad to relate, know next to nothing about it, and none of them agrees as to what is best. The only unanimity of opinion amongst them is that the bill should be made for them and be operated by them, and they cannot understand that the manufacturers, merchants, railroads, farmers, and others have any rights in the premises. I think the bill is getting in good shape. Houston was with me last week and he says that in his opinion, and in the opinion of ninety per cent, of the political economists throughout the country whose opinions are of value, it is the best bill that has ever been constructed — infinite!}* better than the Aldrich Bill. . . . Faithfully vours E. M. House “ October 19, 1913 : I saw Senator Reed of Missouri in the late afternoon and discussed the currency question with him. He says the President seems to be more concerned in regard to haste than he does as to the measure itself. In this, of course, he is mistaken. The President is satisfied vith the measure approximately as it is, and he knows that Reed and the other Demo- cratic Senators who are delaying it are doing so from a failure to study the measure as it has progressed through the House, and he is impatient in consequence. “ October 31, 1913 : Paul Warburg was my first caller, and he came to discuss the currency measure. There are many features of the Owen-Glass Bill that he does not approve. I promised to put him in touch with McAdoo and Senator Owen, so that he might discuss it with them. “ Senator Murray Crane ^ followed Warburg. He has been in touch with Senators Weeks and Nelson of the ^ Republican Senator from Massaclinsetis* lyo iJtlJt AUMlWlblKATlUN STARTS WORK Currency Committee, and urged them to bring about quick action in order that the business community could have done with this uncertainty and could go ahead with the renewed hope a proper currency measure will give them. He telephoned me later that he had been in communication with Washington, and he advised that we bring some pressure upon the Democratic insurgents of the Committee. I called up McAdoo immediately and asked him to convey this information to the President and to gently start the pressure. I also arranged for him to meet Warburg here on Monday. “ November 17, 1913 : Paul Warburg telephoned about his trip to Washington. He is much disturbed over the currency situation and requested an interview, along with Jacob Schiff and Cleveland H. Dodge. Mr. Dodge came in advance of the others. He said he felt obliged to come at their request, because they had just given him a substantial subscription for the Y.M.C.A. fund. He had a feeling that the President knew what he was doing and did not need any more advice than he was getting from the channels he himself selected. I told him I shared this view and that, since all the experts disagreed, it left one in doubt as to what to do. “ Mr. Schih and Mr. Warburg came in a few minutes. Warburg did most of the talking. He had a new sugges- tion in regard to grouping the regional reserve banks, so as to get the units welded together and in easier touch with the Federal Reserve Board. Mr. Schiff did not agree as to the advisability of doing this. He thought the regional reserve banks should be cut down to four and let it go at that. “ They wanted me to go to Washington with Mr. Warburg and Mr. Dodge, Mr. Schiff saying I was the Moses and they would be the Aarons. He asked if I knew my Bible weU enough for this to be clear to me. I told him I did. I combated the idea that the President was stubborn in his stand upon the currency measure. I thought he had to be firm and had to make up his mind as to what was good and what was bad in the innumer- THE ADMINISTRATION STARTS WORK 171 able suggestions that came to him, and that was all he was doing. I advised against going to the President with new suggestions. I thought they should be taken to Secretary McAdoo, Senator Owen, and Mr. Glass ; if they agreed as to the advisability of accepting them, the President would probably also accept them.” Pressure from both sides and from above, as exercised by the President, finally compelled the acquiescence of the opposing Senators ; and on December 20, “ a gala day ” House called it, the Federal Reserve Bill passed the Senate. It was hailed generally as a greater triumph for Wilson even than the Tariff Act, and in the Colonel’s matured judgment was the most important single legis- lative act of the entire Wilson Administration. Even the strongly Republican New York Tribune could not withhold words of commendation : “ President Wilson has brought his party out of the wilderness of Bryanism. It has been a great exhibition of leadership.” Few persons suspected the share taken by Colonel House in the formation and passing of the Federal Reserve Act, and he said nothing that might enlighten the public. Towards the end of December 1913, after the Senate had approved the biU, House was discussing it with two outstanding journalists, Lawrence of the Associated Press and Price of the Washington Star. “ I wish you would let me tell about your activities in making the bill,” said the latter. But the Colonel was obdurate in his insistence upon silence. “ Will you stay over to see it signed ? ” asked Lawrence. But now that the main job was accomplished, House admitted he lacked suf&cient interest in any mere ceremony to keep him in Washington. 172 THE ADMINISTRATION STARTS WORK in As events developed, Colonel House’s connexion TOth the Federal Reserve Act was by no means ended when it became law, for there remained the problem of the appointment of the five Governors of the Federal Reserve Board who, with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Comptroller of the Currency, act as the co- ordinating body of the system. The personnel of the Board was obviously a matter of the first importance, not merely for the sake of administrative efficiency, but also because the easiest way to win public confidence in a measure which has been questioned is to appoint men whom the public admires and trusts. Colonel House acted in much the same capacity when it came to the appointment of the Board as he did in the selection of the Cabinet ; that is, he gathered lists of possibilities, interviewed them, culled opinions about them, sifted the names and passed them on to President Wilson and Secretary McAdoo. The following excerpts are typical : “ January 19, 1914 : Mr. X came to lunch. I had a very frank talk with him, saying I had thought of him in connexion with the Federd Reserve Board and in- tended to present his name to the President provided I did not find someone else whom I thought better fitted for the place. The more I see of him, the more I like him. He is not the biggest mentality I have met, but he has good sense and has many fine qualities. “ Mr, y came to be looked over for the Federal Reserve Board. He differs from X inasmuch as he is an applicant, while I sought X out myself without any suggestion from anyone. ... He is older and has had more experience, but he is not so fine a type. I played the part of schoolmaster, as usual, and questioned him closely about himself and his business career. THE ADMINISTRATION STARTS WORK 173 “ January 21, 1914 : After dinner we [Wilson and House] went to the President's study as usual, and began work on the Federal Reserve Board appointments. I insisted that it was the most important constructive legislative measure that had been passed since the foundation of the Republic and thought its success or failure would largely depend upon the personnel of the Board. He replied, ‘ My dear friend, do not frighten me any more than I am now.’ I saw no need for alarm, because for this particular Board there was plenty of good material to choose from. . . . “ In discussing the Federal Reserve Board, there was one man whose name I presented by sapng that he had been getting his friends to endorse him and had secured many eminent people to ask for his appointment. The President replied to this, ‘ Let us eliminate him without further discussion.’ ” Secretary McAdoo to Colonel House Washington, February 15, [1914] Dear Colonel: ... I wish some people would quit trying to put over political appointments on the Board ! That is the most insidious and difficult thing to deal with. I am firmly opposed to making these banks political instru- mentalities, and yet I am going to offend many of my best friends because they can’t see the importance of eliminating politics absolutely from the organization of the banks. Of course this doesn’t apply to you ! I’m speaking of politicians. With warm regards, always Cordially yours, W. G. McAdoo Colonel House to the President Austin, Texas, February 21, 1914 Dear Governor: I find that Mr. X of DaBas is too old to be considered, so he wiU have to be eliminated. 174 the administration STARTS WORK Burleson, who is here to-day, tells me that Doctor Y, of whom you speak, is a crank of the first water and would not do. I do not know Mr. Z, and the objection to him might be that he is not sufficiently prominent for his appoint- ment to carry weight. That is something to be con- sidered in this Board if it is to be thought of in the same sense as the Supreme Court. I can think of some men that I am sure would be equal to the job, but they would not carry confidence and therefore would be poor appointments. If the elder Simmons were appointed for the two-year term, you could replace him by Houston afterwards, if you desired. Then, with Miller from the Pacific Coast and Wheeler or someone else from Chicago, you would have the West taken care of. . . . If Z does not bear inspection, then your suggestion of Gregory^ would not be bad. Gregory is something of the same type as Carter Glass, and, while he knows nothing of the matter now, yet within six months he would be as weU-informed upon the subject as Glass was after that period of time. Call me when you need me, for I am always under orders. Yours with devotion E. M. House P.S. Any recommendation made by members of Congress should be prima facie evidence of unfitness, and I would not take any suggestions from that quarter without the most careful investigation. What I mean is that their recommendations would be political, and therefore largely worthless. " March 25, 1914 : Houston, McAdoo, Williams, and I [wrote House] discussed the division of the country into districts and the location of the regional reserve banks. ^ T, W, Gregory, later Attomey-GeneraL THE ADMINISTRATION STARTS WORK 175 “ In the evening the President and I dined alone and went immediately to his study to have an old-time business session in regard to the Federal Reserve Board. I found he had added no names to those I had given him before I left for Texas. We concluded, however, that I should get up some new material and submit it to him next week, when he hopes to be able to visit me in New York.” Colonel House io the President New York, April 3, 1914 Dear Governor : I am terribly disappointed that you could not come this week, and more particularly since Mrs. Wilson’s condition is the cause. I have been working assiduously towards getting a list of suggestions to submit to you for the Federal Reserve Board. Since you are not coming, I am enclos- ing them in this. If Richard Olney would take the two-year term, it would be fine, for Houston could then be appointed to succeed him. I have asked a number of people whose opinions are worth while, in regard to Olney, and they all approve it. I do not know whether he would accept, but I have been told that he might do so. There are a number of names on the list that seem to me admirable, but they would need a little more looking into. If you wiU indicate the ones that appeal to you, I will investigate further. . . . Affectionately yours E. M. House During the following weeks, McAdoo and House had many conferences, as a result of which the President was ready by the end of April to make his appointments. House would have been pleased to have Houston ap- pointed Governor of the Federal Reserve Board, but Wilson would not consent to his leaving the Cabinet 176 THE ADMINISTRATION STARTS WORK at this time. “ I wish there were two Houstons instead of one/’ he had told House on February i8. " I really do not see how I can spare him from the Secretaryship of Agriculture, particularly at this juncture when we are considering rural credits and when we are just beginning to be able to guide the farmers in new direc- tions. We have not yet entirely convinced them of our usefulness.” Instead, the President accepted House’s suggestion of offering the post of Governor to Richard Olney of Boston, Secretary of State under President Cleveland and one of the most distinguished figures of the party. Paul Warburg of New York, because of his interest and experience in currency problems under both Republican and Democratic Administrations, and W. P. G. Harding as a leading banker of the South, had always been sponsored by House and were accepted by the President. To represent the Middle West and the Pacific Coast, H. A. Wheeler of Chicago and A. C. Miller of California had finally been selected, Warburg, Harding, and Wheeler were professional bankers, Olney a lawyer, and Miller a college professor whose distinction in the field of economics had brought him into the Department of the Interior. Political affiliations were not a factor in their appointment ; but of the five two were Republicans, two Democrats, and the fifth an independent. Notes made by House of conversations with Wilson in April tlirow light on the final process of appointment. “ April 15, 1914 : We motored for an hour and a half and had a delightful talk. We discussed the Federal Reserve Board at length, and McAdoo’s attitude toward the different names proposed. I had taken the precau- tion to thresh these matters out with McAdoo and could tell the President his state of mind. I am anxious for THE ADMINISTRATION STARTS WORK 177 this Board to administer the currencj- law successfully, for I am certain the President’s reputation in history will rest largely upon its success or failure. “ April 28, 1914 : After dinner we went to the office for the President to sign his mail. We read the l^Iexican despatches together and aftenvards got down to the real finish of the Federal Reserve Board. He took Ms pen and wrote down their names : Richard Olney first, then Paul Warburg, Harding, WTieeler, and Miller. He turned to me and said, ' To whom would j’ou give the ten-year term ? ’ I advised giving it to Miller, which he did. He gave Olney the two-year term, Warburg four years, Harding and Wheeler the six- and eight-year terms. “ I told him McAdoo preferred Hamlin.^ He replied, ‘ But I prefer Olney and I happen to be President.’ He also said, ‘ McAdoo thinks we are forming a social club.’ This, of course, w’as because McAdoo had con- sistently urged a Board that w’ould work in harmony with him.” Olney, however, found it impossible to accept. He wrote the President that he had undertaken trusts which he could not resign and that the provision requiring each member of the Board to give Ms entire time to its work would prove an insuperable obstacle to his accept- ance. ” You can hardly be sorrier than I am,” he said, ” that I am able to do so little in aid of an Administration whose first year of acMevement makes it one of the most notable the country has ever known.” The appoint- ment was therefore given to Mr. Hamlin, according to McAdoo’s wishes.® ^ Mr. Hamlin was an Assistant Secretary of the Treasury whom Me Adcx> desired to take out of the Department and put upon the Board. ^ A further change in the original composition of the Board resulted from Mr. Wheeler's inability to serve. After some delay the place was given to F. C. Delano of Chicago. lyS THE ADMINISTRATION STARTS WORK IV The close of the first legislative session of the Wilson Administration was a season of triumph for the Demo- cratic Party. Two of the major problems had been met with vigour and honesty, and settled, in principle at least, to the satisfaction of the nation. The income tax provisions of the Tariff Act and the Federal Reserve System of the Currency Act established a solid basis upon which national finances could rest securely during the days of stress that followed the outbreak of war in Europe. The triumph of the Administration was the greater in view of the failure of the preceding Republican Administrations to settle the currency problem. The main principles of the solution finally carried through by Wilson, the Republicans had advocated, individually or collectively ; but they had lacked either the courage or the strength to write them into law. Wilson’s success justified largely the inclusion of Mr. Bryan in the Cabinet. The Commoner’s sense of loyalty had kept him from an attack upon the Federal Reserve Act which, it would appear, he never entirely understood ; but had he been outside the Cabinet, with his influence in the party, he could have destroyed the measure which failed to accord with his personal doctrines. Ambassador W. H. Page to Colonel House London, December 20 , 1913 My dear House : . , . I’ve just read of the passage by the Senate of the Currency Bill. What a record that is I The Tariff Act and the Currency Act at one sitting. I don’t know the final form of the currency measure, but no matter. The getting of it through is an unmatched achievement. . . . It’s aU wonderful ; and I’ll be proud to do or to THE ADMINISTRATION STARTS WOKii 179 endure anything for the man at the helm who steers the old ship in this fashion. If Fd lived a hundred years ago Fd have said, " There’s the hand of God in this.” Yours W. H. P. Mr. Jacob W. Schiff to Colonel House New York, December 23, 1913 My dear Colonel House : I want to say a word of appreciation to you for the silent, but no doubt effective work you have done in the interest of currency legislation and to congratulate you, that the measure has finally been enacted into law. We aU know that an entirely perfect bill, satisfactory to everybody, would have been an impossibility and I feel quite certain fair men will admit that unless the President had stood as firm as he did, we would likely have had no legislation at all. The bill is a good one in many respects, anyhow good enough to start with and to let experience teach us in what directions it needs perfection, which in due time we shall then get. In any event you have personally good reasons to feel gratified with what has been accomplished, and trusting that this feeling may increase your holiday spirit, I am with good wishes Faithfully yours Jacob W. Schiff Secretary Lane to Colonel House Washington, D.C., December 25, 1913 My dear Colonel : . . . This should be a glad time for you. I know of no one who has more fully realized his ambition or who may with more justification take pride in the good he has done. I was sorry not to see you when the President signed the Currency Bill. He made a speech in all ways worthy of himself — ^which is sa5dng much. . . . Sincerely yours Franklin K. Lane. i8o THE ADMINISTRATION STARTS WORK The fact that he had had some share in the legislative accomplishment of these months was the reward that House sought for the pains and effort he had given to help in making Wilson's Administration a success. To a friend who wrote complaining that House's aversion for holding office would deprive him of the public credit that belonged to him, the Colonel replied : “I am satis- fied with the consciousness of having taken part in things that are worth while." The sentence was not entirely accurate, for, although Colonel House was obviously careless of the fact that the extent of his activities was not widely suspected, he wanted to exercise his energy in a broader field. He was wearied by the details of party politics and appoint- ments ; even the share he had taken in constructive domestic legislation did not satisfy him. From the beginning of 1914 he gave more and more of his time to what he regarded as the highest form of politics and that for which he was peculiarly suited — ^intemational affairs. They shortly became his main preoccupation, and it is in this field that he rendered his greatest services. CHAPTER VII ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY If some of tlie veteran diplomats could have heard ns, they would ha%"e fallen in a faint. S%f William Tyrrell to Mouse ^ November 13, 1913 I ^ T OTHING is more strange than the chain of \| circumstances which finally brought President ^ ^ Wilson to play a role of supreme importance in the affairs of the world, and to centre his whole being upon a policy of international service. At the beginning of his political career, and even during his first two years as President, diplomatic questions were of far less interest for him than his legislative programme ; he was slow to develop what might be called a definite policy, and he left his Ambassadors to work out their problems themselves. Shortly after the appointment of Mr, Page as Ambassador to St. James's, Colonel House reports that he asked Wilson " if he had given Ambassador Page special instructions. ... He had not, but took it for granted that he would be diplomatic and conciliatory.” This seems casual, but we may remind ourselves that neither the traditions of the Democratic Party nor the background of Mr. Wilson could lead to the expectation of keen interest in other than domestic matters. The Democratic platform touched on foreign affairs only in a brief reference to the Philippines, and Wilson himself in his first inaugural address confined himself entirely to questions of social and industrial reform. For Colonel House, on the other hand, foreign problems were always of the first interest and importance. When he says that he shaped his early career so as to prepare him and permit him to satisfy his penchant for pohtics, he interpreted the word " politics ” in its broadest sense, and included international relations. During his career in Texas he had never ceased to study current diplomacy ; and running all through his varied activities as the President’s adviser in 1913 there is obvious the desire to free himself from details of domestic politics and to find time to help in the formulation of a positive foreign policy. With the passing of the legis- lative programme of 1913, he felt convinced that the moment had come for Wilson to lay its broad foundations. A year and a half later, on June 24, 1915, he wrote : " To my mind, the President has never appreciated the importance of our foreign policy and has laid undue emphasis upon domestic affairs. I thoroughly approved this up to the end of the special session of Congress, when the tariff, banking, and such other measures were involved. . . .” However slow to formulate a positive policy. President Wilson was acutely aware of the danger that always menaces American interests abroad when a change of administration occurs, and to his credit be it said that he fought constantly against the threatened intrusion of the spoils system. His first choices for the more important diplomatic posts were President Eliot, Richard Olney, Professor Fine of Princeton ; and before his inauguration he expressed to House his desire to elevate " the foreign service by appointments as nearly akin to that of Dr. Eliot as he could find favourable material.” The problem was not a simple one, in view of the difficulty of discovering distinguished Americans with the neces- JLwV-' i kJ V/X X -w ’1 ” ^ sary combination of intellectual background and material resources, and also in view of the purely partisan influ- ences which regarded the foreign service as primarily designed to furnish occupation for political supporters. The invincible good-nature of Mr, Bryan made it hard for him to refuse an application for a diplomatic or consular appointment, especially when made by some loyal adherent of i6-i in ’96. Surely such a one had earned his reward ! ^ House was entirely of the President’s opinion. He urged that even the highest consular offices should be kept under Civil Service Regulations, and it was at his insistent recommendation that diplomates de carriere, such as William Phillips and H. P. Fletcher, who had proved their ability under Republican Administrations, were brought back into the diplomatic serffice or pro- moted. And he warned the President against appoint- ments that might seem connected with business interests. “ April 18, 1913 ; I told Mr. Bryan [recorded House] of my conversation with the President regarding the question of keeping the Consuls under the Civil Service. , . . The President stated that he would hold to Roose- velt’s executive order in regard to Consuls. Mr. Bryan is a spoilsman and is in favour of turning the Republicans out and putting in Democrats. He argued strongly and eloquently for his position. I remained quiet, for my ^ Thus the Secretary of State wrote to the Receiver of Customs in San Domingo, who had been appointed through the influence of Mr* McCombs : Now that you have arrived and are acquainting yourself with the situation, can you let me know what positions you have at your disposal, with which to rew^ard deserving Democrats ? . * * You have had enough experience in politics to know how valuable workers are when the campaign is on ; and how difficult it is to And rewards for ail the deserving. . . . Let me know what is requisite, together with the salary, and when appointments are hkely to be made.” (Letter dated August 20, 1913, and pubhshed in the New York Sun, January 15, 1913.) i84 aspects of FOREIGN POLICY sympathy is with the President’s policy even though it keeps some of our very good friends from their desires. “ January i6, 1914 : We discussed the President’s Civil Service views [House wrote of a later conversation with the Secretary of State], which, of course, do not agree with Mr. Bryan’s. I can see some feeling develop- ing between them ... on the question of patronage. Mr. Bryan has no patience with the Civil Service. He said the President told him I had recommended , and the President desired to appoint him. Mr. Bryan said, ‘ Of course he can do as he pleases, but I am certain is one of those supercilious persons who will be constantly looking down upon me.’ ” Colonel House to the President New York, October 8, 1914 Dear Governor : One or two people have asked me to suggest X for the Mexican Embassy. I hardly think it is necessary to caution you about this, but I feel that perhaps I had better do so. X, I have always been told, was a part of the Y, Z Oil Company and a bosom friend of Z. The fact that you offered him Argentina makes them feel that he would have a chance for this place, which I have no doubt he would accept quickly enough. When this appointment is made, I would be certain that the appointee was chemically clean from oil or ore. Affectionately yours E. M. House When it came to the more important diplomatic appointments, Wilson appealed constantly to House for information and advice. At one moment the President commissioned him to discover an applicant’s attitude on religion, as he was being considered for China and the President wanted to know whether or not he was an ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY 185 orthodox Christian.^ House undertook the delicate task, and the following day put the presumptive candi- date through an examination on religious principles. “ He did not seem to have any worth while," recorded the Colonel, and the appointment was not made. With House the President discussed at length the choice of men for St. James’s, Berlin, Rome, Vienna, and Paris. For the Court of St. James’s, Wilson expressed himself as anxious to find a man who could continue the traditions established by Adams, Bayard, and Hay. But first President Eliot, and then Richard Olney, declined the post. Colonel House, who was himself frequently suggested for this position, urged Walter Hines Page. The latter was personally magnetic, possessed a genial and discriminating wit, and could boast of a distinguished journalistic career. On March 20, House, recording a conversation with the President in which Mr. Wilson expressed his discouragement at the lack of material for the important ambassadorships, wrote : “I think he will eventually offer the London mission to Walter Page." “ March 24, 1913 : We first took up foreign appoint- ments [House noted of a later conversation with iilr. Wilson]. He thought that Walter Page was about the best man left for Ambassador to Great Britain. I was not only the first to suggest Page for this place, but, since Eliot and Olney declined it, I have advocated him earnestly. He asked if I thought Page would take it. I assured him that he would, and promised to find out definitely to-morrow. “We discussed a great number of other people for foreign appointments. ... I thought Thomas Nelson Page should have Italy, and he agreed. . . . 1 This interest upon the part of Mr. WUson was dictated Jlr. Bryan’s insistence that none but an orthodox Christian could be appointed as Minister to China. i86 ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY “ March 26, 1913 : ' I called up [Walter] Page anc said, ‘ Good morning, Your Excellency.’ He wanted t( know what it meant. I replied it meant a great deal He seemed quite agitated and asked whether I was noi joking. I replied that I was not, for the President hac authorized me to ask him if he would accept the Am bassadorship to the Court of St. James’s. We arrangec for him to call at 4.30. " Page arrived promptly. He was excited over th( news I had conveyed. He asked me to tell him exactly how it happened. I told him I had suggested his nam( to the President two months ago, ... I had talked tc the President from time to time about the matter, anc when I dined with him on Tuesday he had authorizec me to find whether he. Page, would accept. “ He was immensely pleased with the compliment but expressed doubt as to his ability to fill the place It was so entirely different from anything he had pre viously done. . . . “ March 28, 1913 : Walter Page telephoned arounc nine o’clock : ‘ I have decided to turn my face toward; the East,’ which meant he would accept the post tc Great Britain. I felicitated him and expressed m} pleasure. He wished to know the next move. I tok him I would notify the President and that he woulc write him a formal note offering him the Ambassador ship. “ I called up the President at Washington a littk after nine, to tell of Page’s acceptance. He replied ' That is fine ; I am very glad.’ He promised to write him at once. “ I telephoned Page to let him know how pleasec the President was. He expressed great appreciation foi what I had done. . . Having confided to House the mission of informing Mr. Page of his choice, the President thought little more about it and was apparently in no hurry to communicate himself with the appointee — an attitude which surprisee: ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY 187 and troubled the new Ambassador and recalls the manner in which Secretary Houston had been appointed to the Cabinet : “ March 30, 1913 : Walter Page and Secretary Houston came to dinner [wrote House], and we had a delightful time. Houston and I tried to make Page feel happy in his new field of endeavour. He seems fearful lest he might not be able to maintain himself, and yet he said he had enough sporting blood to under- take it. He was somewhat disturbed because he had not heard from the President, and asked me whether I thought it was actually settled. " Houston then told of his experience. He said, ‘ I have never to this good day received any notification of my appointment as Secretary of Agriculture, excepting that which I received from Mr. House.’ And further, ' I was uncertain whether I should come to Washington, but I concluded I had better do so. I came, and I had no notification there. Finally some cards were sent to my wife and to me, inviting us to lunch at the White House after the Inauguration. We went, the President shook hands with me and said he was glad to see me, but nothing else. The President’s Secretary sent me word that the President expected me at the WTiite House at eleven o’clock the next day for an informal meeting of the Cabinet. I felt that matters were getting warm and I was getting nearer my job. I went to the informal meeting and, since I seemed to be expected, concluded that in due time I would be notified ; but I never was. Then I read in the newspapers that my name had gone to the Senate, and finally I received my commission.’ . . . “ Afril 12, 1913 ; I lunched at the White House [recorded House]. Loulie, Mr. and Mrs. Page, and Mr. and Mrs. Wallace were the other guests. Soon after lunch I rang up Mr. Bryan to teU him that Mr. Page desired to pay his respects. He asked us to come over to the State Department at once. Bryan was very i88 ASPECTS OF FORIGN POLCY gracious to Page, which pleased him because he has not said many Mndly things of Mr. Bryan. Page hoped Mr. Bryan w’ouid place him in the kindergarten and teach him as rapidly as possible the essentials of his work. Bryan laughingly replied, ‘ I will have to learn myself first/ . . ." These were busy days for Colonel House. It was the period when he was trying to concentrate upon the framing of the Federal Reserve Act ; but on the one hand the President, and on the other everyone who desired a diplomatic post, assailed him for advice and assistance.^ " March lo, 1913 : Another stream of callers all day, and long-distance telephones from Washington and elsewhere. This job of being ‘ adviser to the President ’ may have its compensations, but it certainly has its drawbacks. . . . “ March ii, 1913 : Again another day of office- seekers. Thomas Nelson Page called. He did not mention his own aspirations, but I brought up the subject myself. I told him that it had been the Pre- sident’s intention to appoint him either to France or Italy, but I was afraid now that he [Mr. Wilson] had reached Washington he would be stormed by those desiring the appointments for others. ” Page said he would prefer Italy to France, though France was a greater honour. . . . “ April 12, 1913 : The dinner to the French Am- bassador, Monsieur Jusserand, was interesting. I talked with Senator Lodge. He wants a man from Nahant retained in the Boston Custom House, and I promised to try and arrange it if he was competent. “ Thomas Nelson Page was at the dinner, and I informed him that if no change was made he would ^ The character and the amount of the work carried on by Colonel House suggests the advisability of including in the Cabinet a member without portfolio. ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY 189 go to Italy. I advised him to keep away from the President, . . . “ April 16, 1913 : A Colonel who would be a Brigadier- General, and a Secretary of Legation who would be transferred from Japan to France, caught me at break- fast. The diplomat is wealthy, so I requisitioned his motor and had him take me from place to place until lunch time, . . . “ April 20, 1913 : Justice Gerard came to see me about his chances for ambassadorial honours. I thought they were shght, but they were better now than they had been. He laughed and said, ' I do not believe that until right recently I had any chances at all.’ That, I replied, was true, I told him, furthermore, if Mc- Combs and Morgenthau were given foreign appointments that five out of the nineteen major places would have gone to New York, which was out of all proportion to her share. He saw the point. He did not believe McCombs would accept. He evidently does not know McCombs ; he is as likely to do one thing as another. . . . “ September 29, 1913 ; X is sitting on the doormat again. Rumours that McCombs is not to take the Ambassadorship to France have started his hopes afresh. . . .” II Because of his interest in foreign affairs and diplo- matic appointments. House was brought into close touch with the Ambassadors, and the cordial relations that resulted went far to facilitate the special missions which he undertook in Europe during the war. Thomas Nelson Page wrote after his appointment : “ Neither letter nor cable can in the least convey the appreciation I have of your kindness to me since our first acquaintance, I am just going to let the debt stand as it is, and reckon ourselves as old friends whose community of feeling and sentiment does away with any count of mere time.” igo ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY Brand Whitlock wrote from Brussels : “ My dear friend, I hope it’s only un petit au revoir. . , . Your last letter brought me joy. . . . It increased, if that were possible, my desire to see you and to have again one of those long chats. ... I have need of such sympathetic intercourse.” Willard at Madrid, Penfield at Vienna, Morris at Stockholm wrote frequently to him, and House evidently spared neither time nor effort in keeping them informed of political developments at home. The Colonel’s correspondence with Gerard at Berlin and Walter Page at London was voluminous. ‘ ‘ I told Gerard [recorded House] that he would get very meagre information from the State Department concerning the happenmgs in Administration circles, and I promised to keep him measurably well-posted in order that he might confer without embarrassment with the Kaiser or the Minister for Foreign Affairs. * In turn, he said he would write me every ten days.” Colonel House’s relations with Mr. Gerard became of great political importance in the stirring days that were to come, for the Ambassador kept his promise. His war letters to House were pungent and prophetic, and through them President Wilson was to be informed accurately of the complicated forces that governed Germany. Nothing is further from fact than the legend that the President lacked available and authentic information of the political underworld on the continent of Europe. Mr. Gerard was excelled by none in the dignity and capacity with which he maintained the interests and furthered the policy of his Government in the most trying diplomatic situation of the war zone. He knew how to establish cordial relations with the ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY igi Berlin Government, and he gave thought to the details that make for friendliness. But he never forgot Bis- marck's aphorism : " A good Ambassador ought not to be too popular in the country to which he is ac- credited.” Ambassador Gerard to Colonel House Berlin, November 4 , 1913 My dear Colonel : Now that I have presented my letters to the Kaiser, I have something to report. Pursuant to your suggestion I stopped in London to see Page, and had to wait nearly a week for him, as he was in Scotland with Carnegie. I found him a most agreeable and attractive man, and, from all I heard in London, he is a great success. I spent the remainder of mj’ time in Paris, principally in furniture shops, but arrived here the 6th October. . . . The Kaiser was away and I was not received until last Wednesday. The Kaiser has permitted me to wear ordinary clothes, which disposes of the infernal uniform question, so there I am now better off than Page, who has to wear knickers to Court functions. Before seeing the Kaiser I called on the Imperial Chancellor, von Bethmann-HoUweg — a very tall, pleasant, Abraham Lincoln sort of man. He is one of the few officials who does not speak English, but we got on very well in French and some German. The Minister of Foreign Affairs is aw'ay, but his substitute, Zimmermann, is a very jolly sort of large German who was once a Judge, which made us friends at once. The rest of my time I put in at Embassy work, of which there is plent}', and in calling on the various Ambassadors and calling on others who call on me. I think I have the house question settled and will take an old quiet-looking house formerly owned by Prince Hatzfeld, then by the von Schwabacho . . . and just now bought by an ad- joining bank. It will cost me a good deal to put it 192 ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY in repair, but, as it is large enough for the Embassy offices, if I get the same aUowance as heretofore made, I shall pay much less rent than the Paris man or than Page in London, who, by the way, has secured a most suitable and “ fashionable ” house in Grosvenor Square. I have taken up a lot of things which former Am- bassadors did not. I am taking an active part in the American Benevolent Society, the American Church (where Lanier and I sit every Sunday in the front pew), the American Institute, and the American Lunch Club, the American Association of Commerce and Traders, etc., and my wife will become President of the American Woman Club, a very worthy charity which takes care of the numerous girl students in Berlin. We must have made a wonderful sight when we were presented to the Kaiser ; they sent the Royal carriages for us with footmen standing behind in powdered wigs, outriders, etc., though we looked rather dismal in our dress suits. In the glass carriages we must have looked hke a funeral. The Kaiser is a much more majestic- looking man than I expected. . . . We mostly talked business and sport, and he asked why we didn’t have an Embassy building in Berlin and congratulated me on at last housing the Embassy in a decent house. When I presented the staff to Mm, he asked why we did not all ride in the TMergarten and I told him we would challenge any Embassy in Berlin to any known form of sport. Friday I went to Potsdam by train in a Royal military carriage and was driven to the new Palace, where I was presented, alone, to the Empress. She is a tail, fine-looking woman, and we talked of nothing in particular, just " wMte conversation.” I made a speech at a German art banquet and have been doing a good deal of work for the Panama Ex- position. There is an agreement between England and Germany that neither shall exMbit unless both do. . . . Yours ever James W. Gerard ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY 103 With Walter Hines Page, as with Geraid, *■' .-j'ntl House maintained constant and intimate rthiti -.hs. The new Ambassador to St. James’s was pleuM-d to have a correspondent to whom he might write frankly and through whom he might iniluence the President. When House came to London in June 1913, Page gn.'.'t^d film warmly and shared with him his hopes and dinicalti.s. “ I dined with Page last night 'wrote Colonel House on June 19] and remained with him until Jialf-past twelve. ... He finally walked home with me to our hotel. “ He had many curious and interesting experiences to relate and he was much disturbed at some of hi'^ social blunders. The one which distressed him most was at the Duke of Norfolk’s the other evening. He took Princess in to dinner and aftenvard.s, when they were in the drawing-room, he left her without being dismissed. The reason he did thi.s wa.s that lie had been reminded that he was the one to leave first, and for the moment he forgot that with a member of the Royal Family the reverse course was proper. “ He considered taking a duchess or royalty out to dinner was hard sledding. They refused to exert them- selves in the slightest to keep up the conversation, and he said it was the hardest work he had yet encountered in his Ambassadorial duties. He spoke particularly of the Duchess of . She was a woman of good sense, he understood, but she kept it quietly to herself when he was with her. He had gotten quite ' chummy ’ with the Duke of Connaught, and was doing all he could to make himself agreeable to the important people in England. “ He asks me to aid him in formulating some con- structive policy that will make the President’s Adminis- tration and his notable in the annals of this Embassy. He said of all men, I could help him most in this regard. He is always generous in his praise of me. I shall try TO 194 ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY to outline some plan before I leave, for I have some tilings in mind which I think may redound to the advan- tage of both countries.” Mr. Page had great success in winning the regard and respect of the British people and the Government to which he was accredited. His bonhomie, his trans- parent honesty of purpose and method, his evident anxiety to discover means of promoting Anglo-American friendship, soon placed relations between the two Governments upon a cordial personal basis, which Page, like House, believed to be the only firm foundation for intercourse between nations. The Ambassador and his wife had won the hearts of the British even before the trying months of the war, in which Page’s hatred of German militarism intensified British affection for him. On July 12, 1914, Colonel House noted of a conversa- tion with the English journalist, Sidney Brooks : “ In speaking of the Pages, Brooks said Mrs. Page had made the greatest success of ‘ any Ambassadress within his memory.’ This is delightful to hear.” Mr. Page, however, as he himself confessed, was subject to moods. " I sometimes think,” he wrote to House, ” they are the dominant moods of my life, when I feel that I don’t want any official position at aU. . . . I have so long been entirely free and so independent that official restraint is yet unnatural.” He found it hard to sink his individual convictions in carrying out instruc- tions from Washmgton. He enjoyed his work, but the difficulties always attaching to the hfe of an American Ambassador abroad galled him, and his sensitive nature suffered under vexations which some of the other Ambassadors hardly noticed. To House he poured out ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY 195 his soul In a letter of December 12, 1914, lie run- eluded ; ” I didn’t mean to write you all these things . . . . But I must once in a while blow oft" to soraebodv. Y^m have the misfortune to be the only man to whom I can blow off.” With characteristic frankness, the Ambas- sador let the Colonel understand with some d^-hnitent'S'; that he regarded the conduct of the State Department under Mr. Bry’an as worse than unfortunate. And yet at the conclusion of almost every long letter came the assurance that in the main he was enjoying his task, and the intimation that the vexations were minor by- products. " As for this Embassy,” he wrote April 27, 1914, " we're getting on better. We now get answers to questions, and if I had ever been disposed to complain, there’s no excuse for complaining now.” All the difficulties with which the State Department had to contend, House explained : the need 0! a period of experience, the pressure of political factors, the lack of funds. ” Please bear in mind too,” he wrote to Page, ” that just now the State Department is working day and night and is all too short of help. They expect a bill of relief from Congress shortly, and then you will get more secretaries and they will get more help.” With serpentine wisdom, he replied to Page’s criticism of individuals in Washington by repeating complimentary remarks which those veiy individuals had recently passed regarding the Ambassador. Thus, on October 29, 1914, in a letter to Page : “ Your criticism of X came to me the day that Wallace was telling me of a talk he had with him the day before, in which he, X, said : ' Y and Z together have not done as much as Walter Page, and yet they advertise themselves so well that the American people think that comparatively no one else has done anything/ This is to be forgotten.” 196 ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY The relations of House with the American Ambas- sadors abroad were paralleled closely by those which he maintained with foreign diplomatists in Washington. Before the outbreak of the war he was on intimate, almost confidential, terms with Spring-Rice and Bem- storff, Jusserand and Dumba. He was thus admirably equipped to study plans for developing the positive foreign policy upon which he hoped President Wilson would soon embark. Ill Colonel House’s conception of such a policy was far- reaching. He believed that the time had passed when the United States could pose effectively as the protector of aU the American states, and he wanted to bring about a definite friendly understanding with the great South American states upon the basis of an equal partnership. He realized acutely the feeling in South America, hostile to the United States and based upon the consciousness that the Monroe Doctrine (as they interpreted it) was thoroughly one-sided and accordingly distasteful to Latm-American sensibilities. If it could be trans- formed into a common policy and a common responsi- bility in which all American states participated, it would, House insisted, benefit the United States no less materi- ally than morally. Such a partnership, he believed, might develop into a league for the preservation of peace and tranquillity in the Americas, and would be of the utmost service in handling situations such as had arisen in Mexico. This ambitious plan, reminiscent of Blaine’s Pan- American proposals, carried another, even more am- bitious, as its inevitable consequence. A general Pan- American Pact was bound to interest the European ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY lo; Powers, some of which, such as the British Empire. re also American Powers. Huu.'e was c»ne of the persons in the United States vrho realized before the war how thoroughly the previo'is thirty years had altered our relations with Europe and made rd th'.' United States, intellectualh’ and economi.''U!y, one the fanrhy of World Powers. Political conipani-jnsliip, Le waS contdneed, must follow. Never lacking in br'ldness, le was willing to accept the consequences ; and just as Ite felt that the mythical protectorate of the !Monroc Doctrine should be transformed into an American partnership, so he believed that the legend of political isolation from Europe w^as the outworn remnant of an age that was past. What he wanted was some sort of co-operative understanding with the great European P< Avers th.tt might help to preserve the peace of the world, in which the United States had vital material interest. Tiiis conviction w^as not lessened by lus realization that the European situation W'as critical and might at any moment result in a general European war. Such a policy imphed a frank recognition that the factors upon which American traditions re.sted had disappeared. If it w^ere to be developed successfully, a working understanding with Great Britain would be necessary, both because the presence of the British in Latin America could not wisely be ignored and also because the imperial pow’er of Great Britain was neces- sary to any feasible plan of international co-operation. Anglo-American relations w^ere not unfriendly at the beginning of the Wilson Administration, but a cordial and intimate understanding could not be reached until two clouds were removed, of which the most important, at least in the public mind, concerned the Panama tolls controversy. During the last year of Mr. Taft’s igS ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY Administration, Congress had passed an act exempting vessels engaged in coastwise trade of the United States from Panama Canal tolls, notwithstanding a clause in the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of 1901 which provided that the Canal should be open to ships of aU nations on “ terms of entire equality.” Feeling in the United States, especially in Irish districts, favoured such exemption warmly, on the ground that it was “ reasonable,” and made an ” open canal.” A plank in the Democratic platform approved it. Feeling in Great Britain sup- ported with equal warmth the contention that, reason- able or not, such exemption directly contravened engagements taken in 1901 ; the issue was not one of logic, but simply whether the United States would keep its word. Even before Wilson assumed office, he and House seem to have agreed that, despite the overwhelming majority in Congress that favoured exemption, the American contention ought not to be upheld.^ It was of supreme importance to emphasize international ethics by an insistence upon the sanctity of treaties. On January 24, 1913, House discussed the matter with Wilson : ” I asked him concerning his views in regard to the Panama Canal tolls controversy with Great Britain. I was glad to find that he took the same view that I have, and that is that the clause should be repealed.” Action could not be taken by the President during the extra session of Congress. It was first necessary that he establish firmly his leadership, for what he ^ " Hie repeal of the tolls exemption was opposed by nearly all of the Democratic leaders in Congress, To drive the repeal through the House and the Senate, Wilson was compelled to have recourse to Cabinet members, especially Burleson and McAdoo/' (Note by E. M. H,) ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY 199 planned was nothing less than a complete con\'ersioii of the party upon an issue intensely troubled by the strong anti-British feeling characteristic of many Demo- cratic strongholds. The topic v^'as therefore not raised during the extra session. Ambassador Pact* did not fail to call constant attention to tlie importance of the question, indulging in promises of the btnefits of repet- 1 that might be regarded as exaggerated. Ambassador W. H. Page io Colonel House London, Augitit 2S, 1913 My dear House : ... If the United States will . . . repeal tiF- Canal toll discrimination, we can command the British fleet, British manufacturers — anything we please. Till we do these things, they’ll regard us as mean and stingy and dishonourable on occasion and, therefore, peculiar and given to queer freaks ; they like us, but don't know W'hat to think of our Government. Our Government, they don’t trust or admire. . . . Heartily vours Walter H. Page If the British felt they had cause of complaint with the American Government over the matter of the Canal toUs, the American Government, on the other hand, felt that the British were hampering Wilson's policy in Mexico. The British Ambassador in Mexico, Sir Lionel Carden, was known to be am advocate of Huerta and was supposed to represent the British oil interests of Lord Cowdray. Huerta was believed to have made extra- vagant promises of concessions to those interests in the event that his regime became firmly established. The American Government assumed that the British Foreign 0£6ce stood behind the British oil interests and that 200 ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY the British provisional recognition of Huerta meant that they would fight Wilson's policy of non-recognition. Obviously the difficulties with the British resulted largely from misunderstanding and misinformation on both sides. What was necessary was a frank interchange of views, and House welcomed the opportunity given him in the summer of 1913 to approach the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey. It was on July 3, 1913, that the two first met, at a small luncheon given by Sir Edward at his house, 33 Eccleston Square. The only others present were Ambassador Page and Lord Crewe, then Secretary for India. Colonel House doubtless looks back upon the luncheon as an event in his career, since he came to have for Grey an affection and a respect unsurpassed in his relations with foreign statesmen. This feeling resulted in large measure from a singular community of personal tastes and ideals, which from the moment they met made a deep impression upon Colonel House. He found in Sir Edward a philosopher, like himself careless of conventional honours, with no apparent sense of his own importance, driven, over-hard perhaps, by what he felt to be his duty and taking no credit therefor. As statesman, moreover, the British Foreign Secretary approached House’s ideal, supremely distinguished as he was by sincerity of purpose and honesty of method ; above all a diplomat who did not regard diplomacy as a mysterious intrigue, but rather as a means by which the representatives of different states could discuss frankly the coincidence or the clash of national interests and reach a peaceable understanding. House was then and always convinced that foreign policy should be con- ducted like personal business, from which it differed only in degree of importance; and he wanted to introduce ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY 2di into diplomacy the characteristics of personal intf with its code of individual honesty and frieiifllinc'-*^. In Grey he discovered a man with whom he could Irtal upon this basis. We shall find them discussing the mo.st delicate points of national policy with tlie frankness that officials of the same department of a government might use. Their first conversation was of imporiance, for it led in the autumn to an understanding on the two vexatious questions at issue. House explained Wilson’s Mexican policy and attitude on the tolls exemptions ; Grey intimated that British support of Huerta was neither definite nor final. “ Ji^ly 3, 1913* While Lord Crewe and Page were discussing the eradication of the hookworm in In and of the power of the nnancial world in oar p- ntr? to-day. Sir WiUiam was just as earnest in hi? opiaiun regarding this as either the President or I. . . . The iVt.- sident said, ‘ It is the greatest fight we all have on to-day, and every good citizen should enlL't.’ “ The hour was up, and the Pre;iden1 !;ad :< . !■ * for other engagements. ... I talked will: Sir Widnun for a moment after the President left. He pi- : -i tl with the interview and thanked me cordially. II- jitid he had never before had such a frank talk about n.r, as he once said, “ If the President did not object, I kni-w that it vras safe to go ahead, for he rarely agreed in wrtrds ; while if he disagreed, he always expressed IiinisehV With House the opposite was true; we find nuiny phrases, in liis memoranda, such as “ I showed by my silence that I did not agree.” In the present case, receiving no dissenting cable fr(»m Wilson, the Colonel proceeded to elaborate his plan. On July 3 he gathered the American Ambassadors to St. James’s and Italy, the British x\mbassador to the United States, and Sir William Tyrrell. Spring-Rice had prepared a memorandum for Sir Edward Grey, giving the main points of House’s proposal, so that the Foreign Office might be fully informed of its bearing. Colonel House to the President London, July 4, 1914 My dear Friend : ... Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, Sir William Tyrrell, Walter Page, and Thomas Nelson Page, who is now here, took lunch with me yesterday to go into a more detailed discussion. . . . Tyrrell told me that Sir Edward Grey was deeply interested [in the suggestion] and approved entirely its general purpose, and that you could count upon this Government’s co-operation. It was the general consensus of opinion that a great deal of friction in the future would be obviated if some such understanding could be brought about in this direction, and that it would do as much as any other one thing to ensure international amity. The idea, of course, is based entirely upon your Mobile speech, and it is merely that we are trying to mould something concrete from what you have already announced in general as your policy. I suggested that u Ka fA VoAn +tif» matter absolutely confidential THE GREAT ADVENTURE 273 until after I had talked it out with you and you had decided how best to bring ail the other Governments into agreement, if at ail. I do not think it trise to have it known that England was the first to accept the proposal. Tyrrell thought that after we had worked out a plan here which was acceptable to this Government, I could take it to you for your approval and further suggestion. You could then, if your judgment approved, take it to the other Governments through Jusserand — ostensibly because he is the dean of the Diplomatic Corps at Washington, but really because the Central and South American republics would feel more kindly towards a proposal coming from a Latin nation. Tyrrell, Spring-Rice, and I meet again on Wednesday to bring the matter into final form. Page may or may not be present. I think perhaps he had better not be, for the reason that it •would lend something of an official character to it, which we wish to avoid. I touched lightly upon this subject to the Kaiser and I feel sure he, too, -will approve. This was fortunate, for the reason that it can be said it was brought to his attention first. Your faithful and affectionate E. M. House P.S. — ^As Page puts it, this is a concrete example of what may be accomplished if a better international understanding can be brought about. Sir Edward Grey’s personal response to the sugges- tions of House was enthusiastic, for he was as sincerely anxious to do all that lay in his power to convince Germany of the peaceful intentions of the British, as he was to lay the foundations for a permanent system of international co-operation. He may or may not have realized that quick action was desirable. Unfortunately quick action did not seem possible. He had to consider 274 THE GREAT ADVEKTURE the sensibilities of the French and Russians, and Tyrrell reported to House that Grey was meditating methods of coming into touch with the Germans without offending the other members of the Entente. Such were the vices of the pre-war system of alliances which made impossible straightforward conversations. Grey was evi- dently not ■willing to go to Kiel, as House had suggested. Furthermore, the major interest of the Cabinet lay in the Irish crisis, and it w’as difficult to persuade them that the international situation demanded immediate attention if the explosion were to be prevented. House chafed at the delay, but philosophically con- tinued his round of social engagements which might later be turned to diplomatic advantage. Sidney Brooks, of the Times, asked him whether he wished to meet “ politicians or gentlemen,” and it was with him that House breakfasted with Lloyd George. “ June 25, 1914 : Sidney Brooks called at nine o’clock this morning [recorded House], and we wnnt to the Chancellor of the Exchequer’s for breakfast. We were a trifle late and Lloyd George was waiting for me. There were also at breakfast Governor Clifford of the Gold Coast country, and Lloyd George’s daughter. It was a most informal affair, each of us going to a side table and helping himself to whatever desired, as is the usual English custom. The choice of food consisted of fried sole, sausage, ham, eggs, fruit, coffee and tea. George ate a very hearty breakfast. ...” A week later he lunched with the Prime Minister and Mrs. Asquith. July 2, 1914 : After the ladies left the table, Asquith asked me to come and sit by him so that we might talk, which we did earnestly for fifteen or twenty THE GREAT ADVENTURE 275 minutes. I did nearly all the talking. We first discussed the merits of Cabinet officers sitting in Parliament or Congress, as the case may be. ... I expressed the feeling that it was better they should have seats, and he also was inclined to this view. ... I felt very much at home in London now, for the reason that his Government was being abused in exactly the same terms and by the same sort of people as were abusing the Wilson Adminis- tration in the United States. This amused him. I thought the purposes of the Liberal Government and of the Democratic Party were quite similar ; that we were striving for the same end, but if the Conservatives of the two countries had their way, the end would probably be that many of them would be stripped of their wealth and hanged to lamp-posts. He agreed to this. “ Mr. Asquith cast the usual slur upon Mr. Bryan. I explained why the President had taken him into his Cabinet. He understood that the President had acted wisely and yet he considered it extremely unfortunate that the necessity existed. This is the usual comment I hear everywhere, in Germany, in France, and here. They do not do Mr. Bryan justice, but it is absolutely useless to fight his battles, because in doing so you discredit the purpose you are striving for.” VI While House waited for Grey to give some definite word which he might pass on to the Kaiser, the spark was struck that ignited the pile of combustible material which the diplomatic conflict of a decade had heaped up. On June 28 the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir- apparent to the Austro-Hungarian throne, was mur- dered by a Serb nationalist in Serajevo, chief city of Bosnia. Presumably few Englishmen had ever heard of the Archduke and fewer still could locate the pro- vincial capital on a map, yet such was the diplomatic net in which Europe was caught that within six weeks 2;6 THE GREAT ADVENTURE Britibh sjldiers were meeting death on the Belgian border. The nev.s of the Archduke’s assassination reached London at th.e iieighi of the Irish crisis and the feminist agitation, and it created no more audible effect than a tenor solo in a boiler-shop. Some days later the Foreign Secretan,' expressed a sense of anxiety as to the situation in South-eastern Europe, but domestic politics continued to hold the attention of the Cabinet. In Berlin the danger of a puiitical crisis was openly discussed in the papers, and privately the sanction of the German Government was given to Austria for any retaliator}" and repressive measures that Vienna might choose to put into effect against Serbia. But apparently there was little suspicion that the carte blanche so carelessly vouchsafed would end in world war and the destruction of the Empire. The higher officials of the army and navy were not recalled to Berlin ; the Foreign Secretary remained on his honey- moon ; plans for the Kaiser's cruise were not interrupted. Ambassador Gerard wrote cheerfully to House of his return to the United States in August. Ambassador Gerard to Colonel House Berlin, July 7, 1914 My dear Colonel : . . . Have been on A.’s yacht at Kiel, and Mrs. Gerard is still there. I came up for our Colony celebra- tion of the 4th of July. Dined with the Kaiser and lunched with von Tirpitz before the news of the murder of Franz Ferdinand came. They were both most enthusiastic about you. Von Tirpitz thanked me for giving him the opportunity to meet you. We have about decided to go to U.S.A., sailing August 12th on V aterland—and I shall certainly report to you, wherever you are, before my return. THE GREAT ADVENTURE 277 Kaiser had asked me to sail a race on his racing yacht with him at Kiel, but the murder in Bosnia prevented my thus spending a day \rith him. Tennis is responsible for this almost illegible hand- writing. When do you sail ? . . . Berlin is as quiet as the grave. . . . Yours ever James W. Gerard VTiat more sinister, in the light of after-events, than the last sentence: “Berlin is as quiet as the grave.” It was the eve of Armageddon. Ironically enough, precisely at this moment when Austria planned her attack upon Serbia, and Gennany blindly approved, while the wheels of war were already being geared, the British Foreign Office made definite albeit rather belated response to the suggestions of House. On July 3 the Colonel heard from Tyrrell that Grey wanted him to let the Kaiser know of the peaceable sentiments of the British in order that further negotia- tions might follow. House at once wrote a long letter to His Imperial Majesty. Colonel House to the President London, July 3, 1914 My dear Friend : . . . Tyrrell brought word to me to-day that Sir Edward Grey would like me to convey to the Kaiser the impressions I have obtained from my several discussions with this Government, in regard to a better understanding between the nations of Europe, and to try and get a reply before I leave. Sir Edward said he did not wish to send anything official or in writing, for fear of offending French and Russian sensibilities in the event it should become known. He thought it was one of those things that had best be done informally and unofficially. 278 THE GREAT ADVENTURE He also told Page that he had a long talk with the German Ambassador here in regard to the matter and that he had sent messages by him directly to the Kaiser. So you see things are moving in the right direction as rapidly as we could hope. Your faithful and affectionate E. M. House Colonel House to the Kaiser American Embassy, London July 7, 1914 Hjs Imperial Majesty, Emperor of Germany/ King of Prussia, Berlin, Germany. Sir : Your Imperial Majesty will doubtless recall our conversation at Potsdam and that with the President’s consent and approval I came to Europe for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not it was possible to bring about a better understanding between the Great Powers, to the end that there might be a continuation of peace, and later a beneficent economic readjustment, which a lessening of armaments w^ould ensure. Because of the commanding position Your Majesty occupies, and because of your well-known desire to maintain peace, I came, as Your Majesty knows, directly to Berlin. I can never forget the gracious acceptance of the general purpose of my mission, the masterly exposition of the world-wide political conditions as they exist to-day, and the prophetic forecast as to the future which Your Majesty then made. I received every reasonable assurance of Your 1 Tlie Kaiser was " German Emperor and not Emperor of Germany/^ He always aspired to ttie latter title, wMcL the jealousy of the German Princes forbade. Is this unconscious or intentional flattery on the part of Colonel House ? On the copy of the letter is an endorsement in House's handwriting : I wrote thk letter and submitted it to Irwin Laughlin, Counsellor of the Embassy, and he advised its stilted style, which I very much dislike.— E. M. H.*' THE GREAT ADVENTURE 279 Majesty’s cordial approval of the President’s purpose, and I left Germany happy in the belief that Your Majesty’s great influence would be throvm in behalf of peace and the broadening of the world’s commerce. In France I tried to reach the thoughts of her people in regard to Germany and to find what hopes she nursed. Ikly conclusion upon leaving was that her statesmen have given over all thought of revenge, or of recovery of the two lost provinces. Her people in general still have hopes in both directions, but her better-informed rulers would be quite content if France could be sure of her autonomy as it now exists. It was then, Sir, that I came to England and with high hopes, in which I have not been disappointed. I first approached Sir Edward Grey, and I found him sympathetic to the last degree. After a two hours' conference, we parted with the understanding that w^e should meet again within a few’ days. This I inferred to mean that he wished to consult with the Prime Minister and his colleagues. At our next conference, which again lasted for two hours, he had, to meet me, the Lord Chancellor, Earl Crewe, and Sir William T37rrell. Since then I have met the Prime Minister and practically every important member of the British Government, and I am convinced that they desire such an understanding as will lay the foundation for permanent peace and security. England must necessarily move cautiously, lest she offend the sensibilities of France and Russia ; but, with the changing sentiment in France, there should be a gradual improvement of relations between Germany and that country which England will now be glad to foster. While much has been accomplished, yet there is something still to be desired in order that there may be a better medium created for an easy and frank exchange of thought and purposes. No one knows better than Your Majesty of the unusual ferment that is now going on throughout the world, and no one is in so fortunate 2Vj THE GREAT ADVENTURE a position to bring about a sane and reasonable under- standing among the statesmen of the Western peoples, to the end that our civilization may continue unin- terrupted. V'hile this communication is, as Your Majesty knows, quite unofficial, yet it is written in sympathy with the well-known view’s of the President, and, I am given to understand, with the hope from His Britannic Majesty’s Government that it may bring a response from Your Majesty which may permit another step forward. Permit me, Sir, to conclude by quoting a sentence from a letter wliich has come to me from the President : " Your letter from Paris, w'ritten just after coming from Berlin, gives me a thrill of deep pleasure. You have, I hope and believe, begun a great thing and I rejoice with all my heart.” I have the honour to be. Sir, with the greatest respect, Your Majesty’s Very obedient servant Edward M. House Thus W’as a last opportunity given to the Kaiser, who had the assurance of a disinterested outsider that if Germany sincerely desired peace she would have the active assistance of the United States and the co- operation of Great Britain. It was a definite answer to the allegation that Grey’s policy aimed at the encircle- ment and isolation of the Germans. Alas ! by the time Colonel House’s letter reached Germany, Wilhelm II was already on his cruise in Nonvegian waters whence he was recalled by the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia and the war-clouds that immediately gathered. The Great Adventure had ended in failure. But House’s attempt to prevent the war was perhaps less barren of consequences than superficial consideration would suggest. His experience during these months in Europe that ended with the sudden descent of the THE GREAT ADVENTURE 281 horror he feared, taught him the need of international organization and confirmed his belief in the necessit}' of some positive purpose to be followed by this organiza- tion. He was already, in essence, an advocate of a league of nations, and his influence with Wilson in tills respect was to be an historical factor of vital importance. Among House’s papers there is a significant memorandum which he made of a conversation with the President soon after the beginning of the war. “ August 30, 1914 : I explained my plan about the backward nations and how enthusiastically it was received by the British Government, and how much they thought it would do toward bringing about a better understanding between the Great Powers. I believed if we had had an opportunity to put this into effect, in all human probability such a war as this would not have occurred — because with the Powers meeting at regular intervals, and with such a concrete example of the good that might be accomplished by concerted action, a conflagration such as was now’ going on would have been impossible.” Note. — ” ‘ The visit of Colonel House to Berlin and London in the spring of 1914,’ Emperor William re- marked to me at Doom, ‘ almost prevented the World War.’ ” — George Sylvester Viereck. CHAPTER X WILSON AND THE WAR He §0€S even fnither than I in his condemnation of Germany’s part :ti this war. . , . Extract frora D:ary Colonel House ^ August 30, 1914 I C OLONEL HOESE sailed on July 21 and arrived in Boston eight days later. Immediately before he left, word was carried to him that the British Foreign Office had awakened to the serious character of the international situation. “ July 20 , 1914 : Tyrrell brought me another message from Sir" Edward Grey, which was to the effect that he wished me to know before I sailed that the Austro- Serbian situation was giving him grave concern.” The forebodings wliich the Colonel had experienced in Berlin were indeed in process of realization. On July 23, Austria sent to Serbia an ultimatum designed to provoke war, and five days later, brushing aside the Serbian reply as unsatisfactory, began the bombardment of Belgrade. The civil rulers of Germany appreciated suddenly the peril of the path down which they were being dragged by their Austrian ally and their own military clique ; stupidly, they refused to accept the conference suggested by Grey, which would have per- mitted a cooling-off period ; and as the crisis intensified with the mobilization of Russia in support of Serbia, the army leaders seized control at Berlin. As House WILSON AND THE WAR 283 had prophesied, they wasted no time but struck im- mediateh". Diplomatic and military complexities pro- duced this paradox ; that a Russo-German war set in motion by an Austro-Serbian quarrel must begin with a German attack upon France, prefaced by the cynical and brutal onslaught upon Belgium. Great Britain, committed to the defence of Belgium by legal, and to that of France by moral, engagements, impelled by her own national interest, could not stand aside. It was the general war. House reached Boston and went up to the North Shore while the issue of the crisis was yet undetermined. He still hoped that the assurances he had sent William II of British good feeling might strengthen the Kaiser’s peaceful inclination, and that England and Germany might work together for a pacific solution, as thet^ had in 1913. If only the British had been less deliberate in their consideration of House’s proposals, an under- standing might have been reached before the murder of the Archduke. Colonel House to the President Pride’s Crossing, ^Massachusetts July 31, 1914 Dear Governor ; When I was in Germany, it seemed clear to me that the situation, as far as a continuation of peace was con- cerned, was in a very precarious condition ; and you will recall my first letter to you telling of the high tension that Germany and Southern Europe were under. I tried to convey this feeling to Sir Edward Grey and other members of the British Government. They seemed astonished at my pessimistic view and thought that conditions were better than they had been for a long time. While I shook their confidence, at the same time 284 WILSOX AND THE WAR I did not do it sufficiently to make them feel that quick action nt'cessan” : consequently they let matters dra^ until after the Kaiser had gone into Norwegian waters for his vacation, before giving me any definite word to send to him. It was my purpose to go back to Germany and see the Emperor, but the conservative delay of Sir Edward and his confreres made that impossible. The night before I sailed. Sir Edward sent me word that he was worried over conditions, but he did not anticipate what has followed. I have a feeling that if a general war is finally averted, it will be because of the better feeling that has been brought about between England and Germany. England is exerting a restrain- ing hand upon France and, as far as possible, upon Russia ; but her influence with the latter is slight. If the matter could have been pushed a little further, Germany would have laid a heavy hand upon Austria and possibly peace could have been continued until a better understanding could have been brought about. Russia has a feeling, so I was told in England, that Germany was trying to project Austrian and German influence deep into the Balkan States in order to check her. She has evidently been preparing for some decisive action since the Kaiser threw several hundred thousand German troops on his eastern frontier two years ago, thereby compelling Russia to relinquish the demands that she had made in regard to a settlement of Balkan matters. . . . Your faithful and affectionate E. M. House Pride’s Crossing, Massachusetts August 1, 1914 Dear Governor : There are one or two things that would perhaps be of interest to you at this time and which I shall tell you now and not wait until I see you. Sir Edward Grey told me that England had no WILSON AND THE WAR 285 written agreement with either Russia or France, or anj” formal alliance ; that the situation was brought about b}?’ a mutual desire for protection and that they dis- cussed international matters mth as much freedom with one another as if they had an actual written alliance. . . . The great danger is that some overt act may occur which will get the situation out of control. Germany is exceedingly nervous and at high tension, and she knows that her best chance of success is to strike quickly and hard ; therefore her very alarm might cause her to precipitate action as a means of safety. Please let me suggest that you do not let Mr. Bryan make any o\^ertures to any of the Powers in%’'oIved. They look upon him as absoluteh’ \isionary, and it would lessen the weight of your influence if you desire to use it yourself later. . . . If I thought I could live through the heat, I would go to Washington to see you ; but I am afraid if I reached there, I would be utterly helpless. I wish you could get time to take the Mayflower and cruise for a few days in these waters so that I might join you. Your faithful and affectionate E. M. House Even as House was writing these letters, the act which he feared took place. Assailed by technical arguments which he could not controvert, the Chancellor was carried away by the military influence and threw up his hands. Germany despatched to Russia the ultimatum that made war inevitable and flung into Belgium the vanguard of the army designed to conquer France. Herr Zimmermann to Colonel House Berlin, Atigusl i, 1914 My dear Colonel ; I beg to inform you that I laid the letter which you addressed to His Majesty the Emperor from London 2 80 WILSON AND THE WAR before His Majesty. I am directed to convey to j’ou His Majesty’s sincere thanks. The Emperor took note of its contents with the greatest interest. Alas, all His strong and sincere efforts to conserve peace have entirely failed. I am afraid that Russia's procedure will force the old world and especially my country in the most terrible war ! There is no chance now to discuss the possibility of an understanding, so much desired, which would lay the foundation for permanent peace and security. With assurances of ray high regard, I remain, my dear Colonel, Sincerely yours ZiMMERMANN From Ambassador Page in London there came a veiled but emphatic reference to the efforts which House had made to prevent the war. Mr. Page issued the following announcement to the press : “ One thing I want to make clear that a great many people have talked to me about. Many seem to have the impression that the United States missed a great opportunity. The United States did everything possible to avert war. If ever a job was done right up to the hilt, it was that.” On the other hand. Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, the British Ambassador in Washington, went so far as to intimate that, while it was the information that House brought from Berlin which had opened Grey’s eyes to the serious- ness of the situation, the Colonel’s endeavours might have been one of the causes which precipitated that crisis. “You came so near making a general war impossible,” he told House, “that the war party in Berlin and Vienna became alarmed. They probably knew why you were in Berlin and what you said to the WILSON AND THE WAR 287 Kaiser. They also probably knew wh}" j’ou went to England, and they undoubtedly knew the contents of your letter to the Kaiser. That, together with Sir Edward Grey’s conversations with the German Ambassa- dor in London, alarmed the war party and they took advantage of the Archduke’s murder and the Kaiser’s absence to precipitate matters, believing they w^ere coming to the end of the passage and that it was now or never.” The hypothesis is interesting, not entirely conclusive. Eight months aftenvards House made a private memorandum, the gist of which accords in general with the opinions of later historians who were able to study the German official documents. " April 15, 1915 ; I am often asked my \iews as to the cause of the w^ar [he wrote], and, while I never give them, I might as w’^eli record them here. " It is clear to me that the Kaiser did not w'ant w'ar and did not actually expect it. He foolishly permitted Austria to bring about an acute controversy with Serbia, and he concluded that by standing firm with his ally, Russia would do nothing more than make a vigorous protest, much as she did when Austria anne.xed Bosnia and Herzegovina. The rattling of the scabbard and the shining armour w'ere sufficient in that case and he thought they w'ould be in this, for the reason that he did not believe Great Britain would go to war concerning such a happening in the South-east. He had tried England twice in the West and had found that he him- self must give way, and there was not much danger of his trying it again where England w’as involved. But in this instance he thought Germany’s relations with England had improved to such an extent that she w'ould not back Russia and France to the extent of making war on Germany. “And he w’ent so far in what might be termed 2S8 WILSON AND THE WAR ‘ bluff ’ that it ".vas impossible at the last moment to recede bccaii-e the situation had gotten beyond him. He did not have the foresight to see the consequences, neitlior did he have the foresight to see that the building up of a great war machine must inevitably lead to war, Germany has been in the hands of a group of militarists and financiers, and it has been to conserve" their selfish interests that this terrible situation has been made possible.” II Wilson had to meet the political crisis at a moment when he was overwhelmed with domestic trouble, for his wife was at the point of death. “ His burdens are heavier than any President’s since Lincoln,” wrote House to Page on August 6. “He has growm enorm- ously in popularity within the last ten days and there is scarcely a dissenting note throughout the country. I believe he will live in history as one of the greatest Presidents, if not the greatest, that this country has brought forth.” Such eulogistic phrases must have been inspired by House’s general feeling of admiration for the President rather than by what he did in the crisis, for there was little he could do. Urged by the Senate resolution and against House’s judgment, Wilson issued a formal appeal to the belligerents, offering his services in the cause of mediation. But it was, as might have been expected, without effect. Colonel House to the President Pride’s Crossing, Massachusexts August 5, 1914 Dear Governor ; ... If a statement is made, let me suggest that you make it clear that what you have done was at your own WILSON AND THE WAR 289 instance. If the public either here or in Europe thought that Mr. Bryan instigated it, they would conclude it was done in an impracticable way and was doomed to failure from the start. I hate to harp upon IMr. Bryan, but you cannot know as I do how he is thought of in this connection. You and I understand better and know that the grossest sort of injustice is done him. Nevertheless, just now it is impossible to make people think differently. It may interest you to hear that OIney expressed regret that he did not accept your tender of the Ambas- sadorship to London. He said he had no idea it would mean anything more than social activity. My heart is full of deep appreciation for your letter of August 3. I never worry when I do not hear from you. No human agency could make me doubt your friendship and affection. That my life is de\'oted entirely to your interests, I believe you know, and I never cease from trying to serve you. Your faithful and affectionate E. M. House The President’s offer of mediation was merely an expression of willingness to act. As sent to the monarchs of the belligerent Powers, it read : Sir : As official head of one of the Powers signatory to the Hague Convention, I feel it to be my prmlege and my duty under Article 3 of the Convention to say to Your Majesty in a spirit of most^ earnest friendship, that I should welcome an opportunity to act in the interest of European peace either now or at any time that might be thought more suitable as an occasion, to serve Your Majesty and ail concerned in a way that would afford me lasting cause for gratitude and happiness. Woodrow Wilson A fortnight after this offer, President Wilson issued 290 WILSON AND THE WAR an appeal to the citizens of the Republic, requesting- their assistance in maintaining a state of neutrality. It was later to draw upon the President the virulent attacks of pro-Entente elements, especially on the Atlantic seaboard, but at the moment, as Colonel House indicates, general articulate opinion seemed to approve it heartily. Wilson based the appeal, not upon indifference to the war, but upon the danger that might arise for the United States if factions should take form supporting the one or the other of the belligerent groups. “ It will be easy to excite passion [said the President], and difficult to allay it. Those responsible for exciting it -win assume a heavy responsibihty, responsibility for no less a thing than that the people of the United States, whose love of their country and whose loyalty to its Government should unite them as Americans aU, bound in honour to think first of her and her interests, may be divided in camps of hostile opinion, hot against each other, involved in the war itself in impulse and opinion if not in action. . . . Every man who really loves America will act and speak in the true spirit of neutrality, which is the spirit of impartiality and fairness and friendliness to all concerned.” Colonel House to the President Pride’s Crossing, Massachusetts August 22, 1914 Dear Governor: Thinking that I might see you soon has caused me to hope that I might tell you in person of how splendidly I think you are meeting the difficult situations that come to you day by day. Your Address on Neutrality is one of the finest things you have ever done, and it has met with universal approbation. Every day editorials of the Republican press speak of you as if you were of their party instead of being the idol of ours. WILSON AND THE WAR 201 The food investigation, the shippinc bill, tL'* war ri-!: insurance bill, and e\er\'t}mig el-e that you an- 'lojuj give the entire nation cause for constant concratulati.'jn that you are at the helm and serving it as no other could". Of course the war continues iu be a ni' f-t di-t”.rb:ncr and uncertain clement. I am soriy that Jc.gvn inh tWai herself into the general niyice, for it will place an addi- tional strain upon us not to become irA'oived. The saddest feature of the situation to me that there is no good outcome to look forward to. If the Allies win, it means largely the domination of Russia on the Continent of Europe ; and if Germany wins, it means the unspeakable tyranny of militarism for genera- tions to come. Fundamentally the Germans are playing a nik* that is against their natural instincts and inclinatiuns, and it shows how perverted men may become by habit and environment. Germany’s success \wll ultimately mean trouble for us. We will have to abandon the path which you are blazing as a standard for future generations, with per- manent peace as its goal and a new international ethical code as its guiding star, and build up a military machine of vast proportions. Your faithful and affectionate E. M. House President Wilson was harshly criticized in the follow- ing year for not having adopted a more positive policy at this time. As signatory to the Hague Convention, Ms critics averred, the United States should have pro- tested against the German invasion of Belgium and the President should have made plain that in sympathy, at least, the country stood on the side of the Entente Allies. Such criticism disregards the fact that the opinion of the whole country was by no means crystallized at tMs time, and that the issuance of protests or expres- WILSON AND THE WAR 292 sions of sympathy would be worse than futile, unless the Government intended to abandon its attitude of neutrality. Few persons dared to suggest at that time that the United States should enter the war. Theodore Roose- velt, who was to become one of the most outspoken of those who later demanded participation, writing in the Outlook, congratulated the country on the separation from Europe which permitted its neutrality.^ Ambas- sador Page, who himself a few months later insisted that the United States must break relations with Germany, wrote to House on August 28, 1914 : "... What a magnificent spectacle our country presents ! We escape murder, we escape brutalization ; we will have to settle it ; we gain in every way.” And the British Ambas- sador, Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, wrote to the Colonel on September 12, “I hope and believe that at any rate one part of the world will keep out of it.” One of the rare Americans who at the moment had the courage to suggest that the United States should adopt a positive policy in order to ensure the defeat of Germany, was President Charles W. Eliot. His sugges- tion is the more interesting in that Dr. Eliot displayed then, as always, a mental poise which prevented him from criticizing Wilson when the latter refused to take action. Eliot admitted that neither he nor any American ^ Oar conjitry stands well-nigh alone among the great civilized Powers in being unshaken by the present world-wide war. For this we should be hambiy and profoundly grateful. All of us on this continent ought to appreciate how fortunate we are that we of the Western world have been free from the working of the causes which have produced the bitter and vindictive hatred among the great military Powers of the Old World. ... It is certainly eminently desirable that we should remain entirely neutral and nothing but urgent need would warrant breaMng our neutrality and taking sides one way or the other.' —Owl/oo^, September 23, 1914. WILSON AND THE WAR could know enough of the facts to insist upon the r> he first advised, and he also admitted that Wilson not be sure that public opinion in the United S would support positive action. It even appt?ars Eliot himself, after second thought, reached the conclusion as the President, The historian may well ask, however, policy first ad\ised by Dr. Eliot would not have Aiit the war by many months and perhaps have save< need of an American expeditionary force. Would i also have been a direct step toward a league of nati President Wilson was so far impressed by his argur that he read the earlier letter to his Cabinet and disc the suggestion carefully with House. He wroi Eliot, however, that he did not regard it as practi* Dr. Eliot to the President Asticou, Maine, August S, i Dear President Wilson : I have hesitated three days to mail the enclosed to you, and should still hesitate to forward it w'hili are overwhelmed with sorrow, did I not recall under such circumstances there is comfort and for the sufferer in resolving that he will thereaft everything in his power to help other people wh sufiering or bereaved. At this moment millions of men are apprehe; death or agonies for themselves or poverty and desoJ for their families, and millions of women are dre the loss of lovers, supporters, and friends ; and pe you have the power to do something to stop these mi and prevent their recurrence. In such an effort you would find real consoiatic With deepest sympathy in your affliction, I am Sincerely yours Charles W. Elu WILSON AND THE WAR 294 Dear President Wilson : Asxicou, Maine, August 6 , 1914 Has not the United States an opportunity at this moment to propose a combination of the British Empire, the United States, France, Japan, Italy, and Russia in offensi\’e and defensive alliance to rebuke and punish Austria-Hungary and Germany for the outrages they are now committing, by enforcing against those two countries non-intercourse with the rest of the world by land and sea ? These two Powers have now shown that they are utterly untrustworthy neighbours, and military bullies of the worst sort — Germany being far the worse of the two, because she has already violated neutral territory. If they are allow’ed to succeed in their present enter- prises, the fear of sudden invasion will constantly hang over all the other European peoples ; and the increasing burdens of competitive armaments will have to be borne for another forty years. We shall inevitably share in these losses and miseries. The cost of maintaining im- mense armaments prevents all the great Powers from spending the money they ought to spend on improving the condition of the people, and promoting the progress of the world in health, human freedom, and industrial productiveness. In this cause, and under the changed conditions, would not the people of the United States approve of the abandonment of Washington’s advice that this country keep out of European complications? A blockade of Germany and Austria-Hungary could not be enforced with completeness ; but it could be enforced both by sea and by land to such a degree that the industries of both peoples w'ould be seriously crippled in a short time by the stoppage of both their exports and their imports. Certain temporary commercial advan- tages would be gained by the blockading nations — a part of which might perhaps prove to be permanent. This proposal would involve the taking part by our navy in the blockading process, and, therefore, might entail losses of both life and treasure ; but the cause is worthy of heavy sacrifices ; and I am inclined to believe WILSON AND THE WAR 2fA that our people would support the Governmeiit in lalcin!: active part in such an effort to ptrai.di int'-mn::; iial crimes, and to promote future international pf-.i''”-, . Is it feasible to open p'urparUis bv cable on thi'- subject ? The United States is clearly the })e>l coiintn to initiate such a proposal, in so doing tiu^ counti}' would be sening the general cau-e of liberty, and goodwill among men. This idea is not a wholly new one to me. Th i r'f cr.t abominable acts of Austria- Hungaiy* and Germany ha;*- brought to my mind again the passages on the “ Fear of Invasion/’ and the “ Exemption of Private Property from Capture at Sea,” which 1 wrote a 3'car ago in my report to the Carnegie Endowment for Iiitcrnationai Peace, entitled Some Roads Tc'sjyd Peace, pp. 16-17. The outrageous actions of the last fortnight have re- enforced the statements I then made, and have sug-rcsted a new and graver application of the doctrines therein set forth. I offer this suggestion in entire submission to your judgment as to its present feasibility and expediency. It seems to me an effective international police method, suited to the present crimes, and the probable issues of the future, and the more attractive because the European concert and the triple alliances have conspicuously failed. It, of course, involves the abandonment by all the European participants of every effort to extend national territory in Europe by force. The United States has recently abandoned that policy in America. It involves also the use of international force to over- power Austria-Hungary and Germany with all possible promptness and thoroughness ; but this use of force is indispensable for the present protection of d\’ffization against a savagery, and for the future establishment and maintenance of federal relations and peace among the nations of Europe. I am, with Mghest regard, Sincerely yours " Charles W. Eliot 296 WILSON AND THE WAR Asticou, Maine, August 20, 1914 Dear President Wilson : In revising a letter I had written you on August amplifying the proposal contained in my letter of August 6tii. I have come to the conclusion that it would not” be desirable “ to open pourparlers hy cable on this subject ” at the present moment, even if it were feasible. Two considerations have led me to this conclusion ; (i) We apparently do not possess full information on the real purposes and objects of either Russia or Germany ; at least the thinking American public does not possess this information, and therefore cannot justly fix on Germany the chief responsibility for the present cata- clysm. The extreme rashness of Germany’s action cannot but suggest that elements of the situation, still unknown to the rest of the world, were known to her. I do not feel the confidence I then felt in the information accessible when I wrote my letter to you of August 6 th. (2) Communications between our Government and the Governments of France and Great Britain, which would necessarily be secret, are undesirable at the present stage of the conflict. Indeed, secret diplomacy is always to be disliked, whether used by free governments or despotic. These are sufficient objections to the pour- parlers I suggested. I am inclined to give new weight to certain reasons for holding to our traditional policy of neutrality in conflicts between other nations ; (i) It seems probable that Russia, Great Britain, and France together can inflict ultimate defeat on Germany and Austria-Hungary — the only tolerable result of this outrageous war. (2) It seems possible that the seven nations now at war can give the much-needed demonstration that the military machinery which the last half of the nineteenth century created aU over Europe cannot be set in motion on a large scale without arresting production to a very dangerous degree and causing an intolerable amount of suffering and misery. The interruption of production and commerce which has already taken place since WILSON AND THE WAR 297 July 31st is unexampled in tlic histon* of tLr w* rl i ; and yet tlie destruction of life and property lias begun. If seven nation-:; can srive this denionstratior', the other nations had better hevp out of the contlirt. On reflection, I have al.'O conu, to tliink that much public discussion of the inter- st of fru!* covrTinnLnts in the reformation of the militar}' ntonar-'!:i* 5 c.f will be necessar}’ before American pubii: opinir-n v'l'l sanction forcible oppoAtion to outrages consni:!!#.-! ly those monarchies on weaker and freer nei'flibours. I remain of the opinion that, in the interests of civiliza- tion and peace, neither Germany nor Austria-Hungary should be allowed to succeed in its present under- takings. Your address to your countrt’-men on the conditions of real neutrality is altogether admirable in both fonn and substance. Sincere!}’ yours Charles W. Eliot Asticou, Maine, August 22, 1914 Dear President Wilson : My letter to you of August 20th crossed in the mails yours of August 19th to me. Yours came to hand yesterday, the 21st. I had already come to your con- clusion. . . , I am, with highest regard and confidence. Sincerely yours Charles W. Eliot III That President Wilson adopted a policy of neutrality from a feeling of tenderness for Germany and from a failure to appreciate the moral issues involved in the war and in the German attack upon Belgium, is an assertion which has been frequently put forward. It rests upon supposition or prejudice, and not upon evidence. So much is plain from House's account of his \'isit to the 298 WILSON AND THE WAR President’s summer home at Cornish at the end of August 1914. “August 30, 1914 : I was glad to find the President situated so delightfully [recorded the Colonel], The house reminds one of an English place. The view is superb, and the arrangement and furnishings are com- fortable and artistic. The President showed me my room himself. It was the one Mrs. Wilson used to occupy and was next to his, with a common bathroom between. We are in one wing of the house and quite to ourselves. A small stairway leads down to his study, and it was there that we sat and discussed matters until after one o’clock, when lunch was announced. “ I told of my experiences in Europe and gave him more of the details of my mission. He was interested in the personalities of the people who are the Govern- ments’ heads, and later said my knowledge of these men and of the situation in Europe would be of great value to him. " The President spoke with deep feeling of the war. He said it made him heartsick to think of how near we had come to averting this great disaster, and he thought if it had been delayed a httle longer, it could never have happened, because the nations would have gotten together in a way I had outlined. “ I told in detail of my suggestion to Sir Edward Grey and other members of the Cabinet, that the surest guarantee of peace was for the principals to get together frequently and discuss matters with frankness and free- dom, as Great Britain and the United States were doing. He agreed that this was the most effective method and he again expressed deep regret that the war had come too soon to permit the inauguration of such procedure. He wondered whether things might have been different if I had gone sooner, I thought it would have made no difference, for the reason that the Kaiser was at Corfu and it was impossible for me to approach him sooner than I did, . . . WILSON AND THE WAR ? i" I " I was interested to hear him express as his njh'Jcr what [ had written Min some time aao in one of my letters, to the effect that if Germany won it would chanye the course of our ci\ili/ati an and niake tlie Unitt-d Stati ■- a military nation. He also spoke of his deep reyret, indeed I did to him in that same letter, that it wouhl check his policy for a better international t tliical codto “ He felt deeply the destruction of Louvain, and 1 found him as unsympathetic with the German attitude as is the balance of America. He goes even further than I in his condemnation of Germany’s part in tliis war, and almost allows his feeling to include the German people as a whole rather than the leaders alone. He said German philosophy was essentially selfish and lacking in spirituality. When I spoke of the Kaiser bmiding up the German machine as a means of maintaining peace, he said, ‘ What a foolish thing it was to create a p'twder magazine and risk someone’s dropping a spark intvj it I ’ “ He thought the war would throw tlie world back three or four centuries. I did not agree with him. He was particularly scornful of Germany’s disregard of treaty obligations, and W’as indignant at the German Chancellor’s designation of the Belgian Treaty as being ' only a scrap of paper.’ “ I took occasion here to explain to Mm Sir Edward Grey’s strong feeling upon the question of treaty obliga- tion, and Ms belief that he, the President, had lifted international ethics to a high plane by his action in the Panama tolls question.” But although the personal feeling of the President was with the Allies, he insisted then and for many months after, that tMs ought not to affect Ms political attitude, which he intended should be one of strict neutrality. He felt that he owed it to the w'orld to prevent the spread- ing of the conflagration, that he owed it to the country’ to save it from the horrors of war. There was also some truth in the popular impression that he looked upon 300 WILSON AND THE WAR the war as a distant event, terrible and tragic, but one which did not concern us closely in the political sense. He had not yet come to realize that his great opportunity was to lie in foreign affairs. Colonel House saw in the war a great chance to bring about a revolution in international organization by impressing upon the public mind the need of a new standard of international morals. The code of conduct for nations should be as high as that for individuals and, if public opinion could be brought to realize this necessity. House believed that a new spirit would inform inter- national affairs. He tried to show the President how much he might do by preaching this doctrine, which later became the soul of Wilson’s international policies. “ He did not have a hopeful outlook,” recorded House, August 30. “ I tried to make him see that reforms were going fonvard with much more celerity than heretofore, for man desired the commendation of his fellow-man more than anything else, and with public opinion set towards higher purposes, individuals would naturally strive to obtain the good opinion of society.” Some weeks later House expounded his creed to his friend Edward S. Martin, in whom he found a sympathetic auditor. It was henceforth the leitmotiv running through all his diplomatic experiences. “ I lunched with Martin to-day at the Century Club [wrote House]. He had just written one of his illumin- ating editorials for Life, and we feU to philosophizing upon international morals and governmental affairs. I did most of the talking, trying to point out the funda- mental error in international morals, inasmuch as they are upon a different level from individual morals. No high- minded man would think of doing as an individual what he seems perfectly ready to do as a representative of a state. WILSON AND THE ^VAR It has been thought entir#'ly legitimate to lir, (Lriive, and be cruel in the name uf patriotism. I d to point out that we could not uet ver\’ mr lu-aarci a proper international und'-rstanding until one naiif-n treated another as individuals treat ont' unotlu-r. We see the wreck individuals make ut tliemseive- lit’ devoting all their time to seliidi intire'ts, and, ttL:!-. u'.'V nmy acquire things that seem to them worth vLiI-*, m the end they lose the regard of their fellow-mtn an-l fmrl themselves unhappy because of them.” House believed that the United States should lead in a crusade for such a revolution in international morals. He found the President difficult to stir. "Wil.'on wa.< profoundly interested in domestic problems and was .still slow to formulate a positive foreign policy. He .s»-emed to feel that he had already accuinplidied his groat work. “ September 28, 1914 : The President [House noted] declared if he knew he would not have to stand for re-election two years from now, he would feel a great load lifted from him. I thought he need not accept the Presidency unless he wished to, even if the Democratic Party demanded it, though I could understand why he would feel it a duty to do so pro\uded his health permitted. I could not see what else he could do in life that would be so interesting. He replied that the thing that frightened him was that it was impossible to make such an effort in the future as he had made in the past, or to accomplish anything like what he had accomplished in a legislative way. He feared the country would expect him to continue as he had up to now, which would be impossible. I thought the country would neither expect it nor want it. There were other things he could do which would be far more delightful in accomplishment, and w'ould add even more to his fame. I referred par- ticularly to his foreign policy, wliich, if properly followed, would bring him world-wide recognition. 302 WILSON AND THE WAR “ I find the President singularly lacking in appreciation of the importance of this European crisis. He seems more interested in domestic affairs, and I find it difficult to get his attention centred upon the one big question. “ Congress will adjourn now within a few days, and when it is out of the way it is my purpose to make a drive at the President and try to get him absorbed in the greatest problem of world-wide interest that has ever come, or may ever come, before a President of the United States.” A month later House noted again : “ October 22, 1914 : I am sorry to say, as I have said before, that the President does not seem to have a proper sense of proportion as between domestic and foreign affairs. I suppose it is the Washington atmosphere that has gripped him as it does everyone else who lives there, and the work of the day largely obscures the tremendous world issues that are now before us.” Wilson’s lack of appreciation of the opportunity for a positive policy in foreign affairs accounts in some measure, perhaps, for his failure to perceive the immediate necessity of developing the military and naval strength of the nation. Colonel House, on the other hand, had taken great interest in what came to be called “ pre- paredness,” even before the outbreak of the European war, and he seems to have been on terms of intimacy with the outstanding apostle of the movement, Leonard Wood. “ April 16, 1914 : I had a long talk with General Wood about the army’s preparedness. We discussed the international situation, particularly regarding Japan and the possibility of trouble there, and what would be necessary to be done. He said Manila was now so fortified that we could hold it for a year at the minimum, and that WILSON AND THE WAR w itli in a ‘ihrct whi> IP LWiiii ' '.valid !> ‘ in a sintib 111 sipr ■egncihle p't'ithn. 1: ■iritr iiie p in ini t, « ,, w ns so near c'tm’pl-ri'ju i ir.l it c jtild h'i U'* ! in iw*. : dt IJ’S in the event of r.i enter, e 'nay. W“ pi luVt'j'l ?ep in close touch with one a; toth-r frtni ii'v.v I f, as House hoped, tlj L* Unit- i"l btnt ■' Vr'i\ t(< take lead in an international ntuvc iir.ent t > ]'re\'‘n: : :t w ar or to render it less li' kelv, i t \vu' •:i vital imp .rt i that the moral influence of America should be b^sc:* an adequate material force, especially a strong army and na\y. There was even the possibility that if the nation were placed on a war footing as rapidly as possible, tlie United States would be in a position b; insLt that the belligerents stop fighting, by a threat of entering the war against the side that refused reasonable terms. And wth Europe on the road to exhaustion, the combined economic and militar}* strength of America would permit her to decide what were reasonable terms. There tvas also the danger of a German victor}’’, in which case the United States, if unarmed, would find herself facing an aggressive power capable of canying through by force an expansive policy in South and Central America that might touch closely and adversely our most important interests. In any event, it seemed the part of wisdom to prepare a force sufficient to support the diplomatic demands we might be compelled to make upon the belligerents, should either side disregard our rights as a neutral. Because of such factors Colonel House found himself in complete agreement •with the preparedness crusade, and he urged that immediate steps be taken to strengthen both army and navy. He found the President cold. Wilson did not visualize the role America might play in the same fashion as House ; he believed that the United 304 WILSON AND THE WAR States should give an example of pacific idealism which was at the other pole from military preparation, and he felt himself supported by the mass of public opinion which, until aroused by the peril and the opportunity of the situation, opposed the sacrifices necessary to preparedness. “ November 3, 1914 : Loulie and I [recorded House] lunched with General and !Mrs. Leonard Wood at Governor’s Island. I wished to see the General before I went to Washington. I am strongly of the opinion that it is time for this Government to adopt some system, perhaps the Swiss, looking towards a reserve force in the event of war. I found General Wood receptive. He is to send me, at the WTiite House, memoranda and data to hand the President for his information. “ Wood is desirous of going to the war zone, and I told him I would try to arrange it for the reason that we have no military man who has had any experience in the handling of large bodies of troops. . . . " November 4, 1914 [conference between Wilson and House] ; We passed to the question of a reserve army. He baulked somewhat at fir^t and said he thought the labour people would object because they felt that a large army was against their interests. He did not believe there was any necessity for immediate action ; he was afraid it would shock the country. He made the statement that no matter how the great war ended, there would be complete exhaustion ; and, even if Germany won, she would not be in a condition seriously to menace our country for many years to come. I combated this idea, stating that Germany would have a large military force ready to act in furthering the designs which the military party evidently have in mind. He said she would not have the men. I replied that she could not win unless she had at least two or three million men under arms at the end. He evidently thought the available men would be completely wiped out. WILSON AND THE WAR 3^6 " I insisted it was time to do a great constnir^vw work for the army and one which would make countiy- too powerful for any nation to think of attacking us. He told me there was rcasun to suspect that the Germans had laid throughout the cnuntry crder that we might have at least one man in our army with some experience. He said they would not accept him. I replied that Wood thought othenvise and it was 5 f»mcthing fur him to work out in his own way. “ In speaking of the building-up of our army, I thought if the Allies were successful there would be no need for haste ; but if the Germans were successful and we then began our preparations, it would be almost equivalent to a declaration of war, for they w’ould know we were directing our preparations against them. I therefore urged that we start without delay, so that we might be ready and avoid being placed in such a position. . . . “ November 8, 1914 : The President desired me to go to church with Mm, but I compromised by having Loulie go. Mr. Bryan had just arrived from the West and I felt it necessary to sec Mm, I w'anted to find out what Ms views were regarding the army. I found him in violent opposition to any kind of increase by the reserve plan. He did not believe there w’as the slightest danger to this country' from foreign invasion, even if the Germans were successful. He thought after war was declared there W’ould be plenty of time ^ Probably aeitlier Wilson nor House took mch sispldons very seriously ; the investigation proved them to be without basis. 300 WILSON AND THE WAR to make an}* preparations necessary. He talked as innocently as my little grandchild, Jane Tucker. He spoke with great feeling, and I fear he may give trouble. . . . “ Xoi'cmber 25, 1914 [conversation with Wilson] : We spoke of the ever-present topic of the war. I have gotten from good authority that Italy would now be with the Allies if she had been prepared. She found her equipment was not sufficient to be effective, but she is putting herself in shape to get into the war just as soon as she is ready and can make her forces worth while. I thought Roumania would also join the Allies. He e.xpressed pleasure at this, and hoped these two countries would not delay too long. " I again insisted that Germany would never forgive us for the attitude we have taken in the war and, if she is successful, she will hold us to account. , . . “ I spoke again of our xmpreparedness and how impractical Mr. Bryan was. I urged the need of our having a large reserve force, and he replied, ‘ Yes, but not a large army,’ an amendment which I accepted. I particularly emphasized the necessity for greater artillery plants and more artiiler}’.” The arguments of House produced no immediate effect upon the President, who in his annual message to Congress refused to approve plans for a large reserve force and the principle of compulsory training ; Wilson insisted that any revolution in our established military policy (if policy it might be called) would indicate that we had been " thrown off our balance by a war with which we have nothing to do, whose causes cannot touch us.” Left thus without guidance, except of a negative sort, public opinion was slow to perceive the need of military efficiency, and in some quarters, as the Mowing letter indicates, Wilson’s attitude received the most enthusiastic approval. WILSON AND THE WAR '"ij I ^ i-'i Mr. George F^Mor PculoJy in Cnkna Nlw Yci.k, Dr.f'uit* ;'j i <,'4 Dear Colonel House ; As I am to yo-; a: tho \V]iitL‘ Hoiiv*, I venture to say to yi'u t'aat I think (k'rjer.sl Ltoiiarcl Wood’s address to the M’^rclnint^’ A^sodvit: e; r.n''' d '■’:r national proximity to the hriitins- front. Briti.*h siijw r- \ision of war-time neutral trade ha? alwd\.s been strict, and its interpretation (»f the nieaninr of " ronlrahand ” broad. From the British p >int '>{ \iew it Iiave been flying in the face of Providence tr surr'ndf; the opportunities offered by the nia=l'"-ry oi the '1x1, The Entente Allies were naturally interested in prcwr.tire the arrival in Germany, directly or indirectly, of any articles that might help the enemy to piolonu the war, for in a modern war almost any ariide of common necessity, such as cotton, oil, copper, or fotwl-tuff-, may be of as much military value as what va.*. iornnily declared contraband of war. It was inevitable lint the Allies, under Briti.sh leadership becau'^e of the strength of the British navy, should seize and &i.arc]i neutral vessels vhich might carry contraband ; it was equally certain that they would extend the definition of contraband. On the other hand, as the largest of the neutral Powers the United States was vitally concerned in pre.serring open routes to the neutral countries of Europe and an open market in Europe for non-contraband goods. The situation contained dynamite, and it is not pleasant to reflect that under existing international usages it is one which the United States must confront whenever Great Britain is at war with a Continental Power. “ September 30, 1914 [conference betw'een Wilson and House] : When we w’ere discussing the seizure of vessels by Great Britain, he read a page from his ‘ History of the American People,’ telling how during Madison’s Administration the War of 1812 was started in exactly the same way as this controversy is opening up. The WILSON AND THE WAR 310 passage said that Madison was compelled to go to war despite the fact that he was a peace-loving man and desired to do everidhing in his power to prevent it, hut popular feeling made it impossible. “ The President said : ‘ Madison and I are the only two Princeton men that have become President. The circumstances of the War of 1812 and now run parallel. I sincerely hope they will not go further.’ “ I told the British Ambassador about this con- versation. He was greatly impressed, and said that in his cablegram to Sir Edward Grey he would call attention not only to the passage in the President’s book, but to his comment to me upon it.” In view of the strong sympathy for the Entente cause in the United States, the danger of an actual break was remote. Both Wilson and Grey were con- vinced that the future welfare of the world depended upon Anglo-American friendship, and each was anxious to yield as much to the other as might be necessary to assure it. But unless care w’ere taken, a point might be reached beyond which neither could yield. Ambassador Page in London had fortunately won the respect and affection of the British, and negotiations were always facilitated by the cordiality of the relations he maintained with the Foreign OfiSce. On the other hand, he suffered from the defects of his virtues, placing such value upon Anglo-American friendship that he was not inclined to present American protests with the emphasis desired at Washington. Both Wilson and the State Department were convinced that the avoidance of future trouble could best be secured by letting the British understand clearly at the very beginning that we regarded British Admiralty policy as infringing our neutral rights and material interests. Mr. Page looked at the problem in a different light. WILSON AND TIIC WAR T He was willin:^ to mak*' all'fwance f< r tkc Biiii-i;. re- strictions on trade, and Le cvid', ntly felt tlaat in ''.n:- parison with the d(-ltai -af Germany and tl.e m.dintt nro'’*; of good keliiig betwtui Grea^ Britain and Aineriaa, the losses and inconvenienms ('i nentrrds did n-u count. " Everything is going lame, I tiiink," i.e v. :■ te t > House, September 15, 1914. *' The Briti-li G'jvcrnrrj, n: is most considerate of tzs in all large n'ay.=. Tj:-: sn.alh r questions of ships and prizes, etc., are really in the h.and." of the Admiralty— really, tho’ not nominally — and thrv are conducted on a war basis.” It was with some irritation that the Ambassador di.scovered that in the United States Briti.-h seizure (•: ships and prizes was not regarded as a ” smaller question,’ and he did not conceal his lack of sympathy with thi; arguments drafted by the lettal adviseis to the Mate. Department in protection of American rights t.iii the seas. Colonel House to the President New York, Odeber 21, 1914 Deak Governor : I have received the following cablegram from Page, through his son Arthur. ” God deliver us, or can j’ou deliver us, from library lawyers. They often lose chestnuts while they argue about burns. See our friend [President Wilson] and come here immediately if the case be not already settled.' Of utmost importance.” . . , I hardly know to what he refers, but perhaps you do. It may be the Declaration of London matter. ^ The British had refused the American demand that the Declaration -of Londun be generally accepted. The Declaration of Lrmdun (1909b which Great Britain had never ratified, kft among other articles copper and rubber on the non-contraband list and would ha've permitted the jmporiation of foodstutfs by Geiniany 312 WILSON AND THE WAR I notice that Northcliffe, in his papers, and the London Post are demanding that the Government seize neutral vessels carrjing reservists or contraband cargoes. If you think I can be of any service, please wire me and I will come to Washington immediately. Page is evidently disturbed. Ahectionately yours E. M. House The President replied that if Page was disturbed by the attitude of the State Department, he, Wilson, was a little disturbed by that of the Ambassador. If Page were to represent the American Government, he must see the matters under discussion in the light in which they were seen in the United States. Wilson insisted that Page’s advice was of great value, but he expressed the fear that Page’s intense feeling for the British case might prove a danger. Wilson himself was sometimes disparaging in his remarks about professional diplomats, but he did not enjoy having the work of the State De- partment, which emphasized the American point of view, referred to as that of “ library lawyers.” Colonel House shared Mr. Page’s conviction that too much depended upon the friendship of Great Britain and the United States to permit a quarrel over anything that was not vital ; but he appreciated, as the Am- bassador did not, the irritation caused in the United States by the British methods of holding up American cargoes, and he also realized that unless the United States maintained her rights as a neutral with vigour in the case of the seizure of cargoes, she would not be able to protest effectively should more serious attacks follow. On the other hand, he believed that through the exercise of care in the drafting of protests and bv main- WILSOX AND THE WAR 313 taining close personal rt-litions with the British Am- bassador in Washington, much fricrion could be av-dic !. Scplcmber 27, 1914: I to>k ih'-* J2.0S train to Washington and was met at the station l-tv H.'Adon and Eleanor. They went to the White H ni'-e Hii;i me and took dinner with us. After dinner we talked i .-r a v.vdie, until a large package of papers came from hr ite Department marked ‘ urgent.’ This was the sicr.'il !■ m . . . the family to leave, and the President and I im- mediately got down to work. “ X had written a long letter to Page, concerning th*’ Declaration of London and its effect upon neutral shipping. X’s letter of instruction to Page was ex- ceedingly undiplomatic, and I urged the President not to permit it to be sent. . . . “ I then sugge.sted that he pennit me to have a conference with Sir Cecil Spring-Rice and get at the bottom of the controversy. He expressed warm ap- proval of this plan. After this we went to bed, pretty tired and somewhat worried. “ September 28, 1914 : I had Hoover^ arrange with Billy Phillips ®_for the use of his home, and I asked Sir Cecil Spring-Rice over the telephone to meet me there at ten o’clock. The conference was a most interesting one. “ I showed the Ambassador the letter X had prepared to send Page. He was thoroughly alarmed over some of the diplomatic expressions. One paragraph in par- ticular he thought amounted almost to a declaration of war. He said if that paper should get into the hands of the press, the headlines w’ould indicate that war with ^ Chief tisher at the \%ite House* ^ Mr* William Phillips was at this time Third Assistant Secretary of State ; Ms ability and diplomatic qualifications enabled him to perform services as important as they were unheralded* He was on terms of close friendship with Sir Cecil and it was at his house that House usually met the British Ambassador, Phillips became First Assistant Secretary’^ in 1915, and later Minister to Holland and Ambassador to Belgium* 314 WILSON AND THE WAR Great Britain was inevitable, and he believed one of the greatest panics the country ever saw would ensue, for it was as bad or worse than the Venezuela incident. He said he did not know what I had accomplished in a busy life, but he felt sure I had never done as important a piece of work as in this instance. . . . ‘‘We discussed the best ways and means of getting out of the difl&culty, which he said would never have arisen if the State Department had talked the matter over with him frankly in the beginning. His Govern- ment’s attitude had been known at the State Depart- ment for a month, and yet not a word of objection had been raised. If he had known what the feeling of this country was, he would have taken it up with his Govern- ment and their attitude would have been modified. As it was, they had already published their intention of doing the things to which our Government objected, and it would be difficult to handle it now in a way to save the amour-propre of his Government. “ We outlined a despatch for this Government to send to Page, and then we outlined the despatch which w’e thought he should send Sir Edward Grey. We agreed to be absolutely frank vith one another, letting each know just what was being done, so there could be no subterfuge or misunderstanding.” It would be difficult to find in all history another instance of diplomacy so unconventional and so effective. Colonel House, a private citizen, spreads all the cards on the table and concerts with the Ambassador of a foreign Power the despatches to be sent the American Ambassador and the Foreign Minister of that Power. If there is criticism of the method, it is stifled by its success. As a result of this intervention, the threatened crisis was tided over ; and during the next five weeks it proved possible to approach the problem of neutral shipping with equanimity, although no fundamental solution was WILSON AND THE WAR discovered. House him-vlf said nutl/'nc; of vl.at 1;-: I.ad done. Colonel to AmhJSHidcr If. H. Pj'ie Ni w ! liT zu, 1-^x4 Dear Page ; When your cahlegram came, I rom:iiuniA-.te{! with the President, but found that everything in pr■iCt=^ of adjustment. I cannot see how tiAre can i r aitv serious trouble between England and Anif rica, ’^vitli all of us feeling as we do ; but of course we must needs be careful in the manner of doing things- -for the American people, as you know, are exceedingly sensitive n‘eardin£,' certain questions, and it would not be advi^a■^'Ie ff^r the President, \rith all his power and popularity, to uo counter to this sentiment. . . . Faithfullv vours E. M. Hui ?E Ambassador IE. H. Page to Colonel House Lokbon, Kot ember 9, 1924 My dear House : ... I want to thank you for what I suppose you did when I telegraphed you thro’ Arthur. I sent the telegram thro’ Arthur so that your name and mine shd. not be on the same telegram and thereby possibly excite suspicion. The situation is safe, but it can at any time be made critical by a captious manner. I did not and do not mean to criticize Lansing or anybody else— only to make sure that things are seen in their proper perspective. Sir Edward values American friendship more than anything else of that kind. He is not going to endanger it. To this day, he hasn’t confiscated a single American cargo, tho’ there are many that he might have confis- cated within his rights. Our continued good relation- s[hip] is the only thing that now holds the world together. That’s the big fact. A cargo of copper, I grant you, may be important ; but it can’t be as impor- 3i6 WILSON AND THE WAR tant as our friendship. It’s the big and lasting things that count now. I think of the unborn generations of men to whom the close friendship of the Kingdom and of our Republic will be the most important political fact in the world.— Have stiE controversies ? Yes ; I'm for them whole-heartedly, when we have a good reason. But there’s no reason now ; and, if there were, this is the time to be patient. There’ll be plenty of time left to quarrel when this dire period is past. . . . It’s no time, then, to quarrel or to be bumptious about a cargo of oil or of copper, or to deal with these Gov'ts as if things were normal. Thank God, you are 3,000 miles from it. I wish I were 30,000. . . . Yours heartily W. H. P. Unfortunately, the oil and the copper exporters in the United States felt differently and protests poured in upon the State Department in Washington. For Mr. Page, w’ho w^as in vital sympathy with the Allied cause, the situation w’as worse than trpng. His nerves became taut. As usual, the minor questions were the more vexatious. What was dangerous was that, in his misunderstanding and irritation with the State Depart- ment, he should lose sight of the Washington point of view, which he was sent to London to represent. It was the more difficult to warn Mr. Page to be careful not to display pro-Ally feeling in that he looked upon himself as falling over backward in his neutrality, and was not in a frame of mind to receive criticism philosophically. Ambassador W, H. Page to Colonel House London, December 12 , 1914 My dear House; ... I am trying my best, God knows, to keep the way as smooth as possible ; but neither Government helps me. Our Government merely sends the shippers’ WILSON AND THE WAR 317 ex-parU statement. This Government uses tiie Nav3*’s excuse. Oh, well, praise God it j^oes as well as it docs. I R»‘t my facts as best I can~from other neutrals, from ship- captains, etc. — and I do the best I can, thanks for nothing, getting lectures for— nothing. I happened a little while ago to telegraph that I •* confcrrefi ’ with the neutral Ministers, meaning, of cour.se, that I talked with them and found out what facts I could. It wa-. their ships that were stopped, with American cargoes. I got back a despatch from Washington saying I had no authority to be making shipping and trade agreements with neutral Powers— they did that themk;lves at Washington ! Now what damfool in the State Depart- ment supposed that I was making agreements with any Govt, or that I was doing anything but triing day and night to get an American cargo released and to prevent more from being stopped— I don’t know, nor care to know ; and I haven’t a trace of a shade of a dream of feeling about it. Anybody’s at liberty to think anything about me he pleases ; Tve long since ceased to care a fig. A man in a difficult public place must turn heaven and earth to do his verv' uttermost duty— must try doubly and trebly hard at any cost and must absolutdy exhaust every possible effort and resource and satisfy his most exacting conscience. He will be blamed then. He will be misunderstood. He ■will be misjudged. He must accept that and go on without pacing the least heed to it. I can do that easily. I don’t care a fig. I’m incapable of resenting any misunderstanding. but, you can’t help doubting the intelligence of a man (whoever he is) that breaks loose with a sermon about my making " agree- ments with other governments” ; and you don’t know just how much dependence to put in the next telegram about something else, that comes from the same source Everybody here, so far as I have heard (and I shd. hear, you may be sure), regards us all as neutral of course, and so treats us— English, Germans, Austrians, 3iS WILSON AND THE WAR French, and neutrals. Of the neutral members of the diplomatic corps I see much (in spite of my inability to make “ agreements with other countries ”) ; and I can’t tell you to save my life what the leanings are of any of them : I have felt no suspicion from any quarter but Washington. Suspicion, I have noticed, generally sleeps in the bed with Ignorance. . . . Heartily yours Walter H. Page Colonel House to Ambassador W. H. Page Xew York, December 4, 1914 Dear Page ; I have just returned from Washington. . . . The President wishes me to ask you please to be careful not to express any unneutral feeling, either by word of mouth, or by letter, and not even to the State Department. He said that both Mr. Bryan and Mr. Lansing had remarked upon your leaning in that direction, and he thought it would materially lessen your influence. He feels very strongly about this, and I am sending the same message to Gerard. Faithfully yours E. M. House Ambassador W. H. Page to Colonel House Lon'don, December 15, 1914 Dear House : ril tell you a story : Within a week two Americans who have lately come here have criticized me and the Embassy for being pro-German, and I often hear such remarks that come from the English. And Til ask you a question : Is an Ambassador a man sent to keep another Government friendly and in good humour with your Government so that you can get and give all sorts of friendly services and make the world better ? WILSON AND THE WAR 319 Or is his business to snap and snarl and play ‘ '^niart ’’ and keep 'em irritated — damn ’em I — and get and mve nothing ? These I send vou by Mrs. Page as mv Xmas greeting. W'. H. P. If the State Department had difficultic' in impressing its point of view upon the Amcriran Ambassador in London, there was also cause for some anxiet}' because of petty misunderstandings with the British Ambassador in Washington. Sir Cecil Spring- Rice was a diplomatist of distinction and a scholar of charm. During the early weeks of the war, his relations with our Government were of the most cordial sort. House kept in clo.'C touch with him, and the following letter indicates the tone of their intercourse : Ambassijdor Sprin;^-Ricc to Colonel Hou^c British Embassy, Washington Not ember 5, 1914 My dear Colonel : I hear you have come. How are you ? . . . We hope that the exports will continue as at present. But the evident intentions of the Germans are to get some fast cruisers out of the North Sea and effect a junction with those in the Atlantic, and so control for a short time the trade routes. We .suspect the ships in United States ports of an intention to run out and get converted into commerce destroyers, which would be awkward. For this reason I am asking that ships in New York harbour should be periodically inspected and not allo'wed to leave unless their cargoes are innocent. Do you gather that an attack will be made on the Administration in Congress for remissness about contra- band matters ? As a matter of fact, no American exporter has suffered any loss and all the protests of the Administration have been successful. But owing to changed conditions of modem war it is evident that the WILSON AND THE WAR 320 definition of contraband must be changed — i.e., for instance, it must include petroleum and copper (which in Germany is entirely used for cartridges, bombs, etc.) ; and the American doctrine of “ continuous voyage,” or that the character of the goods is determined by its ultimate destination, and not the port where it is landed, is evidently applicable to certain ports like Genoa, Rotterdam, and Copenhagen which are the back doors of Germany. A just cause of complaint would be the seizure of goods really destined for neutrals, and we are making arrangements by which such goods will be hall- marked by the sender here if he wishes it. I hope by December these arrangements will be in working order and no further inconvenience suffered. I am telegraph- ing about this now, and a man is arranging with the copper men here for an amicable understanding. A protest, reserving all rights, could be made at once in cases of unreasonable or prolonged detention. Yours sincerely Cecil Spring-Rice Unfortunately, Sir Cecil was in wretched health and his nerves, even more than those of Page, were prone to become frazzled as unpleasant incidents arose. The following excerpts from House’s memoranda indicate the delicacy of the situation as well as the extraordinary activity of the Colonel, for those were the days in which he was negotiating with the South American Ambas- sadors the first draft of the Pan-American Pact. ” December 29, 1914 ; I went from Naon to the home of BiUy Phillips to meet the British Ambassador. I found him nervous and excited because of the premature publication and a garbled account of the protest made by the President to the British Government concerning the holding-up of neutral vessels. He did not mind the note, for he and I had already threshed that out and settled it long before it was sent. He had even received WILSON AND THE WAR 321 a reply from Sir Edward Grey indicating; that the Presi- dent's request would be granted. The note was merely a formal matter of routine after the real isMie had been met, but what he objected to was the way in which it had been given publicity and the manner in which our press had treated it. . . . I tried to explain to Spring-Rice how badly the President felt. He accepted that part, but blamc'd the State Department most unreservedly and said it was impossible to conduct diplomatic negotiations of a deli- cate nature through the newspapers. He claimed that it was not the first time and that he hesitated to take up further matters with them ; in fact, he intended to absent himself from the Department in future. He had no doubt we would all be pro-Germans within six months, that the Germans were stnmg and had a thorough organization, and they would finally break down any anti-German sentiment which now existed. . . . “ He talked so many different ways, in almost the same sentence, that I concluded he was too upset for me to have any profitable discussion with him, and 1 therefore took my leave.” As it turned out, the State Department was quite guiltless of any indiscretion, but then, as generally, it was made the scapegoat for the sins of others. “ December 30, 1914 : I called up Phillips at the State Department [recorded House] and told him I was sorry Mr. Bryan was out of town, because I desired to suggest to him that he soothe the rufified feelings of the British Ambassador. I asked Phillips to take part in this laud- able endeavour. I said my trip to Wasliington had been largely nullified by the premature publication of the President’s protest to the British Government and I hoped the}’’ would get the Ambassador in a normal frame of mind before I returned, for he blamed the State Department for the leak. Phillips said they liad found exactly where the leak was, that it was not in the 322 WILSON AND THE WAR State Department, and indicated as nearly as he could over the telephone that it was , a fact which I already knew as well as I could know anything that had not happened under my own eyes. . . . “ December 31, 1914 : I received the accompanying letter from Spring-Rice a few minutes ago. He is evidently in good humour again. I am exceedingly glad. ...” Ambassador Spring-Rice to Colonel House^ I have just received copy of the note that is the telegram to Page and it seems to me a very fair, just, courteous, and firm presentment of the case to which no objection whatever could be raised on the ground of its form. I am sure it will create a very lasting impres- sion and will remain on the records as an honourable effort to solve in an amicable manner the question at issue. Such crises, flaring up and flickering down, wearied the President beyond anything else, and were not con- ducive to prompt settlement of the points at issue. When House brought to Mr. Wilson the gist of his various interviews, the President’s face, he recorded, ” became grey.” The Ambassadors might have been recalled, but there were strong arguments against such a step. However unfortunate Mr. Page’s relations with the State Department, it would have been impossible to find anyone more capable of holding close personal relations with Sir Edward Grey. Nor would it have been easy to suggest to the British that they recall Spring-Rice. Wilson’s solution was to send House to ^ Sir CeciFs letters to Colonel House were frequently unsigned and, as in tMs case, witliout any superscription. When they carried a super- scription he generally addressed Colonel House as Mr. Beverly."' His manner, both personal and epistolary, was sometimes apt to suggest the mysterious. WILSOX AND THE WAR 323 England to explain personally the American case on the holding-iip of cargoes. He sympathized with the British, and at the same time realized the force of the view taken by the State Department. He was on terms of intimacy with Sir Edward Grey and Sir William Tyrrell. Wilson’s decision was hastened by another factor which assumed the first importance at the close of the year. All through the autumn Colonel House had engaged in frequent conferences with the German and British Ambassadors concerning the possibility of Ameri- can mediation. The question asked by the President was whether this possibility might be changed to a probability, and he saw no means of answering it except through the European mission which House agreed to undertake. CHAPTER XI PLANS OF MEDIATION Tiie most serious difficulty . • . is the deep-rooted distrust England Iiaj foi German diplomacy and promises. Something of this is also felt by the Germans for England, House to Wtison, Septemb^t 22, 1914 I C OLONEL HOUSE was not one of the multitude which, so long as the war lasted, believed the crippling of Germany as a great economic and political Power to be an essential element of future peace. On the contrary, he was convinced that a strong, albeit demilitarized, Germany was necessary to the economic stability of Europe and the welfare of the world. He consistently opposed the political disintegra- tion of Germany which was openly or secretly advocated by her Continental enemies. In the opening week of the war House foresaw Germany’s defeat, and he feared the consequences if this defeat should prove overwhelm- ing. To his mind the greatest menace to civilization lay in the possibility of the domination of Europe by Tsarist Russia. “ August 6, 1914 : It looks to me as if Germany was riding for a fail [he wrote], and it also seems to me that, if this should happen, France and Russia will want to rend her in twain. It is clearly to the interest of Eng- land, America, and civilization to have her integrity pre- served, shorn, however, of her military and naval power. “ I expect to see the British Ambassador and outline this to him.” PLANS OF MEDIATION 325 Ten days later, in a message to G ‘nrd, House suggested the pos'iibility of stopping the war before passions became so inflamed that neither side would consider laying down arms. It was no more than a suggestion, and House himself did not believe that it would lead to practical re>ults. But tlic message is significant, for it sketched what was, four years later, to be the American plan for lasting peace and in it. as in the Pan-American Pact, is the principle of the League of Nations Covenant— an organization to guarantee territorial integrity and to provide for disarmament. Colonel House to AmhassjJer GcrarJ Pride's Mi^SACiiEsriT^ Augttsi 17 , 1914 Dear Judge : . . . The Kaiser has stood for peace all these years, and it would nut be inconsistent with his past life and services to be willing now to consider such overtures. If peace could come at this hour, it should be upon the general proposition that every nation at war should be guaranteed its territorial integrity of to-day. Then a general plan of disarmament .should be brought about, for there would be no need under such an arrangement for larger armies than were necessaiy’’ for police purposes. Of course, this matter w'ould have to be handled very delicately ; otherwise sensibilities might be offended. As far as I am concerned, I would view with alarm and genuine regret any vital disaster to the German people. The only feeling in America that has been manifested against Germany has not been directed against her as a nation, but merely against her as the embodiment of militarism. Our people have never admitted that excessive armaments were guarantees of peace, but they have felt, on the contrary, that in the end they meant just such conditions as exist to-day. 326 PLANS OF MEDIATION When neighbouring nations with racial differences and prejudices vie with one another in excessive armaments, it brings about a feeling of distrust which engenders a purpose to strike first and to strike hard. With Europe disarmed and with treaties guarantee- ing one another’s territorial integrity, she might go forward with every assurance of industrial expansion and permanent peace. Faithfully yours E. M. House The difficulty was that the victorious advance of the German armies through Belgium and northern France, during the month of August, prevented any considera- tion of peace in Berlin ; on the other hand, the treat- ment they meted out to the invaded regions inflamed the French, Belgians, and British and crystallized their determination never to cease fighting until the damage had been repaired and Teutonic war methods punished. On the eastern front there was the same situation with reversed roles. The Russians advanced triumphantly, wWle their devastation of East Prussia convinced the Germans that the menace of the barbarous Slav must be ended once for all. But in September the Russians, while they were able to continue the invasion of Galicia, were driven out of East Prussia by Hindenburg, who immediately pro- ceeded to threaten an attack upon Russian Poland. In the west the Germans were defeated on the Marne, and although they maintained themselves on the line of the Aisne it became obvious that the immediate and over- whelming defeat of France, which their military leaders had promised, was likely to remain an unfulfilled dream. As’the’autumn drew on, a condition of deadlock seemed to have been reached. PLANS OF MEDIATION 327 German war plans had been based upon the assump- tion of a short campaign, and the prospect of facing a vast coalition through a long-drawn-out struggle was one that appalled the army leaders ; some of them have since confessed that vith the battle of the ^larne, and the beginning of the deadlock on the western front, they regarded the war as lost. Colonel House was of the same opinion, and argued that if the Germans were wise they would accept what terms they might, before the ultimate consequences of defeat became apparent. At the very moment of the decision on the Marne, he had written to Zimmermann, suggesting that the time v'as approach- ing when President Wilson’s offer of mediation might be taken in other than an academic sense. Colonel House to the President Pride’s Crossing, Massachusetts Sipkmler 5 , 1914 Bear Governor ; I am enclosing you a letter to Herr Zimmermann. If you approve, will you not have it properly sealed and sent to the German Embassy for transmission ? Please criticize it frankly and return it to me for correction if you think best. I have a feeling that Germany will soon be glad to entertain suggestions of mediation and that the outlook is more hopeful in that direction than elsewhere. Affectionately yours E. M. House Colonel House to Herr Zimmermann^ Washington, D.C., September 5, 1914 Dear Herr Zimmermann ; Thank you for your letter of August i. I gave it to the President to read and he again expressed his deep ‘ The letter was approved by Wilson and sent to Zimmermann. 328 PLANS OF MEDIATION regret that the efforts to bring about a better under- standing between the Great Powers of Europe had so signally miscarried. He looks upon the present war with ever-increasing sorrow, and Ms offer of mediation was not an empty one, for he would count it a great honour to be able to initiate a movement for peace. Now that His Majesty has so brilliantly shown the power of his army, would it not be consistent with Ms lifelong endeavour to maintain peace, to consent to overtures being made in that direction ? ^ If I could ser\"e in any way as a medium, it would be a great source of happiness to me ; and I stand ready to act immediately upon any suggestion that Your Excellency may convey or have conveyed confidentially to me. With assurances of my high esteem, I am, my dear Herr Zimmermann, Sincerely yours, Edward M. House At the same time House renewed his personal con- tacts with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, of whom he had seen much the previous summer on the North Shore. “ Septemler 5, 1914 : I am dining out to-night [he wrote] to meet Ambassador Dumba. I am laying plans to make myself persona grata to all the nations involved in this European war, so that my services may be utilized to advantage and without objection in the event a proper opportunity arrives. I have been assiduously working to this end ever since the war broke loose. I do not fclieve in leaving tMngs to chance, and then attribute failure to lack of luck or opportunity. ^ House's rather florid tribute to the pacific tendencies of the Kaiser must be read in connexion with Zunmermann's letter of August t (above^ p. 286). The implication of House's phrase is, If the Kaiser really loves peace as much as you say, now is the time to show it." PLAXS OF MEDIATION 329 I am trying to think out in advance the problems that the war will entail and the obligations which will fall upon this countr}’, which I hope the President will properly meet.” Colonel House to the President Pride’s Crossing, Massachusetts Dear Governor : September 6, 1914 Last night I had a conference with the Austrian Ambassador. He talked very indiscreetly and, if one will sit still, he will tell all he knows. I sat very stiU. I learned that the Germans were making a mighty effort to gain a decisive victory in France and that, when that was accomplished, they would be ready to consider overtures for peace. I also learned that their great fear was starvation. Austria is fairly self-sustaining and. because of her close proximity to Roumania, she would not unduly suffer ; but Germany faces famine if the war continues, England, it seems, lets no ship pass into neutral ports without first ascertaining whether or not it contains foodstuffs ; and when it does, she exercises her right to purchase it. What Dumba particularly wants, is for the American ships to defy England and feed Germany. ... He spoke of England’s enormous power and said Germany’s military power was not to be compared with that which England exercised over the entire world because of her navy. He forgot to add that England is not exercising her power in an objectionable way, for it is controlled by a democracy. He strongly deprecated the war and said if he had been Foreign Minister in Austria it would never have occurred. He intimated that Germany and Austria felt that Russia would have been prepared in 1915, and therefore it was necessaiy’ to anticipate her. . . . He deprecated the use of bombs. Your very affectionate E. M. House 330 PLANS OF MEDIATION II Colonel House was under no illusion as to the diffi- culty of beginning parleys. He had observed the pathetic failure of the attempt of Mr. Oscar Straus, who had engaged in peace discussions with Count Bernstorff and hoped to pass a German offer to the Allies through Mr. Wilson ; someone talked, and all hope of success immediately evaporated. The fiasco did not enhance House’s respect for the discretion of the German Ambas- sador, nor would it tend to facilitate other attempts, Furthermore, although House argued that were he in the shoes of the German leaders he would make every concession for peace, he did not place great confidence in their political good sense. On September lo he wrote ; ” England will not stand for peace unless it also means permanent peace, and that, I think, Germany is not yet ready to concede.” Nevertheless, when Bernstorff asked for an inter- view, the Colonel agreed to discuss the matter, for he did not want to leave any possible opening untried. IJ the German Government would actually authorize Bernstorff to make a reasonable offer, it would be good sense for the Allies to consider it carefully. In House’s mind at this time a “ reasonable offer ” seems to have meant evacuation of invaded territory and full compensa- tion to Belgium. Colonel House to the President New York, Sepkmher i8, 1914 Dear Governor : Bernstorff came to see me this afternoon. I suggested that he meet Sir Cecil Spring-Rice at dinner. He is willing. PLANS OF MEDIATION 331 I am writing Sir Cecil, asking if it would be con- venient for him to come to New York within the next day or two, but making no mention of my conferences with Bernstorff. If we can get these two together, we can at least make a start. For the moment, England dominates her allies. Later, she may not. She would probably be content now with an agreement for general disarmament and an indemnity for Belgium. Germany, I think, would be glad to get such terms. Shall I go on, or shaU I give Sir Cecil some satisfactory reason for wanting to see him ? Now that I am in touch with Bernstorff, I hope to persuade him to close his mouth for a while. He promises that no human being shall know of these negotiations. The world expects you to play the big part in this tragedy — and so indeed you will, for God has given you the power to see things as they are. Your faithful and affectionate E. M. House ” I found Bernstorff [Colonel House recorded in a separate memorandum] in a different attitude from when I last saw him, which was in the spring. He was then debonaire and cocksure of himself and of his country. After telling him something of my visit to Germany and of my purpose in making it, and after speaking of the charming manner in which the Kaiser received me at Potsdam, I began to talk of the peace negotiations. I asked if he had met Sir Cecil Spring-Rice since hostilities began. He said he had not, that it was against diplomatic usage to do so, I thought the best thing that could be done now was for the two of them to meet, and I asked if he was willing to do so provided I could bring it about. He hesitated for a moment and then said he would be willing to do so provided it was known only to the three of us. I agreed that the President would be the only one informed. If any- PLANS OF MEDIATION 332 thing developed from the conference, I promised per- mission from our Government for him to use code messages direct to his Government, which of course up to now he has not been able to do. He said if nothing came from the conference, he would not mention it to his Government or to anyone else.” Fortunately House was, even as early as this, on the most intimate terms with the British Ambassador. The two had already gone over important despatches to Page and Grey, together working for the elimination of un- diplomatic phrases. Spring-Rice wrote to House in a private code, and the latter felt free to call on him at any time when the importance of the business in hand warranted. From him the Colonel had already gathered that the Allies would not consider a makeshift peace. “You will understand that no peace is any good which simply means an armed truce with another war at the end of it.” Thus wrote the Ambassador to House on September 12. " We want not only the end of a war but the end of all wars : and unfortunately no treaty has now the slightest importance. We have suffered too severely by trusting in treaties, and if we were to allow Belgium to suffer what she has suhered without com- pensation, we should be pretty mean quitters. It is an awful prospect for the world and I see no immediate remedy.” None the less. House felt it worth while to attempt to arrange a meeting between Bernstorff and Spring- Rice — a highly unconventional proceeding, but House recked little of conventions ; and when Spring-Rice telephoned that he could not leave Washington at the moment. House insisted that he must come at once. ” I will take the midnight train,” answered the Ambas- sador. It is hard to repress a smile at the thought of PLANS OF MEDIATION 333 the diplomatists taking orders from the quietly persua- sive Colonel. “ September 20, 1914 : I met Sir Cecil [recorded House] at seven-thirty at the Pennsylvania. I did not get out of the car for fear of being seen.'^ We immedi- ately took up the subject in hand. I found him un- willing to confer with Bernstorff, whom he considers thoroughly unreliable. He says he has a bad reputation not only in England but in Germany, and that he was sent to America because it was thought he could do no harm here. ... “ I explained to Sir Cecil the situation as I saw it. First, that at this time Great Britain dominated the Allies, which perhaps she would not do later. Second, that Great Britain could probably obtain from Ger- many, for the Allies, a disarmament agreement with compensation for Belgium. This was what Great Britain wanted and not the dismemberment of Germany, which would surely follow even over her protests, pro- vided the Allies were signally victorious. “ He agreed to all this, but said the Germans were so unreliable, that their political philosophy was so selfish and so unmoral that he hesitated to open up negotiations with them. He was also afraid the time was not ripe for peace proposals. “ He said it would be necessary for all the Allies to be approached simultaneously, for it would not do for Great Britain to begin secret negotiations, even if they were willing, because Germany would not play fair and would later denounce Great Britain as being treacherous to her allies. Then there was difficulty with France’s and Russia’s representatives here. Jusserand, he said, had an extremely bad case of nerves at present, ^ Spring-Rice liad a horror of spies. Evidently he preferred that Ms interview with House should not be generally known, for House noted : Around eleven o'clock Sir Cecil went to the Majestic Hotel to see Sir Courtenay Bennett, the British Consul-General. He merely did this to give an excuse for his trip to Hew York in the event it became knomi." PLANS OF MEDIATION 334 and the Russian Ambassador was a reactionary of the worst type and was little less than mad. “ He told me of despatches that had passed between Sir Edward and himself, and we discussed at great length what was best to do in the circumstances and what was best to tell Bemstorff. ... He is frank and honest, and is a high-minded scholarly gentleman. “ He thinks the best thing for the present is for the President to keep constantly in touch with the situation and to give repeated assurances to the different Govern- ments that he stands ready to act whenever they feel the moment has arrived. He believes it would not do for the President to make any proposals as to terms, but merely to hold himself in an absolutely neutral position. . . . “ I was successful in making Sir CecU see that it was not wise for Great Britain to take any big gamble in this conflict. If she could get disarmament and com.pensa- tion for Belgium, she had better accept it and not risk the stupendous consequences of defeat. I also made him see that if the Allies won and Germany was thoroughly crushed, there would be no holding Russia back and the future situation would hardly be less promising than the past.” The cable which Spring-Rice sent to Sir Edward Grey as the result of this conversation, embodying the Ameri- can point of view, was as follows : Ambassador Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey B[emstorff] was willing that he should enter into communication with S.-R. direct. S.-R. answered that as three Powers were bound to make peace simultane- ously, he could not receive a communication. I think B. was not acting without instructions or knowledge of his Government. Conversations here are likely to be difficult. But following considerations seem to force themselves on the attention of the world : If war continues, either G[ermany] becomes supreme PLANS OF MEDIATION 335 or R[ussia]. Both alternatives would be fatal to the equilibrium of Europe. Consequently the present moment is more propitious to an agreement favourable to the principles of equilibrium. President may therefore (from this point of view) be anxious to facilitate negotiations now. The basis for these might well be Sir E. G.'s two principles ; (i) End of militarism and permanent peace. (2) Compensation to Belgium. If other Powers are willing to make suggestions in order to effect an agreement on the basis of these two principles, then negotiations could begin. If they have other proposals to make, it would be as well that they should be made known as soon as possible for reasons given above, and the P[resident] would be perfectly willing to facilitate exchange of ideas as friendly inter- mediary, without expression of opinion. G[ermany] is doing her best to put E[ngland] in the wrong by causing a belief that E[ngland] is rejecting G[ermany’s] friendly overtures. It would be dangerous for E[ngland] to persist in non possimus attitude. Although it is fully understood that she cannot negotiate without knowledge of other two, it would be to advantage of all three that G[ermany] should be forced to show her hand. E. G.’s two principles would have sympathy of world. Colonel House to the President !New York, Sepiemher 22, 1914 Dear Governor : Bemstorff came to see me again yesterday in order to hear the outcome of Spring-Rice’s visit. I told him that Sir Cecil hesitated to go into a con- ference without the consent of his Government and without the knowledge of their allies. Bemstorff thought this reasonable. He justified his own action by saying that he thought the instructions from his Government warranted him in taking up negotiations of this sort. . . . PLANS OF MEDIATION 336 Berastorff thought it was not too early to begin conversations, for the reason that they could hardly bring results in any event for some months. Sir Cecil and I agreed that the Kaiser would probably be willing to accept such terms as England would be glad to concede, provided the Gennan war party would permit him. The most serious difficulty that wiU be encountered during negotiations is the deep-rooted distrust England has for German diplomacy and promises. Something of this is also felt by the Germans towards England. Another difficulty was expressed by Bernstorff, tc the effect that neither side wished to be placed in lh( position of initiating peace proposals. This can b( avoided, however, in some such way as is being dom now, for they will soon find themselves talking about r and will not be so sensitive. . . . Your faithful and affectionate E, M. House Dear Governor : Dumba came to see me and handed me the enclose( article, which he has written for publication in th World’s Work for November. He wanted you to see i in advance. He hardly tried to disguise his eagerness for peac* measures to begin. I told him I did not think the Allie would want to commence conversations of this sort a long as the German forces occupied their territory. H replied, “ Perhaps, then, a German defeat at this tim might not be an unmixed evil.” I told him how anxious you were to be of service but that you felt you had gone as far as it was wise to g without some encouragement. Affectionately yours E. M. House Whatever the private protestations of Bemstor and Dumba, the public announcements of the Germa PLANS OF MEDIATION 337 and Austrian Governments were in a directly opposed sense and did not facilitate the beginning of peace negotiations. Public opinion in the Central Empires had been encouraged to expect a smashing victory, and their official spokesmen continued to promise it. The Allied leaders echoed such sentiments on their side with a shade of increased intensity. The British felt, and not without some justification, that it was hard to reconcile Bemstorff’s suggestions of peace with the campaign of hate against England which Berlin was whipping up. Ambassador Spring-Rice to Colonel House Washington, September 24, 1914 My dear Colonel : . . . The message went to its destination and is being considered by the big bugs there. In the meanwhile I note that the assurance made to you and others by your friend [Bemstorff] has been publicly and officially repudiated by his employers, so that he cannot be re- garded as either authorized or responsible. Any sug- gestions from this quarter that one member of the firm [the Triple Entente] alone should discuss conditions with him, can obviously only be made with a view to sowing distrust among them. Anyone who wants the terms of an arrangement to be discussed, must approach all the members of the firm simultaneously. . . . I notice that our own selves are at the present moment the object of the most virulent attacks from the person who talked to you [Bemstorff] and from his friends and associates. There is no sign whatever of any peaceful intention and everything is done to envenom the situa- tion, especially and very particularly as far as we are concerned. I enjoyed our talk most of any I have had for a long time and I hope we shall have another one. . . . Yours ever C. S.-R. 338 PLANS OF MEDIATION Mr, H. C. Wallace's memorandum of a conversation with Ambassador von Bernstorff September 25, 1914 I was lunching alone at the Ritz Carlton to-day and he came up and asked to sit with me. He was anxious to know whether there were any subsequent developments, and I said I thought the difficulty was the necessity of talking with the partners [France and Russia]. During the conversation I asked whether he believed the time was propitious for negotiations to begin ; and he answered there was not the slightest doubt, provided an opening wedge could be started on the Island [Eng- land]. In his opinion, a fuU co-operation could be counted on in his country, but he told me this was in strictest confidence. He said if negotiations could start on the Island and could be kept absolutely secret, that he could arrange for a favourable reception and visit to his country. His principal apprehension was public opinion on Island and partners — Whence necessity of secrecy. He also believed that unless something was done soon, the affair would be long-drawn-out, as nothing really decisive could occur for at least six months and probably a year ; and, further, that if something occurs which makes either side particularly happy, public opinion would harass, if not defeat, plans short of subjugation. He also told me in confidence that his people had re- frained from doing a number of very disagreeable things to avoid inflaming that nation. If Winston [Churchill] voices the feeling of Govern- ment, it is useless to make effort ; but I told him G[rey] had different views, and he replied that if that were true, great accomplishment might be made by sending someone from the P[resident] to the Island first and then across the Channel. “ Seftember 29, 1914 [Spring-Rice and House in conference] : He said the cablegram to Sir Edward PLANS OF MEDIATION 339 Grey, which we composed together, September 20, was being considered by his Government and they were discussing it with the Allies. When I pushed him, he admitted that perhaps it would be some time before we heard from it. I gathered that they intend doing nothing until what they consider a propitious time, and then they will use it as a means of beginning peace conversations. I could see that Sir Cecil was thoroughly of the opinion that Germany should be badly punished before peace was made. There was something of resent- ment and almost vindictiveness in his attitude. He said to forgive Germany now and to make peace, was similar to forgiving a bully and making peace with him after he had knocked you dovm and trampled upon you pretty much to his satisfaction.” Ill From the American ^Ambassadors in London and Berlin, House received confirmation of the fact that both sides were determined to carry the conflict to a finish. Mr. Page sympathized entirely with the popular point of view in England, which at that time saw no way of ending German militarism without annihilating Germany in the political sense. House did not agree, but maintained then and alw^ays that German militarism had failed at the battle of the Marne and that the only sure way to resuscitate it was to threaten the German people with political destruction and force them to accept a military dictatorship. Mr. Page’s letters displayed at times a prescience and, again, a surprising misreading of the future. Ambassador W. H. Page to Colonel House Lokdon, September 15, 1914 Dear House : ... You needn’t fool yourself ; they are going to knock Germany out, and nothing will be allowed to 340 PLANS OF MEDIATION stand in their way. And unless the German navy comes out and gets smashed pretty soon, it will be a longer war than most persons have thought. It’ll be fought to a finish, too. Pray God, don’t let . . . the Peace Old-Women ... get the notion afloat that we can or ought to stop it before the Kaiser is put out of business. That would be playing directly into Bernstorff’s hands. Civilization must be rescued. Well, there’s no chance for it till German militarism is dead. . . . Yours heartily W. H. P. My dear House ; ..." The war wiU begin next spring ” — so said Kitchener yesterday. And probably that’s true. The French will do all they can till cold weather comes, and the Russians will smash Austria. Then in the spring the English will go in with a million and a half fresh men and get the fox’s tail. That’s what Wellington did at Waterloo. That’s the English way. — ^Look at their diplomatic management. Of course the war is really between Germany and England ; but England made sure that Russia and France were both in before she went in. Germany has only Austria to help her. Italy failed, and Austria is already whipped. — Grey and Kitchener are too much for them.^ In fact the blindest great force in this world to-day is the Prussian war party — ^blind and stupid. Well, the most weary man in London just this hour is Your humble servant W. H. P. but he’ll be all right in the morning. My dear House : November 9. 1914 . . . Peace ? I fear not for a very long time. The Germans feel as the woman feels whose letter I enclose. ^ Tkese statements do not do justice to tlie Ambassadoris historical in.-r'rk-r\'Kciii4*ir» PLANS OF MEDIATION 341 Their Gov’t can't stop so long as the people feel so and so long as it has food and powder and men. The English can’t stop till the Germans are willing to reinstate Belgium and to pay for its awful rape. — ^Yet, I pray Heaven, I am mistaken ; for the sheer awfulness of this thing passes belief. We say to one another, Rocke- feller is worth 400 or 500 or 1,000 millions of dollars. That means nothing ; it is too big. If a man be worth $100,000, or half-a-million, or a million, or even ten millions, we can comprehend it. So, when I say that perhaps 3,000,000 men have been killed — that means nothing. We have no experience to measure it by. Hence this unbelievable carnage goes on. . . . We have lost our common human bearings, and all the old measure- ments of things are thrown away, and we have no new measurements ; we are simply dazed. . . . Yours heartily W. H. P. The Ambassador’s estimate of the killed was exag- gerated, but his conclusion is of poignant interest, for it suggests the soul of the tragedy, Europe helpless to prevent the war in the first place, equally helpless to stop it ; “ simply dazed.” In Germany as in England the only feeling was that of the necessity of endurance. The German people, like all the belligerents, regarded the war as one of self-defence. “ Their principal concern,” so ran a letter written from Leipzig by an American correspondent in August, ” is that America shall understand that they resisted war as long as they could do so with honour. My association with all kinds of Germans bears out their assertion that war was undesired. The general belief among them that they were forced into it by Russia, is perfectly sincere.” With this consciousness, it was hopeless to expect from them a willingness to make sacrifices in order PLANS OF MEDIATION 342 to secure peace. Even in the midst of their suffering, the Germans were buoyed up by the feeling that they fought for a sacred cause. Countess von Moltke to Colonel House Creisau (Schlesien), October 7, 1914 Dear Mr. House : I have so often thought of your remark to me in Berlin in May : " Europe is in a dangerous state.” How dangerous I never realized ; I wonder if you did ? The present state of affairs seems like a bad dream ; one can hardly realize that this embittered struggle is a fact. . • . Only one great value has this war brought with it to us in Germany at least — aU that was best and noblest in the nation has risen to the surface ; materialism, luxury, and selfishness have slipped from us, and each one of us feels that we are better men and women than before. But it is a hard price to pay. My husband is away fighting like everyone else. The spirit among the troops is very sober but most confident. Everyone, even the Social Democrats, feels that Germany did not want war, that therefore they are absolutely right in defending their country, and they all have unbounded confidence in those in command, in their ability and trustworthiness. , . . Our only consolation is that we in Germany are making the best possible use of its lessons and growing morally in an astonishing way. Germany is being new-born, but the travail is heart-breaking. . . . Yours very sincerely Dorothy Moltke Anibassaior Gerard to Colonel House Berlin, November 1914 My dear Colonel ; ... I had a long talk with the Chancellor to-day, who sent for me as he was here a few days from the TTrevn-f TTp cairc La gaa no danger of their going teitli G.^rmriny, i 'ir tl/r i- .cu- siderable doubt whether they vdl! "g ■ vot:. tl.*' A’.ii*-. Germany’s success has made thfnt t;mid ltA Gi- r> i- also difficulty in regard to Bulgaria. I'p i<' \\ ;t 1 1 .- been impossible to hannonize the jiiilJrtnr’i Bulgaria and Serbia. Germany is making trerr.tndf efforts at present to impress Italy and Rumania to k* t ]» them from participating. If the dittfreiiC'“i b>f transportation. They have not adequately pi-'Vitled for this, while Germany has to the smaUe^t iletail. It prevents them from putting at the front and maintaining more than one and one-half million to two million men. The most interesting part of the discussion was what the final terms of settlement might be and how the difficult question of armaments could be adjusted. . . . He went into the discussion of what Russia and France would demand. I told him if France insisted upon Alsace-Lorraine, I would suggest that a counter- proposition should be made to neutralize them in some such way as Luxembourg now is. This would prevent the two [France and Germany] from touching any- where and they could only get at one another by sea.^ He thought that Russia might be satisfied with Con- stantinople, and we discussed that in some detail. ^ I let ffim know that your only interest was in bringing them together and that you had no desire to suggest terms, and that what I was saying was merely my 'per- sonal view, expressed to him in confidence and a.s be- tween friends. ’ Compaxe the demilitarized zone finally arranged in 1925. 370 A QUEST FOR PEACE There was one thing Grey was fairly insistent upon and that was that we should come into some genera guaranty for world-wide peace. I evaded this bj suggesting that a separate convention should be par ticipated in by ail neutrals as well as the present belli gerents, which should lay down the principles upor which civilized warfare should in the future be con^ ducted. In other words, it would merely be the assem bling at The Hague and the adopting of rules governing the game. He did not accept this as our fuU duty, bui we passed on to other things. . . . I am making a point to influence opinion over hen favourably to you and to America. There has beer considerable criticism of us, and I was told that at £ public meeting the other day, when the name of th( United States was mentioned, there was some hissing I find, though, that intelligent people over here ar( wholly satisfied with your course. I took tea yesterdaj with one of the editorial writers of The Times and dinec with the Managing Editor last night. To-night I dine with our friend A. G. Gardiner. I shall write you abou1 that later. Affectionately yours E. M. House In a separate memorandum, Colonel House noted " When we had finished talking, Sir Edward smilec and said, ' Here I am helping to direct the affairs of c nation at war, and yet I have been talking for three anc a half hours like a neutral.’ . . . “ I put questions to him with great rapidity, so as to find what difficulties were necessary to overcome He answered with the utmost candour, telling me the whole story as he would to a member of his own Govern- ment. It was an extraordinary conversation, and 1 feel complimented beyond measure that he has such confidence in my discretion and integrity. ” I have many times expressed my high regard foi A QUEST FOR PEACE 371 the character of Sir Edward Grey, but I wish to reiterate it here. If every belligerent nation had a Sir Edward Grey at the head of its affairs, there would be no war ; and if there were war, it would soon be ended upon lines broad enough to satisfy any excepting the pre- judiced and selfish.” The conversation is significant, not merely because it indicates the embarrassment which the territorial aspirations of France and Russia then and always caused the British, but also because of Grey’s suggestion that the United States should co-operate at the end of the war in a general organization designed to guarantee peace. Even more significant was the reiteration by House of his earlier plan, providing for a scheme of limiting armaments and a guaranty of territorial integrity. The two men who sat discussing these questions before and after lunch, were destined to play a large part in the creation of the League of Nations. Grey from the very beginning of the war insisted that it might have been prevented if the conference he had proposed had been accepted by Germany ; he never wavered in his conviction that until some international mechanism were established capable of providing a permanent inter- national conference, the world would not be safe from the menace of war. Through Colonel House the conviction was ultimately impressed upon President Wilson and was finally translated into the Covenant of the League. And in the drafting of that Covenant the ideas and the diplomacy of Colonel House became of the utmost importance. II Colonel House arrived in England at the moment that Germany embarked upon a momentous course, A yUJibl -bUJK PEACE which stUl more envenomed the feeling between the belligerents and intensified the difficulties of his mission. The military events of the autumn had disarranged German plans, for the surprising speed of the Russian mobilization, the success of the Russian invasion of Austrian Galicia, and the incursion into East Prussia compelled Germany to make a counter-attack in the East at the moment when the Germans had hoped to concentrate their main force upon the defeat of France. Hindenburg triumphantly drove the Russians out of East Prussia, but his attack on Russian Poland failed. In order to rob the Russians of further offensive power, it seemed necessary to carry through the conquest of Poland and to liberate Galicia. This attack upon the Russian armies was the more important in that negotia- tions for an Austro-Italian settlement were not proceed- ing smoothly and there appeared imminent danger that Italy might join the Allies. To meet this new enemy, Austria must be freed from the threat of Russian attacks. If Germany mobilized her main strength in the East, she would be unable to push a vigorous offensive against the French and British in the West. But here she possessed one great advantage, a superiority of muni- tions, and upon this she counted. It was vital that Great Britain, slow in the production of her own muni- tions, should not be permitted to import them from America, which always refused to lay an embargo. Hence Germany's determination to utilize the submarine. Taking as a pretext the British restrictions upon the entrance of foodstuffs into Germany, a new depar- ture which the Germans regarded as worthy of retaliation, they proclaimed a “war zone” around the British Isles to take effect upon February i8, 1915. After that date, they threatened, German submarines would A QUEST FOR PEACE 373 destroy any enemy merchant ship in this zone, without regard for the safety of the passengers or crews of the vessels attacked. They warned neutral shipping of the peril that would attend entrance into the war zone, since mistakes might occur, especially if belligerent ships continued the practice of raising neutral flags. The response of the American Government was prompt and definite. It warned Great Britain of the peril inherent in the unauthorized use of the American flag. In more solemn phrases it warned Germany that if submarines should “ destroy on the high seas an American vessel or the lives of American citizens, it would be difficult for the Government of the United States to view the act in any other light than as an indefensible violation of neutral rights. . . . The Govern- ment of the United States would be constrained to hold the Imperial German Government to a strict account- ability for such acts of their naval authorities and to take any steps it might be necessary to take to safe- guard American lives and property and to secure to American citizens the full enjoyment of their acknow- ledged rights on the high seas.” These new developments complicated House’s mis- sion, but did not alter his underl3dng purpose, which was to proceed to Berlin after his conversations with the British, provided he received a direct intimation that the Germans would receive him. The Colonel refused to go to Germany unless invited. At Washington, Bernstorff kept insisting that his Government wanted House and through him would express their desire for a “ reasonable ” peace. On February 13, Wilson cabled House that he was stimulating German interest in peace through Bemstorfl, who was confident that a letter of invitation was on the way. rsuf House spent long hours almost daily with the officials of the Foreign Office, for he realized that a complete understanding was necessary both as regards trade disputes and the possibility of peace discussions. His proposed trip to Germany would be fruitless unless the British approved. He was anxious also to discuss the bases upon which a permanent world peace could be founded, something beyond the ending of the war and a settlement of the territorial aspirations of the warring States. “ February lo, 1915 : I lunched with our Ambassador [the Colonel recorded] to meet Sir Edward Grey and Sir William Tyrrell. I wish I could give in detail every word of the conversation, for it was freighted with importance. We discussed at length the question of whether Germany was in earnest about beginning peace parleys. I maintained that she was, and that she was sparring for advantage ; that she desired me to come on Bemstorff’s invitation, unsolicited by the Govern- ment, in order that they might say, in the event nego- tiations failed, that they had never been a party to them. " Sir Edward thought the Germans were not ready for parleys, but were fencing for the purpose of getting the Allies at a disadvantage so that they might say to Ferdinand of Bulgaria and others that the AUies were making overtures for peace. I took the view that, while it was doubtful whether the military party was yet ready for peace, I felt certain the Kaiser and his entourage were. “ Sir Edward said he had told Delcasse, French Minister for Foreign Affairs, of my visit and of our conversations of Sunday. Delcasse thought that the Allies had not yet achieved sufficient military success to begin negotiations, and he believes with Sir Edward that the Germans are insincere. “ Among other things. Grey told me that the British Ambassador [Sir Francis Bertie] at Paris had sent him A QUEST FOR PEACE 375 a despatch advising him of my presence in London and suggesting that he get in touch with me. This amused us all very much. “ Grey and I did practically all the talking, Page and Tyrrell joining in every now and then. We went over some of the ground we had covered Sunday, regard- ing a permanent settlement, and Sir Edward reverted to his view that our Government should be a party to the making of peace. Much to my surprise. Page thought this would be possible and advisable. I told Sir Edward more directly than I did on Sunday that we could not do so ; that it was not only the unwritten law of our country but also our fixed policy, not to become involved in European affairs.^ “ Tyrrell said we had not always followed this policy reciting the Algeciras incident. Page also cited the Perry and Morocco Pirates incident. I held, neverthe- less, that it would be impossible and that all we could do would be to join the neutrals and belligerents in a separate convention after the peace covenant was drawn up and signed by the belligerents. I told Grey that it would be impossible for our Government to take part in such questions as what should become of Alsace- Lorraine and Constantinople, and that we could not be a party to the making of the actual terms of peace, which this first convention must necessarily cover. I felt sure, though, that our Government would be willing to join all nations in setting forth clearly the rights of belligerents in the future and agreeing upon rules of warfare that would take away much of the horror of war. “ I suggested that this covenant should forbid the killing of non-combatants by aircraft, the violation of neutral territory, and the setting forth of certain lanes ^ House was evidently uncertain of Wilson’s willingiiess to become entangled in European politics and realized the national prejudice against such entanglements. The covenant he proposed would not involve the United States in any purely European problems. Our participation in the war, naturally, altered his opinion as to the necessity of participating in a peace conference. JL \yX\> A of safety at sea in order that shipping of all countries, both belligerent and neutral, wo^d not be subject to attack when they were in those lanes. " Sir Edward amended this latter suggestion by saying he thought Great Britain would be willing to agree that all merchant shipping of whatever nature, belligerent or neutral, would be immune, I accepted the amendment and was pleased to know that Great Britain stood ready to go so far. " February ii, 1915 : I lunched with Sir William Tyrrell to-day and we had a most interesting conversa- tion. He spoke with entire frankness. . . . “ Tyrrell believed that in the convention I suggested yesterday, if an agreement should be made between all the Powers, neutral and belligerent, to establish rules governing future warfare. Great Britain would consent to the absolute freedom of merchantmen of all nations to sail the seas in time of war unmolested. This was brought out in our conference yesterday, but Tyrrell developed in his conversation to-day that Great Britain recognized that the submarine had changed the status of maritime warfare and in the future Great Britain would be better protected by such a policy than she has been in the past by maintaining an overwhelming navy.” ^ The conversations were significant, for this is the germ of the idea soon to be developed by House, which he later termed the " Freedom of the Seas.” As Grey and Tyrrell realized, the practical application of the idea would be of immense value to Great Britain, an island depending for its life upon the continuity of its merchant trade. But House saw that the Germans, blockaded as they were and also largely dependent upon overseas trade, would be attracted by it. It might serve as the beginning of negotiations. The fact which must touch the sense of humour of ^ Grey had already advocated tMs policy in Ms instructions to the British Delegation to Second Hague Conference, 1907* A QUEST FOR PEACE 377 the historian is that the *' Freedom of the Seas/’ later so bitterly opposed by the British and regarded gener- ally as a German trick, was first suggested by the British Foreign Office as a means of furthering British interests. Ill On February 12 House received the invitation from the Germans for which he had been waiting. It was not entirely satisfactory, for Zimmermann demurred at the suggestion of an indemnity for Belgium, but it gave the opening if the Colonel thought best to use it. Herr Zimmermann to Colonel House My dear Colonel : 4 . 1915 ... I read with interest what you were good enough to write with reference to the desired interchange of opinion. While we are quite ready, as I wrote you before, to do our share to bring about the desired termina- tion of the war, at the same time there are certain limits which we are unable to overstep. What you suggest concerning the pa3dng of an indemnity to Belgium seems hardly feasible to me. Our campaign in that country has cost the German nation such infinite sacrifices of human lives that anything in the form of such a decided 37 ielding to the wishes of our opponents would cause the most bitter feeling among our people. I heard that you are on your way to England at this moment and that a trip to Germany is in view. I shall be most happy to see you, should you carry out your intention, and shall hope for a personal interview more satisfactory than is possible through correspondence by letter. With kindest regards, I am My dear Colonel Sincerely yours Zimmermann 378 A QUEST FOR PEACE “ February 13, 1015 : I lunched alone with Sir Ed- ward Grey [recorded House] at 33 Eccleston Square, which, by the way, he leases from Winston Churchill. We had a very simple lunch, and I made it a point not to talk business while we were at the table. We talked of nature, solitude, Wordsworth. ... He told of Roose- velt’s visit with him in the New Forest, and how it occurred. Roosevelt sent him word he would like very much to hear the song-birds of England, and Sir Edward undertook to gratify this wish. He said they heard forty-one distinct voices, no one of which Roosevelt recognized excepting the golden-crested wren, which I beheve we also have in America. “ In speaking of Wordsworth, I asked if he went often to the English lake district. He replied that he had never been, that his country home was so much more attractive to him than any other place on earth that when he had time he always went there. He is the least travelled man of prominence I have ever known. “ When we went to the library, I showed him Zimmer- mann’s letter and we discussed it long and carefully. I thought it was up to him and to me to decide when to begin negotiations for peace. As far as I was concerned, I did not want them to begin one moment before the time was ripe for a peace that would justify the sacrifices of the brave who had already given their lives, for it was even better for others to die if the right settlement could be brought about in no other way. On the other hand, neither of us would want to sacrifice one single life uselessly ; and if we could accomplish now the desired result, we should do it. “ We went over the entire ground and discussed it in this spirit. I had a feeling that the sooner I went, the better — ^for our relations with Germany were growing worse, and soon I might not be welcome. I was afraid some foohsh or wanton outrage, either by air or sea, might be committed which would so set opinion against Germany as to make it impossible for his Government to begin any discussion. A QUEST FOR PEACE 379 *' We sat by the fire in his library, facing one another, discussing every phase of the situation with a single mind and purpose. He had information that Germany was starting an enveloping movement upon the Russian front with a view of impressing the Balkan States and, if she was successful in this, it might be that Bulgaria would come into the war — ^not, perhaps, against Great Britain or Russia, but against Serbia, which would be much the same thing. “ He told me of the plan to convey English troops to Salonika and to take them that way into Serbia. He thought if as many as 200,000 British troops could be safely taken there, Greece would gladly join the Allies. He did not think it fair to Greece to let her come into the war without some protection. The difficulty, he ex- plained, was the maintenance of the troops after they were there, since only a single track railway ran into Serbia. “ He said they had never tried to influence Holland to come into the war, for they had not been able to send sufficient troops there to protect her from an invasion in the event she declared war on Germany. He thought if Germany succeeded in the present enveloping move- ment [in the East], she would then turn to the West and again try to break through the lines and reach Paris. “ In conclusion, he did not think it wise for me to undertake a peace mission to Germany until after this enveloping movement had either succeeded or failed, for he did not beheve the civil Government would be able to do anything in the direction of peace until von Hinden- burg and the other mihtary men had tried out their different campaigns. “ It was finally agreed that we should defer a decision until after I had lunched with the Prime Minister on Wednesday. He had told none of the Cabinet about our conversations, but he had made notes and it was his purpose to discuss them with the Prime Minister and no one else at present. . . . “ February 14, 1915 : Sir Edward Grey told me 38o a quest for PEACE yesterday that when this war was over, he intended to retire for a year and rest. I advised retiring perman- ently, for he would probably have taken so great a part in this European conflict, that to do anything else after- wards would be like a great artist going out in his back yard and painting the fence. He . . . looked at me wide-eyed and serious.” Colonel Home to the President Dear Governor : ^ 5 , 1915 ... I am still undecided as to what to do about Berlin. The difflculties are these : This Government [the British] has to be extremely careful about giving us any encouragement whatever. They do not dare say what they actually feel, not only because it might make England’s position misunderstood in Germany, but also because it would meet with a storm of disap- proval here, for the reason that no one believes that anything like the kind of terms that England will demand will be met now. As a matter of fact, there is no feeling whatever, excepting among a very small circle, for anything out of the war excepting a permanent settlement, evacua- tion, and indemnity to Belgium ; but no one believes that Germany is ready for such terms. Germany, on the other hand, is now controlled almost wholly by the militarists. There is a peace party there as there is here, and both, strangely enough, are conducting the civil Governments. Those here are much more powerful to act than those in Germany, where I believe they have but little power. As long as the military forces of Germany are successful as now, the militarists will not permit any suggestion of peace. . . . I am formulating in my own mind, and am unravel- ling it from time to time to Grey and others in authority, to see how far it is feasible, a plan for a general conven- tion of all neutral and belligerent nations of the world, at which you will be called upon to preside and which should be called upon your invitation. A QUEST FOR PEACE 381 It could meet concurrently with the peace conference, or, if peace is not in sight by August, it could then be called and it might be used as a medium of bringing about peace between the belligerents. This second convention, of course, would not deal with any of the controversies between the belligerents, but it would go into the rules of future warfare and the rights of neutrals. It would be of far-reaching consequence — more far- reaching, in fact, than the peace conference itself. . . . Affectionately yours E. M. House As a result of his conference with Grey and Asquith, House decided that the trip to Germany should be postponed, at least for a few weeks. The Colonel would reply to Zimmennann in such a way that, if Berlin were reaUy serious, the door could be kept open. A message from Gerard, urging immediate action, did not change this decision, since it was plain that the Germans thought they were winning the war and Gerard himself found it difficult not to agree with them. So long as they were in this frame of mind, negotiations would be fruitless, for the Germans would merely utilize conversations for diplomatic purposes, without any real intention of making peace. Colonel House to Herr Zimmermann London, February 17 , 1915 My dear Herr Zimmermann : Thank you for your kind letter of February fourth, I thought I should be able to go to Berlin early next week, but it now seems best to remain here until I can have another word from you. All of our conversations with the Ambassadors in Washington representing the belligerent nations were based upon the supposition that Germany would consent to evacuate and indemnify Belgium and would be willing to make a settlement looking towards permanent peace. 382 A QUEST FOR PEACE I can readily understand the dif&culty which your Government would encounter in regard to an indem- nity ; therefore, if that question might for the moment be waived, may we assume that your Government would let the other two points mark the beginning of con- versations ? If we could be placed in so fortunate a position, I feel confident that parleys could at least be commenced. I need not tell you. Sir, what great moral advantage this position would give Germany, and how expectantly the neutral nations would look towards the Allies that they would meet so fair an attitude. Your favourable reply to this will, I beheve, mark the beginning of the end of this unhappy conflict. I am, my dear Herr Zimmermann Sincerely yours g j, Ambassador Gerard to Colonel House My dear Colonel : ^915 I received your letter from London. I saw Zimmer- mann also. He told me he had written you saying they would be glad to see you, etc., which is, of course, all they can do. It is felt here that we are partial to England. They are serious here about this submarine blockade, but are wflling to withdraw it if food and raw materials are allowed to enter — ^in other words, if England will adopt either the Declaration of London or of Paris— but they say they wiU not stand having their civil population starved. Make no mistake, they will win on land and probably get a separate peace from Russia, then get the same from France or overwhelm it, and put a large force m Egypt, and perhaps completely blockade England. Germany wUl make no peace proposals, but I am sure if a reasonable peace is proposed now (a matter of days, even hours), it would be accepted. (This on my authority.) A QUEST FOR PEACE 383 The Allies should send a peace proposal or an ofier to talk peace, to me verbally and secretly here. If it is accepted, all right ; if not, no harm done, or publicity for the proposal — for I would only make it in case I learned it would he accepted. But Germany will pay no indemnity to Belgium or anyone else. But, as I told you, this peace matter is a question almost of hours. The sub- marine blockade once begun, a feeling will come about which may make it impossible until after another phase of the war. If you can get such an intimation from the AUies and then come here, it will go, to the best of my belief. I do not think the Kaiser ever actually wanted the war. The feeling, as I said, just now is very tense against America. The sale of arms is at the bottom, and the fact that we stand things from England that we would not from Germany (according to the Germans) is the cause. But it is very real and makes us all very un- comfortable. Hope to see you soon. Yours ever James W. Geraed P.S. I am sure of acceptance of proposal. Colonel House to Ambassador Gerard London, March i, 1915 My dear Judge : . . . These are slow-moving people [the British], and when I undertook to tell them of your opinion that quick action was necessary and it was a question of hours rather than days, I saw that it was hopeless. Of course, though, this is inevitable no matter how fast they wished to move, for the reason that they cannot act alone ; and it takes an incredible time to get any satisfactory communication with the Allies, especially with Russia. I see no insuperable obstacle in the way of peace and I feel if the belligerents would begin to talk, they might soon come to an agreement. 384 A QUEST FOR PEACE The army and navy machine here is now under a tremendous momentum and your prediction as to the final outcome is not shared by anyone here, from the highest to the lowest. If this war lasts six months longer, England will have a navy that will be more than equal to the combined navies of the world. That is something for us Americans to think of ; in fact, it is something for everybody to think of. . . . Faithfully yours E. M. House Colonel Home to the President London, February 18, 1915 Dear Governor : ... I had a conference with Sir Edward Grey last Tuesday evening, and again yesterday at which the Prime Minister and Page were present. Both Asquith and Grey thought it would be footless for me to go to Berlin until the present German envelop- ing movement in the East is determined. It looks, for the moment, bad for the Russians ; and they do not want me to be in Berlin at such a time. If this movement fails and things get again deadlocked, they think I should take that opportunity to p there. . . . I put the matter plainly to both Asquith and Sir Edward, asking their advice as to what to do, telling them we were all interested alike in bringing about the desired result, and it was a question of how best to do it. They accepted this position and Sir Edward thought, at the moment, I should write to Zimmermann along the lines that I did. The idea was that unless they at least conceded these two points,^ the matter had as well be dropped until they were willing to do so. Sir Edward said that England would continue the war indefinitely unless these cardinal points were agreed to. . . . I told them at yesterday’s conference that it would ^ Evacuation of invaded territory and guarantees for permanent peace. A QUEST FOR PEACE 385 not do to close the door too tightly, for we must leave it ajar so it could be widely opened if Germany really desired peace, Asquith smiled and said, “ You will be a very clever man if you can do that successfully.” The situation grows hourly worse because of the German manifesto in regard to merchantmen^ and the sowing of mines. I tried hard to get Sir Edward, and afterwards Asquith, to meet this situation before to-day ; but with the usual British slowness, they put it oh until Thursday or perhaps next Tuesday. The psychological time to have ended this war was around the end of November or the first of December, when everything looked as if it had gotten into a per- manent deadlock. You will remember we tried to impress this upon Sir Cecil and tried to get quicker action, but without success. . . . Affectionately yours E. M. House " February 18, 1915 : I went to 33 Eccleston Square at 7.30 to see Sir Edward Grey and was with him a half-hour. I handed him Gerard’s letter and also one from Penfield. . . . “ Sir Edward talked as frankly as usual and said the terms Gerard proposed would only be entertained by Great Britain in the event all the things he predicted would happen, had already happened ; that is, that Russia and France were completely beaten and Egypt and other British territory occupied by the enemy. “ I again urged upon him better co-ordination between the eastern and western fronts. He did not think this possible, because of the Russian governmental system. It seems to me perfect folly not to work more in harmony ; that is, when the Germans are attacking in the East, they should be severely pressed in the West, and vice versa. . . . ^ On the day on which this letter was written, the Geiman threat of February 4 was to come into efect: that every enemy merchant ship found in the war zone would be destroyed without its being always possible to avert the dangers threatening the crew's and passengers. 1—25 386 A QUEST FOR PEACE ** February 20, 1915 : I called on Sir Edward Grey at 33 Eccleston Square at 7.15. Lord Kitchener was with him when I arrived, but he left within a few minutes. “ Sir Edward said that the Allies intended forcing the Dardanelles and that perhaps it would take them three or four weeks.^ This is not only a spectacular movement, but, if successful, will have far-reaching effect upon the eastern situation, besides giving Russia an outlet and inlet. He also told me that Kitchener said his reports from Russia were that the Germans had not captured more than one division, and the situation in the East was nothing like as bad as represented. Sir Edward qualified this, however, by saying that Russian news was never quite reliable. He thought after matters had quieted down upon the eastern front and a deadlock had once more been arrived at, and the Dardanelles had been forced, it would be well for me to go to Germany.” Colonel House to the President London, February 23, 1915 Dear Governor : In reply to your cablegram of the 20th, indicating that you thought there was danger of my yielding too far to the wishes of this Government in deferring my visit to Berlin, I tried to give you some explanation in my reply which I sent yesterday. tfp to now, all we know is that Germany refuses to indemnify Belgium and refuses to make any proposition herself. She may or may not be willing to evacuate Belgium and consider proposals looking to permanent peace. But even if she concedes these two cardinal points, it is well to remember that neither Russia nor France is wiUing now to make peace on any such terms. When the Russian Minister of Finance and the French Minister for Foreign Affairs were here. Sir Edward told them of your letter and of my presence. He also told them what I thought might be accomplished now, * " It is interesting to note how fax afield this prophecy was.” [Note by E. M. H.] A QUEST FOR PEACE 387 and he asked them whether or not they would like to have a conference with me. They both preferred not doing so, stating that the time was not opportune for peace proposals, for the reason that it was certain that Germany, being so far successful, would not acquiesce in such terms as their Governments would demand. The British public and a majority of the Cabinet would not look with any greater favour upon the only terms that Germany would now concede, than would France and Russia. Since the war has begun and since they consider that Germany was the aggressor and is the exponent of militarism, they are determined not to cease fighting until there is no hope of victory, or until Germany is ready to concede what they consider a fair and permanent settlement. It is almost as important to us to have the settlement laid upon the right foundations as it is to the nations of Europe. If this war does not end militarism, then the future is full of trouble for us. If there was any reason to believe that Germany was ready to make such terms as the Allies are ready to accept, then it would be weU to go immediately ; but all our information is to the contrary, and the result of my visit there now would be to lose the S5mpathetic inWest which England, and through her the AUies, now feel in your endeavours and without accomplishing any good in Germany. You may put it down as a certainty that Germany will only use you in the event it suits her purposes to do so ; and she will not be deterred from this if at any time she sees that it is to her advantage to accept your good of&ces. Asquith told Page yesterday that he sincerely hoped that I would not make the mistake of going just now. That simply means, if I do go they will probably cease to consider you as a medium. If Zimmermann replies to my letter, then I shall go to Berlin and have a conference with him ; but it will accomplish nothing for the moment, for he will not 388 A QUEST FOR PEACE now go further; and the Allies will not be willing to begin parleys upon such a basis. Sir Edward is extremely anxious for England to take the highest possible grounds and not ask for anything excepting the evacuation and indemnifying of Belgium and a settlement that will ensure permanent peace. But, there again, he comes in conflict with colonial opinion. The South African colonies have no notion of giving up German Africa which they have taken, as they say it will be a constant menace to them to have so powerful and warlike a neighbour. The same applies to . , . the Caroline Islands, Samoa, etc., which the Australians have taken. Sir Edward is trying assiduously to work up an opinion upon broader lines, and he may or may not be successful ; but he is not now in a position to say that his wishes will prevail. . . . Germany may be successful. If France or Russia ^ves way, she will soon dominate the Continent ; and it is not altogether written that one or the other will not give way. Even if the Allies hold together, there is a possibility that the war may continue another year I try very hard not to think of it any more than I did at home, and I try to talk of it as little as possible, so that my mind may be clear to look at the situation dispassionately. The one sane, big figure here is Sir Edward Grey ; and the chances are all in favour of his being the dominant personality when the final settlement comes, and I believe it is the part of wisdom to continue to keep in as close and sympathetic touch with him as now. . . . I note now with interest that occasionally Sir Edward speaks of “ that second convention which the President may call.” He has come to look upon it as one of the hopes for the future and, if we accomplish nothing else, you will be able to do the most important world’s work within sight. I have reason to believe that this Government will be ready to make great concessions in that convention A QUEST FOR PEACE 389 in regard to the future of shipping, commerce, etc., during periods of war.^ It is my purpose to keep this “ up my sleeve ” and, when I go to Germany, use it to bring favourable opinion to you by intimating that I believe when the end comes you will insist upon this being done ; in other words, that with your initiative and with Germany’s co-operation. Great Britain can be induced to make these terms. This, I think, will please the Germans and may go a long way towards placating their feelings towards us. . . . Affectionately yours E. M. House IV As one might expect, Colonel House took care to come into contact with everyone who might give in- formation or assistance in his mission of good will : politicians of all parties and shades of opinion, men of business, journalists. “ February 14, 1915 : I lunched with Lady Paget, and in the afternoon Sidney Brooks took tea with me. He said there was much curiosity in London as to the purpose of my visit, and he had explained that my trousers had worn out earlier this year than usual and I had come to have Poole renew them. He asked seriously if I desired anything said of my visit or whether I wished The Times to comment at aU upon Anglo- American relations. I asked him to please say nothing for the moment. He said The Times was at my disposal whenever I wished to use it for the purpose of my mission, whatever that mission was. . . . “ February 20, 1915 : I went to the Embassy and found Hoover discussing with Page the difficulties he is encountering from day to day in his Belgian relief work. He is a resourceful fellow, and needs to be, for he has a most complex situation to contend with, having the German, the Belgian, and British Governments at cross-purposes. ^ Another reference to the plan of the ** Freedom of the Seas/’ 390 A QUEST FOR PEACE “ February 25, 1915 : I lunched with Lord Bryce to-day at his apartment at No. 3 Buckingham Gate. We had a most delightful time. He arranged for us to be entirely alone, not even Lady Bryce being there. “ He inquired after the President, and I told of the President’s having read me Gardiner’s sketch of him in Pillars of Society, the opening sentence of which I remember was ; ‘ If one were asked to name the greatest living Englishman I think it would be necessary to admit, regretfully, that he is a Scotsman bora in Ireland.’ “ Bryce smiled and said he had not read it, and was afraid to do so for fear his head might be turned ; at the same time, I noticed he asked me again the title of the book. “ We gradually drifted into a discussion of the war and of the problems for its solution. It seemed to me a good opportunity to test the wisdom of my views upon so clear and subtle a pohtical mind ; and I told him forthwith, though in strict confidence, pretty much what I had planned. This embraced, of course, the proposition regarding the cessation of the manufacture of armaments for a period of years, the calling of the second convention % the President, and its scope and character. “ Bryce was visibly interested. I told him, too, what I had tried to do towards preventing the war, at least between the Western Powers. He was as in- terested in this as in the other, and agreed that it might have been possible if war had been deferred a short while longer. He had also heard that Great Britain and Germany were on the eve of a settlement concerning the Bagdad Railroad and a division of the sphere of influence in Africa. This convention was yet to be signed when the war burst forth. . . Colonel Rouse to Mr. Gordon Auchincloss Dear Gordon : londo^!, March 2. 1915 ... I am lunching and dining with some one of importance every day. On Tuesday I go into the Con- A QUEST FOR PEACE 391 servative camp further than I have yet done, by dining to meet Balfour, Lord Curzon, and several others. . . . 4 U’s^ and I keep in constant communication by cable ; but so far as I can see, my main object now must be to mark time and not offend by overdoing. . . . Unless one has undertaken such a job himself — and there has been none like it up to now — ^he cannot possibly imagine the pitfalls that lurk on every hand. It keeps one side-stepping every moment ; and if I succeed in doing nothing more than keeping out of trouble, I shall consider I have been fortunate. I have succeeded in keeping my name absolutely out of the European press, which is a good beginning, and I remain in as much obscurity as is possible for one having such work in hand. No one, of course, not even Page, knows when I see the different Ministers or personages of importance ; and my comings and goings are as unchronicled as if I were a cross-sweeper. Paternally yours E. M. House “ March 4, 1915 [conference between House and A. J. Balfour] : We got along famously together, I doing most of the talking, although at times he would become enthusiastic and would get up and stand by the fire and declaim to me just as earnestly as I had to him. I took a liking to him at once, and have a sincere desire that it should be reciprocated. I like the quality of his mind. It is not possible to allow one’s wits to lag when one is in active discussion with him. In that respect, he reminds me somewhat of the President. I am in- clined to rank him along with the President and Mr. Asquith in intellectuality, and this, to my mind, places him at the summit.” Colonel House to Mr. Gordon Auchincloss Dear Gordon : London, March 5, 1915 ... I have seen almost every Liberal of importance in the Kingdom, and for the past week I have devoted ^ An obvious representation of W* W. 392 A QUEST FOR PEACE myself to the Conservatives, as it will be very helpful, not only to the Government, but to me individually in the final negotiations. Balfour was very complimentary in regard to the suggestions I have made, and said they were unique and practicable as far as he could see at the moment. I have seen for a long while that the limiting of armaments was the insuperable obstacle in the way of a permanent settlement, and I have not been able to think of a way that was satisfactory to me until I was on the Lusitania with my mind free to devote to the subject. It then occurred to me that if all the important nations, belligerents and neutrals, should agree to cease the manu- facture of munitions of war for a period of ten years or more, the question then of how large an army Germany should have, or France should retain, or the size of Ger- many’s or Great Britain’s navy, need not be discussed.^ The armies and the navies would remain as they are at the end of the war ; but without the manufacture of any further battleships or munitions of war, everything would automatically become obsolete in a few years. What we need to do is to play for time. Time will make Germany democratic and there will be no more danger in that direction than from the United States, England, or France. Russia is another problem, which may or may not have to be dealt with in the future. This plan would involve the shutting-down of Krupps’ and of Armstrong’s and other manufacturers, and it would leave the world at the end of ten years on a peace footing. The money that it would save to each nation every year would be sufficient to pay the interest on the great war debts that they are piling up. Ail this, of course, is not to be mentioned except to Sidney and Martin,^ from whom I keep nothing. . . . Paternally yours E. M. House ^ Tlie proposal is obviously based upon the assumption of a military stalemate, which at that time seemed probable to House. ^ Dr. Sidney Mezes, and Mr. E. S. Martin, editor of Life. A QUEST FOR PEACE 393 “ March 5, 1915 ; Sidney Brooks called in the after- noon. He was on his way to the Foreign Office to offer his services in an effort to present the British side of questions arising between the United States and Great Britain. He hopes to be able to do better work than has been done. He said up to now the Foreign Office had done it as badly as human ingenuity could suggest. He asked if I thought they could have done it worse. I thought not, and Brooks seemed pleased at this tribute to their efforts. . . . " Chalmers Roberts and I took supper at Scot's. Afterwards I went to the Ambassador’s, as he wished to show me Colonel George 0 . Squier’s diary, which he said I must keep in the deepest confidence. It em- barrassed me to have to tell him that I had had a copy of the diary for more than two weeks. " We talked of home, of the President, McAdoo, and conditions, and we had a genuinely good time. I like Page. He is direct and without guile. . . . “ March 8, 1916 : I dined with Lord Loreburn. John Burns was the only other guest. They are both sane, reasonable, able men, and we talked of the war and of the jingoes and of the difficulties of peace. I told them of the demands of France and of those of South Africa concerning the German African colonies. Bums thought the latter could be met, but considered those of France more serious. . . . “ March 9, 1915 ; We dined with Lady Paget. She had a notable gathering. The other guests were Lord Curzon, Mr. A. J. Balfour, Sir John Cowan, Mr. Cust (who wiU be Lord Brownley), Lord and Lady Desborough (Lady-in-waiting to the Queen), Duchess of Marlborough, Mrs. John Astor, and Mrs. George Keppel. “ Curzon and I had considerable talk together when coffee was served, and I found him the worst jingo I have met. He wants to make peace in Berlin no matter how long it takes to get there. He is an able man, expressing himself forcefully and well. We got along 394 A QUEST FOR PEACE agreeably, for he seemed to want to be as pleasant as possible. With that type I seldom or never argue, because our views are too far apart to ever harmonize. “Balfour has a much more charming personality. I talked to Cust and succeeded in changing his point of view as to the United States. ...” Colonel House to the President London, March 8, 1915 Dear Governor : . . . Since I last wrote, I have seen something of the peace party, headed by such men as the recent Lord Chancellor, Lord Lorebum, Mr. Hirst of the Economist, and others. Northchffe is of the ultra set on the other side. He remarked to one or two friends of mine that if you had sent me over here to discuss peace, I should be run out of England. ... I mention this to show the extreme difficulties of the situation. Sidney Brooks told me, however, that he had found no one with whom I had talked now antagonistic to our purposes. I shall find this anti-peace feeling much stronger in Germany among the military party ; but if I can get directly at the Kaiser, I hope to be able to make some impression. The great question is, who really controls in Germany ? This is something I am afraid I shall have to find out for myself. . . . Affectionately yours E. M. House V In the meantime, Grey and House had decided that the moment had arrived for the Colonel to go to Berlin. Messages had come from von Jagow through Washing- ton that the Germans awaited him ; and although letters from Zimmermann and Gerard contained no intimation of Germany’s wiUingness to make conces- A QUEST FOR PEACE 395 sions, it seemed worth while to discover the real situa- tion in Berlin. Herr Zimmermann to Colonel House Berlin, March 2 , 1915 My DEAR Colonel : Many thanks for your letter of February 17th. I regret to see that you consider giving up your trip to Berlin which I had counted on as offering a much more satisfactory opportunity for an interchange of ideas than has been possible up to now. I read with interest what you believe to be a possible beginning to the desired end. It seems to me, however, that you are taking as a basis a more or less defeated Germany or one nearly at the end of her resources. It is hardly necessary for me to show in how far this is not the case. Although I can assure you that Germany has the welfare of Belgium very much at heart, still she is not able to forget what a terrific cost was paid for the resistance our men encountered there. You may be sure, as I said before, that Germany’s wish for a permanent peace is as sincere as your own. If England would consent to give up her claim to a monopoly on the seas together with her two-to-one power standard, I think it might be a good beginning. I remain, my dear Colonel Sincerely yours Zimmermann Ambassador Gerard to Colonel House Berlin, March 6, 1915 My dear Colonel : I hope you are coming here soon. Von Jagow said he hoped you were coming, and while I see no prospect of peace now, you could acquaint yourself with the general situation and be in a better position to talk in the other capitals. . . . The feeling against America is in abeyance, waiting 396 A QUEST FOR PEACE to see what happens with relation to the latest English declaration about the blockade of Germany. I have as yet no official information. The Chancellor is not boss now. Von Tirpitz and Falkenhayn (Chief of Staff) have more influence, especi- ally as the Chancellor bores the Emperor, and there are great intrigues going on among all these conflicting authorities. The people who were in favour of accept- ing a reasonable peace proposal were, strange to say, the military general staff end, and it was von Tirpitz who did not want our last proposals accepted.^ . . . I hate to write in these spy times and do most earnestly hope you are coming soon, or, if you are going to Italy, I will run down and report to you there if you want. . . , Ever yours James W. Gerard “ March 7, 1915 [conference with Grey] : We both think the time has come for me to go to Germany. I have decided to go via France, and I asked his opinion as to whether I should see Delcasse. At first he thought not. He said Delcasse was decidedly of the opinion, when he was here, that it was no time for peace parleys, and he did not believe he had changed this point of view. I was afraid he would consider it a discourtesy if I did not see him. Looking at it from that viewpoint, Grey thought I was right and it would be best to see him, though he cautioned me to be guarded in what I said. I assured him he need have no fear of my being indis- creet. " Grey thought France would insist upon Alsace- Lorraine. The French believe the Allies will win and that they can impose terms of peace upon Germany ; later, perhaps, they would find that to impose peace conditions upon Germany would necessitate continuing ^ The United States proposed that Germany should give up the sub- marine war zone around Great Britain, provided the British relinquished the food blockade. A QUEST FOR PEACE 397 the war for a number of years and, when that was realized, they might be willing to make concessions. “ He did not know the mind of Russia, but he be- lieved by giving them Constantinople and the Straits, they would be willing to acquiesce in almost any other terms that might be agreed upon. . . . " The difficulty I expect to find here in the final negotiations is, there is no man who dominates the situation. ... In Germany I shall find the situation even more uncertain. If there were a Palmerston or a Chatham here, and a Bismarck in Germany, it would be easier.” The Quest for Peace had thus far revealed nothing but the unwillingness of any of the belligerents to yield an iota of their aspirations. Yet the mission had not been wasted. House had established relations with the British which not merely helped to tide over the diffi- culties of the present, but which must prove invaluable in preventing misunderstanding for the future. The memoirs of the British Foreign Secretary indicate how thoroughly the Colonel had succeeded in establish- ing a sympathetic understanding. ” It was not neces- sary,” writes Grey, ” to spend much time in putting our case to him. He had a way of saying, ‘ I know it ' in a tone and manner that carried conviction both of his sympathy with, and understanding of, what was said to him.” And again : ” Our conversations became almost at once not only friendly but intimate. I found combined in him in a rare degree the qualities of wisdom and sympathy. In the stress of war it was at once a relief, a delight, and an advantage to be able to talk with him freely. His criticism or comment was valu- able, his suggestions were fertile, and these were all conveyed with a sympathy that made it pleasant to listen to them. After a day that began about seven in 398 A QUEST FOR PEACE the morning I broke off work by seven in the evening and took things easily at my house for an hour before dinner. It was arranged that in this hour House should come whenever he wanted to have a talk.” ^ The Colonel’s mission would have been worth while if only because of this close personal understanding with the Foreign Secretary, and it was one of the im- ponderables that weighed heavily in the diplomatic history of the following years. Appreciative of Grey’s honesty and moderation, fearful of the demands of France, suspicious of German sincerity, yet determined if possible to find a thread to throw across the chasm : such were the feelings of House when on March ii he left England for Paris and Berlin. ‘ Grey, Twenty-Five Years {Frederick A. Stokes Company), ii, 124. CHAPTER XIII THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS If peace parleys were begun now upon any terms that would have any chance of acceptance, it would mean the overthrow of this Government and the Kaiser. Zimmermann to House, March 21, 1915 I Colonel House to the President Paris, March 14, 1915 D ear governor : We arrived here Thursday night. A de- stroyer accompanied our boat a good part of the way, and we passed one floating mine about one hundred yards away. Otherwise the trip was without incident. . . . I have just returned from my interview with Del- casse.^ The interpreter was the Assistant Secretary for Foreign Affairs.® I let him read your letter and told him I came to present your compliments, but that you did not desire to intrude yourself upon them or to hurt their sensibilities in any way by making an immature suggestion of peace. I said this before he had a chance to say anything, for I knew quite well what was in his mind. He was visibly pleased when this suggestion was made, and it placed us on a good footing. I then told him that you had foreseen for a year or ^ Minister for Foreign Afeirs. Th^opMle Delcasse had been a prime mover in the Entente with Great Britain, and largely responsible for the energetic foreign pohcy of France from 1904 on. He was the hete mire of the Germans, who regarded him as the collaborator of Edward VII and Grey in the attempt to encircle Germany. ® Jaquin de Margerie, at that time Director of Political Affairs of the Foreign Office ; in the post-war period appointed French Ambassador to Germany. 399 THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 400 more that, unless something was done to prevent it, some spark might cause the present conflagration, and you had sent me to Europe last May for the purpose of seeing what could be done to bring about a better under- standing ; that I had gone to Germany and had come to France, but they were changing Government at the time and it was impossible to talk to them. I wanted to let him know that you had had the threads in your hands from the beginning and that you understood the situation thoroughly. . , . In reply he said that France greatly appreciated your keen interest and noble desire to bring about peace, and he was glad I had come to Paris and would look forward with interest to seeing me when I returned from Germany. He said he would then tell me in the frankest way what France had in mind and was willing to do. I did not press him to tell me this then, because I happened to know what they have in mind and I did not want to go into a footless and discouraging discussion. I had accomplished more than I anticipated, for it was not certain that I would be received cordially. Even Sir Edward was a little worried. The main thing accomplished was that France has at least tentatively accepted you as mediator ; and that, I think, is much. . . . Gerard tells me, through Winslow, that he does not believe the Germans would hesitate a moment to go to war with us. On the other hand, Winslow says that when you sent them the note to Germany which was almost an ultimatum,’- he saw a distinct change for the better at the German Foreign Office the very next day. They had been insolent before, but were all right after- wards. They all seem to think that the Germans have literally gone crazy. I am not so sure of it myself. I can see gleams of sanity in much they are doing. I shall be exceedingly careful about cabling you or ^ A reference to Wilson^s note of February 10, warning the German Government that in case of the destruction of an American vessel or American lives it would be held to a “ stnct accountability/' THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 401 even writing from Berlin, for it is dangerous to the last degree. Winslow tells me that their system of espionage is something beyond belief and that one can never be sure that papers have not been tampered with. I find that the ruling class in France do not desire peace, but that a large part of the people and the men in the trenches would welcome it. This, I think, is also true of Germany. ... Affectionately yours E. M. House P.S. Gerard also sent word that he thought the Kaiser would be deposed in the event Germany was not successful in this contest. “ March 14, 1915 : Willard Straight called this morning. He is a great friend of Casenave^ and also of Margerie, and Margerie is a friend of Casenave and Delcasse, so the circle is fairly complete. I told Straight some things I wished told to Delcasse through Casenave and Margerie. This Straight promised to undertake. I wish Delcasse to know that in my opinion France is taking a big gamble in demanding peace terms that Germany wm never accept unless the Allies reach Berlin. I am sorry I am not on such terms with Delcasse to tell him these things myself, for I do not like using third parties. “ Straight is to convey the thought that it will be of advantage to the Allies to have the goodwill of the President, and that the best way to get it is through me. Another idea I wished conveyed was that the really essential thing and the big thing, was to strive for a permanent settlement and not for any small terri- torial advantage, which in itself would leave wounds which in time would lead to further trouble.” Colonel House to the President Dear Governor ; Paris, March 15, 1915 De Casenave came to see me to-day. He is at the head of the Press Bureau and his principal duties are ‘ In charge of the Press Bureau at the Foreign Office* I — 26 THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 402 to see that the French papers contain the proper kind of reading matter in regard to England, America, and other nations. . . . I asked him to be very frank and to tell me of French opinion. He said the French people at large thought that America had nothing in mind further than a dollar. He said a few Frenchmen had gone to America, had stayed there some weeks, not knowing the language, had visited such places as the pork packeries of Chicago, and had come away to write books concerning the avarice of our people. He said this had been done to such an extent that the opinion was fixed in France that we were guided entirely by mercenary motives. He said when he gave to the French papers directions as to what to say in regard to America, they smiled and shrugged their shoulders, . . . I am tr5dng to make a friend of de Margerie of the Foreign Office, He has lived in America, speaks English well, and is said to be almost as much of a force in the Foreign Office as Delcass^, besides being in Delcasse’s confidence. I have some mutual friends on this job and I will remain here long enough upon my return to try and clinch it. I shall attempt the same thing in Germany, probably using Zimmermann as a medium. If I can establish such relations, the situation can scarcely get away from us, . . . Affectionately yours E. M. House II AU his conversations in Paris merely confirmed the forebodings which House had experienced in England, The aspirations of the French for territorial annexations put out of court immediately the bases for peace which he had discussed with Grey. A message from Gerard indicated that the Germans were equally determined THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 403 upon wide annexations. " He was sure,” House noted after receiving the message, “ that they were not in a frame of mind to consider such peace terms as the Allies would think of offering. . . . The French not only want Alsace and Lorraine, but so much more that the two countries are not within sight of peace. If it is brought about, it will be through the sanity and justice of Sir Edward Grey and British opinion,” House might have given up his proposed trip to Germany then and there. But he saw the chance of placing German-American relations on a better footing, through personal conversations, and did not wish to lose the opportunity of indicating to the Germans some basis of future compromise with the British. He determined, however, that it would be worse than use- less to raise the question of immediate peace parleys in Berlin. Colonel House to Mr. Gordon Auchincloss Berlin, March 21, 1915 Dear Gordon : We left Paris at eight o’clock Wednesday morning. We went close to the firing line, somewhere between ten and twelve miles. Soldiers boarded the train as we passed through this territory and pulled down all shades and stationed themselves in the corridors so we could not look out. We were within hearing of the guns. The different Governments are always notified of our coming, before we reach the borders, and every facility has been extended to us. If this were not done, travelling would be practically impossible — that is, where we have gone. At Basle I had a conference with Minister Stovall from Berne and Consul-General Wilbur from Zurich, and at Frankfort with Consul-General Harrison. We arrived in Berlin yesterday morning in a snow- 404 THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS storm. Gerard met us and brought us to his house. I have had a conference with Zimmermann and he was exceedingly cordial and delightful. I have always liked him and I am glad we have resumed our friendly rela- tions. I cannot write you very fully, excepting to say that there is nothing that even looks like peace within sight. However, I am accomplishing many things that I have in mind and I hope I am doing some good. It looks as if there would have to be a decisive victory on one side or the other before parleys can begin. If I succeed in estabhshing cordial relations at the different belligerent capitals, I will have done all that I expected at this time. . . . Paternally yours E. M. House Colonel House to the President Berlin, March 20, 1915 Dear Governor : . . . We arrived in Berlin this morning and Gerard immediately arranged a private conference for me with Zimmermann. I let him read your letter, which im- pressed him favourably as it does everyone. I told him frankly what I had done in England, whom I had met there, in what way, and my conclusions. He was surprised to hear of the lack of bitterness in England towards Germany and was equally surprised when I told him that the difficulty was with France. They have evidently tried to cultivate good relations with both France and Russia, for the purpose of making separate terms with them. I think I convinced him that England did not desire Germany crushed and that, in the final analysis, terms would have to be agreed upon between these two countries. This is so patent that I wonder they do not recognize it. It is fortunate it is true, for the difierence between the two is not great and they could get together now if it were not for the fact that the people in both Germany and England have been THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS led to expect much more than is possible of reah^Jm. Neither Government can fulfil these expectation^?:^ they attempted to make peace upon a different basis from that which the people have been led to believe will ultimately come about, there is a possibility that the Governments would be overthrown. That is the real trouble now. Just how it can be overcome, is the question. I am trying to get everyone to soften down through the press and create a better feeling. Zimmermann tells me that the main thing Germany wants is a settlement which will guarantee permanent peace. It is the same cry in each of the belligerent states. I showed Zimmermann the different points where our interests and theirs touched, and expressed a desire that we work together to accomplish our purposes. I brought up the second convention [for organizing per- manent peace] in this connection, and he received it most cor^ally. I told him in particular that we as well as Germany desired that some guaranty should be had in the future as to the protection and uninterruption of our commerce, either as neutral or as belligerent. I told him that we recognized England had a perfect right to have a navy sufficient to prevent invasion, but further than that she should not go. He was exceedingly sympathetic with this thought, and I think it will have a tendency to put us on a good footing here. The Chancellor is out of town for a few days, but Zimmermann is to arrange a meeting as soon as he returns. He also suggested that the Emperor might want to see me. Gerard says this is impossible, that he has not seen him for months because of his intense feeling against us on account of our shipment of munitions of war to the Allies. It is not important now whether I see him or not, and I shall leave it to Zimmermann’s judgment. . . . I am somewhat at a loss as to what to do next, for it is plain at the moment that some serious reverse will 4o6 the freedom OF THE SEAS have to be encountered by one or other of the belligerents before any Government will dare propose parleys. I can foresee troublous times ahead, and it will be the wonder of the ages if all the Governments come out of it intact. The world has been strained as never before in its history, and something is sure to crack somewhere before a great while. It looks as if our best move just now is to wait until the fissure appears. Affectionately yours E. M. House Berlin, March 21, 1915 Dear Governor : I am gradually getting at the bottom of things here and, while I cannot write with perfect freedom, I can tell enough to give you a fair idea of it. I am seeing a great many people, just as I did in England, and I hope to have soon a composite picture that may be of value. I met last night an able and sane man by the name of Dr. Rathenau.^ I am told he is a great power in com- mercial Germany. He has such a clear vision of the situation and such a prophetic forecast as to the future that I wonder how many there are in Germany that think like him. It saddened me to hear him say that as far as he knew, he stood alone. He said he had begun to wonder whether aU the rest were really mad, or whether the madness lay within himself. . . . It was almost pathetic to hear him urge us not to cease in our efforts to bring about peace. He said it was the noblest mission that was ever given to man and that he would pray that we would not become discouraged. I hear this note struck in all countries. Mothers and wives, fathers and brothers, have spoken in the same * The dominating figure of tire early post-bellum German Republic. Foreign Secretary from January 31, 1922, to June 24, 1922 ; Germany’s representative at the Genoa Conference, 1922 ; assassinated_by reaction- aries, June 24. 1922, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 407 strain and have seemed to feel that the only hope lies in our endeavours. Affectionately yours E. M. House “ It is a sad commentary,” added House, “ that the Governments of each of the belligerents would probably welcome peace negotiations, and yet none of them are able safely to make a beginning,” For each Government, in order to evoke the belligerent enthusiasm necessary to a prosecution of the war, had created a Frankenstein which emphatically vetoed any whisper of peace. Zim- mermann stated, wrote House on March 24, “that if peace parleys were begun now upon any terms that would have any chance of acceptance, it would mean the overthrow of this Government and the Kaiser.” Colonel Rouse to the President Berlin, March 26, 1915 Dear Governor : While I feel I have accomplished much of value here, I leave sadly disappointed that we were misled into believing that peace parleys might be begun upon a basis of evacuation of France and Belgium. I have been cordially received and have added many new friendships to the old. I find the civil Government here as sensible and fair-minded as their counterparts in England, but they are for the moment impotent. It is a dangerous thing to inflame a people and give them an exaggerated idea of success. This is what has happened and is happening in almost every country that is at war. . . . If those that are in charge of the civil Government now hold their power when peace comes, there will be no doubt of their co-operation — ^provided, of course, our relations grow no worse, and without actual war they could not be worse. This is almost wholly due to our selling munitions of war to the Allies. The bitterness of their resentment 4o8 the freedom OF THE SEAS towards us for this is almost beyond belief. It seems that every German that is being killed or wounded is being killed or wounded by an American rifle, bullet, or shell. I never dreamed before of the extraordinary excellence of our guns and ammunition. They are the only ones that explode or are so manufactured that their results are deadly. I have pointed out the danger of such agitation against us and have tried to show how much it would lessen our influence in helping Germany when our help is needed. I have indicated where our interests touched at various points and how valuable it would be to both nations to work in harmony rather than at cross- purposes. . . . There is a general insistence here, as elsewhere, that when a settlement is made it must be an enduring one ; but ideas as to how this may be brought about are as divergent as the poles. . . . Gerard has been exceedingly helpful here. He has not interfered in the slightest and has insisted upon my seeing the different Cabinet Ministers and influential Germans alone. He is very courageous, and is different from some of our representatives, inasmuch as his point of view is wholly American. Affectionately yours E. M. House As in London, House made a point of meeting varied types, although he sought out especially those who repre- sented the moderate point of view. He had long talks with Rathenau and von Gwinner,^ with Solf , the Minister for the Colonies who later played a major role in the final armistice negotiations, with Helfferich — “ a young man,” House noted, “ who is considered one of the rising powers in Germany ” — with the Foreign Minister, von Jagow, and with the Chancellor. ^ Banker, and promoter of the Bagdad Railway. THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 409 III Apart from his desire to obtain information and create an atmosphere friendly to the United States, House wished to try out on the Germans the plan which he believed might serve as the basis for a future com- promise between Germany and Great Britain. It was the plan which came to be called the " Freedom of the Seas.” The problem presented itself in the following aspects to Colonel House. Existing maritime regulations per- mitted the capture of private property of neutrals on the high seas, if it came within the category of contraband, and it was inevitable under conditions of modern warfare that the definition of contraband should be progressively extended to include practically all materials and articles of industrial life. In any war between Great Britain and a Continental Power, the first thought of the British was naturally to use their control of the sea so as to interrupt the direct and indirect imports of the Con- tinental enemy. A quarrel between Great Britain and the United States, the largest exporting neutral, must necessarily follow, for British restrictions meant the destruction of American trade. The events of 1914 and 1915, as well as those that led to the War of 1812, offered a practical example of this ever-recurring factor of discord, the sole factor that seriously threatened the cordial relations of the two countries. Apart from the peril of complications with America, there were other elements in the situation which did not seem to favour Great Britain. The British, living on an island, dependent for their lives upon trade with the outside world and especially with their colonies, were in a position of real danger that was not clearly recognized. 410 THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS They had believed that so long as their fleet remained supreme, they were perfectly safe. But the introduction of the submarine raised the question whether Great Britain’s ocean-going trade, carried as it was by British ships, could not be destroyed and the nation be deprived of the foodstuffs and raw materials which entered her ports, even though her surface fleet remained intact. Such a threat to the security of national life became very lively in 1917. Germany was dependent, although not to the same degree, upon overseas trade. In their struggle with England, the Germans counted upon the neutral ports of Holland, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. But the British, in control of the sea, could confiscate or seriously harass trade bound for these ports, and thus threaten the starvation of Germany. So much the Germans them- selves, in their protests against the British food blockade, admitted. What House proposed was that the contraband list should be restricted so as to include only actual imple- ments of warfare ; everything else should be placed upon the free list. The trade of merchant vessels, whether belligerent or neutral, should be allowed to proceed freely outside territorial waters so long as they carried no contraband. They might even enter any belligerent port without hindrance, unless that port were actually and effectively blockaded by the enemy’s fleet. Such a blockade in the case of England would be practically impossible, because of the multitude of available harbours and the strength of the British fleet. An effective block- ade was equally impossible in the case of Germany, as the events of the war demonstrated. For what, then, could a fleet be used, one will ask. Simply for purposes of defence, Colonel House replied ; to THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 411 prevent the landing of a hostile military force and to keep essential ports open. The proposal was less revolutionary than many thought, and it had behind it the force of both British and American traditions. Sir Edward Grey had in- structed the British delegation to the Second Hague Conference in 1907 to work for a restriction of the contra- band list, and it was at his inspiration that the delegation carried the idea to its logical limit and expressed a willingness to abandon the principle of contraband of war entirely .1 In their talks with House in February, Grey and Tyrrell had approved also the principle of the immunity of belligerent merchant shipping in time of war; in fact, it was that approval which lay at the bottom of House's present suggestion. What is equally striking is that in 1907 Elihu Root, then Secretary of State, in his instructions to the United States delegates to the Hague Conference, advocated almost precisely what House now suggested, the exemp- tion from capture of belligerent private property, although he said nothing about the restriction of contraband. “ The private property of all private citizens or subjects of signatory Powers [so ran his instructions], with the exception of contraband of war, shall be exempt from capture or seizure on the high seas or elsewhere by the armed vessels or by the military forces of any of the said signatory Powers, but nothing herein contained shall extend exemption from seizure of vessels or their cargoes which may attempt to enter a port blockaded by the naval forces of any of the said Powers.” ^ The foHowkg declaration was made on the part of Great Britain : ” In order to diminish the difficulties encountered by neutral commerce in time of war the Government of is prepared to abandon the principle of contraband in case of war between the Powers which may sign a conven-* tion to that effect. The right of visit would be exercised only in order to ascertain the neutral character of the merchantmen/' 412 THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS This was in entire consonance with the Final Act of the First Hague Conference, which gave preference to “ inviolability of private property in naval warfare.” It was only the use of the term ” Freedom of the Seas ” as applied to this suggestion which was new ; and this, it appears, was originated by Colonel House. Grotius in 1609 used the term mare liberum, and the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries became accustomed to such slogans as ” a free sea or war,” ^ " free ships, free goods,” “ free flag, free goods.” The phrase ” free- dom of the seas ” was itself used in 1798 by the French Revolutionary leader, Barere, in his famous summary of French foreign policy : ” Freedom of the seas, peace to the world, equal rights to all nations.” But it remained for Colonel House to utilize the phrase as applicable to what Choate had called, in 1907, “ immunity of private property at sea,” and to include the proposal of a rigid restriction of contraband of war. House’s plan for the Freedom of the Seas was thus based upon the approval of both British and American authorities. It carried with it immediate and ultimate advantages which in the case of the United States would eliminate practically all factors of complication with European belligerents. If contraband were restricted, the trade of the United States might proceed with almost as much freedom in time of war as in that of peace. The advantages to the world at large were still more obvious, since the role of a navy would become chiefly defensive and naval disarmament might proceed apace. Germany would undoubtedly gain much by the Freedom of the Seas. An enemy possessing a strong fleet, like Great Britain, would still be free to blockade German ports if it could reach them, but could not cut of! ^ In England, on the eye of the War of Jenkins' Ear. 4^3 THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS the foodstuffs and raw materials which the Germans received through neutral ports and contiguous countries. Great Britain would thus lose an offensive weapon, of doubtful legality. But as compensation, how greatly British defensive strength would be enhanced ! 1 he disadvantages of her island position would largely dis- appear, her food supply would be secure, and her com- merce with the farflung portions of the Empire would be assured without the protection of a costly fleet. Submarines would not be able to prey upon merchant shipping. Under the principle of the Freedom of the Seas, the Power with the most colonies and the widest overseas trade stood to gain most. So much was plain to Colonel House, although he was careful not to whisper in Berlin that he believed the British would win the lion's share of advantage. To him the great irony of the war was that his proposal was so eagerly swallowed by the Germans, so scornfully refused by British opinion. The weak point in House’s plan lay in the danger that an unscrupulous nation, after accepting its principle, would proceed to disregard its engagements. The British could not escape the fear that Germany, which had broken its promises in the Belgian treaty, was quite capable of agreeing to the Freedom of the Seas and after securing the partial disarmament of Great Britain thereby, might embark upon a wholesale destruction of British merchant shipping. To meet this danger. House was insistent upon an association of nations bound to unite forcibly against any nation that violated its inter- national promises. The Colonel believed that the acceptance of the Freedom of the Seas, as a principle of international law, was essential to stability of relations between the United 4i6 the freedom OF THE SEAS prejudice against the idea, which ultimately became invincible. IV In the meantime House had left Germany, passing back to Paris through Nice and Biarritz, where he engaged in conferences with the American Ambassadors to Italy and to Spain. “ Afvil 2, 1915 [Nice] : Page^ and I have continued our talks. He has given the Italian situation in detail, going into the intricacies of Italian politics, especially as to the rivalry between the present Premier, Salandra, and the late Premier, Giolitti. Page thinks Italy is acting in a wholly selfish way and that it matters little with her whether she supports the Allies or the Dual Alliance, provided she is on the winning side. The aristocracy are favourable to Germany and the people to the Entente. Nowhere throughout Italy is the feeling against Germany anything like as bitter as it is against their old-time enemy, Austria. Page does not believe Italy would last long in the conflict, and that if she had entered at the beginning of the war she would probably have been easily defeated and disarmed. He believes she will finally enter the war on the side of the AUies when she can see the end of the struggle within a few months. He thinks England has made something of a mistake in not giving her some assurance as to her aspirations for new territory, or, we might say, old territory which she seeks to recover. This would include a portion of Austria, around what the Italians term the Gulf of Venice, the twelve islands which she has long coveted, and a sphere of influence in Asia Minor. . . } ^ Thomas Nelson Page, ^ At that moment, negotiations were being carried on which ended with the Treaty of London, a guaranty by the Entente that Italy should receive the territories she claimed. THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 417 “ April 1915 [Biarritz] : Ambassador Willard came from Madrid to-day, arriving at 2.30. ... He says the King dominates Spain and at heart he is an advanced Liberal. He is well informed and is altogether an intelli- gent and up-to-date ruler. His Ministers are not nearly so progressive, and hold him back to a considerable degree. “ The King desires to figure in peace overtures, but is willing to ^ow the President to take the lead and will co-operate with him in a secondary capacity. I told Willard I did not see how he could figure in it jointly, since it would have to be done by one or the other and, unless the situation changed, it would doubtless be the President. However, the situation could change to the disadvantage of the President, for, if all the bel^gerents become dissatisfied and embittered with our neutral policy, they might conceive the idea that anyone would be preferable to the President as a mediator. I explained to Willard that I was appealing to the self-interests of both sides, and that in itself would probably induce them to accept Wilson. “ Willard said the King was pro-French, but not especially pro-British ; that he was anti-German, but pro-Austrian. His reason for not being strongly pro- British, even though his wife is English, is because he feels that he has not been very courteously treated by the British upon his several visits to England. Then, too, there is always Gibraltar to sting Spanish pride. ...” Colonel House to the President Dear Governor ; Paris, April n , 1915 This is the first time I have had an opportunity to write you freely since I left here. My visit in Berlin was exceedingly tr5dng and disagreeable in many ways. I met there no one of either high or low degree who did not immediately comer me, and begin to discuss our shipment of munitions to the Allies, and sometimes their manner was almost offensive. Upon the streets one hesitated to speak in English, for fear of being insulted. I ^7 • • • 4i8 the freedom OF THE SEAS I feel, however, that with the Government and with the influential people with whom I talked, a better understanding of our purposes was brought about ; and I hope this feeling will sooner or later reach the people at large. ... The trouble with Germany is that it is antiquated in some of its ideas. They started upon the rule of force at a time when the most advanced nations were going in the opposite direction. I endeavoured to make it clear to the German Government that their best interests could be served by working along harmoniously with us. If we can keep this view before them, they will probably want you as mediator, for they are narrowly selfish in their purposes and have no broad outlook as to the general good of mankind. I found a lack of harmony in governmental circles which augurs ill for the future. The civil Government are divided amongst themselves. . . . The military and civil forces are not working in harmony. The Emperor is still in absolute authority, although he is criticized pretty generally by both the civil and military branches of the Government. Falkenhayn and von Tirpitz seem to have more influence with him than anyone, but Falkenhayn is not popular with the army in general. The Crown Prince seems to be left out of all important councils and is generally ignored by both the civil and military Governments, though he seems to be more popular with the people than his father because he is said to be without egotism and more democratic in his manner. Hindenburg is the popular hero and is the only one that dares to assert himself against the Emperor. I believe there are troublous times ahead for the Kaiser and that one dinouement of the war may be a more democratic Germany. . . Affectionately yours E. M. House THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 419 At Paris Colonel House did not raise the question of peace, for there was less chance of it than ever. In the East, the Germans were driving the Russians out of Poland. In the West, the French were planning a great drive in the Champagne regions. The British were developing the attack upon the Dardanelles. Italy was on the point of joining the Allies. Both sides were trying to win over Bulgaria. Everyone hoped for victory. House confined himself to securing information and solidif3dng his personal relationships, especially with Delcass^ and PoincarA House met Poincar^ for the first time on this occasion. An American diplomat warned him not to be disappointed by the coldness of manner characteristic of the French President. “ I replied,” wrote House, “ that his coldness and silence would not embarrass me if it did not embarrass him, and I could be as quiet, and for as long, as anybody.” Colonel House to the President [Telegram] Paris, April 13, 1915 In a private conference with Delcass^, he was good enough to express his satisfaction at the way negotiations have been carried on up to now. He said that I had given Berlin a correct idea of France's attitude and he approved what I had said and done there. . . . He wished me to convey to you the appreciation of France for the fairness with which you have maintained our relations with the belligerents. I shall see Poincard before I leave. E. M. House Colonel House to the President Dear Governor : Paris. Apni 17, 1915 I have just cabled you of my interview with Poincare. I had been told that he was austere in his manner and 420 THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS I was quite unprepared for the warmth with which he welcomed me. He seemed to understand my relation to you and he expressed his appreciation of your having sent me to France. When I wrote the cable to you on Thursday, I made a request that you send some message that could be repeated to him and to Delcass6. I afterwards struck this out, for fear lest it might give you too much trouble. When I received your cablegram yesterday, sending messages to them both, it seemed like a case of telepathy. Poincare was visibly pleased. I have not seen Delcass6 since, but will do so in a day or two in order to discuss with him the second convention. There is nothing you could do that would promote better feeling than occasionally to send some word that I may repeat to those in authority in the country in which I happen to be. We are all susceptible to these little attentions. I find your purposes badly misunderstood in France. They believe the American public largely sympathetic to the Allies ; but there is a feeling, which I am sorry to say is almost universal throughout France, that you personally are pro-German. It is the most illogical conclusion that one could imagine, and I can scarcely keep within the bounds of politeness when I discuss it. . . . Affectionately yours E. M. House Colonel Bouse to Secretary Bryan Paris, April 15, 1915 Dear Mr. Bryan : . . . Everybody seems to want peace, but nobody is willing to concede enough to get it. They all also say that they desire a permanent settlement so that no such disaster may occur hereafter, but, again, there is such a divergence of ideas as to how this should be brought about that for the moment it is impossible to harmonize the differences. THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 421 Germany is not willing to evacuate Belgium at all, nor even France, without an indemnity, and Count von Bemstorff’s suggestion that this could be arranged was wide afield. The Allies, of course, will not consent to anything less ; and there the situation rests. With warm regards and good wishes for Mrs. Bryan and you, I am Faithfully yours E. M. House “ Aj>nl 16, 1915 : I can see from my interviews [wrote House], not only with Delcasse and Poincare but with others, that I would have made a mistake if I had attempted to talk peace at this time. France as a whole has an idea that the President is not altogether in sympathy with the Allies and that he is inclined to be pro-German, and that it is for that reason he has tried to push peace measures and in order to save Germany’s face. It is very discouraging to have to talk to intelli- gent people and argue with them about such a matter, but that is what I have to do. “ Another impression they have here is that the President is catering to the pro-German vote. I explain to them that a man of the President’s intelligence would hardly cater to fifteen per cent, of the American vote in order to lose eighty-five per cent, of it. This they had never thought of. In fact, it seems to me they do not think much at all. “ The ignorance of Europe concerning itself, to say nothing of America, is appalling. “ France, to-day, does not understand England, her purposes, or her forces in the war. They have an idea that they, themselves, are doing it all and that England is idling. Only a few Frenchmen who have been in England understand the momentum gathering force there, and the indomitable energy and tenacity which in the end will probably turn the scales in favour of the Allies.” 422 THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS Colonel House to President S. E. Mezes Paris, Afnl i8, 1915 Dear Sidney : ... We lead a busy and interesting life and do not get time to thoroughly enjoy the bombs that drop be- fore and after us. We just missed them in Paris and also missed them as they were dropped on the stations and railway sheds along our journey. Now that the weather is milder, we have a better sporting chance, as all the belligerents promise that an acceleration of their activities in this direction will soon commence, Martin is evidently looking forward with interest to a bomb catching me somewhere on the Allies’ territory — ^as he believes that would bring about war with Ger- many, which he considers would be worth dying for. On the other hand, the St. Louis Globe-Democrat writing editorially hopes I may be spared, for the reason that, desirable as my taking off would be, the price of a war with Germany would be too great to pay. . . . Fratem^y yours E. M. House “ April 19, 1915 ; Last night Ambassador and Mrs. Sharp gave a dinner. The guests besides ourselves were, the Infanta Eulalia of Spain, the Spanish Ambassador and his wife, Ambassador Willard, Robert Bliss, Mrs. Crosby, and Mr. and Mrs. Tuck. I sat by the Infanta and inunediately caught her attention by complimenting her recent article in an American magazine, on the Kaiser. I thought she had written charmingly of him, and anyone who knew him would recognize how truth- ful it was. She said she was fond of the Kaiser, and had tried to make the French people understand that he was not the ogre they imagined. We had a spirited talk about the war and its outcome. She knew the situa- tion in Italy thoroughly and of the dangerous position in which the ICing was. She also knew that the King and aristocracy were for Germany, but the people were in favour of the Allies. . . . THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 423 “ She spoke of the petty jealousies and differences among Royalty, and laughingly said that when the family silver spoons were to be divided, it was always a question as to who should have this spoon and who should have the other. In talking of the Kaiser, I thought he had not surrounded himself with an efficient Cabinet. She said that was one of his faults, for he wanted to do everything himself and did not desire any dominant figure on the boards excepting himself ; consequently he had been badly served.” Colonel House to the President Paris, Afnl 20, 1915 Dear Governor : . . . The Spanish Ambassador told me that the King of Spain wished him to meet me and ask me to come to Madrid. He confirmed what Willard had said, and that is, the King would like to take some part in peace negotiations and is willing to follow your lead. I told the Ambassador that you did not desire me, at the moment, to visit the neutral countries and that I was confining myself to the belligerents, and that we were not making any peace overtures, but were simply studying conditions. I told him, however, that after visiting Russia I might go to San Sebastian and meet the King. This makes it indefinite and many things may happen to prevent my going. . . . Evidence still comes to me each day of the misunder- standing which the French people at large have of our position. They are very much afraid that peace will be made overnight and that the Germans will not receive the punishment for their misdeeds which they feel they so richly deserve. In the course of the next two or three months, the conviction will break in upon them that the wonderful things they expect the army to do, have not happened ; and they will then become more reasonable in their attitude. 424 THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS I notice that Dernburg has taken the cue from Berlin and is saying that Belgium must be retained unless the “ Freedom of the Seas ” is established. Yesterday I noticed that a prominent Hamburger said the same thing, and it looks as if the German Government had accepted my suggestion that this was the best way to save their faces before the people. I took lunch to-day with Joseph Reinach. He is a German-French Jew whose people have lived in France some sixty years. He is said to be thoroughly patriotic and is a man of influence. He writes for the Figaro, and I outlined some things I thought it would be well for him to incorporate in his next article. I drew his attention to the fact that it was more to France’s interest to have the United States come in at the final settlement and exercise its moral influence than it was to ours. I also made him the same talk I have made to others concerning you and your purposes. . . . Reinach gets German papers from friends in Switzer- land, and he said he saw a great change within the last two weeks in their attitude towards England. I am wondering whether what I said to them in Berlin has begun to bear fruit and they see the wisdom of modifying their hate campaign in that direction. Your affectionate E. M. House House left Paris for London on April 28. His visit to France had been without result so far as hastening the chance of peace was concerned, but he had solidified the personal relations which were later to be of immense diplomatic value. In England he at once renewed his intimacy with British friends and created new contacts of interest and importance. “ May 5, 1915 : I lunched with Lord Northcliffe. The only other guest was L. J. Maxse, of the National Review. “ Northcliffe spoke freely about the war and criticized THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 425 the Government without stint. He thought Kitchener too old for the job and that he did not understand the sort of warfare he was now engaged in. He did not think the British appreciated the magnitude of the task before them, or that they were meeting the situation with anything like the determination and ability the occasion required. Neither Northcliffe nor Maxse thought there was a big man connected with either the Government or army. He told of the number of men they had in France at this time and the number in every place. It was most indiscreet to teU these facts, if, indeed, they are facts. I do not wonder the Germans get so much information, for I hear the most profound secrets of the army and navy repeated in a way that makes me shiver. . . . ‘ “ May 6, 1915 : I dined with General Sir Arthur and Lady Paget. The others present were Mrs. McGuire, daughter of the late Lord Peel, Lady Fingall, Arthur Balfour, and Sir Horace Plunkett. “ During dinner the conversation drifted upon the subject of whether Great Britain was doing her full duty, and was performing as important a part in the war as her resources and position demanded. I allowed the talk to run along for a few minutes, and then I broke in by sajdng that of all the belligerents Great Britain had performed her part best. Germany was considered the dominant military nation of the world, and Great Britain the dominant naval power. Germany had failed to maintain her dominance on land, while Great Brita.in had asserted her supremacy at sea and was the undis- puted master of it within a week after hostilities began. In addition to this, she had raised an enormous army, something it was thought would not be required of her, and she was the only belligerent with a world-wide vision of the war and its consequences — differing from France, Germany, and even Russia, who looked upon it ^ Mr. L. J. Maxse. No reflection of any kind upon the honour and patriotism of Mr. L. J. Maxse is intended by the words appearing on this page. 426 THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS from local points of view and as to its effects upon them. “ When Great Britain entered the war, every neutral country felt that Germany was doomed to defeat, and I was sure Germany herself had the fear of God in her heart. I was interrupted from time to time by the English ' hear, hear,’ and when I had finished Balfour said, ‘ That is the most eloquent speech I have ever heard.’ This, of course, was polite. . . . ” When the ladies left the table. Sir Arthur told us of his recent visit to Russia, Bulgaria, Rumania, Serbia, and Greece, from which countries he has just returned. He was with the Grand Duke for ten days, and he gave a better idea of his ability and character than I have yet had. He spoke glowingly of the Russian army, and regretfully of Russian corruption which prevented the Grand Duke from equipping his army properly. He said the Grand Duke was displeased at the manner of Joffre’s insistence that he change his plan of campaign and attack Prussia, at a time when the Grand Duke thought he should merely fortify himself against the Prussians and direct his entire energies against Austria. This change of policy he claims has caused Russia to lose innumerable men and treasure. “ May 7, 1915 : I went to Sir Edward Grey’s at ten o’clock. I handed him the King’s invitation to call at 11.30. . . . I decided, however, to go with Grey to Kew and get a glimpse of it. Before we started, I showed him some telegrams and letters — one from Ambassador Willard bearing on the Spanish situation, one from Thomas Nelson Page on the Italian situation, and, most important of all, the President’s cable concerning the retention of American cargoes. . . . " The gates of Kew Gardens were not open when we arrived, but we got through by the porter’s lodge. I have never seen the gardens so beautiful ; it is to me one of the superlatively beautiful spots in England. Grey showed me the different trees and told something of them. The blackbirds were singing, and we talked of how different they were to those in far-away Texas. THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 427 “ Grey’s eyesight is failing, the doctors having warned him that unless he stops reading he will lose his sight to the extent of not being able to read again. He said he supposed this was the sacrifice he had to make for his country and he was going on in that spirit, know- ing well what lay before him.” V In the meantime House had taken up again with Sir Edward the question of the Freedom of the Seas, concerning which the two had corresponded while House was still in Paris, and which, as House wrote Wilson, he hoped to use as a means of starting negotiations between the belligerents. Grey was suspicious of the Germans, perhaps not without justification, and he wished to make sure that if England accepted the Freedom of the Seas, Germany would agree to general military disarma- ment. Colonel House to Sir Edward Grey Paris, April 12, 1915 Dear Sir Edward : ... I did not find conditions in Berlin favourable for any discussion looking towards peace ; consequently I did not remain long or say much. The visit, however, had great value and I feel that I now know the true conditions there, making a more intelligent line of action possible. I found but few points where our interest and theirs touched strongly enough for me to create a sympathetic feeling, but one of these was what we might term the Freedom of the Seas. It was upon that subject alone that I awoke sufficient enthusiasm to warrant the hope that in it lies the way to peace. Looking at the matter from a narrowly selfish stand- point, they could not believe that England would concede enough in this direction for Germany to consent to those THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS igs without which no peace can ever be possible. But mi my conversations with you, I knew that you saw a are more secure and splendid for England in this new iction than in the old. I gave no si^ of this, but left m thinking what concessions they might make in order reach so promising an end. While I am eager to discuss this and other matters h you, still I feel that it is well to move leisurely and issume a certain indifference as to time. . . . Your very sincere E. M. House Colonel House to the President Paris, April 12, 1915 AR Governor : . . . What I want to do, is to get Sir Edvrard’s isent to what might be termed a paper campaign. If agrees to this I wiU write to him, even though in idon, and have him reply. Copies of this correspon- ice will be sent either to the German Chancellor direct, to him and Zimmermann through Gerard. This will necessitate replies, and we may have them dng to one another before they realize it. . . . Your a&ctionate E. M. House Sir Edward Grey to Colonel Home AR Colonel House : 33 Eccleston Square, Londois, April 24, 1915 . . . Your news from Berlin is not encouraging ; it luces Bemstorff’s peace talk at Washington to ^udge.” What you hear from Berlin and found there is con- ned to me from another source — ^neutral but not lerican. As to “ freedom of the seas,” if Germany means that r commerce is to go'free^upon the sea in time of war, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 429 while she remains free to make war upon other nations at will, it is not a fair proposition. If, on the other hand, Germany would enter after this war some League of Nations where she would give and accept the same security that other nations gave and accepted against war breaking out between them, their expenditures on armament might be reduced and new rules to secure “ freedom of the seas ” made. The sea is free in times of peace anyhow.^ Yours sincerely E. Grey Colonel Home to the President Dear Governor : London, April 30, 1915 I arrived here Wednesday night, I have already had two conferences with Sir Edward Grey, and I am to have the first formal one with him, by appointment through Page, this afternoon at five o’clock. Of course no one is to know but you of the other two conferences. I have outlined to him the full plan of the Freedom of the Seas and how best it can be brought to Berlin’s attention and what concessions they must give in return. I shaU not let them know how receptive he is to the idea, but shall try to impress upon them how hard we are working to accomplish the desired end and give them little driblets of hope from time to time. The thing thus is held within our hands. Sir Edward tells me that public opinion here wiU have to be educated in this direction, particularly the Conser-, vatives, and I shall endeavour to do this. . . . We will have to keep this prpgramme absolutely confidential between yourself, Sir Edward, and myself ; and even the men I shall discuss these things with, will not know our full purposes. . . . ^ A curious irrelevancy, in view of the fact that war-time trade was the subject under discussion. Perhaps Grey had in mind an argument^ which Wilson later accepted, that with a league of nations to prevent war the question of war-time trade became academic* 430 THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS I told Sir Edward I felt sure that the Berlin Govern- ment wanted peace and that they were deterred mainly by German puUic opinion, which will have to be educated to the making of concessions. . . . Your affectionate E. M. House Even as early as this, the historian will observe, House had begun to make plans for the Peace Conference, for he believed in being prepared. A note which he made after this conversation with Grey throws light on what the Colonel wanted to have accomplished by the Paris Conference in 1918 and 1919. “ A-pril 30, 1915 ; I told Grey . . . how I planned to organize this convention by getting the material that was to come before it thoroughly prepared and digested, in order that nothing should be left to chance. I would try to get the commissioners from each of the neutral states, and from as many of the belligerent states as possible, in accord with us before they came to the convention. “ I explained my methods of organization in political conventions in the past ; that while they were seemingly spontaneous, as a matter of fact nothing was left to chance. While measures were apparently drawn by different delegations, in the end it was found they fitted into the platform like a mosaic.^ I could see Grey was intensely interested in this programme. I showed why no opposition could withstand such thorough organization. , . . We would be actuated by unselfish motives and ^ The illness which laid Colonel House low just before the meeting of the Paris Peace Conference prevented him from carrying through the organization he planned. Henry Wickham Steed, foreign editor of The TimeSi says in this connexion : ** One serious misfortune — which proved to be a disaster — befell the Conference through the illness of Colonel House. A severe attack of influenza incapacitated Mm for any work during this critical formative period. Consequently his guiding influence was absent when it was most sorely needed ; and, before he could resume his activities, things had gone too far for Mm to mend /' — Through Thrty Years, ii, 266. THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 431 would not propose anything that was merely to the advantage of Great Britain or the United States, but would advocate only such things as would redound to the good of the entire world. If we held to this principle, with thorough preparation and organization we would be able to do great and lasting good — ^good which would be limited only by the extent of our ability to conceive and execute it. “ In order to get the proper material and to prepare for an intelligent discussion of the questions which might come before the peace conference, I desired to see some of the best minds in England as to particular subjects. I mentioned Lord Lorebum as being one with whom to advise on Admiralty questions. Grey approved Lore- bum, but suggested, in addition. Lord Mersey, and said Balfour could also be of service. “ Grey makes the point clear that whatever guaranty of good faith the Allies would wish from Germany, Germany would receive a like guaranty from the Allies. His mind and mine run nearly parallel, and we seldom disagree. I know in advance, just as I know with the President, what his views will be on almost any subject. I often come in contact with very able men whose minds run in an opposite direction from mine, and I find it dif&cult to agree with them upon any question. It is therefore my good fortune that Fate has given me two such friends as Woodrow Wilson and Edward Grey. “ Grey came to Page’s at five. I took the precaution to remain downstairs in order to meet him when he first came in and to walk up to the drawing-room with him. In this way there was no embarrassment nor any pretence of not having met before. “ He stayed for a half-hour and the conversation was unimportant, as we had covered most of it before. I merely filled in the gaps by telling something further of my recent travels. I told Page that one of the General Staff in Berlin had said that Sir Edward’s ambition was to be a George Washington, a Lincoln, a Bismarck, and a Napoleon. Page thought this very amusing, but Sir 432 THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS Edward . . . took it seriously and argued upon the peculiar bent of the German mind that could com- pare Washington and Lincoln with Bismarck and Napoleon.” Colonel House to the President London, May 3, 1915 Dear Governor : ... I saw Lord Lorebum this morning. He is not only a man that can be thoroughly trusted, but I believe he is my friend. He told me that he thought if we could bring about the Freedom of the Seas, it would be the greatest act of statesmanship that had been accomplished in centuries. He thought it would be of 100 per cent, value to other nations and 120 per cent, to England, though we would have great difficulty in getting the English mind to see this. He spoke of Balfour as having great ability, but thought his mind was too feminine to grasp the signifi- cance of such a measure. He advised, just as Sir Edward did, that I see Bonar Law, who he said had an inferior mind, but who was practical and could probably be convinced sooner on that account. He said if we could incorporate this idea into the peace convention, it would not only be a great act of statesman- ship, but it would be perhaps the greatest jest that was ever perpetrated upon an unsuspecting nation — shaving, of course, Germany in mind. I told him I shivered in Berlin when I proposed it to the Chancellor and the Foreign Office, for fear they would see that it was more to England’s advantage than their own and would therefore not be willing to make con- cessions because of it. . . . Lord Loreburn is one of the warmest admirers you have in Great Britain, which is naturally a great bond of sympathy between us. Your affectionate E. M. House 433 THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS Colonel House to Herr Zimmermann London, May i, 1915 My dear Herr Zimmermann : Since I saw you in Berlin, I have been to Switzerland and France and came here a day or two ago. I have carried out my plans as expressed to the Chancellor and you and have seen many of our representatives at the different European capitals, who came by appointment to meet me, and I have discussed with them the questions I had in mind. I have seen Sir Edward Grey and have mentioned to him the interest which the United States and Germany had in the Freedom of the Seas, and I am pleased to tell you that he was at least willing to listen to the suggestion. He explained to me, however, that if he himself could be brought to the idea, it would only be upon an agree- ment that would guarantee the making of aggressive warfare on land as impossible as it was intended to make it upon the sea. In other words, if the commerce of the world, even in time of war and even between belligerents, was to go free and to have access to its own ports and to neutral ports without molestation, the land should be as free of menace as the sea. He did not undertake to commit himself to the suggestion, and he particularly wanted me to know that he was speaking for himself and not for the Government or for the people. He has promised to discuss the matter with his colleagues, and I shall undertake to get some estimate of the general sentiment in regard to such a proposal. Of course, you understand that the conversation was predicated upon the evacuation of Belgium and France and upon the consent of all the Allies. If the belligerents really desire to make an honourable peace that will be of far-reaching good, not only to them- selves but to the entire world, I think the opportunity will soon be here. If you will give me some assurance that you consider these questions at least debatable, it will go a long way 434 the freedom OF THE SEAS to aid us in our endeavours. I shall understand that no commitments are made, either directly or indirectly, and that everything is unofficial ; but this seems to me to be the most promising starting-point. It will take a long while to make a successful campaign in England in regard to the Freedom of the Seas ; but we will undertake it with both pleasure and enthusiasm, provided our efforts are cordially seconded by the other nations at interest. Please present my very warm regards to their Excel- lencies, the Chancellor and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and believe me, my dear Herr Zim- mermann, Very sincerely yours E. M. House VI The chief difficulty that obstructed the development of House's plan was obviously the inability of the British to comprehend the advantages they would derive from the Freedom of the Seas. This lack of comprehension rested in part upon a false sense of security and a failure to realize the extent of the danger threatened by the German submarine. It was also based upon a natural emotion, aroused by the war, which compelled the average citizen to believe that anything acceptable to Germany must ipso facto be inacceptable to Great Britain. Any intensification of the bitter feeling between the two countries would inevitably spell failure for House’s hopes. Precisely at this moment, the German navy committed the outrage upon humanity which a modem Talleyrand must certainly have pronounced " worse than a crime, a blunder,” and which immediately rendered hopeless any attempt to reconcile the belligerents. It was not entirely unforeseen by House, who on THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 435 May 5 received a cable from Wilson asking him for advice in view of the attack upon an American oil-boat.* House warned him that the German threat of using submarines recklessly might have to be taken at its face value. Colonel House to the President [Telegram] London, May 5, 1915 I believe that a sharp note indicating your deter- mination to demand full reparation, would be suf6cient in this instance. I am afraid a more serious breach may at any time occur, for they seem to have no regard for consequences. Edward House On the morning of May 7, House and Grey drove out to Kew. “ We spoke of the probability of an ocean liner being sunk,” recorded House, “ and I told him if this were done, a flame of indignation would sweep across America, which would in itself probably carry us into the war.” An hour later. House was with King George in Buckingham Palace. " We fell to talking, strangely enough,” the Colonel wrote that night, “of the prob- ability of Germany sinking a trans-Atlantic liner. . . . He said, ‘ Suppose they should sink the Lusitania with American passengers on board. . . .’ ” That evening House dined at the American Embassy. A despatch came in, stating that at two in the afternoon a German submarine had torpedoed and sunk the Lusitania off the southern coast of Ireland. Many lives had been lost. Thus did Germany interpret the Freedom of the Seas. 1 The Gulflight, torpedoed by a German submarine on May i, but not sunk. The master died of heart failure the next morning, and two sailors were drowned. CHAPTER XIV SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE I think we shall find ourselves drifting into war with Germany. , . . House to Wilson, June i6, 1915 I ^ I HE sinking of the Lusitania destroyed all hope of I beginning negotiations with Germany and Great Britain. It was now, rather, a question as to whether the United States itself could remain out of the war. Ambassador Page regarded immediate inter- vention as inevitable, and cabled Wilson to that effect. " Page strongly urges the President,” House recorded, ” to bring us into the struggle upon the side of the Allies, stating that he does not believe we can retain the good opinion of anyone if we fail to do so.” Colonel House himself believed that the United States could not long stand aside, in view of Germany’s reckless course. “ It seems clear to me,” he wrote on May 9, “ that the Lusitania is merely the first incident of the kind and that more will follow, and that Germany will not give any assurance she will discontinue her policy of sinking passenger-ships filled with Americans and non- combatants.” That the United States must receive such an assurance or enter the war to enforce it, he believed then and always. On May 9 he sent the Presi- dent a carefully pondered cable. It is historic, for Mr. Wilson read it to his Cabinet at the same time that he read them his note of protest to Germany. SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE 437 Colonel House to the President [Telegram] London, May % 1915 It is now certain that a large number of American lives were lost when the Lusitania was sunk. I believe an immediate demand should be made upon Germany for assurance that this shall not occur again. If she fails to give such assurance, I should inform her that our Government expected to take such measures as were necessary to ensure the safety of American citizens. If war follows, it will not be a new war, but an en- deavour to end more speedily an old one. Our inter- vention will save, rather than increase, the loss of life. America has come to the parting of the ways, when she must determine whether she stands for civilized or uncivilized warfare. We can no longer remain neutral spectators. Our action in this crisis will determine the part we will play when peace is made, and how far we may influence a settlement for the lasting good of humanity. We are being weighed in the balance, and our position amongst nations is being assessed by man- kind. Edward House London, May 11, 1915 Dear Governor : ... I cannot see any way out unless Germany promises to cease her policy of making war upon non- combatants. If you do not call her to account over the loss of American lives caused by the sinking of the Lusitania, her next act will probably be the sinking of an American hner, giving as an excuse that she carried munitions of war and that we had been warned not to send ships into the danger zone. _ The question must be determined either now or later, and it seems to me that you would lose prestige by deferring it. 438 SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE Germany has one of two things in mind. She may believe that we will not go to war under any provocation ; or that we will be impotent if we do and she desires us to enter. The first is more understandable than the second, although she probably thinks if we became involved we would stop the shipment of munitions in order to equip ourselves. She may also think that in the peace conference we would be likely to use our influence to settle upon broader and easier terms for Germany. Or she may think that being able to torpedo our ships would contribute to the isolation of England. If, unhappily, it is necessary to go to war, I hope you will give the world an exhibition of American efficiency that will be a lesson for a century or more. It is gene- rally believed throughout Europe that we are so unpre- pared and that it would take so long to put our resources into action, that our entering would make but little difference. In the event of war, we should accelerate the manu- facture of munitions to such an extent that we could supply not only ourselves but the Allies, and so quickly that the world would be astounded. You can never know how deeply I regret the turn affairs have taken, but it may be for the ultimate good. My heart goes out to you at this time as never before, and I think of you every hour of the day and wish that I was by your side. My consolation is that I may be of greater service here. Your affectionate E. M. House Colonel House’s conversations in London make it clear that both he and his British friends believed that Germany had embarked upon a course which would inevitably bring the United States into the war. The Colonel discussed with Kitchener the value of American intervention to the Allies. SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE 439 May 12, 1915 : Lord Kitchener has asked to meet me and invited me to come to the War Office or to York House as I preferred. I seldom go to any of the offices, so I met him at York House at six o’clock. . . , " He was very cordial. When I put the question as to whether it would be of benefit to the Allies for the United States to come in on their side, he said, ‘ Nobody but a damn fool could think it would not be of benefit to us, and I am surprised that any Englishman could question it.' This was apropos of the editorial I showed him from the St. James’s Gazette, and of conversations I had had with some of his countrymen. “ He said, ‘ God forbid that any nation should come into such a war,’ and he asked me to say to the President that he did not want him to think that Great Britain either made the request or had a desire for us to enter, but if we considered it necessary to do so, in his opinion it would greatly shorten the war and would save innume- rable lives, not only of the Allies, but of the Germans as well. " He said the war w'as one of attrition and the moment we entered, the Germans, imless they were totally mad, would know that the end was a certainty and would endeavour to make the best terms they could. It was a case of a mad dog turned loose, and everyone tryiug to do his share towards stopping him. If we entered, and I would let him know, he would at once put his mind upon the problem and would aid us not only as to organi- zation but in any other way we desired. He paid a magnificent tribute to American valour and said : ‘ With American troops joined with the British, we will not need French troops on the West Front, but can keep them as a reserve.’ “ He has 2,200,000 men under arms, and of these 500.000 are now in France and 650,000 are ready to go the moment they are needed. In addition, there are 120.000 in the Dardanelles. He spoke of the army and the war as if it were his army and his war, and ver^* much as a monarch would speak. 440 SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE “ We talked for the best part of an hour, although I tried to leave repeatedly because I knew how busy he must be and how valuable his time was to liis country. When I got up to leave, he arose, but continued to walk up and down the room and talk. He repeated time and again that the war would be shortened enormously if the United States entered, and that it would be helpful to an extent which no one but a man of his experience could estimate. He said the coming in of Italy was as nothing compared to that of the United States, even though she had a large trained army. ... “ He was greatly interested when I gave it as my opinion that the Germans did not have a man of the ' first class ’ in official life. He was also interested in von Tirpitz and Falkenhayn. The latter, I thought, was a much abler man than von Tirpitz and an abler man than von Moltke, whom he superseded. Kitchener spoke several times of their method of warfare, and said he did not dream that a nation claiming to be civilized would stoop to the things they had done. He was especially bitter concerning asphyxiating gases and said the only thing he could do was to reply in kind. “ This is the first time I have met Kitchener, and he seemed to me to be forceful and able, though, perhaps, without the spark of genius — unless, indeed, his great power of organization might be termed that.^ I was impressed by his fairness and the impartial way he dis- cussed our possible entry into the war. While it was the clever way to talk to me, he did not do it for that reason, ^ Kitcliener's organizing ability, however, was better fitted to the crises of his earlier career than to that which he faced as Secretary of War in 1915, The value of Kitchener's name was inestimable and he built up a great army, but he was used to a situation that could be handled by himself as dictator and he never understood the need of an able General Staff at the War Office. His conception of work/' wrote Grey, was that it must be a one-man job. He shouldered the responsibility and did the work of a Titan ; but he did not realize that general responsibility must be shared with the Cabinet, and strategic responsibility with the most inde- pendent and expert military brains, organized in a General Staff and workmg withhim.-^Tw^^i^y-Ffe Years, 11, 246. SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE 441 for how could he know what would or would not influence me ? He doubtless realizes, as the King does, that my advice to the President will be a potent influence in this crisis, but there was nothing of eagerness or urging in his remarks. He took no pains to hide his opinion that our entry would be decisive, and yet he said no word to hasten that decision. Kitchener is not the greatest intellect with which I have come in touch, but he has a manner indicating great reserve force, and if I were going tiger hunting I would gladly have him for a com- panion. “ May 13, 1915 ; I lunched with Arthur Balfour. We had a most interesting talk. I told of my interview with Kitchener and of my advice to the President regard- ing the Lusitania incident and read him my cablegram, which he complimented warmly. I talk to Balfour with more freedom than any man in Great Britain with the exception of Grey, for I trust him implicitly. Grey and Balfour are two great gentlemen, and I feel sure of their discretion. “ Balfour criticized the Government for depending so much upon America for munitions of war. He thought at the very outset they should have accelerated the manufacture of munitions to such an extent that by now they would have needed no outside aid. ...” During the six days that followed the sinking of the Lusitania, Colonel House received no intimation of the action that President Wilson planned. He did not seriously suspect him of an inclination to avoid the issue which Germany had raised, but he did confess some anxiety as a result of a speech which was generally interpreted as proof of Wilson’s invincible pacifism. On May ii he recorded : “ Page and all of us are distressed by the President's speech at Philadelphia, in which he is reported to have said, ‘ There is such a thing as being too proud to fight.’ 442 SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE Page sent him a long cablegram, which he submitted to me for criticism.” Mr. Wilson faced a choice of two alternatives : to break diplomatic relations forthwith, on the ground that the sinking of the Lusitania and her thousand passengers was a crime against civilization, or to demiand an official disavowal and the assurance that inhuman acts of such a kind would not be repeated. To break relations with- out giving Germany any chance to alter her submarine methods was contrary to the President’s instincts, and it is unhkely that the nation would have supported him with the degree of unity which such a decided step demanded. He chose the second alternative, and on May 13 he sent to Germany a note conceived and expressed with vigour, but avoiding both the form and tone of an ultimatum. Rehearsing the earlier attacks made by submarines that had resulted in the loss of American lives, “ a series of events w'hich the Government of the United States has observed with growing concern,” he demanded that the Germans should " disavow the acts of which the Government of the United States complains, that they wiU make repara- tion so far as reparation is possible for injuries which are without measure, and that they will take immediate steps to prevent the recurrence of anything so obviously subversive of the principles of warfare. . . . Expressions of regret and offers of reparation in case of the destruction of neutral ships sunk by mistake, while they may satisfy international obligations, if no loss of life results, can- not justify or excuse a practice, the natural and neces- sary effect of which is to subject neutral nations and neutral persons to new and unmeasurable risks.” SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE 443 The note did not satisfy the bellicose insistence of Mr. Roosevelt for an immediate break with Germany, Another ex-President, however, William Howard Taft, described it as “ admirable in tone . . . dignified in the level the writer takes with respect to international obligations ... it may weU call for our earnest con- currence and confirmation.” Mr. Page himself ex- pressed satisfaction and telegraphed to the President, ” May I be allowed to express my personal congratula- tions on the note.” And he added that most of the members of the British Government, as well as Lans- downe, Balfour, and Bonar Law of the Opposition, gave “private expressions of praise.”^ Articulate opinion, indeed, v/ith rare exceptions both at home and abroad, commended the note ; it was only later, after many months of German diplomatic evasions, that critics with the advantage of hindsight complained that Wilson should have issued an ultimatum and set down for Germany a time-limit — a course which might or might not have led her to give up the submarine cam- paign immediately. Sidney Brooks, writing in The English Review, insisted that “ this note ranks with the greatest .diplomatic literature. It seems as if one could see the President wrestling with the Wilhelmstrasse for the soul of Germany.” The Times declared that “ no- thing less than the conscience of humanity makes itself audible in his [Wilson’s] measured and incisive sen- tences.” From France, it is true, Whitney Warren v/rote to House that there was a growing inclination to believe that “ the President has been influenced in the past and is still influenced by German tradition and inspiration.” And the depatriatized Americans of Paris, always hostile to Wilson, attacked him bitterly for ^ Life and LeUefs of Walter H. Page^ iii, 245* 444 SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE truckling to Germany. But official opinion both there and in England agreed that the President had acted not merely wisely but adequately. Ambassador Sharp to Colonel House PakiSi June 2, 1915 My dear Mr. House : . . . While practically everybody over here has endorsed the President’s note to Germany, following the sinking of the Lusitania, yet it makes a loyal Ameri- can rather “ hot under the collar,” as we say, to read little squibs like those I have marked. . . . However, those in authority in the French Government fully understand and appreciate the attitude of President Wilson and have great confidence in the integrity of his purpose. Sir Francis Bertie, the British Ambassador, told me the other day that he was very much in hopes that we would not go to war with Germany, as we could be of very much more assistance to the Allies out of the war than actively in it. . . } Very truly yours William G. Sharp Mr. J. St. Loe Strachey^ to Colonel House London, Junej, 1915 My dear Colonel House ; ... As I was walking home here just now I was thinking to myself— “ We don’t want America to come in.” The thought of dragging our own kith and kin into this hideous struggle is odious, but I do wish that the Americans could tell the Germans ” if you dare to destroy Westminster Abbey, America will never forgive you. It is ours as well as theirs.'* And yet with these lunatics that might after all be the worst way of protecting it. I suppose it is childish, ^ la his private papers the British Ambassador expressed quite the contrary opinion* 2 Editor of The Spectator, SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE 445 but I would rather see half London smashed than the Abbey and Westminster Hall destroyed. Except for that, Zeppelins will never give me a bad night. Yours very sincerely J. St. Loe Strachey n Colonel House evidently did not believe that Ger- many would alter her methods of naval warfare unless some more potent factor than the protests of the United States could be brought to bear. On May 18, he wrote to Secretary McAdoo : “ The German mind seems not to understand anything excepting hard knocks, and they have a curious idea that we will not fight under any circumstances. As a matter of fact, this idea is pre- valent throughout Europe and will sooner or later involve us in war.” A fortnight later, after another submarine attack, he recorded : “I have concluded that war is inevitable.” Both House and Page agreed that unless Germany yielded to the demands set forth in Wilson’s note and ceased the torpedoing of ships without warning, the United States could not avoid intervention. Unlike Page, however. House shared the sentiment of President Wilson that war with Germany could not be justified unless every possible means to secure a peaceful settlement were first attempted ; and he worked assiduously to discover a plan by which Germany might be induced to give up the cruel and illegal submarine warfare. He had the co-operation of Sir Edward Grey, who, with a singular largeness of view rare amid the passions of war, was ready to consider any reasonable compromise. 446 SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE Colonel House to the President London^ May 14, 1915 Dear Governor : I took lunch with Sir Edward Grey to-day. The principal topic of our conversation was the Lusitania disaster and the action you might take. Grey told me he did not see how you could do dif- ferently from what you have done, and he intimated that if we had done less we would have placed ourselves in much the same position in which England would have been placed if she had not defended Belgian neutrality. In other words, he thought that we would have been totally without friends or influence in the concert of nations, either now or hereafter. I am sure that this is true. If we had failed to take action in a determined way it would have meant that we would have lost the friend- ship of the AUies on the one hand, and would not have mitigated any of the hate which Germany feels for us. Sooner or later we would have had to reckon with Ger- many unless she is completely crushed, and we would not have had a sympathetic friend among the great nations. Grey asked me what I thought Germany's reply would be. I told him that if I were writing Germany's reply I would say that if England would lift the* embargo on foodstuffs, Germany would consent to discontinue her submarine policy of sinking merchantmen. Grey replied that if Germany would consent not only to discontinue that mode of warfare, but would also agree to discontinue the use of asphyxiating gases and the ruthless kflling of non-combatants, England would be willing to lift the embargo on foodstuffs. I am rushing a cablegram to you, outlining this. It distresses me that I cannot have you. Grey, and Berli n within talking distance. If that could happen, so much could be accomplished that is impossible under present conditions. I am writing this hastily, in order to catch to-night’s SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE 447 mail. It may interest you to know that Italy has signed an agreement with the Allies to come into the war before the 26th.^ This agreement will be carried out unless the Italian Parliament refuses to sanction it. I have had this information for ten days or more, but have not written it because there seemed so many slips between the agreement and its completion. . . . Your affectionate E. M. House The conversation with Grey suggested the possibility of an arrangement which might go far towards settling the dispute with England over the holding-up of cargoes and also might avert the livelier danger of an open break with Germany, over the submarine. The European War, as it touched the United States, had now become a struggle between German submarine and British blockade. Both weapons infringed American neutral rights. If the belligerents could be induced to give up their use, much of our difficulties would disappear. And to many the compromise seemed fair, for if the British food blockade threatened to starve Germany out, the German submarine threatened to destroy British com- merce. . The suggestion was not new. In February, President Wilson, following a hint of Ambassador Bemstorff, had made a similar proposal to the British. Since the Ger- mans averred that the submarine war zone was merely retaliation for the British attempt to starve non-com- batants, Wilson argued that, if the British would permit ^ The Treaty of London, signed April 26, 1915, one of the ** secret treaties.*' It did not set a date for Italy's entrance into the war, providing merely that she should use all her resources in making war with the Allies upon all their enemies. On May 23, Italy declared war against Austria, but did not declare war on Germany until August 27, 1916. On April 30, 1917, Mr. Balfour explained the details of the treaty to President Wilson. 448 SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE foodstuffs to pass, Germany ought to give up her illegal submarine warfare. Grey had approved the proposal. Talking to House on February 27, he pointed out that with an agreement of this kind the British could carry on the war indefinitely. British public opinion, how- ever, did not appreciate how dangerous a weapon the submarine might become, and felt that Great Britain would be sacrificing too much by lifting the embargo upon food. Ambassador Page himself held this opinion and, regarding the President’s suggestion as something made in Germany, did not push it vigorously. “ I went to the Embassy to see the Ambassador [wrote House]. He did not return from his week-end with the Prime Minister until 12.15. . . . Page told of the two unhappy days he had spent in the country. One of the perquisites of the Prime Minister is the use of an old castle near Dover, and in it Page was lodged for two cold, wet, miserable nights. There were no fires excepting one here and there, and, though Page is a vegetarian, there seemed nothing to eat excepting meats of many varieties. . . . " Page was inclined not to make a personal appeal to Grey in behalf of the acceptance of the President’s proposal concerning a compromise with Germany on the question of the embargo. I called his attention to the President’s cable to me requesting me to say to Page that he desired the matter presented with all the emphasis in his power. He then said he would make an appoint- ment with Grey and do so, though one could see he had no stomach for it. He did not consider the suggestion a wise one, nor did he consider its acceptance favourable to the British Government. I argued to the contrary, and tried to convince him that the good opinion gained from the neutrals would be compensation enough for any concessions this Government might make, and that the concessions were not really more than those made by Germany.” SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE 449 Evidently the British Cabinet, with the exception of Grey, shared Page’s belief that it was preferable to retain the offensive weapon of the food blockade against Ger- many, even if it meant braving the threat of the sub- marine, the danger of which then and even later they did not fuUy realize. On March 15, they refused the compromise. The crisis of May was so much more acute than that of February, that House seized eagerly upon the chance of renewing the proposal that Germany give up the submarine warfare provided that Great Britain would relax the food blockade. He was sincere in his belief that the British would gain both a moral and a material advantage thereby, and he was convinced that it offered the sole means of preventing American intervention, which otherwise would be inevitable as the result of German submarine attacks. “ Grey was very fine about it [recorded Colonel House]. He said of course it would be to the advantage of Great Britain for the United States to enter the war, and if he agreed to do what we requested it would mean that the United States would remain neutral. Neverthe- less, he wanted to do what we considered to be for our best interests and what, indeed, he thought was in the long run for Great Britain’s best interests. “ We discussed this feature at length, I maintaining that Great Britain was taking long chances upon being isolated by German submarine warfare, and if her com- merce could be free from this menace, she could carry on the war indefinitely without fear of ultimate defeat.” President Wilson immediately cabled to House ex- pressing deep interest in the suggestion. He looked upon it, not merely as a means of ending the crisis in German-American relations, but also as affording a 450 SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE possible solution of the quarrel with England over the blockade. For the sake of diplomatic consistency, he asserted, he would soon have to address a note to Great Britain regarding the interruption of American trade with neutral ports. It would be a great stroke on England’s part, said the President, if she would of her own accord relieve the situation and put Germany wholly in the wrong, a small price to pay for the ending of submarine outrages. Colonel House to the President London, May 20, 1915 Dear Governor : When your cable of the i6th came, I asked Page to make an engagement with Grey in order that we might protest against the holding-up of cargoes and find definitely whether England would agree to lift the embargo on foodstuffs, providing Germany would dis- continue her submarine policy. Page promised to make the appointment. He dd not do so, and finally told me that he had concluded it was useless because, in his opinion, the British Government would not consider for a moment the proposal to lift the embargo. It was then I sent you the discouraging cable. How- ever, when your second cable of Tuesday came, I went to see Sir Edward without further consultation with Page. I found Grey was even more receptive of the sugges- tion than when I saw him last, and he promised to use all his influence in favour of such a proposal, provided one was made by Germany. He added, however, that the discontinuance of asphyxiating or poisonous gases must also be included in any agreement made. He explained that the Cabinet was in dissolution and that he could only speak for himself and that he did not want me to consider that he spoke for the Government. I expressed a willingness to accept his personal assurance in regard to his own endeavours, with the understanding SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE 451 that it committed no one but himself. He said that in ordinary times if the Cabinet refused to acquiesce in his view, he would resign ; but that he did not feel justified in doing this in time of war. I took occasion to express your high regard for him and to assure him that we would consider his resignation a calamity. He dictated, while I wrote, the understanding between us, which was literally this : ist. Permitting staple foodstuffs to go to neutral ports without question. 2nd. All foodstuffs now detained to be brought before the prize court as quickly as possible, 3rd. Claims for cotton cargoes now detained to be made as soon as shippers certify as to each cargo, that they are the real owners to whom payment should be made. Should England agree to the first proposition, Ger- many was to cease submarine warfare on merchant vessels and discontinue the use of asphyxiating or poisonous gases. Propositions two and three are matters between this Government and ours and have no reference to Germany and will be carried out at once. I told Grey that I would immediately cable Gerard, asking Germany to withhold her answer to your note until I could communicate with him further. I also told him I would suggest to the German authorities, through Gerard, that they answer the note by making the proposal in question. . . . I assumed the entire responsibility, so if things go wrong, you and Sir Edward can disclaim any connexion with it. If Germany refuses to consider this proposal, it will place you in the position of having done everything possible to avert war between the United States and Germany. Sir Edward took a copy of the memorandum I made, so that there might be no misunderstanding between us. Of course there would be none, an3Avay, for he remembers well what he says and never recedes from his word. . . . 452 SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE It is unfortunate that the Cabinet is to be reformed, for I am confident with the present members the plan would go through, provided Germany makes the proposal. The new element to go in is less apt to favour the proposal than those already there. Affectionately yours E. M. House Colonel Bouse to Ambassador Gerard [Telegram via Copenhagen] London, May 19, 1915 . . . Can you not induce the German Government to answer our note by proposing that if England will permit foodstuffs in the future to go to neutral ports without question, Germany will discontinue her sub- marine warfare on merchant vessels and will also dis- continue the use of poisonous gas ? Such a proposal from Germany at this time will give her great advantage, and m my opinion she will make a grave mistake if she does not seize it. Edward House “ May ig, 1915 : Page thought I was making a mistake in doing anything [wrote House], and that it would result in bad feeling between England and the United States provided Germany assented, and Sir Edward Grey could not get his Government to agree. I answered that this was a matter I could not control ; that my purpose was to place the United States and the President clearly in the right, so if trouble came between Germany and ourselves the President would have done everything within his power to prevent war, and could maintain his position taken m the note with a clear conscience and with the certain approval of the American people. “ I took dinner with Lord Haldane. By common consent we dined alone, so as to discuss matters freely. . . . He showed me the diary he kept during his memorable visit to Berlin on February 9 and 10, 1912. He was SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE 453 sent over, as the world knows, as the representative of the King and British Government, to try to bring about a better understanding with Germany and to draw up a tentative treaty to that effect. , . . ” I took it as an indication of his confidence that he let me read this. He explained, however, that he felt I should know everything that had passed between the German and British Governments, in regard to Asia Minor, the African Colonies, and the larger relations concerning the Triple Entente, and what Great Britain might do in the event either Germany or England should become involved with nations other than themselves. " Grey had spoken to Haldane about my proposal concerning the lifting of the embargo on foodstuffs and the discontinuance of the submarine campaign. He said his own influence would be in favour of the proposal, but he did not know what action the new Ministry would take. “ He spoke of himself and of his years of service to his country, and his voice saddened when he told of how he had been maligned and misunderstood since the war with Germany began.^ He gave me two of his books, and we talked at length of Germany, her future, and the German people. I mentioned my proposal as to the Freedom of the Seas. He thought it splendid, and I understood that I could count upon his influence m behalf of that measure when the proper time came. . . . “ May 21, 1915 : I lunched with Grey and read him the President’s despatch. ... He has seen nearly all the present Ministry and enough of the Opposition who would probably be in the Cabinet, to be able to say that ^ Haldane, as Minister of War in the Asquith Cabinet, had created the territorial organization and made possible the immediate despatch of an efficient Expeditionary Force. “ But for his work/* wrote Grey to Asquith* ** this Force would not have been available at a moment’s notice. , . . That Haldane of all people should have been . . . accused of lack of patriotism or public spirit is an intolerable instance of gross ignorance, or malice, or of madness/* (Grey, Twenty-Five Years, n, 244.) But the Conservatives made Haldane*s exclusion from the new coalition Cabinet a condition of their own participation. 454 SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE in his opinion, if Germany made the proposal I had suggested it would be considered by his Government. “He is always cautious in his statements, and I conclude that what he says means that the British Government will accept the proposal. It will be a great diplomatic triumph for the President if brought about, and it will settle our contentions with both Govern- ments. . . .” Whatever the ultimate decision of the British Cabinet might have been, the German Government put an end to any chance of a compromise settlement by a brusque refusal to consider House’s suggestion. In public the plaintiveness of German protests against the cruel starvation of women and children by the British was not diminished, but in private the German leaders were evidently unwilling to pay the price necessary to raise the blockade. They were determined to make full use of the submarine, and they were the less inclined to heed American warnings in that they were not convinced the United States would support such warnings by other than verbal factors. Two messages from Am- bassador Gerard to Colonel House carried the news of the failure of the proposed compromise and indicated the cause. Colonel House to the President [Telegram] London, May 24, 1915 Gerard cables me as follows : “ Zimmermann told me yesterday that Dumba, Austrian Ambassador, had cabled him that Bryan told him that America was not in earnest about Lusitania matter.” Of course Mr. Bryan did not say that, but I think you should know what Zimmermann told Gerard. . . . Edward House SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE 455 Ambassador Gerard learned of the cable from Dumba in a curious fashion. Zimmermann had come to lunch with him and after his customary two quarts of Moselle was talking freely to an American lady, wife of a German. He assured her that there would be no break with the United States over the Lusitania, since Wilson was not serious in his protest. The Ambassador, as soon as he learned the gist of the conversation, called upon Zimmer- mann and demanded the source of his information. Zimmermann at once pulled out the cable from Dumba and laid it before him. Mr. Gerard faced a problem. It was essential that he inform Wilson, and he could hardly do so through the State Department, since his cable would go straight to Mr. Bryan. Thus he turned it over to House, knowing that he would at once inform the President. Dumba’s message carried disastrous effects, since it convinced the Germans that they could carry on their submarine campaign with impunity. Hence their refusal of the compromise that House suggested. Colonel House to the President [Telegram] London, May 25, 1915 I have following cable from Gerard ; “ I gave your suggestion to von Jagow this morning. This proposition of permitting the passage of food in return for the cessation of submarine methods has already been made and declined. “ If raw materials are added, the matter can perhaps be arranged. Germany is in no need of food.” Of course the conditions they make are impossible. This does away with their contention that the starving of Germany justifies their submarine policy. I think this strengthens your already unassailable position. Edward House 456 SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE Colonel House to Ambassador Gerard [Telegram] London, May 25, 1915 The Allies would never agree to allow raw materials to go through ; therefore I can do nothing further and there is no need for Germany further to delay acting on our note I am terribly sorry, because the consequences may be very grave. Edward House “ May 26, 1915 : I lunched with Sir Edward Grey again to-day. I read him all the telegrams that had passed between the President, Gerard, and myself since we last met. We first discussed Gerard's cable saying Berlin had refused to accept my suggestion. Grey thought it had at least placed Great Britain in a more advantageous position, and he expressed himself as being glad it had been sent, for it settled the German contention that they were compelled to wage their submarine policy against Great Britain because she was endeavouring to starve sixty-five million German non-combatants. ” In talking to other members of the Government, he said some of them had thought in the event Germany accepted the proposal it would mean that she was actually running short of food and it would not be -well for England to relax. Grey, however, argued that there were too many advantages on the other side to let that one prevail. He said, too, he was anxious for us to know that England was doing what she could to keep us from war with Germany, and not trying to push us in. My admiration and affection for him grows.” Thus ended the most favourable opportunity fof settling the controversy that later was to exercise momen- tous effect upon the course of the war and the fate of Germany. Had Berlin accepted the compromise, not merely would Germany have obtained the food of which, SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE 457 as she complained, her starving civilian population was deprived by an illegal blockade, but she might have avoided the quarrel with the United States that brought America into the war. “ Whom the Gods would destroy ” III Germany’s refusal to seize the opportunity that had thus been offered her convinced Colonel House that further stay in Europe was useless. The chance of beginning peace negotiations between the belligerents, if it had ever existed, had completely disappeared. On both sides emotion was so thoroughly envenomed that any suggestion of a pacific arrangement was regarded as criminal. House was also convinced that German policy meant American intervention and he wished to be near the President so as to urge him to wage war with vigour. " I have concluded that war with Germany is inevit- able [he wrote on May 30] and this afternoon at six o’clock I decided to go home on the ss. St. Paul on Saturday. I sent a cable to the President to this effect. “ I discussed the matter with Wallace, who will go with us, and I also discussed it with Page, who advised our going if we cared to get home within the year. Page is always a candid adviser. . . . “ June 1, 1915 : I told Plunkett I was leaving for America and my reasons for doing so. I said it was my purpose to persuade the President not to conduct a milk-and-water war, but to put all the strength, all the virility, and all the energy of our nation into it, so that Europe might remember for a century what it meant to provoke a peaceful nation into war. “ I intended to suggest a commission, with perhaps a member of the Cabinet as chairman, to facilitate the manufacture of munitions of war and war materials. 458 SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE Plunkett wanted me to see some of the British Cabinet and talk with them before I left. He arranged for me to meet Lloyd George at six o’clock. ...” A letter from the American Ambassador in Berlin indicated that Germany had embarked upon the new course with confidence, and strengthened House’s con- viction that war could not be avoided. Ambassador Gerard to Colonel House Berlin, June i, 1915 My dear Colonel : I am afraid that we are in for grave consequences. This country, I fear, will not give up the torpedoing without notice of merchant and passenger steamers ; and their recent victories over the Russians have given them great confidence here. They seem also to be hold- ing their lines in the Dardanelles and their lines in France and Belgium with ease, and probably Italy will be defeated. The only thing that can gain the war for the Allies is universal service in England and the throwing into the balance of at least two million new English troops. If the English knew what the Germans have in store for England in case of success, the very dead in the grave- yards would volunteer for the war. It is the German hope to keep the Lusitania matter “ jollied along ” until the American people get excited about baseball or a new scandal and forget. Meantime the hate of America grows daily. As to food and even raw materials, the Germans have enough for war purposes. They need raw materials for the trades, but have everything needed for the manu- facture of munitions ; and as they are spending all the money for war supplies in their own country their financial situation is good for the present. They expect some other country to pay the cost of the war. In governmental circles there is no talk of giving up SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE 459 Belgium. They want to keep it and exact great indem- nities from other countries. They are building new and great submarines (2,800 tons), and are putting so many in the water that I thinV they wiU soon become a serious menace to England. That is why a great land army is necessary. . . . ■ 7 % Will cable if anything comes up. Best wishes to Mrs. House. Yours as ever James W. Gerard If, contrary to expectations, Germany agreed to abandon or modify the submarine warfare or if the crisis should be tided over, House was equally desirous of being in the United States and near the President, for in that case the dispute with Great Britain over the holding-up of American cargoes would certainly become acute. The difference was serious enough at best, and mutual misunderstanding threatened to make it worse. Colonel House was anxious that President Wilson should comprehend the difficulties which Sir Edward Grey faced, how hard he was pressed by British opinion and the Admiralty, and how important it was that the United States remain on friendly terms with the Allies. Wliatever the irritation caused by the restriction of American trade. House never wavered in his conviction that our welfare was bound up in German defeat. All this Ambassador Page had urged in many long letters. But the very number and length of the letters, touched as they were by pro-Ally emotion, lessened the influence of the Ambassador, who, in Washington, seemed more like the spokesman of Allied interests than the repre- sentative of the American Government. As House realized acutely, a purely objective summary of the situation with emphasis upon American interests would carry more weight. 46o submarine VERSUS BLOCKADE “ March 4, 1915 : Yesterday [wrote House], when Page was drawing up his despatch to the President asking that he do nothing for the moment concerning the proposed blockade of Germany, he had a lot of things in it which I advised eliminating. It was the strongest sort of pro-British argument, and I knew it would weaken his influence both with the State Depart- ment and with the President. He reluctantly cut it down to a short statement. . . Colonel House to the President Dear Governor : London, May 25, 1915 . . . There is nothing new to report here, and it looks as if things might be settling down for a long war. ... I want very much to see you and to go over the situation in person. There are so many things that cannot be written, and I think it would be well worth while for me to make the trip even if it is necessary to return within a short time. There is no doubt that the position you have taken with both Germany and Great Britain is correct ; but I feel that our position with the Allies is somewhat different, for we are bound up more or less in their success, and I do not think we should do anything that can possibly be avoided to alienate the good feeling that they now have for us. If we lose their good will, we will not be able to figure at all in peace negotiations, and we will be sacrificing too much in order to maintain all our commercial rights. The situation, I know, is most trying and difficult, and you have acted with extraordinary patience and good judgment. Affectionatdy yours 2. m. House Colonel House had constantly impressed upon his British friends the importance of recognizing the irrita- tion and loss caused in the United States by the holding- up of American cargoes and mails. From the moment SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE 461 of his arrival in February 1915, he emphasized the fact that, even though this was the only serious cause of friction between the two countries, it was nevertheless one that would lead to grave results unless eclipsed by the dispute with Germany. The latter infringed the rights of humanity, whereas the controversy with Great Britain was of a far less vital sort. But it touched the pockets and the sensibilities of many Americans. Furthermore, it was impossible for the President to protest with vigour against German infractions of the law of nations, so long as the Germans had some ground for complaint that he permitted the British to alter maritime regulations at will. Letters from the Presi- dent and Cabinet members gave House a clear picture of the difficulties which they faced in Washington. The friendly tone of the President’s message goes far to answer the criticism that the gaucherie of American protests tended unnecessarily to embitter Anglo-Ameri- can relations. He reiterated his emphasis upon the change that was coming over American opinion because of British inter- ference with neutral trade and expressed the fear that it might -be impossible to prevent the passage by Con- gress of an embargo upon shipments of arms. Wilson intimated that he would try to prevent it, but he wished Grey to realize the danger. He conveyed the warning through House rather than Page because he wished it to be absolutely unofficial and spoken merely in personal friendship. Secretary Lane expressed similar sentiments. Secretary Lane to Colonel House My dear Colonel : Washington. May 5. 1915 I am glad to receive your note. There is little that I can say as to conditions here. The President is bearing 462 SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE the burden well. Notwithstanding all the insults of Germany, he is determined to endure to the limit, to turn the left cheek and then the back, if necessary ; but of course, he cannot suffer insult after insult to the point of humiliation, for the country would rise in rebel- lion. We are a sensitive people, as our English friends discovered a hundred years ago. And the English are not behaving very well. They are holding up our ships ; they have made new inter- national law. We have been very meek and mild under their use of the ocean as a toll road. Of course, the sympathy of the greater part of the country is with the English, but it would not have been as strongly with them, not nearly so strongly, if it had not been for the persistent short-sightedness of our German friends. I cannot see what England means by her policy of delay and embarrassment and hampering. Her success mani- festly depends upon the continuance of the strictest neutrality on our part, and yet she is not willing to let us have the rights of a neutral. You would be interested, I think, in hearing some of the discussion around the Cabinet table. There isn’t a man in the Cabinet who has a drop of German blood in his veins, I guess. Two of us were born under the British flag. I have two cousins in the British army, and Mrs. Lane has three. The most of us are Scotch in our ancestry, and yet each day that we mee't we boil over somewhat, at the foolish manner in which England acts. Can it be that she is trying to take advantage of the war to hamper our trade ? . . . If Congress were in session, we would be actively debating an embargo resolution to-day. . . . After all, our one great asset is the confidence of the people in the President. They do not love him, because he appears to them as a man of the cloister. But they respect him as a wise, sane leader who will keep them out of trouble, and whatever fool things are done they are willing to blame on Bryan, which is gravely unjust. I am growing more and more in my admiration for Bryan SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE 463 sach day. He is too good a Christian to run a naughty vvorld and he doesn't hate hard enough, but he certainly is a noble and high-minded man, and loyal to the Presi- dent to the last hair. . . . As always yours F. K. L. Even in England there were a number of thoughtful persons who felt that interference with neutral cargoes bound for neutral ports, even though the goods were ultimately destined for Germany, was not worth the difficulties it would provoke. Such opinion, although held by a minority, was not entirely confined to pacifist circles. “ March 3, 1915 : Both Brooks and Pollen^ [wrote Colonel House] agreed with me that Great Britain was entering into a dangerous phase of warfare in under- taking to establish a paper blockade against Germany, an actual blockade being seemingly impossible. I argued the point very earnestly, for I wanted their in- fluence and that of their papers in the trouble I can see looming up between our two countries. “ March 4, 1915 : Francis W. Hirst, editor of The Economist, called this morning for the second time. I missed him yesterday when he was here. I found in him an entirely new type of Englishman. ... He is antagonistic to the Government, though a Liberal. He criticized Grey and Asquith severely, though Asquith is a near relative. ... He is against the war, and claims he is far from being alone, for he believes the war un- popular in England, and if public opinion could find expression it would be shown to be. He desires me to meet Lord Morley and the former Lord Chancellor, Lord Lorebum. He says both of them are against the war and they believe peace should be brought about now. “ Hirst thinks the President should take an active stand against the proposed blockade, believing if he ‘ A. H. PoEen, journalist and naval authority. 464 SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE would prohibit all exports to all the belligerents, he could force this Government to do practically what he desired. He wished the President to lay down a new international code of laws and insist upon every nation living up to it. I tried to point out some of the difficulties of such a procedure. “ He said that his predecessor on The Economist, Richard Bagehot, whom the President admires so much, declared that England should have done this in 1870. “ March 9, 1915 ; Mr. Robert Donald, editor of The Daily Chronicle, took tea with me. He is an able and reasonable Scotchman. We talked of the embargo, and of war and everything relating thereto. He is a great friend of Lloyd George and thinks he is the greatest man in the Kingdom. He thought it a mistake for Great Britain to declare a blockade against Germany, and believed if it is enforced our Government would be justified in placing an embargo on munitions of war. He is to touch upon this matter cautiously in his paper, and will try to influence the Government in the direction we desire. ...” IV Colonel House to the President London, May 7, 1915 Dear Governor ; Your cablegram concerning the delaying of cargoes came to me yesterday. I already had an engagement with Sir Edward Grey this morning, so I did not make an earlier appointment. I read him your message and told him that in my opinion the situation was critical and that it would not do to temporize with the matter ; that the Germans were doing everything possible to embarrass you and to force you to place an embargo upon arms. He said he understood the situation perfectly. He took a memorandum, which he read to me afterwards and which was to be sent to each member of the Cabinet in the form of a communication. He put it strongly SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE 465 and urgently, and he told me he would do all that was possible. He said he had to contend with public sentiment here that demanded a complete blockade of Germany. I think, too, he has opposition in the Cabinet with Kitchener and Winston Churchill. . . . Sir Edward wants to do everything that is possible, and he desired me to let you know that he had great difficulties here to contend with. . . . I have seen a great many people since I last wrote you, among them the Russian Ambassador. I found him a very able man, but as ignorant of your purposes as the people of France. . . . When I came over here it was practically the universal opinion in France and England and, I find now, in Russia also, that you were inclined to be pro-German even though the American people as a whole were other- wise. I have a feeling that Sir Cecil ^ has fostered this sentiment, because what I have heard here sounds very much like what he said to me on several occasions. He told Norman Hapgood that the Administration was pro-German, and he has told others the same thing. I took occasion to teU Sir Edward that Sir Cecil was very nervous and was constantly seeing spooks and that he had told me that we would all be pro-German before the end of the war. I did this because I was sure he had written the same thing to Sir Edward, . . . Your afiectionate E. M. House London, May 27, 1915 Dear Governor : I saw Sir Edward Grey yesterday and discussed the holding-up of cargoes. As to cotton, he said this Government, following precedent, had a right to make it contraband of war just as our Government did during our Civil War. But out of consideration for our wishes they had not done so, and therefore he hoped we would be lenient. i Sir Cecil SDrine-Eice. Britisli Ambassador m Wasbinffton. 466 SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE He also said they were doing everything that was possible now to avoid friction with us and that orders had gone out to pass upon all questions speedily, so they could no longer be charged with delay. He told me some things of interest concerning the Balkan States. One was that Rumania had agreed to come in, provided the AUies would give her certain Hungarian territory.^ Sir Edward refused to consider such terms, for the reason that what she wanted would be unfair to Serbia. His reply was that since Great Britain went into this war to defend the rights of one small nation, it would not transgress upon the rights of another, even though great advantage to the Allied cause might accrue. If it were not for Ferdinand, Bulgaria would probably come in with the Allies, and, if she did, then Greece would also. They all fear lest some one of the Balkan States will remain out and be in a condition to take advantage of the exhaustion that may occur. . . . I am glad Balfour is in the new Cabinet. He is a man of the Grey type, and I feel sure that there will be less trouble with the holding-up of cargoes now than when the Admiralty was administered by Churchill.® Sir Edward leaves Monday to be gone a month, and Lord Crewe will probably act for him during his absence. He is to arrange with Crewe for me to see hiih at any time I desire, and at his home. He lives close by. I never go to the Foreign Office or any of the other Govern- ment Offices on account of the publicity. They all understand my reasons for this. . . . Your affectionate E. M. House 1 The Banat of Temesvar and the Transylvanian toreiands, Serbia's Claim to the south-western portion of the Banat was insistent. The Peace Conference in 1919 recognized much of Serbia's claim, dividmg the Banat between that Power and Rumania. 2 An unfulfilled prophecy, despite the calm good sense of Mr. Balfour and his friendly feeling towards the United States. SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE 467 Before leaving for the United States, Colonel House entered many long conferences with members of the new Cabinet and with others of influence, in order that no misunderstanding should mar Anglo-American relations. In most of these conversations he laid strong emphasis upon the blockade problem, for he regarded it as vital that the British should appreciate the American point of view. “ May 22, 1915 : Lord Bryce called at ten o’clock. I told of some of the troubles between Great Britain and the United States, regarding the holding-up of cargoes. He expressed a willingness to use his influence with the Foreign Office, but I asked him to do nothing for the moment, for I am sure^he cannot do more than I have already done with Grey."" “ We agreed that it was not the Foreign Office at fault, but the War and Admiralty Departments. I talked to him about the Freedom of the Seas, and he asked if it had to do with ‘ capture and search at sea.’ He did not seem in favour of it, sa3dng he had heard that Dem- burg very much desired it. I replied that I was the instigator of it in Germany, and the Germans were merely echoing the thought I had given them. He laughed and said he felt better, for, if we were doing it, he was quite sure it was not a bad thing, and that in the future he would look at it with more friendly eyes. “ June 2, 1915 : I met Lloyd George at ten, as previously arranged. I was surprised at the freedom with which he criticized the War Department. He said Great Britain should now have all the shells they could use, since they were the largest engineering country excepting the United States, and had all sorts of factories that could be made to turn out explosives. He showed me a list of shrapnel and explosive shells that were used by the British in recent battles. In one battle, 50,000 shrapnel were fired and only 1,600 high explo- sives, while it should be the reverse. 468 SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE “ He said he had found soldiers to be self-opinionated and unsatisfactory, but he indicated his intention of putting an impetus on munition production that would revolutionize the situation. He had a list of firms and corporations from whom they were getting munitions in the United States. While important, it was not as large as I had thought. . . . “ He stated that it would be a serious menace to the Allied cause if we should stop the shipment of munitions of war at this time. . . . “ This was, I believe, George’s first day as Minister of Munitions in his new Whitehall quarters. There was no furniture in the room except a table and one chair. He insisted upon my taking the chair, which I declined to do, declaring that a seat on the table was more suitable for me than for a Cabinet official. “ He spoke again and again of ‘ military red-tape,’ which he declared he would cut out as speedily as pos- sible. He was full of energy and enthusiasm, and I feel certain something will soon happen in his department. He reminds me more of the virile, aggressive type of American politician than any member of the Cabinet. ... He has something dynamic within him which his colleagues have not and which is badly needed in this great hour. . . . “ After lunch I went to keep an appointment with the new Chancellor of the Exchequer, Reginald McKenna. ... I took occasion to tell him that Germany had saved England from a good raking over the coals because of her embargo policy, which was entirely illegal and to which we submitted merely because Germany was so prodigal in greater infractions. I urged him to use his influence at Cabinet meetings to modify their actions in this direction. If they did not, and we composed our differences with Germany, I assured him we would hold his Government to a stricter accountability It was not a question of what the President thought of the contro- versy between the belligerents, but what he had to do in justice to a large portion of the American people, SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE 469 who were insisting that their rights were being in- fringed. “ He entirely agreed with this and hoped the differ- ences could be ironed out satisfactorily. It was also agreed that in the event we came into the war on the side of the Allies, he would communicate with me un- officially, in order that I might help in facilitating the solution of financial questions arising between the two Governments. . . . “ At half-past five, I went to Lansdowne House to call on the Marquis of Lansdowne. ... I spoke strongly of his Government’s policy in holding-up neutral cargoes, and let him know that, if Germany was not acting so much worse, they would be called to an accounting. I did not believe Great Britain, under similar circumstances, would permit it for a moment, and the President had bent almost to the breaking point in order to avoid a disagreeable controversy with them. “ I gave a sketch of the President in which I depicted him as a Scotchman with all the tenacity of purpose of that race, and bade him remember that while the Presi- dent at heart sympathized with the Allies and their purposes, yet he was President of the United States, and our people did not differentiate between those violating international law, and he had of necessity to maintain an equitable attitude, “ Juiie 3, 1915 : Lord Crewe and I lunched alone, in order to have a farewell talk about matters which could not be discussed before a third party. . . . “ I read him the President’s despatches to me regarding the shipping controversy, and urged him_ to impress upon his colleagues the necessity of straightening this out, provided we did not imme^ately drift into war with Germany. I told Mm the President was being criticized for writing one kind of note to Germany and demanding an immediate answer, and writing another kind to Great Britain and having no reply for months. I considered it necessary for them to prepare an answer at once to the note sent in February concerning the 470 SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE stoppage of cargoes, and to hold it in readiness for delivery in the event it was asked for. On the other hand, I would advise the President not to ask for it until the German submarine controversy was settled one way or the other ; and if it was settled by war, there would be no need for an answer. But if our differences with Germany were settled, then an immediate answer should be forthcoming. I spoke of how pressed the President was in this matter, and that it would not do to act in the future as they had acted in the past, “ June 4, 1915 : I read the King one or two cables I had sent the President, principally about the inter- ference with our shipping. I wish all official England to understand our Government’s attitude upon this question, in order that there may be no misunderstanding should it be necessary to act with vigour later. “ His Majesty talked of the recent Zeppelin raid and thought a very much more serious one would occur soon, believing they would attempt to burn London. I showed him the last cartoon in Life which Martin sent in advance of publication, which depicts his distinguished cousin Wilhelm hanged at the end of a yardarm. I was not sure of the wisdom of showing this, but he seemed to enjoy it thoroughly. The more I see of the King, the better I like him ; he is a good fellow and deserves a better fate than being a king. . . . “ I lunched with Mr, Balfour. The only other guest was Sir Horace Plunkett, who has our confidence. Balfour said he intended to have the St. Paul convoyed as effectively as the British navy could do it. . . . “ There is a distinct feeling of depression in England at present, largely due to the lack of high explosives, and also to the fact of Russia’s continued defeat because she, too, lacks munitions of war. “ He said that what the navy needed most now was torpedo-boat destroyers, and he was contracting for a large number of other small fast boats of this type. They have plenty of battleships. He spoke of how fortunate they had been with their transports, saying SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE 471 they had not lost one. He reached over, like any good American, and knocked on wood. " I went into our shipping troubles as I have with other members of the Government, and I think I made him understand just what difficulties our Government was labouring under.” v House sailed on the St. Paul, June 5* Arriving in the United States a week later, he summarized for the President his impressions of European affairs and emphasized the gravity of the crisis which the American Government must face. Colonel House to the President Roslyn, Long Island June 16, 1915 Dear Governor : The situation, as far as the AUies go, is not encour- aging. Much to their disappointment and to the surprise of the Germans, they have not been able to make the progress which they thought the spring and summer weather would bring about. They have made two cardinal errors. One was the attempt to force the Dardanelles by sea only. They found this was impossible and, before they could send a land force to co-operate with the fleet, the Turks under the direction of German officers had time to make the Straits almost impregnable. They will finally get through, but at a terrible cost.’- The second mistake was in not accelerating during the winter months the manufacture of high explosives. When the spring campaign opened and they attempted to storm the German trenches, they found that they not only had insufficient ammunition, but what they had was of the wrong kind. This mistake was more largely made by the English than by the French. > The prophecy was not fulfilled, for, although the cost was paid, the Allied expedition withdrew from Gallipoli in the following winter. 472 SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE The Germans, through their espionage system, evidently knew the weakness of the Allies ; consequently their great concern regarding the munitions of war coming from America. When I was in Berlin in March, it seemed to me that they were talking nonsense when they said that if we would stop the shipment of munitions the war would end within a short time. The English have been unable to do more than hold their ground, and the Russians have been utterly unable to withstand the German onslaught, for the reason that they have neither sufficient arms nor ammunition. It has resolved itself into a war of munitions rather than one of men. Germany was much more willing for peace in the autumn than she has been since. I am enclosing you a Letter from Gerard bearing upon this phase. There was the greatest possible concern in England when I left, although they are confident of ultimate victory if the Allies hold together ; but it will be delayed longer than anticipated, and perhaps it would not come at all if their American supplies were for any reason shut off. I need not tell you that if the Allies fail to win, it must necessarily mean a reversal of our entire policy. The sinking of the Lusitania, the use of poisonous ^ases, and other breaches of international laws; made it mpossible for me to continue the discussion in England Df the Freedom of the Seas or the tentative formation of 1 peace covenant. If these things had not happened, I :ould have gone along and by midsummer we would lave had the belligerents discussing, through you, the Deace terms. The difficulty is not with the German civil authorities, Dut with the military and naval as represented by the -Caiser, von Tirpitz, and Falkenhayn. The feeling is lot good between the Foreign Office and von Tirpitz, or their differences are irreconcilable. In my opinion, ron Tirpitz will continue his submarine policy, leaving SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE 473 the Foreign Office to make explanations for any “ un- fortunate incidents ” as best they may. I think we shall find ourselves drifting into war with Germany, for there is a large element in the German naval and military factions that consider it would be a good, rather than a bad, thing for Germany. Regrettable as this would be, there would be com- pensations. The war would be more speedily ended, and we would be in a strong position to aid the other great democracies in turning the world into the right paths. It is something that we have to face with fortitude, being consoled by the thought that no matter what sacrifices we make, the end will justify them. Affectionately yours E. M. House The mission of Colonel House had not accomplished the miracle of peace, which in 1915 was a practical im- possibility. But he had accomplished what few persons guessed — a thorough understanding with those who guided the fortunes of the Allies. Henceforth, whatever the disputes of State Department and Foreign Office, the personal relations he had created would preserve an underlyiftg cordiality. He had been given a private code that would permit him to communicate .speedily and informally with Sir Edward Grey, and the British Foreign Secretary promised to write him frankly and frequently. House had obviously won the confidence of the British Government at a moment when pubhc opinion in England was turning against America. He had made a host of friends abroad who would send him con- stant and reliable information. And President Wilson, supposed to be ill-informed and isolated, was through Colonel House kept in close touch with the inner currents of European politics. 474 SUBMARINE VERSUS BLOCKADE Sir Horace Plunkett to the President The Plunkett House, Dublin June 4, 1915 Dear Mr. President : , . . Colonel House, in his own quiet, tactful, and marvellously persuasive way, has, to my certain know- ledge, rendered an inestimable service to the Government of this country by his counsel and advice in regard to its attitude to the United States in this crisis. What similar service he may have rendered to you, and to his people, in other European countries you will know. He sails to-morrow, and I can well believe that, as he cannot be in Europe and America at the same time, it may be better that he should now be at your side. As I have had the privilege of introducing him to some people he wished to meet over here, and of explaining to them some aspects of American public life which it was neces- sary for them to know in order to appreciate the value of Colonel House’s help, I have offered to be of any assistance in my power, should misunderstandings arise in his absence which informed unofficial intervention may be best qualified to remove. I have also offered to keep him advised of any events or movements of opinion, which, from the possession of his confidence, I feel he ought to know. I merely wish to assure you, Mr. President, that something will be done to minimize the loss to us over here which must be set against the gain to you and to the United States in having Colonel House at Washington. I am, with deep respect Yours sincerely Horace Plunkett It was, therefore, with his eyes fully opened to all aspects of the European situation, that President Wilson faced the long-drawn-out crisis in our relations with Germany which followed the sinking of the Lusitania. END OF VOLUME I